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
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES

Studies in honour of
SAYYID ABUL A'LA MAWDUDI



The Islamic Foundation

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IN THE NAME OF ALLAH,
THE MERCIFUL,
THE MERCY-GIVING

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ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES

STUDIES IN HONOUR OF
MAWLĀNĀ SAYYID ABUL
A'LĀ MAWDŪDĪ

Edited by

KHURSHID AHMAD
ZAFAR ISHAQ ANSARI

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Preface

Few men have captured the imagination and inspired the educated Muslims during the last few decades to the extent that Mawlānā Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī has done. Born in 1903 C.E., Mawdūdī started his participation in journalism and public life as early as 1918. He has written and spoken as an editor, a scholar, a religious thinker, and a political leader, authoring over a hundred works of varying size and delivering more than a thousand speeches. He made his debut in the intellectual life of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent in 1927 at the early age of twenty-four and created a stir by his voluminous scholarly work *Al-Jihād fī al-Islām* ("Jihād in Islam") (first serialized in a newspaper, and subsequently published in the form of a book in 1930).

The work was remarkable for its range of conception: the author had placed *jihād* in the total context of the Islamic law of nations, especially of war and peace, and had compared the Islamic laws of war and peace with those found in other religious and legal systems of the world, both of the past and present. The book revealed the scholar as possessed of extraordinary knowledge as well as keen and profound thought. The book was also striking for its arrestingly confident tone about Islam. There was no weak-kneed inclination to compromise, no "apologising" for Islam, no attempt to uphold it by showing it to be in harmony with the respectable ideas of the time. The author's strong conviction about the intrinsic soundness and distinctness of the teachings of Islam, and about their continuing relevance for all mankind were too transparent to be missed by any reader. Moreover, the book disclosed its author not only possessed of challenging and provocative ideas, but also of a very powerful pen to express them. These characteristics, which were evident from the first major work of Mawlānā Mawdūdī, have stood him in good stead throughout his life, and since the middle thirties he has been a major, dominating figure on the intellectual scene of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The monthly magazine *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān*, which he has edited since 1933, has been a major influence on the minds of the Muslim intellectuals of the subcontinent. Since the forties, when Mawlānā Mawdūdī's writings began to be available in their translated versions in other languages, especially in Arabic and English, his ideas began to attract an increasing number of people far beyond the confines of the subcontinent. It is no exaggeration to say that at present he is the most read living Muslim author, and has contributed immensely to the contemporary resurgence of Islamic ideas, feelings and activity all over the world.

Islam, however, has not been merely an intellectual concern of Mawlānā

Mawdūdī. In his early youth, he went through a process of intellectual experience as a result of which he has shown the zeal and vitality of a convert. (In fact, Mawlānā Mawdūdī claims himself to be a “convert” to Islam in so far as at a certain age of his life, he discovered in Islam a meaning and significance which he had not experienced before.) Since then, he has consciously tried to live Islam and to live for Islam. At this point in his life – presumably in his early twenties – he resolved not only to devote all his energy to expounding the teachings of Islam, but also to do all that lies in his power to transform Islamic teachings into practical realities. Mawlānā Mawdūdī has been emphatic in asserting that Islam is not merely a body of metaphysical doctrines, nor merely a bundle of rituals, nor even merely a set of rules of individual conduct. It is indeed a way of life, the bases of which lie rooted in Divine Revelation; a way of life which is permeated with God-consciousness and is oriented to doing God’s will and actualising good and righteousness in human life. A Muslim is committed to follow this way of life, to bear witness to it by word and deed, and to strive in order to make it prevail in the world. Hence, in addition to his intellectual contribution, in 1941 Mawlānā Mawdūdī founded a movement known as the *Jamā’at-i Islāmī* (“The Islamic Organisation”). He led this movement from its inception till 1972 as its chief. Even after he got himself relieved of the duties of its formal headship for health reasons, he continues to be a major source of guidance and inspiration for those associated with the *Jamā’at-i Islāmī* and indeed for a very large number of men and women across the globe, who do not have any affiliation to that organisation. On the whole, more and more people, particularly Muslims of the younger generation, are coming to appreciate Mawdūdī and even identify with the vision of Islam that he articulated so lucidly and incisively.

Mawlānā Mawdūdī, therefore is not merely an academician, but also a man of action who has been engaged in a grim struggle for the implementation of the Islamic vision. During this struggle many sterling qualities of his character have come to the surface – his sincerity and selflessness, his zeal and devotion, his courage and patience, his magnanimity and tolerance. It is because of his involvement in practical matters, especially since 1948, that Mawlānā Mawdūdī has often had to suffer persecution at the hands of the men of authority in Pakistan who failed to perceive the real motives and true character of his movement. Many a time he had to court imprisonment, not unlike some of the great heroes of Islam – Abū Ḥanīfah, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Ibn Taymiyah, Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, and Sayyid Quṭb of our own time, to name only a few luminaries. Not only that, in 1953 he narrowly escaped the gallows and in 1963, the bullets of an assassin. In braving persecution for the sake of his cause, Mawlānā Mawdūdī has displayed a serene dignity and heroic fearlessness which have won him abiding love and respect of friend and foe alike.

It is remarkable that despite the exacting tasks laid on Mawlānā

Mawdūdī's shoulders as the head of a large movement, he remained prolific as a writer and his writings remained impressive, not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively. (For his works, see the bibliography at the beginning of this work.) His *magnum opus*, of course, is his translation and *tafsir* (exegesis) of the Holy Qur'ān, an epitome of his elegant literary style, his erudition, and the clarity and brilliance of his thought. One of the major characteristics of Mawlānā Mawdūdī has been his ability to bring out the relevance of Islam to the problems and concerns of man in the present age. This is largely because he combines with his Islāmic scholarship an awareness and knowledge of the intellectual trends and practical problems of man in the modern age. In encountering the challenge of modernity, Mawlānā Mawdūdī displays neither ultra-conservative rigidity, nor the proneness to be overawed by the ideas and institutions current in our time simply because they are fashionable in the modern age or have gained respectability among the nations which are currently the leaders of the world. He wants the Muslims to creatively appropriate the healthy and beneficial elements from the cumulative treasure of human experience and to employ them to serve the higher ends of life embodied in the Islamic tradition. It is this aspect of Mawlānā Mawdūdī which has, at once, attracted many, but has also repelled many others, particularly the ultra-conservative and the ultra-westernised elements of the Muslim society.

In the early years of the seventies, when the public life of Mawlānā Mawdūdī seemed to be drawing to a close because of his failing health, a number of his admirers in different parts of the world felt inclined to pay their tribute to his long record of service to the cause of Islam, particularly to Islamic scholarship. This *estschrift* epitomises their heartfelt tribute to this outstanding Islamic savant who, even in the middle seventies of his life, has not ceased to enrich Islamic scholarship despite his failing health. Doubtlessly each contributor has spent many precious days and nights in writing, and several weeks and months researching on and reflecting about the subject which forms his contribution to this volume. Each one of them has thus dedicated to Mawlānā Mawdūdī something that he indeed holds very dear to his heart – much dearer than material belongings. The contributors to this volume belong to different areas of the world and come from diverse backgrounds. What they essentially share is faith in Islam as the final authoritative revelation of God's Will, and thus they share what might be broadly characterised as "Islamic perspective". Hopefully, the diversities of interest, approach and viewpoint reflected in the different contributions of this volume mirror the richness of diversity which has characterised healthy Islamic intellectual life in the past, and ought to do so in the future as well.

For us, who were charged with the editing of this book, working on this project has been both a joy and a privilege. This work is, in part, a

continuation of our literary partnership and our fellowship and brotherhood in the cause of Islam which began roughly a quarter of a century ago. Both of us are thankful to the contributors of this volume and to the members of the Committee of Sponsors of this *estschrift* for their co-operation and encouragement, and most of all, for the patience with which they have waited to see this book appear in print. We wish to join them in their tribute to Mawlānā Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdūdī and also in their prayer that may Allah grant him long life and health and strength in service to His cause, and bless his efforts and reward him amply for all the good that he has done.

Leicester
Ramaḍān 1, 1398 A.H.
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Mawdūdī*

*Compiled by Qazi Zulqadr Siddiqi, S. M. Aslam
and M. M. Ahsan*

CHAPTER ONE

Writings of Mawlānā Mawdūdī

I

The titles of the English translations of the works of Mawlānā Mawdūdī appear in italics.

We have provided in parenthesis English translations of the titles of works of which there are no English translations. These translated titles have not been italicized.

Years of publication appearing in square brackets may not indicate the original publication date.

The abbreviations appearing in square brackets after each work indicate translations into various other languages.

The abbreviations are:

A—Arabic	K—Kannada
B—Bengali	Ml—Malayalam
D—Danish	Mr—Marathi
F—French	P—Pashtu
G—Gujrati	Po—Portuguese
Ge—German	Pr—Persian
H—Hindi	S—Sindhi
Hu—Hausa	Sw—Swahili
I—Indonesian	Tl—Telugu
It—Italian	Tm—Tamil
J—Japanese	Tr—Turkish

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11. *Da'wat-i Islāmī kiyā hay?* (What is the Islamic Movement?): Hyderabad Deccan, [n.d.].
12. *Da'wat-i Islāmī mēn Khawātin kā Hīṣṣah* (Women's Role in the Promotion of the Islamic Movement: Rampur, [n.d.].
13. *Da'wat-i Islāmī, us kē Uṣūl, Ṭarīq-i kār awr Muqtaḍiyāt* (The Islamic Movement, its principles, methodology and requirements): Rampur, [1952].
14. *Dawr-i Naw kā Chailanj awr Nawjawān*, Lahore, 1976. Eng. tr. entitled *Challenge of the Modern Age and the Youth* serialized in the *Criterion*, March–May, 1977, Vol. 12, No. 5.
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PART I

Intellectual Perspectives

CHAPTER TWO

Tawhīd: The Concept and the Process

Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi

TAWHĪD is the key concept in Islam. It sums up the Islamic way of life and presents, in a nutshell, the essence of the Islamic civilisation. It is also the one term which describes the *process* of the Islamic transformation of an individual or a society. In human history it presents the crux of the prophetic mission, having been the sheet-anchor of all revealed religions. It is specially suited to describe the characteristic and abiding contribution of the last of the prophets, Muḥammad (peace be on him) in history.

A student of history who is out to discover the causes of the decline of the Muslims – the causes of their loss of political power, of their economic backwardness, intellectual stagnation, and social degeneration – will always find this to be a lapse from *tawhīd*. Likewise, if a person is in search of a blueprint for Islamic reconstruction and wants to elaborate the process through which Muslims can once again occupy their rightful place in the world, he will also find in *tawhīd* the principal answer.

Tawhīd, in fact, is the essence of being human; for, the inculcation of this attitude in man means the restoration of human dignity which has been the central task before all revealed religions. The role of divine guidance in man's life is to remind him of the ways that suit his own nature and the world of nature around him; and *tawhīd* has always been the essence of such guidance.

What do we mean by *tawhīd*? As the word in its literal sense signifies, it is a relationship with the Only One that excludes a similar relationship with anyone else. *Tawhīd* is man's commitment to Allah, the focus of all his reverence and gratitude, the only source of value. What Allah desires of man becomes value for him, the end of human endeavour. Man, who commits himself to the will of Allah, recognises no authority except His and accepts no guidance other than His. This commitment is total as well as positive and vigorous. It involves love and worship, obedience and submission combined with an eagerness to do His will and the sense of a mission.

When we turn to the negative aspect of the concept clarified above, we hit at the *process* through which an individual or a society is transformed into a Muslim individual or society. The concept of *tawhīd* excludes man's

commitment to anyone other than Allah and the adoption by him of a similar posture towards any being other than Him. A rejection of all sources of value other than the will of Allah, all authority except His, and a refusal to accept any idea, command, or injunction from anyone, as man does from Allah, on the basis of its having not come from Him. Love or reverence, worship or submission, and a sense of obligation – all are directed towards Allah alone and no one else deserves them in the ultimate, full sense of these attitudes.

The negative aspect of *tawhīd* indicates a *process* as it must precede the fullest expression of the positive content. In the human context it means emancipation and restoration of man's essential freedom from all human and (man-made) super-human bondages before his commitment to Allah can be genuine and positive. Man is free. He is bound to no other man, group of men, or to their mores and manners, customs and traditions, social institutions, laws, modes of thought, views and presumptions, theories and philosophies. Man is under no obligation to submit to any authority or commit to anyone's will. He owes nothing to any being other than Allah, to Whom he owes everything, even his own existence. He has no superiors except Him. The world of nature around him is His creation for man's use; it is neither to be feared nor revered. Man must be fully conscious of this essential freedom and independence before he can enter into the relationship with Allah required of him by his own nature and consciousness. *Tawhīd* presupposes a consciousness in man of his stature independent of all being and dependent on the One Being alone. If this consciousness of independence and freedom is lacking, genuine *tawhīd* is impossible, and if it is deficient and vague, the relationship with Allah will be impure, weak and largely ineffective.

The consciousness that *tawhīd* presupposes gives men the sense of being equals. All men are equally free and independent of one another while they are equally dependent on Allah. The moment a man regards himself as essentially inferior to another human being he loses this freedom and finds himself in bondage to whomsoever he recognises as superior. Such is the case with individuals and groups, nations and generations, who have accepted, on their own or as a result of indoctrination, the superiority of other individuals on account of their supposedly holy status in matters of religion, or exclusive access to knowledge of things divine or on account of power, wealth, colour of skin, or precedence in time. Sanctity has been attached to the wisdom of the earlier generations, the ways of the forefathers, or to social institutions inherited from the past or devised by supposedly more advanced people, to the extent that critical judgment has been suspended in their regard. Similar is the case when views and opinions are accepted uncritically because of their having been held by this philosopher or that group of intellectuals, or when some mores and manners are imitated blindly on account of the acknowledged superiority of their

original bearers. All this runs counter to the spirit of man which must reassert its independence and must insist on independent exercise of judgment before anything is accepted from any source whatsoever.

When the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) addressed his message to the people around him asking them to live a life directed by the basic moral values universally exalted by men and shun the many evils into which idol-worship and the consequent over-lordship of their socio-religious leaders had led them, he was frequently met with the "argument" that the way of life being attacked by him was the "way of our forefathers".¹ Other prophets had also to face similar "arguments".² To this irrational and uncritical approach the Qur'ānic rejoinders are most revealing:

"They say: We follow that wherein we found our forefathers. What! Even though their forefathers were wholly unintelligent and had no guidance?" (2: 170)

"They only say: Lo, we found our forefathers on a course and we are guided by their footsteps. . . . [And the warner] said: What! Even though I bring you better guidance than you found your forefathers following?" (43: 22-24)

"And when they do some lewdness they say: We found our forefathers doing it and Allah hath enjoined it on us. Say: Verily, Allah enjoineth not lewdness. Tell ye concerning Allah that which ye know not? Say: My Lord enjoineth justice . . ." (7: 28-29)

The first verse challenges the man who follows other men to consider the obvious possibility that the other fellow might be wrong or misguided, which consideration would liberate his mind and lead it to see reason. The second verse suggests that the new ways being taught might be found on examination to be better than the old ones, and thus asks the blind follower to decide for himself. The third verse refers him back to the practice in question to consider its merits and demerits so that he discovers its obvious evil, and the light within him rejects it, further concluding that Allah would never will of man what is bad or unjust. Therein lies the core of the liberating process: always to keep in view the fallibility of everything human, the possibility of its being improved upon and a readiness to exercise one's own judgment on the basis of the merits of the case and see for oneself if it has any genuine value.

Besides following the practice of their forefathers, another predicament of the common man has been the blind following of their leaders. The rulers, the politically powerful, the wealthy, those high up on the social ladder, and the religious leaders have been exalted to the position of unquestioned authority, before whom men surrender their reason and critical judgment, to their utmost detriment. The leaders have their vested interests in the *status quo* and mislead their followers. Time and again the Qur'ān warns against such an attitude and the indignity as well as unreasonableness of

doing so. Those who do so will repent having done so on the Day of Judgment.

"On the day when those who were followed disowned those who followed (them)". (2:167)

"And they say: Our Lord! Lo, we obeyed our leaders and great men, and they misled us from the way". (33: 67)

"Those who were suppressed say unto those who dominated: But for you, we should have been believers . . . [it was your] scheming night and day, when you commanded us to disbelieve in Allah and set up rivals unto Him. And they are filled with remorse when they behold the doom". (34: 31-33)

Specially devastating in effect has been the elevation by the uncritical masses of their religious leaders to a position of final authority which belongs only to Allah:

"They have taken as lords beside Allah their rabbis and their monks . . .". (9: 31)

The only protection against these eventualities is to retain one's critical judgment and to demand a reference to the revealed word of Allah from all those who issue statements or give commands in the name of religion.

"Say: Have you any knowledge that you can adduce for us? Lo! you follow not but an opinion, Lo! you do but guess". (6: 149)

"Bring me a scripture before this [scripture], or some vestige of knowledge [in support of what you say], if you are truthful". (46: 4)

"Say: Bring your proof [of what you state] if you are truthful". (2: 112)

It is worth emphasising that in most forms of *shirk* (polytheism), and especially in idol-worship, it is generally *men* who, posing as representatives of the deity or as intermediaries between God and man, act as their overlords. The common man has also, not infrequently, succumbed to the mental slavery of other men who do not claim any divine status. It is in view of this aspect of deviation from the straight path of *tawhīd* that the Prophet's task (peace be on him) was aptly described by his Companions as "emancipating men from submission to human beings". During the famous battle of Qādisiyyah when Mughīrah b. Shu'bah stood in the court of the Persian general, Rustam, to explain what Islam stood for, he conveyed the very essence of it in the historic words: ". . . and to emancipate people from the obedience of men [and lead them] to the obedience of Allah".³ The second Muslim emissary to the same court, Rib'i b. 'Āmir also repeated the same: "Allah has sent us forward so that we may liberate, whomsoever He wills, from following men [and lead them] to the obedience of Allah,

and pull them out of their narrow world into the broader one, and from under the suppression of [various] religions into the justice of Islam . . .".⁴

Last, but not the least, rather the most important step in emancipation is that which, in the realm of values especially, relates to one's own self. It is not sufficient to be free and independent of others. One must be on one's guard against oneself in order not to succumb to the lowly, the transient, the narrow-minded and the short-sighted in what one seeks and makes the outcome of one's endeavour. Shall it be pleasure only, or pursuit of power and wealth, or aims confined to the narrow interests of one's kith and kin, one's group or nation? Such are the false values, rather disvalues to which those dedicate themselves who fail to take a view of life in society. They let themselves go after their shifting moods and passing emotions. The One Who knows all that is best for men guides them in their best interests and only commitment to His will can protect them from disvalues and ensure their welfare. This can be confirmed empirically if one looks around and sees the state of the people who have fallen. It is the recurrent lesson of history which the Qur'ān cites profusely. Those who fail to learn this lesson may be beyond redemption.

"Hath thou seen him who chooseth for his god his own lust? Would'st thou then be guardian over him? Or deemest thou that most of them hear or understand? They are but as the cattle, nay but they are farther astray". (25: 43-44)

A life dedicated to the pursuit of sensual pleasures, or of power and wealth clouds reasoning faculties, distorts thinking and perverts judgment, which amounts to a real loss of freedom, a fall from the status of being truly human. The liberation of man from such a bondage of lust and avarice assumes, therefore, priority in the process that is *tawhīd*.

Parallel to the process of emancipation goes the restoration to man of the essential human characteristic of thinking for himself and taking his own decision. The only attitude that behoves man is to utilise the powers of observation, analysis, reasoning and judgment which only man, among God's creations, possesses. It is only the emancipated man who thinks for himself and makes his own choice, who can most warmly and readily respond to the prophetic call. The Qur'ān is full of appeals to man to exercise these powers and thus be truly human. Once man does so it rightly expects him to see the truth in the Message and commit himself wholeheartedly to Allah. The Qur'ān asks man to observe the world of nature for therein lie the signs of Allah.

"Lo! herein indeed are portents for those who reflect . . . for men of knowledge . . . for those who understand . . .". (30: 21, 22, 24)

"Have they not pondered upon themselves"? (30: 8)

It asks men to consider the Prophetic Message, study the Qur'an and think carefully before they decide their response to it:

"Say unto them, O Muḥammad, I exhort you unto one thing only, that rise up for Allah's sake, in twos and singly, then ponder". (34: 46)

"Have they not pondered the Word . . .". (23: 68)

"Will they then not meditate on the Qur'an, or are there locks on their hearts"? (47: 24)

Man's commitment to Allah is neither genuine nor potent when it is neither preceded by the emancipation from *shirk* nor accompanied by the consciousness and independent thinking outlined above. The Islam which comes to an unemancipated people who possess no consciousness of their human status and do not exercise their unique human faculties resembles genuine Islam only in name. This provides us with the key to understanding the present state of the Muslim people.

Yet another concomitant of *tawḥīd* deserves consideration to complete the study of the various facets of genuine commitment to Allah. Man's entering into that relationship with Allah involves a particular relationship with the universe. The will of Allah revealed to man gives him the vision of a society engaged in the pursuit of value, of man living a healthy, well-provisioned, good life in co-operation with fellow-men, doing His biddings in all walks of life. That vision inspires man to change the world around him accordingly, and Allah explicitly wills him to do so. That is the mission of a Muslim. The mission belongs to this world and calls for a course of action in this life. The sense of a mission is born simultaneously with the commitment to Allah, being an integral part of it. It is not a mere implication or a derivative of that commitment.

This commitment, and the concomitant mission, creates a positive attitude towards the world of nature as man must have resources to fulfil that mission and to stand by that commitment. As soon as a number of individuals, similarly committed and inspired, come into existence, they become the *ummah* which has a mission with humanity, a date with history. The task of the Prophet is to raise his *ummah* through the process of *tawḥīd* and lead it to the successful performance of its mission. The whole process of emancipation, restoration of reason and independent judgment, acceptance of revealed guidance and transformation of individual and social life accordingly (as revelation gradually unfolds over a period of time) is a movement directed at raising the *ummah*. The Muslim society and the Islamic state are the product of this movement as well as an instrument in its further expansion till it embraces all humanity. From the very outset it is a dynamic movement, and its dynamism goes on increasing with changing circumstances and increasing numbers involving new lands, new peoples and new generations. As we find in the Qur'an, the focus of atten-

tion always remains humanity in general, and not any particular people, even the Muslim people.

“You are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. You enjoy right conduct and forbid indecency; and you believe in Allah”. (3: 111)

“And thus We have made you an equitable nation that you may be the bearers of witness to the people and (that) the Apostle may be a bearer of witness to you . . .”. (2: 143)

It is noteworthy that the crucial terms *ma'rūf* (right conduct) and *munkar* (indecency) used in the first-quoted verse are basically human in content. It is man possessed of sound judgment and balanced orientation, who, by the light that God gave man while creating him, recognises the good and bad. Revelations serve as reminders. That which has been defined in the Qur'ān as *ma'rūf* (or *munkar*) is of course so; but the value-oriented intellect of man is capable of extending this principle to new situations that may arise.

Anyone who carefully studies the career of the Muslim *ummah* under the leadership of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him), will appreciate the deep impact of the foregoing process on that career. This study reveals the crucial role of *ijtihād*, *jihād*, and knowledge in the onward march of the *ummah*, which are the direct products of the emancipation and restoration of the thinking man and the missionary spirit in the *ummah*. We can note the following in this regard to supplement such a study.

1. In the early part of the career of the *ummah* what Allah willed of man was, generally speaking, confined to the basic moral values, the proper ends to be pursued in life and the norms of a decent life. Legal provisions of the *Shari'ah* followed later on.

Equality and brotherhood, justice and benevolence, truthfulness and honesty, compassion and kindness, priority of the social good over that of the individual, acceptance of the principle of rule by consent and decision through mutual consultation, the sanctity of the family, and that sex relations shall be based on contracts, emphasis on co-operative living and recognition of the right of the society to private wealth – are some of the values and rules prescribed in the Makkan chapters of the Qur'ān.⁵

It was natural, in this situation, for men to exercise their own judgment as to how to realise these values in practice and how to modify them or replace them by new ones in the existing social institutions in the light of the revealed rules of conduct.

2. When we consider the more specific commands revealed later in Madina we find that they were designed to realise in practice the very rules emphasised in the early phase. These commands were given to those who had already been oriented towards the relevant values and were anxious to realise them. They could very well recognise the important nexus

between the specifics and the more general ends towards which they were directed and had a clear understanding of the priorities, and the hierarchy in the entire *Shari'ah* – with its value-ends as well as specific commands. There are inter-relationships of instrumentality, dependence and complementarity within the system, which are crucial for the larger ends in life towards which the entire revealed guidance leads man. An understanding of these relationships is necessary for the application of the system in changing situations. This understanding came naturally as the revelation was geared to the dynamics of the movement that the *ummah* was making in pursuance of its mission to live as Allah willed them to live and change the world around them in accordance with the same.

The role of value-oriented intellect and mission-inspired will lay in accepting these commands in practical life as part of the ongoing process which had started with the commitment to Allah, passed through the phase of acquiring value-orientation and was to move on to the realisation of its mission. They could never have considered that by only complying with these commands they had fulfilled all the demands of the religion and had nothing to perform in addition to them; for, they were already conscious of the more comprehensive demands and the wider connotation of their commitment to Allah.

3. Another important point to be noted in this regard relates to the encompassing of man's life by the *Shari'ah*. The *Shari'ah* does not cover all the aspects of human life *directly* and *explicitly*. Among the aspects covered are those regulated in detail, as well as those very thinly covered, not going beyond a few guiding principles. Among the aspects *not* regulated by it are the exploration of the world of nature and its exploitation for man's own benefit. Man has been encouraged to do so, and the method and means of doing it are left to his God-given faculties to discover. This is the area covered by science and technology. In agriculture and industry, business organisation and mass communication, procedures of decision-making and similar matters, Allah has not prescribed any particular technology, methods and procedures. Man is free in this respect.

Most elaborate is the coverage of the *Shari'ah* in matters relating to personal life, cleanliness of body and mind, keeping alive the remembrance of Allah through prayers, etc. Then comes the family life and related socio-economic matters. Trade and commerce and economic relationships come in for regulation through some specific but mainly general provisions. The same is the case with political organisation of society and international relations.

The reason is not far to seek. Socio-economic and political life of man is deeply influenced by the advancement of science and technology and the realisation of value in these walks of life has to find new institutional arrangements in changed situations. This the value-oriented intellect and the mission-inspired will of the *ummah* can easily do in the light of the basic guidelines contained in the revelation.

Man's value orientation and his dedication to the mission of making the entire human race live a value-oriented life is, however, very much relevant for science and technology and such aspects of trade and industry, commerce and communication as are not directly regulated by the *Shari'ah*. Therefrom come the means for a value-oriented life and therein originate new forms of human relationship which pose a fresh challenge, so far as realisation of value is concerned.

The nature and content of the revealed guidance in relation to the dynamics of a living that moves on and on to new situations, therefore, necessarily envisage a very active role for human intellect. This role which may be confined to mere understanding and interpretation and intelligent applications in the thoroughly regulated matters such as prayers, develops into much more in matters thinly covered by the *Shari'ah* or involved in religious life only indirectly through the over-all ends of life, such as science and technology. *Ijtihād* or the independent exercise of judgment is the name given to this entire role. The points we have noted above indicate the crucial significance of *ijtihād* in Islamic living, in pursuit of the Mission – the reconstruction of human society as willed by Allah – and through the dynamics of the movement towards this goal.

Besides *ijtihād*, the greatest demand of the mission has always been *jihād*. This all-comprehensive requirement takes sometimes, as it took in early Islam, the form of armed conflict imposed upon the Movement by the irrational and obdurate attitudes of the powerful minority determined to mislead the masses and deny to it a free choice, but is in no sense confined to it. It starts at a much earlier stage of the Movement. As hinted above, it originates at the very instant that commitment to Allah takes place and the committed is inspired by the sense of a mission. The mission necessitates health, material resources, power and organisation. It calls for hard work as it calls for efficiency in doing everything. This is not to suggest that the urge for productive enterprise, hard work and efficiency emanates solely from the Islamic mission. These attitudes have their own roots in the nature of man and the conditions of his living and Islam does not cut these roots. The idea is that these urges are powerfully reinforced and given a new direction which, in the ultimate, is social rather than self-centred (into which it degenerates in a life uncommitted to Allah). Islam contributes positively to man's worldly pursuits and does so with immense force, only it harnesses the energies so directed for the mission with humanity that the *ummah* has before it. It is impossible to conceive of a Muslim filled with the zeal for this mission to sit idle or be lukewarm towards productive enterprise while the children of Allah starve for provision and the Movement needs resources for forging ahead. Likewise, the value of efficiency, discipline and organisation cannot but be high for those who have a role to play in history.

Above all is the attitude of these men towards knowledge, its acquisition,

organisation, dissemination and utilisation. This is crucial both for *ijtihad* and *jihad*. From the very first revelation "knowledge" has been emphasised as the *sine qua non* of being human.⁶ It is presented in that very position in the Qur'anic story of the first man.⁷ It is indicated as the basis of a good religious life.⁸ It is men of knowledge whose commitment to Allah and dedication to the Mission can be really genuine. The very mission of the *ummah* with humanity has been defined in terms that involve a knowledge of what is good and what is bad. Pursuit of knowledge has, therefore, been declared to be a duty of every man and woman and scholarship highly extolled by the Prophet (peace be on him).

Would he who is out to change the world in accordance with the vision of the Good Society acquired from the revealed guidance shirk from knowing the world as it is, or shirk from knowing the revealed guidance itself? The answer is obviously in the negative. The two are equally necessary for the performance of the mission which is the be-all and end-all of religious life in Islam.

It is important to note that the knowledge that the Muslim must seek vigorously has two distinct dimensions. The knowledge of the revealed will of Allah, of how Allah wills men to live, of what is good and what is bad, what is right and what is wrong in the light of the revealed truth, is one. The second dimension is the knowledge of man, his society, the world of nature and all that is relevant for the value-realising activity in this life here on earth. Both dimensions are crucial for *ijtihad* and *jihad* and both are the *sine qua non* of a truly Islamic living. The knowledge of what is to be changed is no less important than the knowledge of into what it is to be changed. The knowledge of all that relates to the means of achieving the ends is likewise as indispensable as the knowledge of the ends themselves. This point must be clearly understood to banish from the mind the fallacious view propounded by some people that the "knowledge" emphasised in the Qur'an and *Sunnah* is the knowledge of "religion" only. It could not be so; for religious living must be conducted in this world which must, therefore, be "known" to make living in it possible. It is an untenable proposition in view of the fact that "religion" is not a closed system but open to extension, through *ijtihad*, to new situations which must be analysed and understood before they are covered by religion. Lastly, the claim mentioned above is obviously ill-founded in view of the fact that the terms "knowledge" and "men of knowledge" are also used in very early parts of revelation when almost the entire *Shari'ah* had yet to be revealed.

What we have characterised as the other dimension of knowledge, besides the knowledge of religion, emphasised by the Qur'an, mainly inheres in science, the natural sciences as well as the social sciences. The natural sciences, like Physics, Chemistry, Zoology, Botany, Medicine, etc., study nature and its objects whereas the social sciences study man, his society, economy, polity, etc. All this is essential for true *ijtihad* which

alone can enable man to think how to realise value and live an Islamic life. Based on science is technology, which is most essential for *jihād*: the efforts directed at translating the above thinking into action. By technology we mean not only the use of machinery and adoption of methods appropriate for getting things done most efficiently, but also the techniques of mass communication, organisation and management. The more a society is seriously bent upon doing the will of Allah in life, the more vigorously shall it avail itself of all that is useful in the latest technology. It shall also adopt suitable measures for the advancement of science and technology so that its Mission – reconstruction of man's life on earth in accordance with the will of Allah – can be achieved in the best and most efficient manner.

It would have been a most rewarding task to study the career of the *ummah* after the lifetime of the Prophet (peace be on him), to assess the humanising and energising role of *tawhīd* in the early history of Islam and relate the Muslim contribution to the civilisation of man to the process through which the *ummah* was raised and then to see how degeneration set in and why the Muslims were ultimately reduced to the position they have been in now for the last few centuries. Unfortunately the space at our disposal does not permit doing so. We shall, therefore, directly come to the present and examine the state of affairs relating to the Muslims in our own times.

The most striking feature of the present-day Muslims is that their existence today is *not* the result of a process similar to the one described above through which the *ummah* had first emerged. Of the three formative stages in the processes of emancipation, restoration of independent thinking and conscious commitment to the will of Allah, the present-day Muslim community has passed through none. They have inherited Islam from their fathers who in turn had inherited it from theirs. If one remembers that the past few centuries have been a period of all-comprehensive degeneration one can easily see that this heritage could, at the best, be mixed. The Muslims of today remain, therefore, unemancipated from the vestiges of *shirk* (polytheism) that had accumulated in the Islamic heritage during the age-long degeneration. Secondly, they were never called upon to think for themselves and have hardly the proper consciousness which is the prerequisite of making the commitment to Allah genuine. Being Muslims by virtue of their parentage and most of what is "Islamic" in their living having come through emulation rather than choice, free thinking, initiative and innovation are at a discredit and "following in the footsteps of their forefathers" has become the chief value.

Missing from their Islam is also the most vital dimension, the sense of a mission. As a result of this background, we have neither *ijtihad* nor *jihad*, nor the urge for knowledge which are the most essential elements in the making of the *ummah*. Islam is no longer a movement and religious life seems to have no achievement to make in this world and needs neither

resources nor power. Organisation and efficiency are devalued in the new scale and the entire approach is passive. The best among the Muslims is the one who conforms to a closed list of "dos" and "do nots" and not the one who contributes significantly towards the attainment of Islam's ultimate objectives in this life.

One may legitimately point out that it is not possible for each generation of Muslims to be raised exactly in the manner in which the *ummah* was first raised from out of the pagan society. That of course is obvious. What is required, however, is that the system of education and training through which the new generations of Muslims pass must cater for the needs of the process that is *tawhīd*. Central in this scheme should be the aim of creating men who think for themselves, exercise their judgment and make their own choice. They must be emancipated from the mental slavery and cultural imitation of other human beings, even their own forefathers, so as to bring into fullest play their own creative genius. They must be brought into direct intellectual contact with the revealed word of Allah and the personality of the Prophet (peace be on him) as the leader of the Islamic movement so that they are able to have a fresh and original commitment to Allah that is accompanied by a sense of the Mission. Should the system of education and training fail to do so, the new generation will not be the same as the Qur'ān envisages the Muslim people to be, and if this continues over a number of generations, there is a real danger of these people drifting into a sub-human life of the kind in which the Prophet (peace be on him) had found his own people.

That exactly is what happened in Muslim history of late. If one examines the process of degeneration over the past few centuries, focussing one's attention especially on the system of education and training, one can easily see that it has gravely failed in catering for the needs of *tawhīd*.

We can make a special note of the following in this regard.

For centuries independent thinking and exercise of judgment have been discouraged and reason has been denied any except a minimal role in religious living – quite contrary to what is actually required.

In the name of commitment to Allah, the actual emphasis has been on following the example of certain groups of human beings and accepting their opinions on all matters requiring deliberation and judgment. Cultural imitation of the "pious" among the forefathers has become the highest value in religious living, depriving man of the freedom he actually enjoys in these matters within the framework of the *Shari'ah*.

As a result, empiricism and the use of the faculties of observation, inference and reasoning generally have hardly any place in the mind of the contemporary Muslim. Creativity has hardly any role and knowledge is reduced to the learning of the already known. Religious behaviour has become synonymous with behaviour regulated by authority.

Submission to Allah is no longer accompanied by the sense of a mission

with humanity and the consciousness of having a role to play is gone. The attention of the religious community is focussed on itself, with little concern for humanity in general. Religious life has become inward looking. The focus of religious attention has shifted from changing the world outside to protecting the inner self from being corrupted by a devilish world. Thereby the Muslim people lost the source of immense energy that lies in the pursuit of a goal relating to the outside world. The fallacy of regarding the Islamic way of life coterminous with the codified legal corpus which came to prevail of necessity once the gates of *ijtihād* were declared closed, has excluded most of the socio-economic and political aspects of life from the value-orientation of the religious people in Islam. These aspects, being new in form and substance, could not possibly have been covered by any code. They can only receive the light through the process by which they were first Islamicised – the action of the value-oriented intellect of man. But that alas had already received its death blow in Muslim society.

As time passed the hierarchy of values and the priority of ends over the specific rules instrumented to secure them was also forgotten and the religious code became static as well as unproductive.

Last, but not the least, the Muslim mind ceased to come into direct contact with the Qur'ān and the personality of the Prophet (peace be on him) as the leader of the Islamic movement. The first was replaced both in formal curricula and in the Muslim homes by substitute human hand-outs on religion, and the second, by the portrait of a pious man of highest moral standard but devoid of any creativity and dynamism. The relationship of the ordinary Muslim with Allah became, for all practical purposes, dependent on some human intermediary, once he lost contact with the Book which is the only authentic *and intelligible* nexus between humanity and Divinity now available. This distortion in man-God relation was bound to have its catastrophic impact on man's relation with the universe.

What exactly is the present-day Muslim's relationship with the universe? Does he feel the urge to know its mysteries? Is he out to exploit nature for his mission? Is he aware of the role envisaged for him in history? Is he conscious of his duties towards humanity? His personality has no such dimensions. If there is any semblance of any, its sources are not in his religion, in his commitment to Allah. This is the predicament of the Muslim people today and its cause lies in the manifold reality which we have analysed above. In essence it is the lack of *tawhīd* – the conscious commitment to the will of Allah, of a thinking people emancipated from the mental slavery of other people and the bondage of their own baser instincts.

The consequences of this loss of freedom, fall from the status of being human, and lack of commitment to the will of Allah and the unmindfulness of the concomitant Mission are many. Economic backwardness, political disintegration, social chaos, moral degeneration, intellectual stagnation and spiritual decay, all are the results of the distorted religion that prevails

in the name of Islam. Islam in the first place is *not* the list of “dos” and “do nots” to which one is nowadays urged to conform. It is the live man-God relationship depicted above that is based on *tawhīd*, the concept as well as the process. Islam is not a static system of rules and rituals. It is rather a dynamic process in which man himself actively participates. It involves knowing, thinking and creating. It involves learning, inventing and constructing. Its arena is the entire human life, in history, and extending outside the confines of the “Muslim peoples”. It is a movement that passes through various phases and not a state of equilibrium where contending forces come to a state of peace and tranquility with one another. Compile a list of all the characteristics of a good Muslim described in the Qur’ān and see how their meanings derive themselves from this movement and its development. Read the same in the context of the stagnant life of a religiously “pious” man and see the degeneration that these concepts suffer thereby. Such is the case with the notions of *tawakkul*, *ṣabr*, *qanā’ah*, etc.

This is what the traditional religion has done to the most important Islamic concepts. Even the central concept of the Islamic State is not spared. As we have seen earlier, the Islamic State is a stage in the Islamic movement, being itself a vehicle for it and instrumental in its onward progress. Its role, as has been defined in the Qur’ān, is identical with that of the Muslim *ummah*, that is to enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. (The Qur’ān, 3: 111).

“Those who, if We give them power in the land, establish worship and pay the poor-due and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency . . .”. (The Qur’ān, 22: 41)

This positive content, which extends beyond the narrow limits of any given code, can be compared with the now popular image of a state which imposes the Islamic penal laws and implements some other provisions of the *Shari’ah*. The degeneration lies in the loss of the broader missionary and essentially humanising dimensions of the concept. A similar degeneration is found in the concept of the Islamic movement itself. The popular notion has it as an effort by the Muslims for the Muslims and among the Muslims. There is hardly any awareness of the fact that the Qur’ān envisages it as a movement for humanity in general. Even the leaders of the movement often take the present division of the human race into Muslims and non-Muslims as something given and seek to operate in this static framework, trying merely to “improve” the Muslim people. They forget the most important lesson of the history of the prophetic movements: that the key to the resurgence of a degenerate Muslim society and the emancipation of the non-Muslim humanity is one and the same; and that is *tawhīd*.

The movement that focusses its attention on the religious revival among Muslims emphasises conformity without emancipation, restoration of the

thinking man and the proper value orientation. It is hardly able to discriminate between the ends and the means, the higher values and the subsidiary rules of conduct. It appears confused before new situations for which no rules of conduct are found in the compendia by which it is guided. The result is a revival of orthodoxy, rigid attitudes and closed minds instead of the dynamic approach which could face new situations, create new institutions and realise the Islamic values afresh. This does not satisfy the many urges of man whose life is presently passing through a crisis of values in the wake of scientific advances that tend to go out of control.

The last half century in the world of Islam witnessed the emergence of powerful movements which sought to re-establish a direct contact between the Muslim mind and the Qur'ān and gave it a fresh awareness of its larger role in human society. Due to reasons whose detailed examination is not possible in the limited space at our disposal even these movements now seem to be losing their vigour and are tending to become sluggish under the weight of the traditional religiosity of the Muslim masses and the narrow outlook of the '*ulamā*'. As the present writer sees it, the basic cause of the threatened failure lies in a half-hearted attempt to follow the process of *tawhīd* explained above. The need for the emancipation and restoration of the thinking mind was seen; but its demands were not fully met. Without going into the how and why of this deficiency we suggest the following measures to rectify the error and bring these movements round to perform the real task which could recreate the *ummah*.

1. The objective of religious life should be to change this world, including the personality of the individual himself and extending to the whole of human society, so as to reconstruct it in accordance with the will of Allah as revealed in the Qur'ān.

2. The religion should be understood directly from the Qur'ān aided by the *Sunnah*, and *all* human interpretations should be treated as secondary, tentative and, in principle, liable to error and open to correction.

3. Basic moral values and the ends of human endeavour in individual and social life, as defined in the revealed will of God, should stand prior to the details of the *Shari'ah* regulating man's life. The emphasis should be on the realisation of the values and securing the desired ends, and the specific rules should be seen and shown as a means towards them.

4. Due emphasis should be placed on science and technology as indispensable means of truly religious living and the concomitant missionary role. We need a fresh realisation of the truth that understanding man and the world of nature are essential not only for the realisation of the values but also for a proper understanding and appreciation of them, and that our backwardness in technology is a source of our weakness in the determination to do our best in fulfilling the Mission.

5. The importance of free thinking and independent judgment should be recognised in all human affairs, along with the commitment to the expressed

will of God. The system of education and training should especially encourage fresh thinking and initiative in areas thinly covered by the *Shari'ah* or left open for human decision making. Each generation should be allowed the fullest freedom of evolving its own strategy for the fulfilment of the Mission and developing its own way of Islamic living, bound only by the eternally binding provisions of the *Shari'ah* and refusing to elevate anything else in the Islamic heritage to that status.

6. The Islamic movement should address humanity at large and proceed according to the priorities in the original Message, involving the Muslim people in that process and attempting their religious revival subject to the same order of priorities. The masses must be liberated from the hold of their ignorant religious mentors and brought into direct contact with the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. They should be made to enter into a positive relationship with the universe under the inspiration of the Islamic Mission, and they should know that in that context they can think, create and do experiments.

7. The movement should attach a higher value to the emancipation and value-orientation of all human beings, Muslims as well as non-Muslims, than to political change within Muslim societies. The impact of the value-orientated intellect on contemporary thought in Humanities, Arts and literature is of greater significance for the future of Islam in the modern world than the inclusion of a few Islamic provisions in the constitutions of Muslim countries. In a world that is fast becoming one unit a total civilisational change in a country can hardly come about in isolation. The advance towards a genuinely Islamic State can only be gradual, and what the movement achieves outside a country in terms of global intellectual changes is no less important for the establishment of an Islamic State in that country than what it achieves inside the country by way of mobilising public opinion and effecting reforms, etc.

8. Lastly, the movement itself should allow its members and those joining it in the course of time all the freedom of thought that Allah has given to human beings. It should encourage the empirical approach, fresh initiatives and innovation in matters not covered by the revealed guidance. In its internal organisation the principle of decision through mutual consultation should be observed and an individual's right to have his own views and evolve his own style of doing things should be respected. It should not present before humanity as Islam what is not divine but human in formulation without conceding to it the right of reformulation. It should not encumber itself with the cultural traditions, linguistic preferences and technological bias of any particular time or space lest these should stand in the way of humanity coming back to Allah. It should not reject any human preferences, manners and institutions merely on account of their having originated in a non-Muslim society unless they deserve a rejection according to the scale of values given by Allah. It should proceed with a clear realisation of the *fact* that humanity today is almost unanimously

agreed on certain fundamental values for which Islam stands, such as freedom, equality, justice and democracy – a situation that did not obtain a few centuries earlier. While the Movement has a lot to contribute by way of giving these values proper roots in the mind of man and unfolding their varied implications, it can also learn a lot from the variety of human experiences in realising these values in actual life. This requires an open mind *vis-à-vis* the contemporary human institutions, which is lacking in most of the religious people of the East.

The contemporary relevance of these measures in the context of the process of *tawḥīd* is not difficult to discern. Should the contemporary Islamic Movement stand equal to this task, it will be of great significance, not only for the world of Islam but for mankind in general. Should it remain preoccupied with the revival of traditional religiosity in Muslim countries and involved in political struggle with their westernised *élite*, both the Muslims and mankind in general will have to wait for a fresh attempt for the regeneration of humanity on the basis of *tawḥīd*.

Notes and Sources

- 1 See the Qur'ān, 7: 28; 31: 21; 34: 43; 43: 22; etc.
- 2 See the Qur'ān, 10: 79; 11: 62 and 87; 14: 10; 28: 36; etc.
- 3 Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, (Cairo, Sa'ādah Press, n.d.), vol. 7, p. 39.
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 See the chapters 6 (al-An'ām), 16 (al-Naḥl), 17 (Banū Isrā'il), and 31 (Luqmān) among others.
- 6 The Qur'ān, 96: 1–6.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 2: 31
- 8 *Ibid.*, 35: 28.

CHAPTER THREE

Decadence, Deviation and Renaissance in the Context of Contemporary Islam

Seyyed Hossein Nasr

IN CONTRAST to traditional Islamic scholarship where in all branches of the sciences terms are already defined and always used with a specific meaning in mind, there has appeared during the past century among a large number of modernised Muslims a tendency toward ambiguity and the careless use of many important terms. Words and expressions have been used by many modernised Muslims in such a way that they betray the state of cultural shock and often the inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* the West from which these Muslims suffer. Such writings echo a slavery of the mind to the norms and judgments of Western civilisation. Moreover, these norms are most often hidden under the veil of an "Islam" of which there often remains little more than a name and certain emotional attachments but which has become devoid of the intellectual and spiritual truth that stands at the heart of the Islamic revelation. In this essay it is our aim to discuss three such widely used expressions, namely decadence, deviation and renaissance, which are employed often in reference to Islamic history and the present-day Islamic world and which reflect in a profound fashion the attitude of a certain type of modernised Muslim toward the whole of Islam as a religion and a historical reality.

Let us begin with the term "decadence", which appears very often in the writings of modern Muslim scholars, who continuously refer to the condition of the Islamic world before the advent of modernism as one that could aptly be described as "decadent". This value judgment immediately raises the following question: "decadence with respect to what, or in respect to which norm"? There must be a norm by which something is measured and in relation to which it is judged to have decayed. Here while some take the early centuries of Islam as a norm, most often it is the value-system adopted consciously or unconsciously from the modern West that provides in a hidden and subtle manner the norm and criterion for determining decadence. This can be best illustrated when it comes to the question of science. Many modernised Muslims, like so many other Orientals, equate science with civilisation and judge the value of any human society and its culture

by whether or not it has produced science, disregarding completely the lessons of the history of science itself.¹ Islamic civilisation is then considered to have begun to decay when it ceased to produce outstanding scientists. And even the date of this cessation of activity is taken by most Muslim writers from Western sources, where until very recently for the most part interest has been limited in all aspects of Islamic intellectual life to the period when Islam influenced the West. As a result everything in Islam from philosophy to mathematics suddenly “decays” mysteriously somewhere around the 7th/13th century, exactly when the intellectual contact between Islam and the West came to an end. Modern Muslim authors who hold this type of view do not even bother to delve into the more recent and less known research of those Western scholars who have shown how important Islamic astronomy was in the 9th/15th century or how actively Islamic medicine was pursued in Persia and India until the 12th/18th century.²

The result of this concept of decadence, which is based upon the modern Western criteria for “civilisation” in its worldly aspect³ rather than on the traditional Islamic perspective which looks upon the Madina community as the most perfect Islamic society, a society according to which all other Islamic “societies” are judged, has been to atrophy the minds of young Muslims and make them lose confidence in themselves and in their own culture. Rather than depicting the decadence which did take place in the Islamic world as a gradual and normal process of “ageing” and of becoming more removed in time from the celestial origin of the revelation and without, moreover, emphasising the very recent nature of this decadence, such authors posit the fantastic and abhorrent theory that the Islamic world began to decay in the 7th/13th century. They remain completely oblivious of the fact that if this had been the case it would have been impossible for Islam to continue to nurture a vast civilisation and remain a living force to this day. They brush aside such masterpieces of art as the Shah Mosque, the Blue Mosque or the Taj Mahal, or the literary masterpieces of a Jāmi or a Šā’ib Tabrizi, or the metaphysical and theological syntheses of a Mullā Šadrā or a Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, not to speak of the ever-living spiritual tradition of Islam contained within Sufism, which has continued to produce saints to this day. Surely had decadence, as envisaged by those modernised Muslim writers who have adopted completely Western norms of judgment, taken hold of the Islamic world at the early date so often posited by this group, there would have been no Islamic civilisation left for such a group to revive during the present century. Islamic civilisation would have died out long ago and become only a subject of archaeological interest as in fact so many Orientalists would like to treat it.

As for the term “deviation”, it is in fact rarely used by modernists and is seen only in the writings of the more orthodox Muslim writers who are still aware of the presence of a spiritual and religious norm with which to

judge any human society including their own, for to speak of "tradition" in the widest sense of the word *al-dīn* is also to speak of the possibility of deviation. In fact, in the place where this term should be used, namely in reference to modern Western civilisation, which is itself a major deviation and anomaly, not to say "a monstrosity", to use the words of R. Guénon,⁴ the group of modern writers with whom we are concerned shy away from it, again precisely because of the lack of an objective norm with which to judge the temporal flux which determines the specific conditions of time and space of any particular "world" and which must of necessity transcend this flux.

When we come to the word "renaissance" we find a profusion of the wildest uses of this term in nearly every context, ranging from art and literature to politics. The modernists never tire of speaking of nearly every form of activity in the Islamic world as a renaissance, whose Arabic translation, *al-nahḍah*, has become such a prevalent word in contemporary Arabic literature. There is something insidious about the carefree usage of the word renaissance, for it recalls the Renaissance in the West when the re-birth of spiritually deadly elements of the Graeco-Roman paganism – and of course not the positive elements of this ancient tradition which had already been integrated into Christianity by the Church Fathers, especially St. Augustine – dealt a staggering blow to Christian civilisation and prevented it from reaching its natural period of flowering as a *Christian* civilisation. What many Muslims often take as renaissance is usually precisely the re-birth of the very forces that Islam came to supplant, forces which are identified in the traditional Muslim imagery with the age of ignorance or *jāhiliyyah*. That is not to say that a form of "renaissance" in a particular domain is impossible, for the appearance of a great saint can cause a "renaissance" of spirituality in a particular region of the Islamic world. A great master of Islamic art can revive a particular artistic form or a powerful intellectual figure can cause the revival of some aspects of Islamic intellectual life, provided he is himself genuinely rooted in the Islamic intellectual tradition.⁵ But that does not mean that every form of activity that occurs is an Islamic renaissance. Actually, most of what is paraded as "renaissance" today is nothing of the kind. Rather, it is the coming to life of the *jāhiliyyah* qualities in one form or another. How often has a directly anti-Islamic form of thought been hailed as the "renaissance" of Islamic thought or an activity directly opposed to the teachings of the *Shari'ah* as an Islamic social renaissance! Intellectual honesty would require us at least to avoid using the epithet "Islamic", even if the term renaissance must for some unknown reason be employed. Here again, it is the lack of vision of the objective Islamic norms which causes many people to identify simply any change and activity in the Islamic world with an Islamic renaissance, in the same way that in the secular world of the West and its dependencies on other continents any change is equated with "progress"

and "development" even if this change is in every way a debasement and diminishing of the quality of human life.

In all these cases, the common error results from the loss of vision of the objective, transcendent and immutable Islamic norms which alone can enable one to judge from an Islamic point of view whether a particular form or activity or period of human society is decadent, deviated or resurging with the characteristic of a true renaissance. Without the absolute, the relative can never be fully understood and without the immutable one cannot gauge the direction of flow of change. But because of a meta-physical myopia combined with a blind submission to the follies of the modern West, which has lost its vision of the Immutable, the group of modernised Muslims under discussion possesses neither the intellectual vision to perceive the immutable essences of things, the *malakūt* of things in Qur'ānic terminology, nor the binding faith to remain steadfast to the norm established by the Prophetic Tradition (*Sunnah* and *Ḥadīth*). Since the first of these ways of reaching the immutable principles of things is of an intellectual order, it is brushed aside by the modernised group in question without too much popular opposition and the energy of this group is then concentrated on the second, which because of its direct religious colour is bound to arouse greater opposition among believing Muslims. But in both cases, the ultimate motive is the same. It is to remove the only objective Islamic criteria according to which one could judge the present-day Islamic society and in fact the modern world in general.

The desire to remove this criterion becomes therefore concentrated in the attempt to weaken, in the eyes of faithful Muslims, the trans-historical significance of the Prophetic *Sunnah* and *Ḥadīth* by subjecting them to the so-called method of historical criticism in which usually the absence of the record of something is equated with the non-existence of the thing itself. The Holy Prophet (peace be on him) provides for Muslims, both individually and collectively, the perfect norm for their private and collective lives, the *uswah ḥasanah* of the Qur'ān. As long as his *Sunnah* is respected and kept intact, there is present a divinely appointed norm to judge human behaviour and, along with the Holy Book itself, to provide the basis for the life of human society as well as for the inner religious lives of the members of that society. The attack against the integrity of the *Ḥadīth* literature has as one of its major reasons, whether this is realised consciously or not, to remove the divinely ordained criterion for judging Muslims and therefore of leaving the ground open for men to follow the line of least resistance and to surrender to their passions or to the transient fashions of the day, however demonic they might be. All of this is done, moreover, in the name of an "Islamic renaissance" or of criticising as decadent any group which refuses to be a blind imitator of the cheapest products of Western civilisation.⁶ The ambiguous and often wishy-washy judgments of many of the modernists with respect to Islam, past and pres-

ent, are inseparable from the attempt to blur the clear example and norm for human life provided by the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. And conversely many orthodox Muslims who have sought to defend the integrity of Islam have found it necessary to emphasise over and over again the significance of the *Ḥadīth* and *Sunnah*, without which even the message of the Holy Qur'ān would become in many parts incomprehensible to men. The works of Mawlānā Mawdūdī are an example of this latter type of defence of Islam in which the defence of the Prophetic norm occupies such a central position.

It may now be asked that once this criticism has been made of the prevalent use of such terms as renaissance, decadence and deviation, what can these terms really signify if we accept the full authority of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* as well as the gradual unfolding of the tradition in stages to our own day. To this question one can give a precise answer which, however, because of the difference in premises and point of departure, will be very different from that of the modernist group in question. Let us begin with the term "renaissance".

Renaissance in the Islamic sense can only mean a rebirth or literally re-naissance of Islamic principles and norms and not just a re-birth of no matter what. Every sign of life is not the sign of true life and every activity that occurs among Muslim peoples is not necessarily an Islamic activity, especially during this age of the eclipse of so many aspects of the truth. A renaissance in its Islamic sense would correspond to *tajdid* or renewal, which in its traditional context is identified with the function of a renewer or *mujaddid*. Islamic history has been witness to many renaissances in the true sense of the word identified with the activity of a *mujaddid* in one part or another of the Islamic world. But always such a *mujaddid* has been the embodiment *par excellence* of the principles of Islam, which he has sought to reinstate and apply to a particular situation. He thus differs profoundly from the "reformer" in the modern sense, who is usually a "deformer" because he is willing to sacrifice an aspect of the Islamic tradition for this or that contingent factor that is most often made to appear irresistible by being called "inescapable conditions of the times". One wonders what would have happened to Islam during and after the Mongol invasion if such "reformers" had appeared at that time and tried to adapt Islam to what was then surely the most irresistible set of "conditions of the time", that connected with the victorious Mongols and their way of life. A true Islamic renaissance is then not just the birth or re-birth of anything that happens to be fashionable at a particular moment of human history but the re-application of principles of a truly Islamic nature.

And here the primary condition for a truly Islamic renaissance becomes clear. This condition in our day resides in independence from the influence of the West and all that characterises modernism. A Muslim far away from the influence of modernism can possibly experience spiritual renewal while

remaining oblivious to what is going on in the modern world. But a Muslim leader who wishes to renew the intellectual life of the Islamic world which is under such profound pressure from the West and from modern civilisation in general, which has now travelled from the West to the Islamic world, cannot hope to bring about an Islamic renaissance on either the intellectual or social level except through a profound criticism of modernism and the modern world itself. To speak of an Islamic renaissance and at the same time accept without any discrimination all that the modern world stands for is pure chimera and the wildest of dreams, a dream which in the end cannot but turn into a nightmare. Today no truly Islamic activity, especially in the intellectual order, can take place without a profoundly critical attitude towards the modern world combined with a deep understanding of this world. Nor is the practice of giving opinion or *ijtihād* possible in the field of Islamic law for a mind that has been transformed by the tenets of modernism. If, despite all the talk about an Islamic renaissance among Muslim modernists during the past century, no such thing has taken place – certainly not issuing from their quarter – it is precisely because of the lack on the part of these modernists of this absolutely essential, critical, and at the same time profound, knowledge of the modern world and an evaluation of the transient values of this world in the light of the eternal principles of Islam. It is high time that those who want to speak in the name of the Muslim intelligentsia and who wish to bring about a renaissance of Islam stop speaking from the position of inferiority *vis-à-vis* the West and begin to apply the sword of metaphysical discrimination contained in its purest form in the *Shahādah* to the modern world itself.

If such a perspective is followed the meaning of decadence and deviation also becomes clear. Decadence is always a falling off from a perfect norm but following a course that is still related to that norm, while deviation is a complete departure from that norm itself. Moreover, there are two forms of decadence: one passive and the other active, one which the civilisations of the East underwent during the past few centuries and the other which was followed by the modern West during the same period⁷ and which because of its activity became a deviation. Many Orientals – Muslims as well as others – mistook it for true life precisely because of the dynamic element it contained. Today, strangely enough, before the startled eyes of many modernised Easterners, this deviation of the West is turning into decadence of a form that is easily recognisable for Easterners themselves. It can in fact be said that the curve of life of modern Western civilisation beginning with the termination of its spiritual normalcy during the Middle Ages has gone from “renaissance” to deviation to decadence, this last phase becoming ever more evident during the last two decades. As for that aspect of Islam connected with the group of modernists in mind – and not the totality of the Islamic tradition which fortunately remains above this process – the curve can be described as going from decay to “renaissance”

to deviation, a deviation which will surely be followed by another phase of decadence, but of a different type from which the modernists originally sought to escape.

There is only one way to escape this insidious chain. It is to remain faithful to the eternal and immutable principles which stand above all contemporary events, and then to apply these principles to whatever situation the Muslims are faced with, to whichever "world" that presents itself to them. To take any transient spacio-temporal set of conditions or "world" as the criterion of the validity of Islamic principles and teachings is to reverse the natural order of things. It is to put the cart before the horse; it is to make the contingent the criterion of judgment for the eternal. Its fruit can only be an unfolding similar to the fatal course pursued by the West, the end of which is the impasse which modern civilisation now faces and which threatens human existence itself.

The Muslim "intelligentsia" cannot do anything better than to benefit from the lessons that can be drawn from a deeper study of the stages in the history of the modern West which have brought it to its present crisis. If they wish to speak for Islam and to renew its life they must remember the extremely heavy responsibility they bear. It must be recalled that a true death is better than a false life and that if one wishes to renew the life of the Islamic community it must be the renewal of a life whose roots are sunk deeply in the Divine. There is no way to avoid both decadence and deviation and to achieve a true renaissance but to reapply the principles and truths contained in the Islamic revelation, which have always been valid and will always continue to be so. And to be able to apply these principles to the outside world it is first of all necessary to apply them to oneself. Man must become spiritually revived before being able to revive the world about him. The greatest lesson that all true reformers today could learn is that the real reform of the world begins with the reform of oneself. He who conquers himself conquers the world and he in whom a renewal of the principles of Islam in their full amplitude has taken place has already taken the most fundamental step towards the "renaissance" of Islam itself; for, only he who has become resurrected in the truth can resurrect and revive the world about him, whatever the extent of that "world" might be according to the will of Heaven.

Notes and Sources

- 1 See S. H. Nasr, *Science and Civilisation in Islam*, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, and New York, 1970, where we have dealt extensively with this question, especially in the introduction, p. 21 ff.
- 2 The situation for Islamic philosophy is even more startling since Islamic philosophy and metaphysics have never really decayed at all. See S. H. Nasr, *Islamic Studies*, Beirut, 1967, ch. VIII and IX; and Nasr, "The Tradition of Islamic Philosophy in

Persia and its Significance for the Modern World" (tr. by W. Chittick), *Iqbal Review*, vol. 12, n. 3, Oct. 1971, pp. 28-49; also Nasr, "Persia and the Destiny of Islamic Philosophy", *Studies in Comparative Religion*, Winter, 1972, pp. 31-42.

- 3 For Western man, especially after the 17th century "civilisation" became wholly identified with the purely human and in fact with the self-aggrandisement of terrestrial man which reaches its peak with Louis XIV. See F. Schuon, "Remarks on some kings of France", *Studies in Comparative Religion*, Winter, 1972, p. 2 ff.
- 4 See the two fundamental works of R. Guénon on the modern world, *The Crisis of the Modern World*, tr. by M. Pallis and R. Nicholson, London, 1962, and *The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times*, tr. by Lord Northbourne, London, 1953. See also the masterly analysis of F. Schuon, *Light on the Ancient Worlds*, tr. by Lord Northbourne, London, 1965.
- 5 See H. Corbin, "The Force of Traditional Philosophy in Iran Today," *Studies in Comparative Religion*, Winter, 1968, p. 12 ff.
- 6 On the significance of the prophetic *Hadith* and a reply to its modern critics see S. H. Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam*, London, 1971, p. 79 ff.; and F. Schuon, *Understanding Islam*, tr. by D. M. Matheson, London, 1963 and Baltimore, 1971, ch. III. See also S. M. Yusuf, *An Essay on the Sunnah*, Lahore, 1966.
- 7 "All civilisations have decayed: only they have decayed in different ways; the decay of the East is passive and that of the West is active.

"The fault of the East in decay is that it no longer thinks; the West in decay thinks too much and thinks wrongly.

"The East is sleeping over truths; the West lives in errors". (F. Schuon, *Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts*, tr. by D. M. Matheson, London, 1953, p. 22.)

CHAPTER FOUR

Reflections on the Roles and Educational Desiderata of the Islamist

Ismā'īl Ibrāhīm Nawwāb

THIS is a modest attempt, made in a spirit of diffidence, to explore briefly a subject that has a vital, pressing and multi-lateral importance for the Muslim world: the present-day roles of the Islamic scholar and the kind of education that best equips him to play these roles effectively. In some ways, the Islamist faces problems that are similar to the ones confronting contemporary scholars everywhere, the most intractable among them being those of the resistance to forsake the familiar, and the striking of a harmonious balance between specialisation and liberal education. But in so far as he has roots in a distinctive cultural and religious heritage, the Islamist's unique, decisive roles and his special discipline and its requirements necessitate a separate treatment. No detailed, satisfactory study of these aspects has yet been undertaken. The purpose of this exploration is to indicate, in the perspective of history, a few of the main points deserving of consideration.

Despite the various social, political, historical, intellectual, and pedagogical backgrounds of Muslim countries, there is a common unifying strand of function that subtly twines their scholars together and makes them feel that they share problems which are, on the whole, somewhat similar in nature. No attempt will be made here to consider professional or semi-professional classes such as religious teachers and *imāms*, whose training has either not had scholarship as one of its aims, or, in the case of non-Arab Muslim countries, has not even been grounded in Arabic, the philological *sine qua non* of Islamists.¹ Their function is in some instances performed by Islamic scholars, but in the majority of Muslim countries, the role of the non-scholars differs considerably from the parts played by the Islamists. The role of the former is indeed of immense social, and even political, significance. It is, therefore, an urgent need of the times that special studies be made and action be taken to invigorate this group, thus repairing the broken bridge of understanding between it and other segments of society. Unfortunately, in some Muslim countries, a sad sequence of historical events has resulted in a lack of appreciation of the integrative potentialities

within this group; on the contrary, it is dreaded as being disruptive and divisive. Hence the misguided attempts to emasculate it.

For different, but obvious reasons non-Muslim Islamists will not come within our purview, though their contacts with Muslim scholars warrant a few remarks.² The non-Muslim Islamists, whose backgrounds, motives and activities vary noticeably, belong to a relatively new group; their function also varies and is interlinked with the special needs and diverse interests of their nations. The influence of their leading figures, spreading through their indefatigable zeal, modern methodology, and pioneer investigations, is increased many times over by their recruits from the Muslim student body and is thus reaching Muslim society. Their best Muslim students have brought a fresh, vigorous and much-needed stream of fertilising thought into an almost stagnant pond of learning. But it is ironical that their poor Muslim products – the choice of the word is deliberate and expressive of an educational judgment – share with the average, traditionally-educated scholar a similar uncritical outlook of learning, and are burdened with a similar, but superficially more dazzling, dead-weight of “inert ideas”.³ They do not, however, have the redeeming feature of the latter: a psychological and emotional concern for and involvement in Muslim society.

The roles and education of the modern Islamic scholar have, of necessity, to be viewed within the context of the complex world of contemporary knowledge, not only as it exists in Muslim countries but as it does in the world as a whole. Muslim society is interacting with other societies; it lives neither in geographical nor in cultural isolation. The Islamic scholar, seized by the throat and hurled into the turbulent cross-currents of modern thought, can hold to the cramping impediments of a medieval *weltanschauung* only at the cost of being an anachronism, and to the detriment of society. He is not, nor can Muslim society allow him to be, an island.

Of the several roles of the Islamists, the supreme and yet hardest of fulfilment is that of keeping alive the ideological *raison d'être* of Muslim society: the Islamic faith itself. The Qur'ān adumbrates their role in a verse which states:

“Let there arise from you a group of people, calling to goodness, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong; such are they who are successful”.⁴

The Prophet (peace be on him), too, has indicated, with his characteristic brevity, both their importance and responsibility when he said:

“Scholars are the heirs of the prophets”.⁵

This role has two main aspects, the one individual, requiring a personal struggle to acquire and practise the religious ideal; the other social, requiring the dissemination of this ideal to others. It demands a vision that

is permeated by a deep sense of piety, and illuminated with the genuine purpose of a Muslim's life: an active surrender to, and dynamic enactment of, God's Will here and now, combined with a constant and vivid awareness of the life to come. But, basically, such a vision is the creation of individual experience. Unlike religious knowledge, which is cumulative and transmissible, the vision comes to an end with the death of its beholder. Hence, the scholars, as well as other members of every generation, face the need to achieve afresh a religious vision of their own.

This is a challenge to human nature; several are the epochs and many the Islamists who have failed to meet it. Their conduct being of no mean social importance, it is no exaggeration to state that the disparity between the precepts and practice of numerous scholars, the discrepancy between their words and deeds, have done, and are still doing, immeasurable harm, for such inconsistencies not only reveal their divorce from the Islamic way of life as expounded in the Qur'an and exemplified by the Prophet (peace be on him), but also emphasise their failure to provide example and guidance to the masses. Of course, there have been notable exceptions, such as Abū Hanīfah (81–150/700–767), Mālik b. Anas (ca. 93–179/ca. 712–795), Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (164–241/780–855), Taqī al-Dīn b. Taymīyah (661–728/1263–1328), and some others, whose courage has matched their convictions. In recent times, Sayyid Quṭb (ca. 1324–1386/ca. 1906–1966) and Abū al-A'lā Mawḍūdī (b. 1321/1903) have been put to the test, each in his own way, and found admirable by friend and foe alike. It is, however, noticeable that, in our day, men of great courage have rarely been forthcoming from the traditional Islamists. Many Islamists have wasted their life in the labyrinth of intellectualistic triviality. Many others have wallowed in the Serbonian bog of worldliness: the craving for wealth, power and status. Discredited, they lost the confidence of the masses and also did damage to the image and cause of Islam. The general disillusionment with corrupt scholars has found expression in such disparate genres and personalities as the ornate *maqāmāt* of the worldly-minded Badī' al-Zamān al-Hamadhānī (358–398/969–1007),⁶ the meditative poetry of the pessimistic Abū al-'Alā' al-Ma'arri (363–449/973–1057),⁷ the spontaneous prose of the devout Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (450–505/1058–1111),⁸ and the versified social criticism of the renowned Ḥasan al-Badrī al-Ḥijāzī (d. 1131/1718–19).⁹ In disgust with a morally degenerate and materialistic world, and to be immune from contamination by it, some of the pious fled to the other extreme and withdrew into the shelter of mystical encapsulation.

The religious responsibility of the modern Islamist is grave; just as grave is his manifest failure to discharge it in an age when

The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.¹⁰

Today, seeing the vortex of various man-centred ideologies and philos-

ophies, some of which are based on atheism and materialism, his role in keeping his religion alive assumes a new significance. In performing his role, the Islamist faces the perennial problems: the struggle for the achievement and practice of piety, the demand for social activity, the temptation to join the status seekers, the allurements of intellectualistic red herrings, the attitude to authority, and the escapism of introversion. It is, of course, every Muslim's individual responsibility to understand, practise, preserve and preach his religion. Islam is certainly not the monopoly of any group. But the scholarly background of the Islamist imposes on him a greater responsibility in this matter than falls to the lot of the average Muslim. The primacy of his religious role cannot be over-emphasised, for in the entire heritage of Muslim society, the faith of Islam is the most precious heirloom.

Another role that Islamic scholars perform is that of the preservation and transmission of the religious and intellectual heritage of Islam. This role has an ancient and glorious history going back to the very early days of the religion. We owe the growth, richness and spread of Islamic learning to the religious devotion, creative gifts, scholarly activity, social commitment, and stupendous, often largely individual, exertions of the predecessors of the modern savant. To them we are greatly beholden for the preservation and diffusion of this learning in times when its very survival was at stake.

Even a brief consideration of the central position that religious learning has occupied in the Muslim educational system for many centuries will give some idea of the value of this conservation and of the extent of the Islamists' contribution to it. At a popular level, innumerable Muslims owed their literacy solely to the religious education which they had received. It is probable that but for such a preservation, a major intellectual breakdown would have occurred, the various sciences disappeared, illiteracy become more widespread, and a clear understanding of the teachings of Islam become unattainable. Lacking the educational infrastructure provided by the Islamists, it would not seem unreasonable to conclude that civilised life would have greatly suffered and Muslim society might have sunk into intellectual barbarism. Faced with such uncongenial circumstances and the educational *tabula rasa* resulting from them, the rise of new learning would be a slow and difficult process. To illustrate: the present-day evidence seems to indicate that no significant development took place in literary Arabic (*al-fuṣṣḥā*) during the post-classical period. On the contrary, a combination of causes resulted in its becoming rigid, stereotyped, rhetoric-infected, and impoverished. But despite these and other weaknesses, its various branches – philology, grammar, prosody, lexicography, historiography and so on – never ceased to be cultivated by the Islamists, who thought of them as auxiliary in the study of Islamic religious sources. This led to two striking consequences. First, literary Arabic escaped the fossilisation which overtook some of the other classical languages, such as Latin and Sanskrit, and which brought in its wake the proliferation of cognate,

but mutually unintelligible, languages. Secondly, its continued cultivation, even in an impoverished condition, enabled its writers, within a few decades of their feeling the need, to improve it so that it could become a medium for the expression of modern thought. Ḥāfīz Ibrāhīm (1287–1351/1871–1932) has movingly described the plight of literary Arabic and its decay in one of his early poems that deserves a permanent niche in the history of Arabic literature. His lamentation, however, is tempered with pride in the richness of the language and confidence in its capacity for adaptation and growth in the modern technological era.¹¹ Could such confidence exist without the efforts which the Islamists had directed towards the conservation of Arabic?¹² Had Muslim society been forced to start from scratch in the educational sphere, would it have produced the writers and thinkers of its modern Renaissance at the period that it did? One's mind staggers at the immensity and complexity of the task that would have confronted the Muslims.

The crucial role of the Islamists in preserving knowledge, specially when the radiance of its light paled during unfavourable epochs, needs to be examined. It appears incontestable that even when the surroundings became storm-encompassed and the days grew dismal, this light remained inextinguishable. It became dim, it flickered, but it survived and bravely kept on emitting a glow, albeit a greatly diminished glow. We may be unsympathetic to the limited aims, restricted scope, confining content, pedagogical methods, and dull quality of Islamic learning in ages uncharacterised by fresh and brilliant contributions, but should this obscure the startling fact that learning never ceased to exist in the Muslim world? Its survival is due mainly to Islamists who worked to conserve and disseminate what, in their view, was essential to the welfare and survival of the community. Considering the difficulties that they had to contend with, this is, by any educational standards, a remarkable achievement. Their achievement can be gauged by the perceptiveness with which some of them were able to see the new challenges that were inherent in the Muslim's encounter with Western European civilisation. In the Arab world, for example, two of the towering figures of the Renaissance arose from the traditionally-educated Islamists. These were Rifā'ah Rāfi' al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (1216–1290/1801–1873) and Muḥammad 'Abduh (1261–1323/1845–1905); their influence has been pervasive in its width and depth.¹³ Were it not for the learning which had been lovingly preserved by the Islamists, Rifā'ah al-Ṭaḥṭāwī and Muḥammad 'Abduh would not have had the educational background indispensable to the contribution that they eventually made. Without their roots in traditional Islamic learning, whose shortcomings did not escape them, it is unlikely that they would have been enriched by their contact with the stimulus of a different civilisation, let alone their having been in a position to respond to it in any fructifying manner.

Yet the significance of the role of the Islamists in preserving and diffusing

learning is not generally appreciated. It is even overlooked.¹⁴ Cherishing the remembrance of a past that is resplendent, weighed down by the burden of a present that is ignominious, aspiring to a future that can restore ancient glory and wipe away present disgrace, we seem to grope, impatiently and hastily, for the reasons of our decline – and inevitably fall into the temptation of easy, naïve generalisation. One such generalisation is the over-emphasis placed on traditional learning and its bearers in accounting for our decline.

This over-simplification prevents us from gaining a true understanding of the complicated web of historical causation; moreover, by making us isolate one part for emphasis, it also distorts our perspective of the total configuration. Consequently, cause and effect are confounded.¹⁵ There can be no doubt that the narrow concept and content of traditional learning in the later Middle Ages has been a factor in our decline. But the quality of learning in any society generally reflects the entire situation of that society; it cannot remain unaffected by the forces working within that milieu. The fate of learning is thus intricately interwoven with the environmental condition as a whole; learning and society exist symbiotically: learning in a vigorous society is vigorous, as learning in a stagnant one is stagnant.

It thus becomes apparent that we cannot hope to offer a more balanced explanation of the nature and basis of Muslim civilisation unless we take into account the services rendered by the Islamists to the conservation and dissemination of learning. But our picture would remain incomplete if we do not examine the extent to which they discharged their role wisely and perceptively. Here we must be circumspect for it is dangerous as well as unhistorical to project our views and criticisms of the periods about which we are relatively well-informed to times that have not yet been subjected to full investigation. What evidence there is seems to suggest that the Islamists, with far too few exceptions, rarely gave a clear, systematic, philosophic expression to their conception of education.¹⁶ The few attempts that were made in this direction were not re-evaluated in the light of the social demands and educational requirements of successive ages. It appears that from the beginning there were present certain tendencies pointing to a lack of insight into the close reciprocity and innate unity of all branches of learning. The views of knowledge prevailing in Muslim society have often been warped by an undue emphasis on the compartmentalisation of the sciences as well as by the partisan pride usually generated by the parochial protagonists of the various disciplines. It was not generally seen that the barriers being erected between the different fields were not only arbitrary but also harmful. The Islamists, too, had their share in the erection of these barriers, which, in some periods, led to the creation of many self-contained groups, each of them having its own aims and blowing its own trumpet.¹⁷ This was linked to the belief that the subjects of the religious curriculum offered a comprehensive and self-sufficient system of education; Islamists,

it was held, could become versed in religion merely by studying subjects “really” related to it. This had the effect of depriving Islamists of the much-needed nourishment and fertilisation from other sources.¹⁸ The historian ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Jabartī (1116–1237/1754–1822) records details which reveal how some of the leading Islamists of mid-twelfth/mid-eighteenth-century Egypt were content to live in a climate that, intellectually, was almost suffocating.¹⁹ When other disciplines – the philosophic and scientific ones, for example – languished under unfavourable conditions, it seems that the educational imbalance grew more marked and there appeared in Muslim society a disproportionately large number of Islamists with a narrow educational base. As far back as al-Ghazālī, we hear the complaint that, of the disciplines of high relevance to society, the study of medicine was being neglected, while preference was being given to the cultivation of the “religious” sciences. The result was that in al-Ghazālī’s time there was a plethora of theologians and jurists and a dearth of Muslim physicians.²⁰ As time went on there grew among the Islamists a contempt for the “non-religious” sciences, whose acquisition was sometimes deemed to be not only reprehensible but religiously unlawful. No less a person than Muḥammad ‘Ulaysh (1217–1299/1802–1882), the energetic *Muftī* of the Mālikīyah in Egypt, exemplifies the narrow and socially disastrous educational views that became dominant among the representatives of the traditional Islamic learning.²¹

The modern Islamist needs to consider the role of his predecessors in the preservation and diffusion of learning; he ought to observe their virtues and faults, their successes and failures. This will enable him to seize what is of relevance to contemporary Muslim society. It is necessary for him to look back at their astonishing accomplishments with legitimate pride, and learn from their inadvertent mistakes with profound humility. Today, the Islamist needs to give continuity to previous achievements, and work for the elimination of persistent errors. He is in a position to play this role dynamically if he develops a broader outlook on his place and mission in society. By viewing learning as an integrated whole, he can at once avoid the gravest weakness which enfeebled many of his predecessors, and render his own role more ample and comprehensive.

This inevitably raises a question of considerable importance: does this role not reduce the present-day Islamist to an inert individual, a passive *object*, respectfully and unquestioningly reproducing the thoughts of others? His preservative and transmissive part may give such an appearance, but what is the reality? In his performance of this role, he emerges as a potentially discriminating *subject*, able to exercise his powers to select or reject personal, social and educational alternatives. Though a bearer and transmitter of his predecessors’ learning, he has the capacity and right to choose and criticise what is to be conserved and diffused. However, it has to be recognised that – due to reasons which do not concern us here – many

Islamic scholars frequently failed to make use of their right to question earlier authorities and went on repeating what had been said by the ancients. But is it just to disparage this role on this account? *Ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia*. The modern Islamist has the right to use his critical faculties when performing this role. Moreover, if the active nature of his function is in doubt, it would surely be absurd and meaningless to impute blame to him for his mistaken judgments or lavish praise on him for his intelligent decisions. This would also be true of his predecessors, who would have to be thought of as mere social mechanisms, and would, therefore, fall outside the scope of historical evaluation.

But there is another consideration which further strengthens the investigator's argument to reject the attribution of passivity to the Islamists. This is their creative role, whereby the few exceptionally gifted and intuition-endowed members of the learned community expand the frontiers of knowledge by their advance into virgin, unknown territory. It would seem rather platitudinous to elaborate on the original, fecund contributions of prominent Islamists, which rank, or merit to rank, among the foremost creative and abiding achievements of literate societies. Of the many distinguished names and enduring accomplishments, those of al-Shāfi'i (150–204/767–820) in jurisprudence, al-Bukhārī (194–256/810–870) in *ḥadith*-criticism, Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (*ca.* 224–310/*ca.* 839–923) in Qur'ānic exegesis and historical comprehensiveness, al-Ghazālī in theocentric philosophy, and Ibn Khaldūn (732–808/1332–1406) in sociology, form luminaries in a constellation that shines bright in the firmament of the world's immortal geniuses. Whenever social life stirs with crisis or blossoms into activity, whenever unprecedented changes and challenges present the need to propound new solutions for old problems, the great Islamists concurrently play the preservative and transmissive part on the one hand, and the creative role on the other. These two parts then become inseparable.

Muslims now live in such a society. We seem to have arrived at the cross-roads. The decision that we take will have far-reaching and long-lasting effects; once an ill-fated path is chosen and followed, it will require uncommon and time-consuming efforts to turn away from it and counteract the harm done. Islam as a system, as a distinct practicable ideology with its own definite purpose and plan for Man, has suffered from neglect and remained unfulfilled in practice for centuries. Today, Muslim society is faced with the challenge and need to take stock of the cataclysm which is indiscriminately shattering its long-established traditions. It must plan a sound course of action that, by-passing secondary streamlets, derives its inspiration directly from the limpid, gushing, original sources of Islam themselves. In this enormous, momentous task, Islamists with the ability to play a creative part are absolutely indispensable. Such Islamists have a decisive role to play in re-vitalising our heritage by investigating and

suggesting ways and means by which Islam can today provide meaningful, relevant, and helpful solutions for our urgent and multifarious problems. If Muslim society arrives at solutions without the benefit of the Islamists' labours and contributions, it is likely that such solutions will prove of doubtful value as they would not reckon upon the Islamic point of view.²² If the present-day Islamist hesitates to forsake his ghetto of familiar and unimaginative ideas for the bustle and stress of the outside world, where the more demanding creative role awaits him, he will jeopardise all his other roles. Unless, enlightened by him, social progress takes an Islamic direction, his other parts are certain to diminish in importance. What, for instance, will be the scope of, and the value attached to, the preservation and diffusion of *uṣūl al-fiqh* in a milieu wherein the *sharī'ah* itself becomes a dead letter? Or, to give another example, how feasible will it be to lead a religious life in a society dominated entirely by secularist forces? Hence the pressing necessity for the contemporary Islamist to realise the great importance of his creative role as well as the grave risks involved in not performing it. The majority of present-day Islamists have, so far, been content to follow the beaten track. So, how and when will the Islamic scholars needed by modern society appear in numbers adequate to meet its requirements? The growth and flow of such Islamists will be favoured only when a wider concept of learning is embraced and the essentially intimate interconnections of the varied disciplines are vividly apprehended. With a thoroughly solid and up-to-date educational foundation, the contemporary Islamist can do more than preserve and disseminate this re-vivified learning: he can enrich it by his own creative endeavours. Steeped in ancient and modern disciplines, and propelled by their fruitful combination, he can climb on the mountains of original thought to heights that have not known the foot of Man, and view panoramas not seen by his predecessors.

The Islamic scholars also have a social role. They need to participate in social activities that may not pertain to academic pursuits, such as giving popular lectures and radio talks, and writing non-technical articles and books. Islamists do not have the right to spend their whole life in the rarefied stratosphere of contemplative and academic absorption. If they are not entirely engrossed in scholastic activities that are socially irrelevant, it is reasonable to expect that they will have the urge to communicate to a wider circle the important aspects of the object of their keen and long devotion. To discharge their spiritual duty, they ought to come into contact frequently and closely with the ordinary man, inspiring him with their example, disseminating the finer points of Islam to him, and stimulating him with their thought. In the past, some Islamists realised the importance of broad social contacts and played this role with distinction. Others were not as successful because both their lives and thoughts were uninspiring. In modern times, after an initial revulsion against the earliest form of mass

communication, the printing press, the Islamists seem to have become aware of the great importance of these media, but in some countries access to them is still restricted, while in others the gate is altogether closed against them. It is, however, noticeable that some of the present-day Islamists are showing an undesirable aloofness from the humdrum and simple needs of the Muslim community. The result has been that the masses have to rely on inadequately qualified persons. The modern Islamic scholar ought to find a common ground between him and the larger, non-academic public by sharing his knowledge with it. He must find allies in the mass media, which can give him avenues of communication undreamt of by his predecessors. Unless he does this, the vacuum that he leaves will be filled by other forces.

The Islamists have yet another role, that of the intellectual unification of the Muslim world; as such, this role is of special relevance to our era. Many of the most distinguished classical Islamists have played this part. Despite the Muslim world's many political divisions, vast geographical distances, and numerous linguistic barriers, the body of Islamists was held together by the cement of Islamic fraternity. Arabic was the universal language of the Muslim learning. Travel was difficult, but it was, nonetheless, every savant's objective, and thousands took the trouble to perform the scholar's pilgrimage. Islamists thus came into close personal contact with one another and the benefit was mutual. It is to be hoped that this unifying role can be resurrected by the contemporary Islamic scholar. Political fragmentation, the plague of nationalism, and irreconcilable, divergent orientations, have made it difficult for Muslim countries to co-operate even in the non-political sphere, so much so that a *rapprochement* between them seems a chimera. But the disunion of the Muslim world only serves to frustrate each of its individual components in the achievement of its real interests. The illogical gulf which separates Muslim states from one another is, in some instances, partly due to sheer ignorance of the special conditions and peculiar problems of other countries. The Islamist is in the position to be a mediator between the Muslim intelligentsia. By undertaking studies and translations, he can acquaint his own compatriots with the thoughts of the scholars of other lands and introduce the ideas of those from his homeland to other countries. Such efforts towards mutual understanding and sympathetic contact can be the precursor of Muslim unity.

The consideration of the roles of the Islamist has shown that they are many and mutually interpenetrating. He has religious, preservative and transmissive, creative, social and unifying roles. The greater the number of roles that the modern Islamist performs the better will he succeed in the service of God and Man and in the creation of a community that has the capacity to enrich humanity by its way of life and contributions. But he should have the wisdom to perceive that, just as his roles are of exceptional importance to society, the good or bad influence of the life that he leads is

also not comparable to the life led by other well-educated members of society. It would be a great tragedy if the modern Islamist fails to realise the extent of his moral responsibility to provide a practical example of the Islamic life. It must be stressed that, whatever the roles he plays, no amount of selfless dedication, professional competence, or scholarly contribution, can relieve him of giving priority to his primary role: the religious one. The performance of this role is a matter of individual volition and answerableness, and its hub is – to use a Qur’anic expression that goes to the very roots of Man’s most recalcitrant problem – the remembrance of God.

Notes and Sources

- 1 Members of this group are variously called, depending on the bias and linguistic region of their compatriots. Some of the terms in current use are: *guru ugama*, *kiai*, *ustādh lebai*, *mullā* (from the Arabic *mawlā*), *mawli* (variant of *mawlawi*), *miyān-jī*, *muṭawwa’*, *fagī*, *fodyo* (dialectical variants of *faqih*, pl. *fuqahā*). It is not without significance that some of these sometimes carry a derisive connotation. Generally, the blanket term used for the Islamic scholar proper is ‘*ālim*, which has an ancient chequered semantic history. ‘*Ulamā*’ is its plural. However, in Malay/Indonesian, ‘*ulamā*’, modified phonetically and orthographically, is almost invariably used in the singular.
- 2 On the non-Muslim Islamists, and Orientalists in general, see the historical surveys of Najīb al-‘Aqīqī, *al-Mustashriqūn* (3 vols., 3rd rev. edn., Cairo, 1964), and Johann Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20 Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, 1955). For a Muslim’s critical evaluation of non-Muslim Islamists, see the Palestinian ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Ṭībāwī’s “English-Speaking Orientalists, A Critique of their Approach to Islam and Arab Nationalism”, in *The Muslim World*, 53 (1963), pp. 185–204; 298–313 (reprinted, London, 1384/1964; Geneva, 1385/1965). Their impact on a brilliant Muslim mind can be seen in Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, *Tajdīd Dhikrā Abī al-‘Alā’* (2nd ed., 5th impression, Cairo, 1957), pp. 7–10. In 1897, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, at the age of fifty-two, followed a summer course in French literature at the University of Geneva; it is interesting to note the impact that the Socratic method made on him. This has been recorded in Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt, *Wahy al-Risālah* (7th impression, Cairo, 1381/1962), I, p. 27.
- 3 To adopt A. N. Whitehead’s expression in *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (London, 1959), p. 1. He defines (pp. 1–2) “inert ideas” as “ideas that are merely received in the mind, without being utilised, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations”.
- 4 The Qur’ān, III: 104.
- 5 Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, III (*Kitāb al-‘Ilm*): 10.
- 6 See “al-Maqāmah al-Naysābūriyah”, in *Maqāmāt Badī‘ al-Zamān al-Hamadhānī*, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abduh (4th impression, Beirut, 1957 [? 1958]), pp. 199–200.
- 7 See his *Luzūm mā lā Yalzam*, ed. Ibrāhīm al-A-‘rābī (Beirut, n.d.), I, p. 303.
- 8 *Ihyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn*, with a foreword by Badawī Ṭabānah (Cairo [1377/1957]), I, p. 3. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 22, ll. 13–17; pp. 65–66. Al-Ghazālī’s critical attitude to the scholars of his age and their materialistic pursuits has been quoted, described, and discussed by W. Montgomery Watt in *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazālī* (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 108–116.
- 9 He is extensively quoted on this theme in ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī, ‘*Ājā’ib al-Āthār fī al-Tarājīm wa al-Akhbār*, ed. Ḥasan Muḥammad Jawhar *et al.* (Cairo, 1958), I, pp. 198, 203–206. None but the scholars of al-Azhar of the day is the object

of this onslaught; elsewhere in this composition, the poet shows a clear grasp of the weaknesses of al-Azhar as an educational centre, thus preceding the early reformers of the modern Arab Renaissance by more than a century in his awareness of some of the central moral and educational issues involved.

- 10 W. B. Yeats, "The Second Coming", in *Collected Poems* (2nd ed., London, 1955), p. 210.
- 11 Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm, *Diwān*, ed., Aḥmad Amin, *et al.* (Beirut, 1969), pt. I, pp. 253–54. For a study of the general social significance of Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm's poetry, see 'Abd al-Ḥamid Sanad al-Jundi, *Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm: Shā'ir al-Nil* (Cairo, 1959): bibliographical data are given in the introduction (pp. 8–10), to which can be added: Shawqī Ḍayf, *Dirāsāt fī al-Shi'r al-'Arabī al-Mu'āsir* (2nd ed., Cairo, 1959), pp. 9–27; and, in English, A. J. Arberry, *Aspects of Islamic Civilisation, as depicted in the original texts* (London, 1964), pp. 359–377, where Aḥmad Shawqī, another leading poet, is also discussed.
- 12 As far as Arabic language and literature are concerned, others apart from the Islamists also contributed to their preservation. For example, many Arab Christians have shown great zeal and love for Arabic and have actively sought to conserve and enrich it. On this subject, see Louis Cheikho, *al-Ādāb al-'Arabīyah fī al-Qarn al-Tāsi* 'Aḥar (2 vols., 2nd edn., Beirut, 1924–1926). In recent times, even Orientalists, by editing and publishing Arabic texts – and thus blazing the path of scientific textual scholarship – have played a preservative role.
- 13 On al-Taḥṭāwī, see Aḥmad Aḥmad Badawī, *Rifā'ah Rāfi' al-Taḥṭāwī* (2nd ed., Cairo, 1959); Khaldūn Šā'i al-Ḥuṣrī, *Three Reformers: A Study in Modern Arab Political Thought* (Beirut, 1966), pp. 11–31; Albert Habib Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (London, 1962), Index; Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, *Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters* (Princeton, 1963), index. There is a wealth of literature on Muḥammad 'Abduh, in many languages, of which the following will be found specially useful: Rashid Riḍā, *Ta'riḫ al-Ustādh al-Imām* (3 vols., Cairo, 1326–1350/[1908]–1931); Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London, 1933); Albert Habib Hourani, *op. cit.*, pp. 130–192; Aḥmad Amin, *Zu'amā' al-Islāh fī al-'Aṣr al-Ḥadīth* (Cairo, 1367/1948), pp. 285–345; Osman Amin, *Muḥammad 'Abduh, essai sur ses idées philosophiques et religieuses* (Cairo, 1944).
- 14 Cf. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal, 1964), a masterly presentation, in which the author's irritation with the Turkish 'ulamā' of the past leads him to concentrate on their faults, to the neglect of their positive contributions. The services of the Islamists to the conservation of Arabic are overlooked in Shawqī Ḍayf, *al-Adab al-Mu'āsir fī Miṣr, 1850–1950* (Cairo, 1957), and Luwīs 'Awāḍ's leftist *al-Mu'aththirāt al-Ajnabīyah fī al-Adab al-'Arabī al-Ḥadīth, al-Mabḥaṭh al-Thānī: al-Fikr al-Siyāsī wa al-Ijtīmā'ī* (Cairo, 1963), pt. 1. These are but a few of the examples germane to our argument.
- 15 This is apart from the fact that our knowledge of some periods – specially those in which decline set in and our fortunes were low – is so inadequate that we cannot yet really hope to understand and interpret these obscure phases of our history. Cf. P. M. Holt's inaugural lecture, *The Study of Modern Arab History* (London, 1965), p. 15. Perhaps we find it psychologically more comforting to study such epochs as reflect glory on us.
- 16 Cf. Aḥmad Fu'ād al-Ahwānī, *al-Tarbiyah fī al-Islām aw al-Ta'lim fī Ra'y al-Qābisi* (Cairo, 1955), p. 6.
- 17 See, for example, al-Ghazālī, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15.
- 18 Cf. Charles Pellat's not entirely unjustified vehemence in "Ibn Qutaybah wa al-Thaqāfah al-'Arabīyah", in *Ilā Tāhā Husayn fī 'Id Milādih al-Sab'in*, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Cairo, 1962), pp. 29–37; also the perceptive remarks of Fazlur Rahman (Faḍl al-Raḥmān) in his *Islam* (London, 1966), pp. 166–187.

- 19 'Ajā'ib al-Āthār fi al-Tarājim wa al-Akhhbār (Cairo, 1322/1904), I, pp. 192–194.
- 20 Al-Ghazālī, *op. cit.*, pp. 22, 43.
- 21 Cf. the part of his *fatwā* quoted by Pierre Cachia in his pioneer study *Tāhā Husayn; His Place in the Egyptian Literary Renaissance* (London, 1956), p. 86: "What is decreed in the law of Muslims is that the branches of knowledge which are to be sought are the theological sciences and their tools, i.e. the sciences of the Arabic language; other knowledge is not to be sought, indeed is to be proscribed. And it is well-known that Christians know nothing at all of the theological sciences or of their tools, and that most of their sciences derive from weaving, weighing, and cupping, which to the Muslims are among the meanest trades".
- 22 On the undesirability as well as impracticality of resolving questions and divisions within the Muslim community by purely secular or pragmatic outlook and methods, see H. A. R. Gibb, "The Heritage of Islam in the Modern World, III" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971), pp. 129–147. Of his many illuminating remarks the following is apt: "... when the secular leaders, administrators, and professionals ... learn to understand the spiritual values that inhere in Islam, this understanding may in time discipline the pragmatism and control the subjective impulsiveness which, in seeking to restore the strength of Islam as a political concept, destroy its inner spirit and tear the historical Community asunder" (p. 147).

CHAPTER FIVE

Lost Opportunities: The Musings of a Student of History

Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi

I RECALL an afternoon in 1938, when I was a research student in Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge and I had the honour and the pleasure of receiving a senior don of a sister college in my room. He explained to me that he belonged to a small group of men who met regularly to study religion in an objective manner. Would I attend one of their meetings and discuss Islam with them? I accepted the invitation with pleasure and, after having explained the main tenets of my faith and their implications, I said that Islam could not find its real fulfilment in a world where it had no scope for translating its philosophy into political, economic, intellectual and social action. It could play an important role in the world only if it could find an opportunity of applying its principles freely without any hindrance. This could be possible only if it attained a sovereign status in some society or part of the world.

It may be recalled that this was a time when the Muslims were under direct or indirect foreign rule almost everywhere. The only major independent Muslim states were Kemalist Turkey and Reza Pehelvi's Iran, both of which were engaged in "modernising" themselves, which, according to their thinking, was synonymous with total, albeit, superficial westernisation. Many of us had looked upon the two developments as isolated phenomena and were not sufficiently far-sighted to understand that they heralded a new trend in the Muslim world. We knew our minds and thought it inconceivable that the Muslims of the subcontinent, who had considerable insight into the hollowness of the Western civilisation, would succumb to its superficial lustre and charm. We knew that we had to learn a good deal from the West, but matters of the spirit and philosophy of life were not among these. When I expressed the idea that Islam was waiting for an opportunity to prove not only its relevance, but also its efficacy, I had our demand for Pakistan in mind, for I was a member of the Pakistan National Movement founded by Chaudhri Rahmat Ali.

At that time our optimism was matched only by our enthusiasm. We

knew that it was not easy to establish Pakistan, but we were naïve enough to think that once established, it would develop in accordance with our dreams. This optimism never came under the shadow of even a passing cloud of doubt, because we were a band of enthusiastic and ardent believers in the good sense of our people, firmly holding the view that their loyalty to Islam was so strong that it would easily surmount all the difficulties in the way of implementing a revolutionary programme of nothing short of reconstructing the pattern of a decadent life. We were too naïve to understand the stupendous nature of the task that we wanted to assign to Pakistan, if it ever came to be established. We were unaware of the compelling nature of world forces and the weaknesses of our own people. In fairness to ourselves, let me say that we were right in thinking that given faith and enthusiasm born of it, the undertaking would be a feasible one and we never doubted that our people possessed the necessary ardour. It seemed to us that we could rely upon all of our people responding to the call, if the issues were clearly put before them. We never doubted what their choice would be, nor did the Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. When questioned about the nature of the constitution which would be framed for future governance of the country, he said in his characteristic manner that he saw no reason why it should not be Islamic if the people wanted it to be so. On 14th August, 1947 it seemed that the stage was set for the great experiment. And yet the venture was never undertaken. It is worthwhile to probe into the causes of this failure.

Were we mistaken in our assessment of the enthusiasm of our people for Islam? The eagerness with which the idea of Pakistan was greeted by them would belie such a suspicion. However, it would be correct to say that their emotional loyalty to Islam was not matched by a true understanding of its tenets and goals. That is the reason why the technique of subverting Islam in the name of Islam has recently proved so successful. Those who are busy morning and evening in consciously destroying Islam and all that it stands for swear all the time by its name. The people are ignorant, gullible and confused. Besides, there is a world of difference between deep-seated intelligent adherence to religion and superficial sentimental religiosity. Of the latter there is a surfeit among the Muslims of the subcontinent; of the former much too little. The truly intelligent believer cannot be fraudulently converted into an instrument for the destruction of Islam, whereas the ignorant sentimentalist can unwillingly become a party to digging the grave of what he professes to love. Even the intelligent, but less wary believer can be misguided through subtle methods, but no subtlety is needed in beguiling the ignorant. All that is needed is brazen-faced hypocrisy. After the faith of the people has been weakened, it can be subverted completely by a sincere or false appeal to their cupidity and greed.

That, however, was not the only miscalculation in our thinking. We underrated the need of vigilant and far-sighted leadership for steering

the polity through certain pitfalls towards the cherished goal of Islamic resurgence. We forgot that political leaders can play only a limited, albeit a crucial role in the process of national resurgence and the resurrection of the dead or dormant urges, insights and instincts of the people. Even of political leadership we had precious little. The Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, despite his acumen, his sincerity, his determination and his solicitude for the welfare of his people – all of which contributed to his towering stature and ultimate success – could not possibly eliminate the need of leadership at lower levels. The number of eminent politicians among his trusted lieutenants was extremely limited. The disarray in national political leadership after the death of the Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Qaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan would show how poor was the Muslim community in this regard. Four eventful years, full of grave problems demanding immediate attention saw the end of effective leadership and then our political scene was a veritable bedlam.

This would show that the short-lived effective and principled leadership had little time to devote itself to planning a reasonable future for the country. Day-to-day administration was our first concern and it continued to be our only aim later. In the governments that followed we had no leader who could think of planning an ideological future for the nation or showed the least interest in its spiritual health. We did begin to think of planning at an early date, because it was the most commonly talked about commodity in the world, but then it was firmly anchored to the need of economic development in the mind of our government. That also was certainly not our original idea, because the entire world talked about it as the most urgent need of the poorer countries. That we needed development in matters other than purely material never occurred to us, because our foreign mentors never mentioned anything extraneous to our physical growth. Even there our progress was lopsided. We squeezed the poor consumer to enrich a few capitalists and never took the necessity for creating employment for our poverty-stricken millions into serious consideration. All that shows that even in the field where we came to have some achievement to our credit our thinking was hackneyed, second-hand and inspired from outside. When we were yearning to achieve nationhood and sovereignty, we were oblivious of the fact that we were a backward people not possessing sufficient manpower for any serious business of life, not even technicians to implement plans, much less the designers and architects of a brave new world for our people.

This has not been said to argue that we should not have striven for independent existence and sovereign status. The urge for freedom is deeply implanted in every human heart and we had stifled it for about two centuries without having extinguished it. The desire for Pakistan was natural; it was stronger because it was the logical culmination of our history of more than a millennium. But what was not natural was our impervious

indifference towards the problem of our backwardness. It is true that the backlog of poverty and ignorance cannot be removed by mere enthusiasm, but then a resurgent spirit is the only guarantee that the effort will be made in earnest. As a people we laid no store by the cultivation of the spirit. We thought that independence would be enough; in fact it could pay the right dividends only if it were considered to be a removal of shackles on the desire and capacity to strive for higher goals. With the acquisition of that spirit, the shortages in intellectual vision and technical know-how would have been short-lived.

Our lack of understanding of the principles of nation-building and our failure in making constructive use of the instincts implanted by its historical experience in the subconscious of our people and the enthusiasm for independence created by them has resulted in a grave disaster. We could not avoid it then, nor can we avoid graver disasters in the future if we do not take stock of our difficulties and discover their root cause and their mutual interdependence in time. For our multifarious difficulties are but the varied manifestations of the same failing like the seemingly unconnected aches and pains and distresses caused by a single ailment. And as time is the essence of treatment in all serious diseases which have to be cured before they succeed in destroying life, nations do not have infinity at their disposal for fighting decay, disintegration and destruction. Therefore we should hasten the process of diagnosis, or we are doomed.

In my opinion the root cause of our plight is our neglect of the cultivation of the spirit. This statement, because of our present state of mind will be hotly contested in many quarters, but I think I have both history and logic on my side. There is not a single instance in history where a people have prospered without possessing the strength of some philosophy. And however earthly or constricted that philosophy might have been, it was sufficiently transcendent to inspire national effort in mundane spheres. The supreme example, of course, is found in Islamic history which can be more effective in moulding our thinking. The Arab contribution to political organisation, jurisprudence, philosophy, mechanics, arts and sciences is known to all students of history; it is also known that the Arabs were a conglomeration of uncouth tribes before they were inspired by Islam. The Qur'ân and the Prophet (peace be on him) did not set for themselves the task of teaching them various branches of knowledge and techniques; on the contrary they created among the Muslims the spirit that could overcome all obstacles and strike for itself a path in whichever direction it felt called upon to turn. It broadened their intellect and gave it a catholicity of tastes that came to embrace the entire spectrum of contemporary knowledge. And when that spirit was gone the Arabs once again sank into torpor and apathy. Logically, we all work under the influence of a desire to achieve some end. Our effort corresponds to our keenness. Without the psychological impetus of keenness, we would achieve nothing. When the spirit

is aroused, it creates a restlessness which must find fulfilment in achievement. This urge sharpens the intellect, energises the effort and ensures success.

We did have a good deal of enthusiasm, as I have said earlier, when we had to fight for our right of self determination. And when Pakistan was achieved, our enthusiasm enabled us to overcome many seemingly overwhelming difficulties. It was no mean achievement to organise an administration out of chaos and to run it with a fair amount of efficiency; to build up a new viable economy out of disrupted resources; to maintain a high level of law and order; to build up a sound defence potential; to sustain democratic traditions and fundamental rights when our society was in a state of flux; to reorganise our communications; to receive and absorb an army of refugees; and to achieve social stability despite an upheaval of tremendous proportions. We, through these successes, achieved quietly and without any fanfare or strife, wrote on the pages of history our own charter of existence. We walked in the corridors of international organisations and conferences with our heads held high.

All this was possible because we strongly believed in our destiny as a sovereign nation. This belief was strong in us because we were still being led by the instincts created by our long historical struggle to maintain our entity in the face of overwhelming odds. We had been in danger of losing ourselves in the milieu of the subcontinent which had absorbed militarily equally virile immigrants into its social and religious system. Only Islam saved us from that fate, because it gave us a sense of uniqueness. We were anxious to save our faith which was more precious to us than our lives and so long as we strove to save it, it saved our existence and entity. This struggle continued when we were merely small trading communities settled on the coast; it did not abate when we were rulers, because our efforts to reconcile the local population and establish friendly contacts with them exposed us to the danger of assimilating their ideas and beliefs; it became more imperative when we became one of the subject races of the subcontinent. Every time we came out with flying colours and became so used to fighting the challenge that the constant endeavour looked almost effortless except in periods of great stress. Hence the decision to demand Pakistan and to work for it seemed only natural. And when Pakistan was established, it seemed equally natural to serve it with sincerity and devotion. And then, slowly and surely, our loyalty came to be undermined; our enthusiasm flagged; we lost interest in defending our integrity.

If this appears to be an alarmist or extreme statement, let us look at facts. What else could have produced separatist tendencies in East Pakistan? And was that the only part of the country where such ideas were entertained? And who deliberately planned the break-up of this *patria*? Had the indigent taxpayer fattened the generals who betrayed this country for this purpose? Did we pay large salaries for this end to some of our

highly placed civil servants? And what can we say about the politicians who were hand in glove with them to prosecute their selfish or parochial aims? Could all this happen without a marked deterioration in Pakistani patriotism? Do we not have a sizable literature questioning the very *raison d'être* of this country? And do we not have a fairly large number of young men who could not care less for Pakistan and the purpose for which it came into existence? Have we not witnessed the sad spectacle of the sons of the rich and the *élite* then studying in the two foremost universities of the United Kingdom, whose organisations are subsidised by our embassy, literally resisting all attempts to persuade them to issue even a mild statement regarding the iniquity of India holding our prisoners of war? It is no use shutting our eyes to inconvenient symptoms which point to the gnawing fatal malady destroying the vitals of the nation. We cannot ignore its existence if we are not bent upon suicide. Only the most incorrigible and purblind optimist can fail to see the writing on the wall under such circumstances.

Before we can think of a cure, we have to understand the root causes of the malaise. What has gone so seriously wrong during the brief period of a quarter century of our existence that we are threatened with annihilation? What opportunities have we lost? What mistakes have we made? What follies have we committed to be brought to the brink – not of disaster – but of total destruction as a nation?

It has been mentioned that what has sustained us throughout our long history has been our consciousness of our uniqueness. We have been able to keep our nation alive because we have jealously guarded our entity; in other words we have continued to live because we have continuously wanted to live. If our ranks have now begun to produce individuals who are not deterred by any sense of loyalty from betraying us, it only means that to the extent we are producing such wayward elements in our body, we are guilty of neglecting something basic to our very existence. We must have been side-tracked from the primary aim of guarding our uniqueness into pursuits which are destructive of that aim. It was our pride in Islam which created the spirit that was our armour in weal and woe. If that spirit has languished, it must have done so because we have been estranged from Islam. That this is so is demonstrated by the fact that the most indifferent and sometimes hostile to Pakistan are those who have ceased to believe in Islam. It is obvious that if we renegade from Islam, there is no difference between us and the other sections of the population of the subcontinent. And if there is a difference, it is to the disadvantage of Pakistani unbelievers, because the Hindus have some moorings in their ancient culture and philosophy, whereas a Pakistani renegade has none.

It is not only heartrending but also rather curious to talk of Pakistani renegades, turncoats and traitors. It is not intended to include those with lukewarm loyalties or those who do believe in the fundamentals of Paki-

stani ideology and who only lapse into erroneous ways thoughtlessly. But surely anyone who deliberately plans to destroy this country is a traitor by all definitions. And similarly one who is indifferent to the major interests of the nation is disloyal. And one who has changed his faith or discarded it is a renegade. What shall we call those persons who ridicule Islam and question its fundamentals and validity and therefore propagate views that can only result in the destruction of Pakistan? And what term shall we apply to those who lend themselves to further the ends of those powers and countries which are keen upon destroying Pakistan because they see in it danger to their hegemony over large Muslim areas or to their ambitions for expanding at the cost of Muslim peoples? And in what light shall we present those who shrink from support to Pakistan's just causes? If we do not understand the elements that have, in spite of being of us, turned against us; if we do not measure the extent of their revolt, which can be done only by using the right adjectives for those who have rebelled, however harsh the appellations may sound; if we go on believing that they will even now side with us in any final reckoning, we shall never realise the extent of the internal subversion of our polity and its supporting ideals and we shall not build up a comprehension of the danger that surrounds us. It was this ostrich-like refusal to face facts which found us totally unprepared for the traumatic experience of the loss of East Pakistan. We did not understand the various moves on the chessboard of our politics because we were unaware of the perfidy of the players. Eternal vigilance is the price of freedom. We cannot be vigilant if we do not identify traitors and renegades. We should not unnecessarily question the motives of our opponents, but it is always imperative to analyse the intentions of all who seek our suffrage or get into positions of authority, so that we may come to distinguish between dissent and treachery.

Even of greater importance than vigilance is the need to prevent further defections from our ranks and lapses into disbelief and apostasy. For preparing the nation for this task it is necessary to analyse the causes of our failure in inculcating patriotism and loyalty among those who have forsaken loyalty to the nation, because no constructive effort is possible without this analysis. Why did a spirit that had sustained us throughout a millennium forsake us within less than a quarter of a century? Why did a people that had held together during the two centuries preceding the establishment of Pakistan despite the deepest despair of defeat and repeated failures to redeem the lost freedom develop symptoms of disintegration so soon after our attaining sovereign status? Why should we have begun to court death so soon after rising phoenix like from our ashes, not to live again for several centuries, but to lose our integrity within the period of less than a mere twenty-five years? Did we not possess a large population, an extensive territory dotted with a steadily increasing number of chimneys, a brave and well trained defence force, an expanding economy, preening its

feathers for "a take-off", a large number of young men and women with modern education, an *élite* educated in public and missionary schools, ostensibly trained for leadership with "a progressive" outlook that had started to shed all "antiquated prejudices", in short all those multifarious glittering nothings that seemed to us to be the essence of progress and stability?

And when the crisis of the great betrayal came, none of these shining trinkets proved to be gold. Had we not achieved a higher G.N.P., a modestly larger *per capita* income, a small but mentionable increase in the income of the average man, a much boasted green revolution to an extent that we had come to be looked upon as a model for countries seeking development? True, we were still poor, but not as poor as we had been in the beginning when we had managed to break the shackles of slavery. The general standard of living had gone up, though not as much as we would have liked it to. Only if we had had stability and imaginative planning we could have achieved much more for the common man. Even in East Pakistan where the poverty of the populace was exploited for breaking up the country, the poor were better off than they had been before, and instead of semi-naked men, half-starved children and thatched roofs that the visitor saw in 1947, he came across fully-clad men, better fed and healthier children and corrugated iron roofs in the villages. The people were better off economically than they were before, or they are likely to be for some time. So that materially we were better equipped to resist subversion and, if we had possessed sufficient loyalty to the Fatherland or to our ideals, we did have sufficient material reason as well to try to save the country. But what we lacked was the will to make the effort in earnest.

It is, therefore, obvious that mere material development cannot sustain our national integration. Not that material development is not necessary, the fight against poverty and ignorance is imperative and brooks no delay, but we must understand that it alone is not enough. Indeed if it is assigned a greater priority than the spiritual ingredients of nation building, it can be positively destructive of character and patriotism. If we create a feeling that material prosperity is all that matters, then the limits of selfishness are annihilated and cupidity, avarice and greed overcome the restraints of morality and patriotism. Only a strong moral sense and loyalty to the country can create that social sense which keeps man's acquisitive propensities within the bounds of law and decency.

Is there no significance for the social scientist in the fact that the betrayers of Pakistan, invariably, without any exception, have been men who never took Islam seriously? Those sectors of our society which are either antagonistic or indifferent to Islam form the bulk of unpatriotic elements and also provide it with leadership. We should also trace the sources of contamination, if we want to ward off the danger. The bulk of these elements which show total indifference to the causes of Pakistan come from

the so-called prestige schools. It is interesting to note that if our people have to be humoured by such persons, the latter always talk of Islam. When General Yahya Khan spoke to the nation on the radio regarding the outbreak of war with India, he spoke of *jihād*, even though at that very time he was so soaked with alcohol that he could hardly utter the words in the script. Our people can be bamboozled very easily, yet they did not believe at all that Yahya Khan meant for a moment what he was saying. And what a difference there had been in 1965 when Ayub Khan's words had come sober, firm, clear and charged with determination. Whatever opinion may be held about him by his critics, even his bitterest enemy cannot say that Ayub Khan was not sincere in defending Pakistan from aggression. And who can question the relationship between the sincerity of the leader and the response of the people? During the war of 1965 we were a different people, a nation of which each one of us was proud. We gave up all unsocial activities and stood shoulder to shoulder against the aggressor. In 1971, we did not respond in the same manner, because we felt that one who can call for *jihād* in a state of intoxication cannot be genuine. All this shows that the spirit of our people can be aroused only through sincerity, but those, who themselves do not believe in Islam and only exploit its fair name will leave the nation cold. Hypocrisy only begets hypocrisy.

If the people are to be once again galvanised into a vigilant, patriotic, public-spirited nation, their loyalty to Islam will have to be deepened. This cannot be done by hypocritical statements and appeals. No people in the world are so dense as not to discover insincerity when it sees the contradiction between public statements and policies. During the time governments talked of Islam and failed to take it seriously and worked only for material benefit, they created the impression that Islam had no relevance to life. It was enough to talk about it without any attempt to make it an integral part of life, which could be lived more successfully if only material ends were kept in sight. There is little wonder that some keen minds came to see the absurdity of such an attitude. Those who did not take the trouble of examining the issues with any depth only glided into misbelief; those, who did, became fervent in their adherence to their faith.

Yet the fact remains that successive governments did nothing to train the youth into thinking and loyal Muslims. We kept the old educational system alive and did not have the wisdom to adapt it to our needs. Even such good qualities as the old system had possessed were permitted to decay. Standards deteriorated, discipline was decried by some students and their political mentors, teachers ceased to look upon their profession as a vocation, with disastrous effects upon the students. Religious education was added as an afterthought, a mere unimportant appendage to a programme that did not harmonise with it, and even as such, it seldom went beyond teaching the rules and rites of prayers and fasting. What is the use of

teaching a child how to pray and prepare for it, if his loyalty has not been canvassed so that he begins to attach importance to prayer and, for that matter, to the Faith itself? In this manner we turned generations of students into victims of a deep schizophrenia, living in two worlds, the world of belief and the world of actual life. It is strange that the results have been less disastrous than could have been expected. It was not unexpected when the *élite* schools produced sceptics and unbelievers, because most of them had consciously set this objective before themselves. The unexpected outcome is that some, because of the wholesome influence of a few homes, escaped contamination. Those who turned away from Islam were at least saved the tortures of schizophrenia into which most of those who went through the ordinary schools have come to suffer.

How could our government and educational planners be so blind as not to see the disastrous consequences of their sins of omission and commission? How could they hold that Muslim children would come out unscathed from the traps they had set for them? How could they hope to produce generations of loyal Pakistanis through the monstrous machine they had built for their education? How could any nation hope to survive if its children were exposed to the danger to which Pakistani children have been through the ineptitude, timidity and unimaginative policies of our rulers and educators? How could a nation plunge its offspring into the most potent inferiority complex by giving them the impression that all good things come from the West and the Muslim world had not only never been intellectually strong, but is totally incapable of becoming so? If someone talks of past glory, he shuns the idea of mentioning the possibilities of today, much more of tomorrow. We have left the minds of our children blank like clean slates and exposed them without stamina for resistance to the influences of the four quarters of the world. They are taught through the medium of a foreign tongue, as if language were a neutral means of communication. They speak English, read English, write English and think English, cultivating a deep inferiority complex, because few ever attain real fluency and most get mentally stunted because language is not only a means of expression, it is also the only vehicle of knowledge and ideas. But any attempt to abolish the supremacy of a foreign language is resisted by all vested interests, so that the positions of power and prestige may remain the preserve of the few already entrenched there. These few think that a superficial veneer of Anglo-Indian mannerisms is the height of culture and perpetuate ludicrous vanity and shallowness through their cock-eyed thinking.

The products of the system are tragically inferior to the educated classes of other countries and accept their inferiority by an uncritical acceptance of any rubbish that might be current in the lands that they worship and adore. All this would, perhaps, have led only to material inferiority as it invariably does, had its corrosive effects not destroyed the soul of this

class as a whole. That is the real reason of the decay of our nationalism, our pride, and our loyalty. It has destroyed the sense of identification with the people among the *élite*, resulting in a contempt for those outside their magic circle. The side effects are a lack of respect for humanity as such and for human values like regard for fundamental rights, for liberty and for justice. Those who fall prostrate before the idol of a foreign way of life treat their fellow countrymen with abominable hauteur and contempt. How can patriotism survive in these circumstances and what can prevent the most destructive class war from raising its head in such a society?

It will be easily recognised that all this is the very negation of Islam, which can never prosper in such an environment. The real leadership has passed into the hands of a class that not only does not understand Islam, but is allergic to it, because it sees in its democratic principles an end of its undeserved dominance, whose nefarious influence has destroyed democracy. It is not merely a coincidence that all the assaults upon democracy came from the services in this country. From being the servants of the people they constituted themselves their masters and rulers, and through a process that can only be self-annihilating, they will ultimately be destroyed by the undemocratic forces which they have unleashed themselves. They cannot escape nemesis. It is, however, poor consolation for an organism if some of its cells that develop cancerous growth will be destroyed, because they will have succeeded by then in killing the organism itself. Any totalitarian government that usurps authority in this country will first destroy their authority and even the legitimate sphere of their independence as public servants. It is essential to have a free, unbiased public service, not interfering in matters which should never fall under its purview and motivated by the highest ideals of patriotism, which, in the instance of Pakistan, predicates loyalty to its fundamental ideology. This is not possible if the services are the preserve of men suffering from a psychosis of inferiority. A robust pride in the culture and traditions of Pakistan alone can enable one to render true service to this country.

These lines must not be misconstrued as a plea for cultural isolation or cutting ourselves off from scientific and technological progress. We have to keep a window open on every side from which the light of scientific progress may be coming, but this is quite different from opening the flood gates of trivialities and irrelevant cultural and moral notions coming from decadent or immoral societies. We have done just the reverse: of the scientific advancement and intellectual efforts of the West we have imported precious little; of the superficialities and evils, which do not fail to trouble even some of the best minds of the countries of their origin and which we adopt so gleefully, there is no limit.

This propensity to imitate the superficial has created a curious tendency which has proved the undoing not only of Pakistan but the entire world of

Islam. As the Muslims have been attracted only to the cultural superficialities and have failed to develop a real proficiency in the learning of the West, they have come to take Western opinions as gospel truth. They have grown accustomed to think that all that comes from abroad is of greater value than anything that they produce. This also applies to ideas, thoughts and opinions. They have so much respect for the opinions of others that they have no judgment left of their own. They have become incapable of analysing or examining the worth of any suggestion that is made to them by people they have come to consider superior. They never discover if the source of the prompting is selfish or tainted. This is the reason why all kinds of interests find it so easy to disrupt Muslim states and societies. The Arabs were persuaded to revolt against the Ottoman Empire because the Western powers wanted to strike good bargains with Sheikdoms in their quest for oil and to plant Israel in their midst, to keep them even on tenter-hooks to prevent them from ever preparing their societies for real progress. It was not only the Ottoman Empire that was destroyed, but also Arab unity. In one stroke of policy the entire region was reduced to a state of dependence that it cannot shake off without uniting again. A united Ottoman Empire with internal adjustments for Arab and Kurdish autonomy with its oil resources and military potential would have been a bulwark of strength to the Near and Middle East, North Africa and West Asia. Today the region only invites expansionist intrigues and internal tensions.

The success achieved there has emboldened every adventurer to enrich himself at the cost of Islam. The Bengali separatists could listen to the promptings of Hindu India to revolt against a country which only a generation earlier they had established so enthusiastically to end the dominance of Hindu capitalist and political power. Their leaders succeeded, at the prompting of their very exploiters, in taking them back to the same fate from which they had escaped. Nowhere are disruption, disloyalty and disintegration so rampant as in the Muslim world. We are the only people in this wide, wide world who seem to be bent upon committing every kind of suicide and plunging our masses and future generations into abysmal misery. Can there be any explanation for this phenomenon other than the development over the last few decades of a serious crisis of self-confidence? And yet, all Muslim governments and societies are working sedulously to deepen it. If we had learnt the real things – the critical faculty, the intellectual curiosity, the maturity of judgment, the capacity to have a hard look at all advice and every proposition, the propensity to examine the short term as well as the long term consequences of every measure and, perhaps, above all, the ability to rise above selfish and narrow interests, we would not have been the plaything of ambitious powers. When shall we understand that no one will ever help us without a price and no one will provide solutions to our problems which do not benefit him? We must learn to rely upon our own judgment and to form opinions after due deliberation.

Even in our internal affairs the tendency of dependence upon others reached an extent that we provide the most fertile soil for charismatic dictatorships and fascism. We do not think for ourselves, not even our so-called educated *élite*. Indeed we are the most gullible of peoples because we are mentally lazy. This laziness is the result of the pernicious system of education that kills curiosity and makes the mind subservient to the unlimited tyranny of the printed word. We comprehend very little of what we read, because most of us fail to achieve that facility in a foreign language that could give us a real understanding of what the writer intends to convey. And the little we comprehend we accept without question. This cripples our intelligence and destroys our critical faculty. Hence when someone says anything with confidence we accept it. And this is precisely the failing that creates political and cultural immaturity, which can be exploited by any clever dictator or disruptor. It creates the most fruitful field for the dictator and the disruptor alike, because the former creates a tendency to accept all that he dishes out and the latter plants a disaffection that is never removed.

Even in those who do not fall a prey to such machinations, the present system of education implants a deep schizophrenia, which gradually percolates to the masses, though they may not have even a nodding acquaintance with the Western world. They are not sufficiently knowledgeable about their own culture and its values either. The glitter of the West, however, follows them wherever they go. The radio, the television and the cinema provide for them not only an escape from their humdrum world but, in fact, ensnare them relentlessly into the worship of an unreal world. To them that world is the very quintessence of bliss. Thus even those who escape the tentacles of our education are not immune from schizophrenia. The perpetrators of the crime of spreading schizophrenia are our *élite* who more or less control all the avenues of our life. How did they come to be ensnared themselves?

This complex development can be understood only in its historical perspective. The Eastern world of Islam suffered a terrible blow when the Mongol hordes of Chengiz Khan devastated it. It was no ordinary aftermath of a war. The Mongols destroyed the schools, colleges and universities which had sustained intellectual activity for nearly six hundred years; they destroyed the libraries which had stored most of the learning accumulated during this long period; they killed many of the scholars and dispersed the rest. The political structure broke down and the social order was impaired. The economy was disrupted; overland trade and commerce dried up; agriculture was reduced to the minimum. The elaborate system of irrigation built up patiently by generations of engineers and skilled workers were either destroyed or fell into disuse. The Mongols were not a simoom that comes, scorches and then moves on; they were not a devastating flood which may destroy much but at least leaves the debris so that the

populace, after recovering from the shock begins to repair and reconstruct; they were a plague, a blight that sits and perpetuates destruction until all life is drained off; because the Mongols occupied the lands they had devastated and ruled them for more than a century as heathens and non-Muslims. What civilisation could endure a shock like that? That Islam not only survived in these regions but also ultimately succeeded in converting these barbarians is a great tribute to its resilience, but the Muslims could not possibly rebuild all that the Mongols had destroyed. Then they began to recollect and preserve their cultural and intellectual heritage, and all their academic effort was directed towards putting together whatever they could collect and understanding it. Preservation and interpretation were the two great needs of the day if the knowledge of their forefathers was not to be lost to them; yet preservation and interpretation are not voyages into the unknown. Muslim knowledge became stunted and the Muslim mind had yet not recaptured its original vigour, when another blow fell upon the Muslim world from a different quarter, which was to prove even more disastrous than the Mongol occupation in its effects.

This was the rise of the West. The first onslaught came on Muslim shipping and commerce. Even in the days of Mongol raids Muslim maritime commerce which covered the entire coastline along the Indian Ocean and extended into the Pacific as far as the Philippine Islands and China continued unhampered. As the Muslims had the monopoly of all the seaborne trade of this region and there was no one to challenge it, they did not consider it necessary to maintain men-o-war in the region. Europe's pirates and navies had not entered the Indian Ocean or ventured far along the African coast. Therefore the Muslims had little reason to build up a naval force in the Indian Ocean. This situation, however, changed when the Cape of Good Hope was rounded and the Portuguese armed vessels began to frequent the Arabian Sea. They carried on a crusade against Muslim vessels and caused tremendous damage to Muslim commerce because the Muslim vessels were mostly unarmed. At last the Egyptians woke up to the need of guarding the Arabian Sea. Their navy was built with Ottoman help but it did not prove a match for the Portuguese vessels and was ultimately all but destroyed.

There is a tendency to belittle the long-term consequences of the loss of Muslim commerce among recent European historians because they want to believe in the intrinsic superiority of the West. However, it is obvious that it was a prelude to a general decay of Muslim power. It would nevertheless be unsound not to take into account the failure of the Muslim powers to understand the significance of the annihilation of Muslim shipping. The Ottomans, the Persians and the Mughuls had sufficient resources to build up a good navy and to bring about the necessary improvements in its equipment to give battle to the West in their own waters. Only the Turks were alive to the need of a navy but they also seem to have lost heart after

their disastrous defeat in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 in which the Turkish fleet was almost totally destroyed. It is true that Sultan Selim II's vizier, Muhammad Sokoh built another fleet as rapidly as he could, yet the Turks were never again in a position to challenge Christian supremacy on the high seas. The Asian waters were neglected by the Turks. The Persians and the Mughuls never awoke to the importance of sea power with disastrous consequences to the future of the Muslim peoples.

The assault by the West continued unabated. The Muslim powers were first put on the defensive and later they were subjugated. Disaster followed disaster, until resistance became almost impossible. Yet the Muslims went on fighting until the tide began to turn after World War II and Muslim peoples began to gain independence. A long, drawn-out battle does not give a people sufficient respite to think of intellectual activity. In the beginning the Muslims thought that the European methods of warfare were superior and in that alone lay the secret of their might. They, therefore, feverishly started reorganising their military forces on the European pattern, but it was soon discovered that this was not enough. European military techniques were but a branch of their general know-how and this, in turn, was the outcome of their intellectual curiosity. The Muslims were gradually left so much behind that the task of catching up seemed to be beyond them. Yet they did make some effort, but it was not well planned and was based upon wrong premises from the beginning, when it was looked upon as "Western" knowledge, whereas, in fact knowledge is neither Eastern nor Western. Arts, culture, beliefs, way of life, cuisine, dress and the like can belong to a region or a people, but how can scientific truth be anyone's possession?

Was it necessary to take in all Western thought along with science and technology? But we did, making no distinction between the essential and the incidental. The earlier Arabs took Greek medicine, Greek logic and even Greek philosophy, but they adopted neither Greek sculpture, nor Greek dress, nor the Greek code of ethics. In our own days the Japanese took Western science but not the Western way of life. The modern Muslims, however, left out only Western religion and took in all else. The earlier Arabs could, at that time, distinguish between the essential and the incidental; the Chinese and the Japanese have done the same in our own times. The Turks, however, divided their people into two parts, first the "Western" educated *élite* and the rest. The Turks ended up in total (or ostensibly total) Westernisation and so did the Iranians. The other Muslim peoples are still divided into the modern and the old-fashioned. It would not have mattered so much if it were only a question of shaved chins and close-fitting clothes, but it created a psychosis that progress demanded a total acceptance of all that the West has to offer. Indeed "all" generally meant merely the superficialities and not deeply intellectual or scientific pursuits. Superficialities tended to satisfy the ego without the effort needed in

acquiring real knowledge and techniques, so that the Muslim countries produced large sections of "Westernised" men and women without anything except a mere smattering of science and even the less important humanities. This has resulted in ignorance parading as knowledge and inferiority complexes finding expression in aggressive, offensive and unjustified contempt for national traditions and even values. Such knowledge as is gained is not even properly organised, much less integrated into the national ethics, it produces a deep-seated and perniciously destructive schizophrenia.

The tall claims of this class are taken at their face value. Its jargon is taken for learning, its superficiality for depth, its ignorance for knowledge. And it is mortally afraid of being found out because the position of power and prestige it has built for itself would be endangered the moment the hollowness of its claim to be the repository of all knowledge is found out. It is, therefore, afraid of knowledge, real knowledge percolating to the masses through their own language as it has done in China and Japan. It is this class which has, in one way or another, come to the top in every Muslim country. Despite its grave shortcomings it was the only group of people who had some idea of the skills which are needed to run a modern government and to sustain relations with other countries. It did not possess a profound knowledge of the world in which it had to seek adjustments for its country, but it was the only group of citizens which had some knowledge. And, then, it led the armed forces and controlled the war machine. It is true that its fighting skill was also inferior, but it at least knew something of modern strategy whereas no one else did. And then it was in a position to seize power and make and unmake governments. Therefore its authority could not be questioned.

It was this class that came to power in all Muslim countries. Unfortunately, instead of using its power and modest abilities in serving the people and Islam, it made every effort to perpetuate its position. It is the same story in practically all the Muslim countries. There are coteries in power which are at war with the leaders of Muslim opinion. The people are by far and large Muslims; the rulers do not pursue Islamic policies. How can such coteries be expected to serve the true interests of Islam? Even such sincere Muslims as have access to the magic circle of the rulers get the same inferiority complex and think that the pursuit of truly Islamic policies would not be in the interest of the country they seek to rule.

When Pakistan was established the government wanted to strike a new line in its educational policy. The Education Conference convened in Karachi (beginning 27th October, 1947) sought to remould education to make it responsive to the needs of a Muslim society. The details, however, could only have been worked out by the technicians who failed to take up the challenge. Nor were the teachers alive to their responsibilities. They went on as if no change was needed. The only difference was that they

showed less devotion to their duties and displayed little sense of vocation. Pakistan was different from other Muslim countries in its genesis and even some of those who had received "modern education" were desirous of having an Islamic polity, but the services which could have translated this dream into a fact were victims of the schizophrenia that has been described above. They belonged to the class that had taken hold of modern knowledge from the wrong end.

And that was the only capable class that we possessed. Even today we have none other who can reconstruct the society and the polity for us. We have a selfish schizophrenic *élite* and a gullible population. Between the two the cause of Islamic reconstruction seems to be lost. It is not only the cause of Islam that is in jeopardy. Because of the follies of the ruling *élite* the Muslim states are threatened with disruption and subjugation. If we want to build a brave new world for ourselves, we have to build a new capable ruling *élite*. The real service to Islam today lies in bringing up children, unaided by the state, if need be, not only as true Muslims but simultaneously as brilliant experts in all walks of life, capable of thinking for themselves and holding their own against their counterparts in other lands.

CHAPTER SIX

The Creation of the Heavens and the Earth in the Bible and the Qur'ān

M. Abdul Haq Ansari

WE PROPOSE to make here a comparative study of Biblical and Qur'ānic ideas of creation. Those who have pursued the subject have been struck with the identity of views between the Bible and the Qur'ān. Some have found the cause of the identity in the common Semitic background of both the scriptures. Jewish and Christian writers in general try to show that the Qur'ānic ideas of creation are borrowed from the Bible. This view is not a conclusion, it should be noted, that emerges from a comparative study of the two scriptures, but a theological assumption which the writers subsequently try to confirm.

The present paper does not deny a fundamental identity between the Biblical and the Qur'ānic views of creation. On the contrary, it strongly confirms that identity. But it also seeks to show that their differences are not less striking and by no means less fundamental. These differences either are not visible or do not seem to be significant to the eyes which are not disposed to look for them.

A comparative study is in its nature analytical. By itself it cannot pronounce judgment regarding the sources of an idea, which is a historical question. Similarities established by means of analysis and comparison may in some cases be an indication of a direct connection. In others, it may be more reasonable to trace them to a common source; in others still the hypothesis of an independent origination may be more feasible. Each case has to be studied without any prior assumptions; and historical connections if any, have to be established on the basis of an objective study, rather than assumed.

In view of the limitations of space the present study of Biblical and Qur'ānic ideas has been confined to the creation of the heavens and the earth, leaving apart the creation of man which is a fascinating topic by itself.

I

The Account of Creation in Genesis

The account of creation in *Genesis* (1:1–2:4a) reflects the views common in the priestly circles at the time of exile. The so-called second account of

creation by the Yahwist (*Genesis* 2:4b–22) is older, but was placed by the priestly redactor after the first account which is very carefully articulated to show that the universe came into being in six successive stages in a definite order by the supreme will of one Almighty God. First, (1–5) out of “chaos” of darkness and waters light was created. The second stage (6–8) was the division of the waters by the creation of a firmament, the sky. The third stage (9–13) was the creation of the earth by the gathering together of the lower waters into one place, so that the dry land appeared. The fourth stage (14–19) was the creation of luminaries for the division of time; day and night, seasons and years. In the fifth stage (20–23) animal life was created in the waters and the air. The sixth stage (24–31) comprised the creation of animal life on the earth leading up to the making of man in the image of God. This account ends (2:1–4a) with a very solemn statement of the sanctity of the Sabbath as the day on which God rested from all the work which He had done.

Between this priestly account and that of the Yahwist there are a few contradictions. For instance, birds arose from waters in P and from the ground in J (2:19); man is the last creation in P whereas in J he was created before birds and animals (2:19); water is the assisting element of creation in J; but, in P and in some psalms (*Psalms* 104:5–9; 89:10 f; 74:12–17), it is the enemy of creation.¹

The priestly account of creation is at variance with the conclusions of modern science. For instance, we notice that light is created and the day is divided from night (3–5) before the creation of the luminaries (14–18), and the plant life appears before the sun (11–12). The creation of the universe took place, according to *Genesis*, in six natural days, while geology shows its immense antiquity. That the six days allotted to the successive stages of creation are meant to be regarded as ordinary days of the week seems to be indicated by the clear reference to the sanctity of the weekly Sabbath as the seventh day which God hallowed by his rest. Von Rad writes that “the seven days are unquestionably to be understood as natural days”.² Even if “day” is taken to mean geological period, the difficulty arises that the order in which life on the earth and the heavenly bodies are said to have been created does not agree with the facts of geology and astronomy. Driver has thoroughly examined the attempt of interpreting day as period and has pointed out that whereas in *Genesis* plant life appears two “periods” before animal life, geology shows that they appear simultaneously even if animal life does not appear first.³ Similarly, the creation of the sun, moon and stars after the earth cannot be brought into harmony with astronomy. The formation of the heavenly bodies after the earth is inconsistent with the entire conception of the solar system as revealed by science.

The sky (*rāqia*, meaning that which is firmly hammered and stamped) is regarded by the Bible as a solid vault confining the upper waters (cf. *Job* 37: 18 – “the sky which is strong as molten mirror”).⁴ It was thought that

the rain was supplied from these upper waters when "the windows of heaven were open" (7: 11; cf. *Psalms* 104:13) and that above them Jehovah sat enthroned (*Psalms* 104:3; *Amos* 9:6)⁵.

The Bible takes for granted a three-storied structure of the universe: heaven, earth and underworld (*Exodus* 20:4). The earth is founded upon pillars which are sunk into the subterranean waters (*Psalms* 24:2; 104:5), in the depths of which is located the Sheol. The habitable world is surrounded by the waters of chaos, which unless held back would engulf the world in chaos (*Genesis* 7:11; cf. 1:6).

It is true that creation is not the central doctrine of *Genesis*, nor is it described for its own sake. But this fact does not justify any attempt to reduce the significance of various details in the account. In the words of Von Rad: "Nothing is here by chance. What is said here is intended to hold true entirely and exactly as it stands. Nowhere at all is the text only allusive, 'symbolic' or figuratively poetic."⁶

At times in the history of Judaism and Christianity the truth of one or the other idea in the account came to be doubted.⁷ But on the whole the account was held to be divinely inspired and believed to be true. In the nineteenth century, for the first time, the truth of the account was seriously questioned. Discoveries in geology, astronomy and biology made the account unacceptable. Reactions to this situation in the Christian circles have been very different. One reaction has been to overturn the relation so far maintained between the *Genesis* account and the New Testament references to creation by giving primacy to the New Testament and downgrading the *Genesis* account to a secondary position.⁸ The other reaction is to regard the sequence of creation and the time element as fancies of the priestly writer. The phrase "in the beginning" (*Genesis* 1:1) is construed to mean that time was created with the universe, and the essence of the creation account is understood to be as follows:

- (a) "time and the universe came into being simultaneously,
- (b) the universe was created by God out of nothing,
- (c) the universe is defined as being the whole of creation, and
- (d) no reference to a date is made, and thus any age for the universe is allowed."⁹

II

Creation and the Qur'ân

Reference to the creation of the heavens and the earth are scattered throughout the Qur'ân. But most of them simply affirm that the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them were created by God. Only in a few instances, such as the ones listed below, have some details been offered. The Qur'ân has in fact no account or accounts of creation like the ones we find in *Genesis*. To get an idea of the Qur'ânic view of creation let me collect all the relevant verses together.

- (1) He (God) created (*khalāqa*) everything (6:101; 13:16; 39:62; 40:62) and gave to each its determination (54:49; 25:2; 87:2-3).
- (2) He created (*khalāqa*, *faṭara*, *bada'a*, *anṣa'a*) the heavens and the earth and all that there is between them (15:85; 38:27; 2:116-117; 6:14; 29:20).
- (3) "They (i.e. the heavens and the earth) were one piece (*ratq*); then We separated (*fataqnā*) them" (21:35).
- (4) a. "He created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His 'arsh (throne) was on water" (11:7).
 b. "Allah it is who created the heavens and the earth and that which is between them in six days. Then He mounted the throne. You have not beside Him a protector, friend or mediator. Will you not then remember. He directs the ordinance from the heaven unto the earth; then it ascends unto Him in a day where-of the measure is a thousand years of that you reckon" (32:4-5).
- (5) a. "Say, do you indeed disbelieve in Him who created the earth in two days; and do you set up equals unto Him? He is the Lord of all creatures. And He placed in (the earth mountains) firmly rooted, rising above the same, and He blessed it, and provided therein the food [of the creatures designed to be the inhabitants thereof] in four days; alike for all who ask. Then (*thumma*) He turned to the heaven; and it was smoke: and He said unto it, and to the earth, Come either obediently or against your will. They answered, We come obedient [to Thy command]. And He ordained them into seven heavens, in two days; and revealed unto every heaven its mandate. And We decked the nether heaven with lamps, and rendered it inviolable. This is the disposition of the Mighty, the Knowing" (41:9-12).
 b. "Are you the harder to create, or is the heaven that He built? He raised the height thereof and perfectly formed the same; and He made dark the night thereof, and brought forth the morn thereof. After that (*thumma*) He stretched out the earth whence He caused to spring forth the water thereof, and the pasture thereof, and He established the mountains. [This is] a provision for you and your cattle" (79:27-33).
 c. "He has created seven heavens one after the other (*ṭibāqan*) in harmony. You cannot see in a creature of the Most Merciful any unfitness or disproportion. Lift up your eyes again: Can you see any flaw" (68:3).
 d. "We created the heavens and the earth and what is between them in six days, and no weariness affected us" (50:38).
- (6) "He it is who created the night and the day, and the sun and the moon. They float each in an orbit" (21:33). "A token unto them is night. We strip it of the day, and lo! they are in darkness. And the

sun runneth on unto a resting place for it. That is the determination of the Mighty, the Wise. And for the moon We have appointed mansions till it return like an old shrivelled palm-leaf. It is not for the sun to overtake the moon, nor doth the night outstrip the day. They float each in an orbit" (36:36-39).

- (7) "We made every living thing of water. Will they not then believe?" (21:30). Allah has created every animal of water. Of them is the one that goes upon its belly and the one that goes upon two legs and the one that goes upon four. Allah creates what He will. Lo! Allah is able to do all things" (24:45).
- (8) "Have they not pondered upon themselves? Allah created not the heavens and the earth, and that which is between them, save with truth, for a determined period. But truly many of mankind are disbelievers in the meeting with their Lord". (30:8).

What we gather from these verses can be stated as follows:

The heavens and the earth were one piece in the beginning (Qur'ān 21:35), something like smoke (41:11). By separating one part of this smoky material from the other, God created the heavens and the earth. He formed the heavens in two days and the earth in two days. The verse (41:12) suggests that both these two days ran concurrently, as is implied in the sentence, "Then (*thumma*) He turned to the heavens . . . we come obedient". One should not be bogged down by *thumma* (then), for it signifies here a narrative rather than a real time sequence. It would be wrong to construe the verse as telling that the heavens were created after the earth. It would be likewise incorrect to infer from (79:27-33) that the earth was created after the heavens. Neither of the two verses is oriented to describing the order of creation. The Qur'ān is not concerned with describing the stages of the creative process. Consequently it avoids using ordinal numbers for days, which occur in *Genesis*, and uses simple cardinal numbers.

"Day" (*yawm*) in this context is used in the Qur'ān in the sense of a period of time, not the actual days of the week. Such use of *yawm* is quite common in the Qur'ān and is corroborated here, on the one hand, by the repudiation of the seventh day of resting, the Sabbath (50:38), and on the other, by explicit statements like (32:4-5). The "day" of God is equal to a thousand or five thousand years in human reckoning.¹⁰ These figures, however, are not to be taken literally; in consonance with the Arabic usage they mean an indefinitely long period of time.

On the basis of *Genesis* (2:1-3) which says that God "completed" or "finished" his work on the seventh day, Von Rad says: "This completion and the rest must be considered as a matter of fact . . . the world is no longer in the process of being created. It was not and it is not incomplete, but it has been 'completed' by God".¹¹ This idea has no parallel in the Qur'ān. On the contrary, the verse 35:1 suggests, as Dr. Muhammad

Iqbal has correctly observed, that the creative process did not stop at a point of time in the past but is still in progress.¹²

The word for heavens in the Qur'ān is *samāwāt* (sing. *samā'*). The *samā'* has been described as *binā'* or canopy (2:22 etc.); as *saqf mahfūz* or a ceiling that has been protected (21:32); as *dhāt al-ḥubuk* or that which contains orbs of the stars, or streaks which appear like paths (51:7); as *ṭibāqan* meaning one above the other or in harmony (67:3); as standing without pillars (31:10); as created for a definite period (*ajal musammā* 30:8), and as being seven in number, seven heavens (17:44; 23:86) or seven paths (23:17).

In order to understand these references it should be noted that *samā'* in Arabic and in the Qur'ān may mean any of the following:

- (1) The outer space above one's head. So we have the tree rising in the *samā'* (14:24), the birds flying in the *samā'* (16:79), and rain coming down from the *samā'*.
- (2) The rain. *Irsāl al- samā'* (lit. sending the heaven) means sending rains in torrents (6:6; 11:52; 71:11). A further extension of the metaphor occurs in the verse 54:11: "Then We opened the gates of the heaven with pouring water". Similarly to cause the *samā'* to fall down (17:92) means to cause death and destruction from above through rain, fire, or any other thing coming from above.
- (3) Celestial bodies including sun, moon, stars, galaxies, etc. There is nothing in the Qur'ān that suggests that *samā'* is a solid body stretched over us; *binā'* is a metaphor and not a description, and this is also true of *saqf mahfūz* which only indicates that the evil spirits have been debarred from entering remote regions of the outer space. The seven heavens may therefore mean seven divisions or regions in the outer space, one over another (*ṭibāqan*), or seven broad orbits (*sab' ṭarā'iq*).¹³

There is no reference in the Qur'ān as to the form or shape of the earth or to its location in the universe. But it has been repeatedly said that the mountains contribute to the internal equilibrium of the earth (31:10 etc.).¹⁴ There is also no suggestion that hell is somewhere located inside the earth or that paradise is up in the heavens. On the contrary, verse 14:48 tells that the last judgment will take place on this very earth after it has been changed into another earth.

About the sun, moon and stars the Qur'ān says that they move (*yusbiḥūn*) in their own *falak* (orbit or path). *Yusbiḥūn* may be rendered as floating, running, moving fast. Verse 36:38 says that the sun is also moving to a particular destination.¹⁵

III

Biblical and Qur'ānic View of Creation and Myth

The Babylonians traced the origin of the universe to a fierce struggle between two divine powers – Marduk, the god of order, and Tiamat, the

goddess of chaos, Marduk gained victory over Tiamat and split her fish-like body at the middle, separating the upper part from the lower part. "The Old Testament contains reminiscences of this creation myth, for we hear of Yahweh's primordial battle with a sea monster named Rahab or Leviathan (*Job* 9:13; *Psalms* 74:13-14; 89:10; *Isaiah* 27:1; 51:9) and of his action in setting bounds for the sea (*Psalms* 104:7-9; *Proverbs* 8:27-29). Moreover, the Hebrew word for the "Deep" (Abyss) (תהום) is linguistically related to Tiamat of the Babylonian myth."¹⁶

But though the Bible takes for granted the contours of the Babylonian cosmology, it has de-mythologised its understanding of existence. "The Old Testament contains no theogony, no myth which traces the creation to a primordial battle between divine powers, no ritual which enabled man to repeat the mythological drama and thereby ensure the supremacy of the national god. Mythological allusions have been torn out of their context of polytheism and nature religion, and have acquired a completely new meaning within the historical context of Israel's faith."¹⁷

In the Qur'ān there is absolutely no reminiscence of any Babylonian or pagan Arab myth. There is not the slightest allusion to God's struggle with Rahab or Leviathan or any other being. The Qur'ān mentions water at the beginning of creation; but this water is under the complete control of God (11:7).¹⁸ The entire process of creation is at the will of the all-powerful God. The Qur'ān has reduced the use of metaphorical language to the extent indispensable for addressing the common folk.

Chaos

The Bible and Qur'ān agree in saying that God began the creation of the heavens and the earth out of a primordial stuff. The Bible pictures the stuff as "waste and void" (תהו ובהו meaning formless, chaotic, empty)¹⁹ as the primeval waters תהום (*Genesis* 1:2) meaning deep, abyss, or seas of chaos on which darkness was superimposed. God's work of creation did not destroy the chaos and darkness but pushed them back to the outer surface of the universe.²⁰ The world is thus surrounded on every side by chaos. Although God has made the firmament strong and assigned boundaries to the primeval sea (*Job* 38:8-11; *Psalms* 33:7, 104:7-9; *Proverbs* 8:27-37; *Jeremiah* 5:22), He still watches over the chaos (*Job* 7:12).²¹ Should it want to arise God would still it (*Psalms* 89:10; *Job* 26:12).²²

The notion of a primordial waste and void, a primeval chaos, is altogether foreign to the Qur'ān. About the beginning of creation the Qur'ān makes only two statements:

- (1) The heavens and the earth were *ratq*, one piece, and then God separated them (21:35), and
- (2) that there was water at the beginning under the full control of God (11:17).²³

Thus the Qur'an mentions a primordial stuff but not a chaotic waste; primeval waters but not threatening and inimical. In the process of creation all the stuff and water were transformed, leaving nothing that would stand as a threat to God's creation. This threat is also visible in the background of the New Testament. A seer declares that at the end of the time when God's redemptive work is complete, the sea will be no more (*Revelation* 21:1), and there will be no more night (*Revelation* 22:5).²⁴

Creation by the Word

Creation in the earlier account has been conceived, some have observed, anthropomorphically as God forming man out of clay on the pattern of a potter; in the later P account, the anthropomorphism of J has been dropped and replaced by the notion of creation by the word. The literary basis of this observation lies in the use of the term יצר (form, make) in J and ברא (create) in P. But this point, I believe, has been overemphasised.²⁵ For even introducing the creation of man uses the term עשה (*Genesis* 1:26) that means make (RSV, KJV) and not ברא. It says "let us make man" and not "let us create man" or "let there be man" – phrases employed in the case of light (1:3), firmament (1:6), earth (1:9), herb and fruits (1:11), luminaries (1:14) etc. On the other hand, עשה has been employed besides ברא (1:1) for making the firmament by causing separation in the waters of chaos (1:7). There is another fact that must also be taken note of. The J account is not an account of general creation. It is primarily an account of the creation of man, and the creation of the heavens and the earth is assumed by it.

However, both the accounts agree in attributing creation to the free and sovereign will of God. P expresses more forcefully the sovereignty of God, and emphasises His transcendence. "And God said . . . And it was so". The same idea is echoed in the *Psalms*.

He spoke, and it came to be;

He commanded, and it stood forth. (*Psalms* 33:9), and in other Old Testament passages (*Isaiah* 45:12, *Psalms* 148:5). Creation by telling or commanding is also the normal phrase for God's creative act in the apocryphal writings (*Ecclesiastes* 42:15; *Syr. Apocrypha of Bar* 3:32 ff.). The phrase is intended to convey the idea that God is absolutely free and has all the powers to create what He chooses. Creation by speech, word or command is a metaphor and involves no suggestion to an entity, the Word or Logos, besides God.

This was also Jesus' understanding of God's creation. There is no suggestion in the Synoptic Gospels that he thought otherwise. The hypostatisation of the Word and creation by the Word was first introduced by John in his Gospel under gnostic influence and repeated by the authors of the *Hebrews* (11:3) and *Peter* ii (3:5–6).

The Qur'ān is in complete agreement with the Old Testament idea of creation by word or command, and it uses similar phrases and metaphors for the purpose. God said: "Be, and it is". This is the common way of the Qur'ān.

Creation Ex Nihilo

The Old Testament metaphor of creation of word or command is the Hebrew or the Semitic way of expressing the Christian concept of creation *ex nihilo*. In the intertestamental writings there is a clear reference to creation out of nothing (*Macc.* II,7:28). But doubt has been expressed as to whether we can find the idea in *Genesis* or in any other book of the Old Testament. On the basis of the fact that עָשָׂה (make) and דָּתַךְ (mould) have been used in *Genesis* along with בָּרָא (create). Anderson, for instance, thinks that the Old Testament has the idea of creation by the word rather than the idea of creation *ex nihilo*²⁶. This is a strange distinction. It is very difficult to see what exactly is the difference between the two notions. I would rather agree with Emil Brunner that both the notions are identical.²⁷ Considering the primacy of the verse 1:1 of *Genesis*, I would welcome Von Rad's statement on this point: "It would be false to say, however, that the idea of creation *ex nihilo* was not present here at all (v. 1 stands with good reason before v. 2), but the actual concern of this entire report of creation is to give prominence, form and order to the creation out of chaos (cf. the fundamental idea of 'separating')"²⁸

During the Hellenistic period the doctrine of creation was a cardinal tenet of the Judaic faith, distinguishing it from other religions and philosophies. The translators of Septuagint avoided using the Greek verb δημιουργέω with respect to God's creative action, owing to its association with the idea of a worker who produces things out of a pre-existing material. Instead they chose other verbs, specially κτίζω which expresses the absolute sovereignty of God. The New Testament authors followed the same practice.

The Qur'ān uses different terms for creation such as *khalaqa faṭara*, *bada'a* and *ansha'a*. But *khalaqa* is the most common term, and has been used for the creation of everything including man, animal, plants, sun, moon, stars, earth and heavens, spirits and angels. *Faṭara* and *bada'a*, however, have been used only in the context of the heavens and the earth. They have never been predicated of any agency other than God. This is, however, true for the other verbs also. *Bada'a* and *faṭara* convey the same sense as the Hebrew בָּרָא. *Bara'a* in the verb form has not been used for creation in the Qur'ān; only the active participle *al-Bārī* (the Creator) has been twice used (59:24; 2:54).

Bada'a occurs in a context that throws further light on the meaning of the term:

"And they say: Allah hath taken unto Himself a son. Be He glorified. Nay, but whatever is in the heavens and the earth is His.

All are subservient to Him. The Originator (*badi'*) of the heavens and the earth. When He decreeth a thing, He saith unto it only: Be! and it is". (2:116–117).

The verse draws a clear line of distinction between the Creator (Originator) and the rest of the creation which without exception is subservient unto Him. The absolute power over creation and the self-sufficiency of the Creator for creation is expressed by the creative command: "Be" and the thing comes into being.²⁹

The Meaning of Creation

"The doctrine of creation is pre-eminently a religious affirmation about the sovereignty of God and the absolute dependence of the creation. To say that Yahweh made the earth is to confess that it belongs to him; he is the Lord (*Psalms* 24:1–2; 89:11 – H 89:12; 95:5). Nothing in the realm of creation should be glorified, for the meaning of the creation is that it points beyond itself to him who is high and lifted up, and therefore is worthy of the praise of man and all other creatures. Thus the proclamation that Yahweh is creator is a summons to worship, for the creation testifies to His wisdom and His power (*Psalms* 104:24; *Proverbs* 3:19–20; *Jeremiah* 10:12–13), His steadfast love (*Psalms* 136:4–9), and His incomparable majesty, which He shares with no other (*ii Kings* 19:15; *Neh.* 9:6; *Isaiah* 40:25–26). . . . The sovereignty of God, manifest in His works of creation, is the basis for adoring, trusting, fearing, and obeying Him (*Psalms* 95; *Isaiah* 40:27–31)"³⁰

This is a fine statement of the religious meaning of the doctrine of creation. The Qur'ân completely endorses it. One can quote many verses as evidence. A few of them are:

"Allah is Creator of all things, and He is Guardian over all things. His are the keys of the heavens and the earth" (39:62–63).

"His verily is all creation and commandment. Blessed be Allah, the Lord of the worlds" (7:54).

"Then praise be to Allah, Lord of the heavens and the Lord of the earth, the Lord of the worlds. And unto Him (alone) belongs majesty in the heavens and the earth, and He is the Mighty, the Wise" (45:36–37).

"O mankind. Worship your Lord, who has created you and those before you, so that you may ward off [evil]" (2:21).

"He unto whom belongeth the sovereignty of the heavens and the earth, He hath chosen no son nor hath He any partner in the sovereignty. He hath created everything and hath meted out for it a measure" (25:2–3).

"Yet they ascribe as partners unto Him the *jinn*, although He did create them, and impute falsely without knowledge, sons and

daughters unto Him. Glorified be He and high exalted above all that they ascribe unto Him. The Originator of the heavens and the earth. How can He have a child, when there is for Him no consort, when He created all things and is aware of all things? Such is Allah, your Lord, there is no God save Him. And He takes care of all things. Vision comprehends Him not, but He comprehends all vision. He is the Subtle, the Aware" (6:101-104).

"We created not the heavens and the earth and all that is between them in play. If We wished to find a pastime, We could have found it in our presence – if We ever did. Nay, but We hurl the true against the false, and it does break its head and lo! it vanishes. And yours will be woe for that which you ascribe unto Him" (21:14-18).

"Or do those who commit ill deeds suppose that We shall make them as those who believe and do good works, the same in life and death? Bad is their judgment. And Allah hath created the heavens and the earth with truth, and that every soul may be repaid what it hath earned. And they will not be wronged" (45:21-22).

It is a common theme in the Qur'ān that the creation of the heavens and the earth is the work of one and the only God, and hence He alone is its Owner, Lord and Ruler. He has no partners in creation and therefore no partners in his sovereignty and rule over the world. Everyone besides Him is a humble servant and has no share in divinity. His majesty and glory, His wisdom and power, His care and love manifest in the creation demand that He alone should be praised and glorified, loved and obeyed (see 2:21; 25:2-3; 6:101-104). The Lord and the Ruler of the world strengthens the truth and sees that it prevails in its struggle with falsehood (21:14-18). He will also see that righteousness is acknowledged and rewarded, and wickedness is condemned and punished here or hereafter (45:21-22). Cosmic justice and the purposefulness of creation are tied together. If virtue is denied justice and happiness, the creation would be meaningless, a senseless play.

The World

Neither in the Bible nor in the Qur'ān have we the concept of a cosmos – an ordered system existing *in and by itself* governed by its own laws and explicable and intelligible from within itself. Cosmos is a Greek idea; and the Biblical or the Qur'ānic doctrine of creation is meant primarily for repudiating it. From this, however, it does not follow that the Biblical or the Qur'ānic world is without order or system, or is not governed by any laws. There is no denial of causality, properly understood. The world is an ordered system and has its laws not because of itself but because of the will of its Creator. The world is not only an ordered system but also a harmony of interests and purposes of all that is therein. The world is a

harmonious whole, a creation that is good. The difference between the Biblical and Qur'anic view of the world, on the one hand, and the Greek view of cosmos, on the other, lies in one point only: The world for the Greeks is a self-subsisting entity, intelligible in itself, while for the Bible and the Qur'an the world depends absolutely on the will of God to whom it owes its being, order and harmony, and meaning and purpose. Without God the world makes no sense.

Both the Bible and Qur'an would go further and say that without God neither the world nor history makes any sense. We cannot understand the movement of history or the destiny of man without God. The Qur'an would also add that the meaningfulness of human life and consequently of the world depends on a life beyond the grave and the fulfilment of the divine purpose in it, which is only partially realisable in the course of history – a view that is endorsed in the apocryphal writings and the New Testament.

An important consequence of the Biblical as well as the Qur'anic view of the world, it has been pointed out, is the encouragement towards understanding the world, investigating its laws and harnessing its forces. The modern scientific civilisation owes as much to the Greek view of cosmos as to the Biblical and Qur'anic view of a purposeful ordered whole geared to the purposes and the control of man.³¹

The World and God

The doctrine of creation, as noted earlier, is primarily a religious affirmation of the dependence of the world on God's will, implying a distinction between the world and its Creator which provides the basis for the real worship of God, for absolute obedience, trust and love.

This has led both the Bible and the Qur'an to emphasise the transcendence of God. Religious philosophers and theologians in both traditions have consequently disapproved of pantheism. Although in both traditions strong pantheistic, even monistic, trends have always been present particularly among the mystics, the idea that God is more a personal being than an underlying principle has been repeatedly affirmed. The relation between God and the world has been interpreted in terms of rational categories or images in many ways in both the traditions. But the most common models have been either personalistic or pantheistic. And there has been a continuous struggle between them for supremacy. From my studies in both the models in either tradition I have drawn two conclusions. First, neither of the models – neither the personalistic nor the pantheistic – is adequate to satisfy all rational and religious needs; and second, and this is more important, it would be better from rational as well as religious points of view to take transcendence and immanence as two complementary dimensions of religious life rather than principles characterising the structure of reality.

To return to the Christian doctrine of creation, it is of two types. The one is found in the Synoptic Gospels. This is similar to the Old Testament and the Qur'ānic doctrine. The other is the one which takes its birth from Pauline epistles and Johannine writings. This latter doctrine which was to be called *the* Christian doctrine differs from the Biblical and the Qur'ānic doctrines on two important points. According to it the entire created order is not only good but also evil in a real sense. It is under the rule of God as well as of the devil, and before Jesus the supremacy belonged to the devil in the struggle between the divine and the satanic powers. The life and particularly the death of Christ marked the victory of God over the devil, of the forces of good over the forces of evil. The cross is the dividing line between the kingdom of the devil and the kingdom of God. This is true of human life and history as well as nature and the entire creation.

The other idea that distinguishes the Christian doctrine of creation from the Biblical and the Qur'ānic doctrines is the idea that Christ is also the one in whom and through whom there exists all that exists. This is the result of the combination of two other ideas, the pre-existence of Christ and incarnation. John expresses the pre-existence of Christ as follows:

In the beginning was the Word,
The Word was with God,
And the Word was God (*John* 1:1-2).

This eternal word was identified with Christ (*John* 1:4-9). From this identification it was inferred that the world was made by him: "All things were made by him" (*John* 1:3), through him and in him (*John* 1:10, see also *Colossians* 1: 15-17; *I Corinthians* 8:6). What the *Isaiah* ii, 44:6 and 48:12 says of God, was then affirmed of the eternal Word or the eternal Christ by the author of *Revelation*.

I am the first and the last,
I am the Alpha and the Omega,
The beginning and the end,
(*Revelation* 1:17; 22:13).

The second idea of the incarnation of the metaphysical Christ in the world was put by John as:

And the Word was made flesh (*John* 1:14).

An effort has been made to find a basis for the doctrine of the Word in the concept of wisdom (*Job* 28:12-27; *Proverbs* 8:12-36; *Wisd. Sol.* 7:22-8:1).³² This is, however, very unsatisfactory. John's Gospel owes many of its particular ideas to Jewish gnosticism, and his doctrine of the pre-existence of the Word is certainly one of them.³³

The rational justification for a being besides God and partaking in his divinity and his incarnation in flesh, not the religious need for such a belief

which is not accepted by either the Old Testament or the Qur'ān, lies in the Christian concept of the "sinful" man, which is in turn justified by the doctrine of incarnation. The discussion of this point is, however, out of the purview of this paper.

Notes and Sources

- 1 Gerhard Von Rad, *Commentary on Genesis*, German ed. 1956, Eng. tr. John H. Markes, (Philadelphia, Westminster, 1961), p. 75.
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- 3 Driver, S. R., *Commentary on the Book of Genesis*, second ed. (London, Methuen, 1904), p. 20 ff.
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- 8 Emil Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption*, (Philadelphia, Westminster, 1952), p. 7 ff.
- 9 Russell L. Mixer, ed., *Evolution and Christian Thought Today*, (Grand Rapids, Mich., Eerdmans, 1959), pp. 48-49.
- 10 The Qur'ān, 70: 4.
- 11 Von Rad, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
- 12 Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (Lahore, 1968), p. 10.
- 13 14, 15. How these statements are to be viewed in the light of modern scientific knowledge is not clear to me. I have not come across any satisfactory explanation in modern commentaries. It is a challenging subject for the Muslim thinkers of our time.
- 16 Anderson, B. W., article on "Creation" in *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, (New York, Abingdon Press, 1962), vol. 1, p. 726.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 726.
- 18 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429 A.H.), *Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Istanbul, 1928), pp. 113 and 78.
- 19 Francis Brown, S. R. Driver and C. A. Briggs, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 1062.
- 20 Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 730.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 730.
- 22 Von Rad, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- 23 Al-Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
- 24 Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 730.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 727.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 728.
- 27 Emil Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 10 f.
- 28 Von Rad, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
- 29 Al-Baghdādī (d. 429 A.H./1038 A.D.) says that the Muslims believe that Allah has created (*khalāq*) things out of nothing (*Uṣūl al-Dīn*, *op. cit.*, p. 71); al-Kalābādhi (d. 380/990) explains the meaning of *khalq* of a thing: God is the Creator of the very idea (*'ayn*) of the things (*al-Ta'arruf li Madhāhib ahl al-Taṣawwuf*, Cairo, 1960),

pp. 44–45); al-Qushayri (d. 1074) puts it as: “The Creator is the Originator of the ideas or the essences” (*al-Taḥbīr fī al-Tadhkir*, (Cairo, 1968), p. 34).

30 Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 728.

31 Cf. C. F. Von Weizacker, *The Relevance of Science: Creation and Cosmogony*, (New York, Harper and Row, 1964), p. 178.

32 Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 731.

33 Feine, Behm, Kummel, *Introduction to the New Testament*, 14th rev. ed., Eng. tr. A. J. Mattil, Jr., (New York, Abingdon Press, 1965), p. 160.

ABBREVIATIONS

J = the Yahwist account

P = the priestly account

Syr. Apocrypha of Bar. = the *Apocalypse of Baruch*

Macc. = *Book of Maccabees*

H = the Hebrew version of the Old Testament

Neh. = *Nehemiah*

Wisd. Sol. = *Wisdom of Solomon*

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Doctrine of Redemption: A Critical Study

Muzammil Husain Siddiqi

THE doctrine of redemption is one of the central doctrines of the Christian Church. It is directly related to the basic dogmas of Christianity such as Trinity, Incarnation, and Original Sin. An attempt will be made in this paper to review the Biblical evidence of this doctrine as well as its subsequent development in the Christian theological tradition. We shall also try to see how Islam views this whole question, both *per se* and in connection with its criticism of Christianity.

I

The English word "redemption", comes from the Latin *redemptio* (derived from the verb *redemere* meaning to buy back) and signifies literally the process of buying back, liberating by payment of a price or ransom.

In the Old Testament redemption is primarily a human act but its meaning is also extended, especially in the period of later prophets, to God's dealings with men. There are three Hebrew roots signifying this meaning: *pādā*, *gā'al* and *kāpar*.

Pādā is a legal term; the accent here lies on the actual substitution for the person or animal delivered. The substitution may be either money or another animal. The object to be redeemed is always a living being and in almost all cases would be put to death, if it were not redeemed. There are, however, a few exceptions. (See *Job* 6:23; *Leviticus* 19:20; *Exodus* 21:8). In Israel it was understood that every first-born male, whether human or animal, belongs to Yahweh. In *Numbers* 3:45-46 we read that the Levites are taken instead of all the first-born of Israel and dedicated to God, but the "overplus" must be redeemed by paying a price.

In the Septuagint, (the Greek translation of the Jewish Canon), when *pādā* refers to human activity it is translated by *lutroō* or *lutron* which have been derived from *luo*.

Gā'al is a term of the family law and suggests the vindication for oneself of some person, property or right to which one has a previous claim through kinship or prior possession. In *Leviticus* 25:47-49 an Israelite who has had to sell himself into slavery to a non-Israelite because of poverty is expected to be redeemed by a brother, uncle or clansman: he may also redeem

himself. There is no idea of substitution or ransom in *gā'al*; it is simply taking back what once belonged to oneself.

Kāpar means literally to cover; in the intensive conjugation (*piel* form) it can mean to cover over sin, atone, make expiation. *Kôper* is ransom which is translated in a number of cases in the Septuagint by *lutron*. It signifies a price paid for a life that has become forfeit. It signifies what a negligent owner of an ox, which has killed someone, must pay as ransom for his life (*Exodus* 21:30). The price paid here is not to deliver one person from another who holds him captive, but from death he would otherwise have to face.

What is common to all these cases is that it is always man who gives ransom, that it is he who is the redeemer or the redeemed. Nowhere in the Old Testament has man been called ransom except in a metaphorical sense (as in *Isaiah* 43:3-4)¹.

God, in the Old Testament, is the *gô'el* of the people. Exodus is the act of His deliverance. He does not pay a price, because everything belongs to Him.² His activity consists of intervening in order to deliver His people. *Gô'el* is the ideal word to signify this, but later *pādā* and *gā'al* are used interchangeably which in the Septuagint are sometimes translated by *rhuomai* (to deliver) or *sôzô* (to save). Some other verbs that have no direct connection with the ransom idea are also used. It should also be noted that in the poem on the Suffering Servant of *Second Isaiah* (ch. 53), none of the above-mentioned words are used.

II

In the New Testament, redemption is a basic concept. It is seen basically as "deliverance of man through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ". The fundamental difference between this and the Old Testament concept is that here God is seen as the one who pays a price.³ The ransom is God's own incarnated Son, a human being and/or God Himself. Several words are used to express this meaning: atonement, expiation, ransom, sacrifice, salvation, liberation, reconciliation, on the one hand, and paschal meal, lamb of God, suffering servant, etc., on the other. Some Old Testament concepts like Covenant and Exodus are also reinterpreted in the light of the redemption theory.⁴

The Greek word denoting the meaning of "redemption" is *lutron* (ransom) which occurs in the New Testament only in *Mark* 10:45 and *Matthew* 20:28 in a saying of Jesus (peace be on him). In *Luke* there is a parallel saying but with the omission of the word "ransom". The word *antilutron* occurs once only in *1 Timothy* 2:6, which seems to be plainly based on *Mark* 10:45 (Cf. *Matthew* 20:28). Other verbal and noun forms are *lutroô*, *lutrôsis*, and *lutrôtês* which are also quite infrequent in the New Testament. The noun form *apolutrôsis* is used quite often meaning freedom

through ransom. In *Luke* 21:28 it is used in the plain sense of salvation which the disciples longingly and painfully await and which will mean their release from affliction and persecution at the return of the Son of Man. It has some eschatological overtones and the idea of ransom as such is rather absent from it. In the Pauline epistles the word frequently occurs: *Romans* 3:24; 8:23; 1 *Corinthians* 1:30; *Ephesians* 1:7, 14; 4:30; *Colossians* 1:14, etc.⁵ In Paul *apolutrôsis* is bound up with the person of Jesus.

It is, perhaps, not presumptuous to say that the New Testament corpus provides several understandings of the concept of redemption. In Synoptics (i.e., the gospels of *Matthew*, *Mark* and *Luke*), for example, or even in the Gospel of *John*, though with some reservations, the activity of Jesus is described as healing and preaching the Kingdom of God. Healing is almost in every case followed by faith on the part of the one to be healed or the faith follows it. Often Jesus (peace be on him) is heard saying: "Your faith has cured you; go and sin no more!" Nowhere does Jesus accept or pay any price for healing. He says that he has the authority on earth to forgive sins (*Mark* 2:10), but nowhere does he say that he has to die or pay a *phidyôn* for their sins. Among the parables of Jesus the parable of the Prodigal Son is very significant (*Luke* 15:11-32). The son repents and he finds his father willing to accept him, though there is no special machinery to make possible a reconciliation!

The notion that "Christ died for our sins" also occurs nowhere in the Gospels. Nowhere is there any mention of or allusion to Adam's sin in connection with the idea of redemption.

There are, however, a few sayings in the Gospels which are generally interpreted in such a manner as to support the doctrine.

- (1) "She will bear a son, and you shall call his name Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins" (*Matthew* 1:21).
- (2) "For to you is born this day in the city of David a saviour, who is Christ the Lord" (*Luke* 2:11).
- (3) "For the Son of man came to seek and to save the lost" (*Luke* 19:10).
- (4) "For the Son of man also came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many" (*Mark* 10:45; *Matthew* 20:28).
- (5) "For this is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins" (*Matthew* 26:28; *Mark* 14:24; *Luke* 22:20 ff).

Of these, the first three are rather general statements. It must be noted that here the words which occur are "saviour" and "save" rather than "redeem" or "redeemer". As for the last two statements, they require some explanation. So far as the "ransom" saying of Jesus is concerned (i.e. No. 4 above), some Biblical scholars have questioned its authenticity, especially the last expression: "and to give his life as a ransom for many". They have

suggested it to be an addition under Pauline influence⁶ and have held the Lukan narrative to be more primitive and authentic. It is significant that *Luke* omits the ransom idea. Many scholars have, however, rejected this opinion on several grounds which need not concern us here. I would like to argue on epistemological grounds that even if the saying is authentic, it does not embody the doctrine of redemption. The significance of this passage seems to lie in the words "for many" (*anti pollôn*). Note that Jesus does not say "for the sins of many". In the context of the narrative in which the whole saying is placed it seems absurd to bring in the idea of sin. The allusion is certainly to the event which was to take place at the end of Jesus' earthly ministry. The idea is, if one were to see it in its own context and without attempting to impose later interpretations, that Jesus perceives the imminent danger which was going to confront his movement and his own person. In this situation he decides not to ask his followers to take the sword and fight for this movement. To take the sword at this juncture, when the group was small and ill-equipped, would have been tantamount to suicide. Hence, Jesus would rather hand over himself voluntarily to save his movement and his followers rather than have his followers sacrificed. The word "ransom" has been used here, and as the context clearly indicates, it has been used figuratively and metaphorically rather than literally.

The words allegedly uttered by Jesus at the Last Supper can also be understood in the same way. He had exhausted all his efforts. He had poured out his whole being for his mission and for the good of his followers. He had nourished his movement by his sweat and blood and now he wanted to return to his Lord with a clear conscience. He had fulfilled the mission for which he had been sent. In order to make his followers witness and in order to remind them, Jesus calls attention to the whole drama of his life, of his movement, in a symbolic manner. "And as they were eating, he took bread, and blessed, and broke it, and gave it to them, and said, 'Take; this is my body'. And he took a cup, and when he had given thanks he gave it to them, and they all drank from it. And he said to them, 'This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many . . .'" (*Mark* 14:22-24).⁷

No mention of sin, neither theirs nor that of Adam; no mention of redemption or sacrifice. Jesus often spoke in parables and this was perhaps his last parable. Jesus (peace be on him) asked his disciples to celebrate this event often, probably because it would remind them that their master did not flee or leave his mission incomplete. The whole event seems to me a highly mystical and allegorical one which unfortunately Christianity took literally.

In some sayings of Jesus there are allusions that he applied to himself the words spoken of the Suffering Servant of Isaiah in chapter 53 (for example *Luke* 22:37, etc.). It has already been pointed out that in this poem no words of "ransom" or "redemption" are used.⁸ Jesus had rightly foreseen

his end similar to that of the Suffering Servant, but I think that he saw himself as a judgment against Israel: an Israel which often self-righteously lamented its own misfortunes and boasted that in the Suffering Servant she saw her own personality.

In the Gospel of *John*, John the Baptist is reported to have called Jesus "the Lamb of God" (1:29). The word "lamb" signifies humility and innocence. Moreover, in Israel, it signified a sacrificial animal *par excellence*. When this metaphor is applied to a man, naturally we would not expect all the activities and functions of a lamb to apply to him. In this statement John seems to say, in effect, about Jesus: "Look at this humble and pure man of God who has come now to guide the Children of Israel to the right path and save them from their sinful life." To understand it as a sacrificial lamb for sin and guilt offering, as the writer of Hebrews does, is to misunderstand it altogether, and to apply literally the function of an animal to a man.

III

A peculiarly Christian concept of redemption is found, however, in the New Testament in the writings of St. Paul. Here for the first time we meet with the idea that Christ died for the redemption of our sins. Paul connects sin with death. Adam for him was created for eternal life but he transgressed and committed a sin with the result that death overcame him. Man was taken away from the sight of God, from the presence of Eternity. This fall of man is his eternal condemnation and a permanent deprivation of his being. The Law and Torah could not heal this wickedness and transgression; nay but law itself became a deadly thing and increased transgression; hence the hands of death became more strong. Death, for Paul, seems to be not merely a subjective experience but an objective being, a kind of monster which lives in association with sin and the devil. To conquer death is, thus, to conquer sin and the devil. Death stands over against God; it threatens Him and stretches its hands even to the divine sphere. Thus in order to take back the world, to buy it back, as it were, from death, God has to pay some price. He has to undertake a new plan. He comes down on earth in the guise of a Son and dies upon the cross a shameful death. And while sin, the devil and death all enjoy their victory, lo and behold suddenly he is resurrected and as though he says to death, "Look O death, you are defeated. I am here".

Bultmann rightly calls this doctrine Hellenistic and Gnostic.⁹ One should rather characterise it as Semitic-cum-Hellenistic, since it has elements of both. Paul's contribution to Christianity seems to lie in achieving this synthesis in a remarkable fashion.

However, Paul is not an easy writer. His theory of redemption, therefore, is liable to several interpretations. In general one can say that his concept of redemption is a dramatic one and contains an element of mystery. It is

not surprising, therefore, that Gustaf Aulén calls it a drama and a dramatic idea of redemption.¹⁰ This idea had a tremendous influence upon the Greek mind for known reasons. The New Testament itself and the consequent Church history show that there were other theories of redemption known in the early Church. The experience of the Jewish-Christian community provides us with several examples. In this community, as Hans-Joachim Schoeps tells us, the Pauline soteriology was emphatically rejected. "In their view, Christianity had been freed from Jewish sacrificial worship not through the universal efficacious sacrifice of the Son of God, as the Church which followed Paul believed, but rather through the water of baptism whereby Jesus had extinguished the fire of the sacrificial cult".¹¹

The Hellenistic concepts, however, triumphed and the other views are now shrouded in obscurity since they were condemned as heresies. The Hellenistic views are known in more detail. Gustaf Aulén summarises these views in three categories:

The first he calls "the Classical view", which, after Paul, was propagated by Irenaeus (c. 120/140–c. 200/203). It remained the outstanding view for 1,000 years. Irenaeus claims that Christ's work was "recapitulation", the restoring and perfecting of the creation.¹² Salvation, according to him, is the bestowal of life rather than forgiveness. Because of sin, Irenaeus holds, there was an enmity between man and God which can only be taken away through an atonement (*reconciliation*).¹³ For Irenaeus, incarnation is essentially the indispensable basis upon which salvation rests.

This Classical theory was overshadowed by the Latin theory, especially in the West until Luther's time. Luther revived the Classical idea with its vividness and dramatic quality. "To give one example among many", Aulén says:

Luther describes how it was the Lord of glory, not a mere man, who was crucified; but God concealed this fact from the devil, or he would never have dared assail Him. God acts like a fisherman, who binds a line to a fishing-rod, attaches a sharp hook, fixes on it a worm, and casts it into the water. The fish comes, sees the worm but not the hook, and bites, thinking that he has taken a good morsel; but the hook is fixed firm in his gills and he is caught. So God does; Christ must become man; God sends Him from high heaven into the world, where the devil finds Him like 'a worm and no man' and swallows Him up. But this is to him as food which he cannot digest. "For Christ sticks in his gills, and he must spue Him out again, as the whale the prophet Jonah, and even as he chews Him the devil chokes himself and is slain, and is taken captive by Christ."¹⁴

The analogy of fish and hook was, perhaps, used for the first time by a Cappadocian Father St. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 330–c. 395) who says, "The Deity was hidden under the veil of our nature, as is done by greedy fish,

the hook of the Deity might be gulped down along with the bait of the flesh . . .”¹⁵

The second view of redemption, as Aulén describes, is the Latin or objective view. Anselm is its greatest proponent. In this view God is seen as the object of Christ’s atoning work. Christ as a man presents his sacrifice to God, and thus satisfies God’s wrath which was kindled since Adam’s sin. Two words are here important: *satisfaction* and *merit*. Satisfaction is a compensation which a man makes for his fault. Thus repentance and penance are also called satisfaction. Christ by his great sacrifice compensates for all humanity. Another word is “merit”. Merit is the performance of the Law. It is specially applied to “supererogation”, i.e. going beyond what is strictly of obligation. Cyprian (c. 200–c. 258) asserts that the superfluous merit can be transferred from one person to another. By his passion and death, Christ earned an excess of merit and this is paid to God as satisfaction and compensation. Thomas Aquinas teaches explicitly: “The human nature of Christ makes the offering, but, because He is God, the merit of His work is not merely sufficient, but superabundant”.¹⁶

Creation and redemption are closely associated in Anselm’s view. The order of creation needed to be restored and this was what God did through Christ. In the Latin view Christ does not abolish the Law but fulfils it and thus restores the relationship with Law-requiring God. Emil Brunner too, in general, follows this view. The idea of Law is, to him, the foundation upon which the doctrine of Atonement must be built.

The third view is the liberal or subjective view. The classical exponent of this view was Pelagius (c. 354–c. 418). According to this view, Atonement consists essentially in a change taking place in man rather than a changed attitude on the part of God. Abelard, Socinians, nineteenth century Liberals and Schleiermacher all contributed to this view. The subjective theory, however, was not accepted by the main line orthodoxy, as Aulén says: “Apart from a few isolated points, it cannot be said that Abelard’s thought exercised any great influence in the Middle Ages. He was, indeed, so far in accord with the mind of the period that all his thought lay on the moralistic level; but, on the whole, he was far too radically opposed to the common view to gain a hearing. In particular, the fact that he attached no special significance to the death of Christ was sufficient of itself to make his teaching unacceptable . . .”¹⁷

In modern times again the question of Christ’s work has been raised. Since “Redemption” always presupposes “Original Sin”, efforts are being made to reconsider it and if need be to get rid of this archaic doctrine. Modern writers seem more inclined to use the metaphor of imbalance, disorder and failure in human existence than original sin.¹⁸ References are sometimes made to psychological conditions in man and to the universality of evil.¹⁹ This also radically changes the understanding of the work of Christ.

"Man cannot be saved", says a modern theologian John MacQuarrie, "as, let us say, a burning building can be saved, by an action that is entirely external to him. This would be to make the whole matter sub-personal. Man is saved only in so far as he responds to and appropriates into his existence the saving activity that is directed toward him".²⁰

MacQuarrie does not belong to those who hold the subjective view, but his words show the tendency of the modern writers in general who want to emphasise the moral and ethical elements too. On the other hand, Aulén says:

The weakness of this [subjective] exposition is not to be found in the language about the ethical effects of the Divine forgiveness on human lives; on the contrary, this is its strength. Its weakness is that the forgiving and the atoning work of God is *made dependent upon* the ethical effects in human lives; consequently, the Divine Love is not clearly set forth as a free, spontaneous love, as not called forth by the worthiness or goodness of men, but as bestowing value on men by the very fact that they are loved by God, the work of the Divine forgiveness always appears as prior to ethical regeneration, not dependent upon or proportioned to human repentance or any other condition on man's side. It is this primacy of the Divine Love which is the basis of the classic idea of the Atonement of God's own work.²¹

One may agree with every word of this statement; one still wonders why this understanding of love and forgiveness is associated with Incarnation and Crucifixion. Donald Baillie tries to answer by asking another question: "Is there no difference between a good-natured indulgence and a costly reconciliation? There is an immense moral and spiritual difference between the two. And which of them are we to attribute to the love of God? Does the whole process of reconciliation cost Him nothing? Is His forgiveness facile and cheap?"²²

According to Baillie's understanding, it is this "costly forgiveness" which is given through Christ's suffering and crucifixion. This notion of forgiveness, according to Baillie, has two merits: it tells, on the one hand, about God's great love for us the sinners, and on the other hand it speaks about the Divine abhorrence of our sins, over which He does not "pass lightly"; rather they cost Him tremendously and He suffers on account of them.

Looking from this perspective one may say that deep, painstaking religious thinking underlies the development of this notion of redemption. Basically, the doctrine rests upon a pessimistic and negative view of man. Since man is corrupt and totally depraved, the first thing he needs is not an instruction to teach him how to act righteously; his need is that his

sickness should be healed and he should be brought back to his original image.

This notion of redemption is also based upon a mystical and philosophical interpretation of other doctrines of Christianity such as Trinity, Son of God, and Incarnation. Redemption is always connected with Incarnation. If it is believed that God came upon the earth and suffered upon the cross, then it is quite obvious that:

- (1) this suffering must be voluntary, because no one can compel God;
- (2) this suffering must be redemptive, because there is no need for God to suffer for Himself.

Given these notions it follows that, to the Christian, He must have suffered for mankind.

IV

Referring to Christianity, the Qur'ān makes no mention of the idea of redemption. It rather comes to grips with the fundamental issues involved and attacks the premises upon which the whole notion is based. The story of Adam is told from a new perspective. The Qur'ān is explicit that although Adam committed a mistake, he was, nevertheless, not arrogant. When he was reminded by God, he admitted his mistake and transgression. In return God bestowed upon him His Words and taught him how to repent. Adam's repentance was then accepted,²³ which thereafter left upon him no scars of sin.

Speaking in general terms about man the Qur'ān says that he is created out of the best stock.²⁴ He is the viceroy of God upon earth.²⁵ By birth he is neither evil nor good in the ethical sense, but he is given a just bias towards good, and a bias against evil has been put into his nature.²⁶ He has also been endowed with the freedom to choose between right and wrong.²⁷ Man is, however, by nature weak and constantly needs divine help and guidance.²⁸ The story of Adam, if it teaches anything, teaches that man can never be self-sufficient. In history and society, the forces of good and evil work side by side, and man is continually tested, but in the end judgment will be according to each one's own capacity.²⁹

The idea of Incarnation is strongly opposed and rejected by the Qur'ān.³⁰ Christ was only a prophet and messenger of God.³¹ His message, like that of all other messengers of God, was "to serve God and avoid unrighteousness".³²

The idea of transference of the punishment of sins or vicarious punishment is not accepted by the Qur'ān.³³ But it must also be noted that, according to the Qur'ān, the punishment is not the necessary and unavoidable consequence of sin. If there is repentance then any sin, however grave it may be, can be forgiven by the mercy of God.³⁴ God is not bound to punish.³⁵ Contrary to Augustinian understanding of justice, Divine

justice in the Qur'ān means that God does not punish anyone without reason, or beyond that which is necessary. Justice also means that no good of man is left by God unrecognised and unrewarded.³⁶ It does not mean that God is not allowed to leave any sin unpunished.

Words like *fidā'*, *fidyah*, *kaffara* and *kaffārah* (as in Hebrew *pādā* and *kāpar*) are used in the Qur'ān. In the case of sickness or journey or some other incapacities one is allowed to make expiation (*fidyah*) if one had failed to perform one's obligations.³⁷ *Kaffārah* or ransom is made when a violation of religious duties or rituals is committed.³⁸ However, the Qur'ān says explicitly that "repentance" (*tawbah*) is always needed, and when one repents and acts in faith God does the act of *kaffārah*.³⁹ As in the Old Testament, so in the Qur'ān only God is the subject of *kaffara* and only He can wipe out sins, not by paying a ransom – which is alien both to the Old Testament and to the Islamic tradition – or by accepting a price,⁴⁰ but simply by His grace and mercy.

There is one place in the Qur'ān where the subject of *fidā'* is God, i.e. it is God who pays the ransom. This occurs in the story of Abraham who takes his son for sacrifice to God and God substitutes a ram or sheep to be sacrificed instead. It is said in the Qur'ān, "And We ransomed him with a great sacrifice".⁴¹ Abraham intended to sacrifice his son to God. God appreciated Abraham's intention but spared the life of his son by placing an animal in his place to be sacrificed instead. The idea seems to be similar to that which is found in *Numbers* 3:45–46.⁴² Both Islam and Judaism are opposed to human sacrifices.

In Judaism, after the destruction of the Temple, the sacrificial system came to an end. In Christianity too it was thought that the sacrifice at Calvary had annulled and abolished all other sacrifices. In Islam, however, sacrifice remains a continuing practice. Abraham's sacrifice is commemorated once every year by Muslims on the 10th of Dhul-Hijjah (the twelfth month of the Islamic Calendar). Sacrifice is also recommended at the birth of a child. The philosophy of sacrifice in Islam is made clear by the Qur'ān:

And for every nation have We appointed a ritual, that they may mention the name of God over the beast of cattle that He hath given them for food; and your God is One God, therefore surrender unto Him. And give good tidings to the humble . . . So mention the name of God over them when they are drawn up in lines. Then when their flanks fall (dead), eat thereof and feed the needy and the suppliant. Thus have We made them subject unto you, that haply you may give thanks. Their flesh and their blood reach not God, but the devotion from you reacheth Him. Thus have We made them subject unto you that you may magnify God that He hath guided you. And give good tidings to the good.⁴³

Notes and Sources

- 1 This analysis is adopted from J. Jensen's "Redemption (in the Bible)" in *The New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1967), vol. XII, pp. 136-144, and H. Wheeler Robinson, *Redemption and Revelation in the Actuality of History* (New York, Harper and Row, 1942), ch. XII, pp. 219-28.
- 2 J. J. von Allmen says: "This divine redemption . . . [in the Old Testament] does not imply the payment of a ransom: for God disposes of all things in accordance with His sovereign transcendence" *Vocabulary of the Bible* (London, Butterworth, 1958), pp. 349-350.
- 3 For a long time Christian theologians were engaged by the question to whom this price was paid. In the words of Robinson: "From the time of Irenaeus in the 2nd century down to that of Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth 'the customary and orthodox statement of the doctrine of the Atonement' was that of a ransom paid by Christ through His death to the devil" (Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 236).
- 4 See a study of all these terms in J. J. von Allmen, *op. cit.* and John R. Sheets, S. J., ed., *The Theology of the Atonement* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., n.d.), pp. 85-158.
- 5 For a study of the Greek words, see Buchsel in *The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. Gerhard Kittel, tr. and ed. in English by Geoffrey W. Bromiley, (Michigan, Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), vol. IV, pp. 340-56.
- 6 R. Bultmann as mentioned by Buchsel in *op. cit.*, p. 342, n. 16.
- 7 At the end of his ministry, Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) also made a highly moving gesture. It is said that while he was giving a sermon to about one hundred thousand of his followers at the time of pilgrimage in the valley of 'Arafāt, he suddenly posed a question to his audience: "On the Day of Judgment you will be asked concerning me, what are you going to reply?" And the multitude cried in response, "You indeed delivered the message, fulfilled the trust, and gave us sincere advice". The Prophet (peace be on him) pointed his finger towards the heaven and said: "Have I fulfilled? O Lord, be thou a witness!" (Reported by all authorities on *Ḥadīth*).
- 8 See above, p. 92.
- 9 R. Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting* (New York, World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 196-208.
- 10 Gustaf Aulén, *Christus Victor* (New York, McMillan, 1969), p. 4.
- 11 Hans Joachim Schoeps, *Jewish Christianity*, tr. Douglas R. A. Hare (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1969), p. 83.
- 12 G. Aulén, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 24.
- 14 Gustaf Aulén, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-4.
- 15 H. E. W. Turner, *The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption* (London, A. R. Mowbray and Co. Ltd., 1952), p. 57.
- 16 G. Aulén, *op. cit.*, p. 93; see also St. Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium of Theology*, tr. Cyril Vollert, (St. Louis, Herder Book Co., 1947), pp. 272-73.
- 17 G. Aulén, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97.
- 18 J. MacQuarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology* (London, SCM Press, 1966), p. 62.
- 19 See D. M. Baillie, *God was in Christ* (New York, Scribner's Sons, 1948), ch. VII, pp. 157-79.
- 20 J. MacQuarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
- 21 G. Aulén, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-40.
- 22 D. M. Baillie, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
- 23 The Qur'ān, II: 35-37.
- 24 *Ibid.*, XCV: 4.
- 25 *Ibid.*, II: 30.

- 26 *Ibid.*, XCI: 8.
- 27 *Ibid.*, XCI: 9
- 28 *Ibid.*, IV: 28.
- 29 *Ibid.*, II: 286.
- 30 *Ibid.*, V: 17, 72.
- 31 *Ibid.*, V: 75.
- 32 *Ibid.*, XVI: 36.
- 33 *Ibid.*, VI: 164; XVII: 15; XXXV: 18; XXXIX: 7; LIII: 38.
- 34 *Ibid.*, XXXIX: 53.
- 35 *Ibid.*, IV: 147.
- 36 *Ibid.*, II: 281; IV: 124; XIX: 60; XLVI: 19.
- 37 *Ibid.*, II: 184; 196.
- 38 *Ibid.*, V: 45; 89; 95.
- 39 *Ibid.*, II: 271; IV: 31; V: 12; VIII: 29; LXIV: 9; LXVI: 8.
- 40 *Ibid.*, III: 91; X: 54; XXXIX: 47; LXX: 11; LVII: 15.
- 41 *Ibid.*, XXXVII: 107.
- 42 See above, p. 91.
- 43 The Qur'ān, XXII: 34–37.

PART II

Islamic Intellectual Heritage

Tartīl al-Qur'ān al-Karīm

Lamyā' al-Fārūqī

“ . . . *Wa rattil al Qur'āna tartilan.* ” “ . . . And chant the Qur'ān like a chant ” (Qur'ān 73:4).

In accordance with this directive found in the Muslim scripture, the Qur'ān, Muslims have involved themselves since the seventh century in refining the science of recitation of their holy book. To all the continents where Islam moved, this preoccupation with correct and beautiful reading of the Arabic text always followed.

The Muslim believes that the book revealed to Muḥammad (peace be upon him) should be read and understood in its original Arabic. Translation would distort its meanings and destroy its poetic beauty. It could only lead to variations in the scripture and faith and to schisms in the Muslim community. Therefore, although the Qur'ān has actually been translated into all the world's major languages, it is always recited or chanted in Arabic.

The cantillation or musical rendering combines the Qur'ān with an improvised single-line, rhythmically free melody. Chanted by a single reciter, it varies in melodic content and complexity according to the style of the reciter, but various readings display many common characteristics.

The Qur'ān's 114 *sūrahs* or chapters have varying numbers of *āyahs* or verses which fit neither the category of poetry nor that of prose precisely. The Arabic term for poetic rhyme, *qāfiyah*, is not generally attributed to the Qur'ān by Muslims, nor is its inimitable quality described as *saq'*, the Arabic for the type of rhymed prose associated with the pre-Islamic soothsayers.¹ Instead, the Qur'ān is considered a unique literary type; and a great variety of repetitive means, known collectively as *tawāzun*, are described as participating in the *balāghah* or “eloquence” of the Holy Book. These characteristic poetic devices, which Labīb al-Sa'īd calls the “musical aspects of the Qur'ān,”² include the following varieties:

- (1) *muḍāri'*, the juxtaposition of two words or two phrases in which only one letter is changed in the second item to achieve a new meaning;
- (2) *tajnīs*, any homogenisation involving the pairing of two words or phrases having similar meaning or pronunciation;
- (3) *mumāthalah*, the juxtaposition of two words that are identical in construction but utilise different consonants;
- (4) *ta'dīd*, a repetition of sound patterns;

- (5) *tasjī'*, rhyming;
- (6) *ibdāl*, the repetition of two or more phrases in which one letter is changed each time in order to produce a progressively greater effect;
- (7) *ḥusn al-nasaq*, a series of successive clauses having a meaning connection;
- (8) *mushākalah*, a pair of clauses in which there is an alternation of subject and predicate while maintaining the same root verb;
- (9) *muqābalah*, any two words or phrases that are paired while at the same time being opposites in some way; and
- (10) *tardīd* or *ta'aṭṭuf*, a pair of words with the same sound but different meanings. In *tardīd* they follow each other immediately, in *ta'aṭṭuf* they are separated by intervening material.³

Of course, this use of the expression "musical aspects" is more poetical than literal, but it is one to which other Muslims have been prone. In this article we hope to describe to the reader those aspects of *tartil al-Qur'ān* which can more properly be termed "musical" and to explain their relationship to the poetic features of *tawāzun*.

Four Arabic names have commonly been used to designate the artistic vocal rendering of the Qur'ān.

- (1) From the scriptural directive mentioned at the opening of this chapter comes the name *tartil*, the verbal noun from *rattala*, "to sing" or "to chant". Different periods of Islamic history have given different emphases and meanings to this term. In early Islam it meant simply chant or recitation with melodic treatment. It is in this sense that *tartil al-Qur'ān* is used in this article. For Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1058–1111 A.C.) the word seems to have included not only the idea of chant, but a special kind of rendering. He writes that the goal of reading the Qur'ān is pondering over the ideas expressed. *Tartil*, he continues, is a help for this since it gives a greater feeling of reverence as well as affects the heart more.⁴ In the fifteenth century 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Jurjānī wrote that *tartil* meant "*khafḍ al-ṣawt*" ("lowering or lessening the sound") and "*ḥuẓn bil-Qur'ān*" ("making the Qur'ān reading sound sad").⁵ Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, writing in the fifteenth century as well (d. 1505 A.C.), explained that *tartil* involved knowing where to stop in the reading and correct pronunciation of the letters.⁶ Like al-Ghazālī, Suyūṭī maintained that *tartil* was helpful for thought and meditation.⁷ Today *tartil* is used not only as a generic term for Qur'ān recitation but also more specifically as very careful and slow recitation. This is one of the three categories of recitation described by contemporary writers, the other two being *ḥadr* (fast recitation) and *tadwīr* (recitation at medium speed). This specialised meaning of *tartil* was given the name of *taḥqīq* ("correctness") in an

almost identical classification made by Suyūṭī in the fifteenth century.⁸

- (2) *Tilāwah* is a second expression for Qur'ānic chant which is derived from the Qur'ān itself. The imperative singular *utlū* used in *Sūrah* 29, *āyah* 45 is derived from the Arabic root verb *talā*, meaning "to give a deliberate, poised and pleasing recitation". This word was used in pre-Islamic Arabia to designate recitation of poetry. Such recitations involved a manner of simple humming or singing called *tarannum*.⁹
- (3) *Tajwid*, the verbal noun from *jawwada* ("to make something better"), is another term used to designate cantillation of the Qur'ān. It is sometimes given the more specialised meaning of the technical science of correct Qur'ānic recitation. Expounded in books and pamphlets as well as in various commentaries on the Qur'ān, this science of *tajwid* has not dealt with music as such. Instead it treats exhaustively the poetic, the literary, and especially the linguistic features, while merely implying the musical element. Its commendation of the beautiful voice and expressive reading and its discussion regarding the corruptions and desirable features in reading give adequate proof of an implied inclusion of musical elements.
- (4) The fourth widely used term to designate Qur'ānic cantillation is *qirā'ah*, the verbal noun from the verb *qara'a*, meaning "to read". Though this designation gives no hint of a musical treatment, it is a fact that not even the least adept of public reciters merely *reads* the Qur'ān. He always attempts to raise and lower pitches, emphasise inherent durational patterns, and punctuate stopping places in his recitation which he would not do in ordinary speech. An al-Azhar University graduate who learned to recite the Qur'ān at that Islamic university of Cairo, Egypt, maintained in a discussion that it is impossible merely to "read" the Qur'ān. Correct rendering of its words and phrases would make a musical rendition unavoidable, he argued. Those who, because of inherent musical ability and/or special training, succeed in this embellishment of the recitation are much in demand as *qārī's* ("readers").

The differentiating characteristics described by Si Hamza Boubakeur to the above-mentioned four words used for Qur'ānic chant – i.e., *tartil*, *tilāwah*, *tajwid* and *qirā'ah* – have not been found to have any basis for justification in the literature. He assigns to them distinctions dependent on whether they are done with text or by memory.¹⁰ The contemporary Muslims to whom these definitions have been presented for confirmation or rejection found them quite untenable.

Another term, or pair of terms, mentioned in various works by H. G. Farmer¹¹ is *ta'bīr* (literally "expressing oneself" or "interpretation, explanation") or *taghbīr* (literally "making dusty"?). These two words have identical spellings in Arabic except for a single punctuation point over the

second consonant in *taghbīr*.¹² Professor Farmer uses them both, sometimes one, sometimes the other as equivalents for Qur'ānic chant. Ibn Khaldūn has described *taghbīr* as a word used by pre-Islamic Arabs for a type of humming in praise of God (*tahlīl*) and for "some kind of recitation". This fourteenth century historian, however, does not use the word in connection with the Qur'ān. Franz Rosenthal's insertion of the words "of the Qur'ān" in the translation after "recitation" is certainly unwarranted. Two paragraphs later, Ibn Khaldūn clearly announces: "Then, Islam made its appearance."¹³ Of course Muslims did not chant the Qur'ān before Islam! According to Ibn Khaldūn, Abū Ishāq al-Zajjāj (d. 922 A.C.) explained the term *taghbīr* as melodies "reminding one of *al-ghābir* 'that which remains,' that is, the affairs of the other world".¹⁴ As far as can be ascertained, neither of these terms is used by contemporary Muslims to designate Qur'ānic cantillation, though they have been applied to pre-Islamic religious chant.

Now that the terminology for *tartīl* has been treated, we can proceed to a description of the chant itself. The information to be presented in this chapter on Islamic scriptural chant is derived from three types of source materials. The first includes books and articles dealing with the following four subjects: (a) those describing music in Islamic or Arab culture; (b) those on Islamic religious practices; (c) those dealing with Qur'ānic studies; and (d) those concerned specifically with *tajwīd*.

The second type of resource materials for this study includes actual performances of the chant. Some available examples of *tartīl al-Qur'ān* were recorded commercially in Cairo. Others were commissioned by the Government of the United Arab Republic's *al-Majlis al-A'lā li al-Shu'ūn al-Islāmiyyah* ("Higher Council for Islamic Affairs"). Still other examples studied were recorded personally in Egypt, Lebanon or the United States. Four professional and four non-professional readers are included in the various recitations.

The third body of information involves answers to questions posed to informants from various parts of the Islamic world. Some of these were residents of the United States at the time of questioning; others were residents of Muslim countries where I have done research or lived (Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan).

Tartīl al-Qur'ān will be discussed in this study under two main headings: (i) History and Development, and (ii) Musical Aspects.

(i) History and Development

Its revelatory character aside, as a literary work, the Qur'ān certainly had roots in pre-Islamic society and culture, and so is the case with its cantillation. One cannot fail to notice the correspondences between the Qur'ān and the literature of pre-Islamic Arabia. A relationship is no less clear between the Qur'ān and the literature of the larger Semitic Near East,

of which Arabia was one part and Islamic culture was one flowering. We find many poetic devices in the Qur'ān which are similar to those used in the literature of the Ancient Semitic world. There is the same importance placed on the end of the lines, the same symmetry, the same use of refrains. Not only do the literary materials before Islam bear resemblance to the Qur'ān, but the association between poetry and musical recitation was also rooted in the pre-Islamic world. Many of the poets of the *Jāhiliyyah* period were themselves singers or musicians; others made use of musicians for the chanting of their poems. There are many reports of poetic recitations which involved singing or even instruments.¹⁵ The terminology used for oral recitation gives further proof of the close connection between poetry and chant. *Anshada* meant to recite or declaim poetry with elevation and lowering of the voice. Later it also meant "to sing," "to chant". A derivative word is *nashīd*, which means "song" or "hymn". *Lahhana*, which meant "to chant a poem," later meant "to sing". The derivative word *lahn* means "melody".

Poetic recitation style was not the only pre-Islamic influence on the recitation of the Qur'ān in the early Islamic period. We also know that the incantations of the *kāhins* (magicians or pagan soothsayers) received a melodically and rhythmically enhanced recitation. These pronouncements were in fact sometimes similar in form to the verses of the Qur'ān. The Qur'ān reports that, because of this, Muḥammad himself was falsely accused by the people of being a soothsayer rather than a real prophet of God (Qur'ān 69:42).

A third pre-Islamic influence on *tartil* was the religious chanting performed by pilgrims who journeyed to the annual religious gatherings at Makka.¹⁶ These chants, tradition has held, were musical practices going back to the time of Adam and Noah. They certainly must have been very old. We know from early Christian and pagan writers and poets that the northern Arabs chanted while encircling sacrificial stones or pillars.¹⁷

There seems to be no reason to doubt that from the early years of Islam the Qur'ān was treated musically as were other forms of poetry and poetic prose of the period. Yet, the Qur'ān contains only two references which instruct us in this matter. One is the command mentioned above to "chant the Qur'ān like a chant" (Qur'ān 73:4). Another verse includes the imperative to "Recite deliberately and pleasantly (*utlū*) what is revealed to you of the Book" (29:45). There is nothing further in the Qur'ān itself to tell us about how it was, or should be recited. Yet Ibn al-'Arabī (d.c. 844 A.C.) maintained that reciting of the Qur'ān came in early Islam to replace the pre-Islamic chant (*Lisān*, s.v. *taghanna*). M. Talbi writes that, without doubt, the first Muslims sang the Qur'ān with very simple tunes.¹⁸

After the Qur'ān itself, the next source of information on cantillation in Islamic culture is the body of traditions (*ḥadīth*). One of these stories or sayings from the life of the Prophet tells us that Muḥammad (peace be upon

him) said: "Decorate the Qur'ān with your voices." Other sayings of the Prophet recorded in the *ḥadīth* literature are: "Allah never permitted anything as much (so strongly) as he permitted to the Prophet the beautification of the voice in the Qur'ān which he makes heard." "*Jawwid* the Qur'ān." "For everything there is a *ḥulyah* (ornament, decoration), and the *ḥulyah* of the Qur'ān is the good voice." "God never sent a prophet except with a beautiful voice." "He is not one of us who does not feel so moved by the Qur'ān that he hums (*yataḡhanna*) it." The Prophet himself is remembered as being a reader who moved his hearers by his beautiful voice. According to one *ḥadīth*, the hearer had never heard a more beautiful sound or reading than that of the Prophet (peace be upon him).

Traditions involving the companions of the Prophet in statements regarding Qur'ānic chant are also plentiful. Among these are the stories praising the reading of Abū Mūsā, who "used tunes" (*yatalaḡḡhanu*), whose voice was better than any *ṭanbūr* (early stringed instrument), *ṣinja* (harp), or *mizmār* (reed pipe).¹⁹ Other readers are also praised for their beautiful reciting voices.

Ibn al-'Arabī wrote in the ninth century (*Lisān*, s.v. *taghanna*) that a new kind of chant, *qirā'ah bil alḡān* ("reciting with tunes"), was introduced by 'Abdullah ibn Abī Bakr late in the seventh century.²⁰ This was confirmed by Ibn Qutaybah (d. 889 A.C.). Ibn Abī Bakr's son, 'Abdullah ibn 'Umar ibn 'Abdullah, inherited this style from his father; and it is from his fame that this style received another name, "*qirā'ah* of Ibn 'Umar". In what way this *qirā'ah* differed from the old we are not certain. Ibn Qutaybah stated that Ibn Abī Bakr recited the Qur'ān on a sad tune which was like neither the music of songs nor the *ḡudā'* (the song of the camel drivers).²¹ This evidence, in addition to the lack of any evidence of unfavourable reaction to these early practitioners of the new *qirā'ah* would seem to confirm a close adherence to tradition and perhaps nothing more than a change of style. Disciples of Ibn Abī Bakr were welcomed at the Umawī court, and they are said to have had a place in the Damascus palace near the professional singers.²² These musicians probably had an effect on their associates' recitation, as the latter in turn influenced the singers' style. *Kitāb al-Aḡḡānī* includes the information that the singing girls (*jawāri*) were trained by exercises in *qirā'ah*.²³ This practice is continued today. The famous Arab singer Umm Kulthūm (d. 1975) received her vocal training as an apprentice Qur'ān reciter.

The religious expansion of Islam was swift and far-reaching. From the vicinity of Makka and Madina it spread to the rest of the Peninsula and subsequently to other parts of Asia, Africa and Europe. In so doing it encountered peoples of many races, cultures and languages who did not have the close connections with Arabian culture that the companions and earliest converts had enjoyed. These new converts did not know the poetic and musical tradition in which the Qur'ān had been revealed. They were newly

discovering the Arabic language. Consequently, many pronunciation and musical innovations began intruding on *qirā'ah*. Practices from other religious traditions as well as secular and non-Arab melodies were sometimes incorporated. Abān, Sa'id ibn al-'Allāf al-Ibādī and his brother, Muḥammad ibn Sa'id (or Sa'd) al-Tirmidhī, surnamed "al-Qārī," were readers who represented the new departures. They incorporated known tunes in their reading. Ibn Qutaybah even named some of the current tunes that they had incorporated in the chant of the ninth century.²⁴

Since there is no liturgy as such in Islam, *qirā'ah* is a major element of the Muslim public worship. It is also the most esteemed form of private religious activity. The jurists and traditionists were, therefore, understandably harsh in condemning the intrusion of the secular song upon Qur'ānic chant. The following *ḥadīth* expresses their concern to maintain the purity and original essence of *tartil*: "Read the Qur'ān with the tunes of the Arabs and their sounds, and avoid tunes of the debauched people and the tunes of the People of the Book (i.e., Jews and Christians). . . ." "Tunes" here may refer to the melodic modes (*maqāmāt*) or to the actual songs of the Arabs. Of the four Sunni law schools, only one permitted the use of melodies in reciting the Qur'ān. Ibn Khaldūn, in discussing this question, is emphatic that there can be no difference of opinion as to the fact that adding known secular tunes to the recitation is forbidden even by that school, the Shāfi'ī. When any of the authorities permit recitation "*bil-alḥān*," he writes:

"the thing they have in mind is the plain music to which nature guides the person who is musical (*mizmār*). . . . Such a person arranges his sounds in certain harmonious cadences, which those who know about singing, as well as others, perceive (as music). This is the point about which the difference of opinion (revolves). The obvious (fact) is that the Qur'ān is (to be) kept free of it, (exactly) as the imām (Mālik) thought."²⁵

Other authors made equally severe condemnations of the secularising tendencies in this *qirā'ah bil-alḥān*.

H. G. Farmer maintains that the idea of an inherent difference between secular music and sacred chant is a fiction craftily created in Islamic times in order to condone the use of musical aspects in the chant in a society where music itself was condemned from time to time by puritan individuals or movements. These conservative elements, he maintains, needed a way of separating religious chant from associations with the forbidden pleasures (*malāḥī*), i.e., wine, women and song.²⁶ It seems unwise to put so much emphasis on this idea being a new creation since the two types of music had existed from the *Jāhiliyyah* period. Secular song and religious chant were distinguished from each other before Islam. It remained a problem for Islamic culture, not to invent, but to maintain that separation throughout the centuries.

After the traditionists and the jurists of the four law schools, we find that the intellectuals of Islamic culture continued to voice their opinions on *tartil* up to the present day. These pronouncements appear not only in writings on *tajwid* itself. There are also quantities of material in the works on Islamic practices and Qur'ānic studies. In fact, practically every writer of non-fiction from the early centuries up to the present had a section in his work devoted to *tilāwah* or *qirā'ah*. While some writers made brilliant arguments for the legitimacy of music, others strengthened music's stand by relating tales which show the close relationships between singing and *tartil al-Qur'ān*.²⁷ None of them, however, tried to break down the thin partition between the two. The writings of Ibn Qutaybah (ninth century) and Ibn al-'Arabī (twelfth century) were equally condemning of innovators whose *qirā'ah* resembled secular music. As we have mentioned earlier, Ibn Khaldūn emphasised the difference between *qirā'ah* and secular song in the fourteenth century, and gave an emphatic condemnation to incorporation of the latter. Suyūṭī (fifteenth century) also took up the discussion. He maintained that the practice of using tunes from songs in reciting the Qur'ān was severely reproved by the Prophet.²⁸ Similar arguments are still being presented in this century.²⁹

It is clear that the important writers of all ages have been fairly consistent in their acceptance and promotion of recitation with some musical embellishment. They have been equally consistent in condemning the practice of incorporating secular styles and tunes in the reading. The use of known melodies in *qirā'ah* is usually treated with other corruptions like defective pronunciation, exaggeration of feelings, or distortion of the words and meaning to produce effect. All of these militate, we are told, against the reverent, meditative and meaningful rendering of the Holy Book, which is the aim of *qirā'ah*.

Just how traditional and consistent then is the chant that we hear today in comparison to that of earlier centuries? Because Qur'ān recitation was never notated in the past,³⁰ we have no specimens from earlier times to examine. It is therefore impossible to be absolutely sure, but there are several important reasons which make it wrong to suppose that today's *qirā'ah* is radically different from that of the past. First, the care exerted by the 'ulamā' and jurists in Islam to ward off innovations in the chant has been a powerful force for continuity of the tradition. Second, the conservatism inherent in religious practices helped guard the *qirā'ah* tradition. Third, limiting *qirā'ah* to an untranslated text was another force for consistency. Fourth, continuing attempts to remain true to tradition have been evidenced repeatedly in the writings on *tajwid*. All of the writers condemned practices which deviated from the norm, and their writings provide evidence of the continuing battle waged against secularising change. Labib al-Sa'id's recent book, *al-Muṣḥaf al-Murattal*, and the recordings of the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs are such efforts in our own century. We would

surmise from our research, with which others seem to agree,³¹ that although aberrations and alterations have been perpetrated on the religious chant of Islamic culture, the chant acceptable to the religious scholars today is not radically different from that acceptable to those of other periods of Islamic history.

(ii) Musical Aspects

The chant is a series of long and short musical phrases separated by pauses of varying lengths. These phrases may correspond with a single *āyah* or verse of the Qur'ān; at other times one phrase may combine two or more *āyahs*. A musical phrase may even end in the middle of an *āyah*. The reciter's next phrase, in any of these cases, may be a continuation from the place he left off; or it may include a repetition of some or all of the literary materials already recited. A *qārī'* may "backtrack" in order to repeat only a few words or as much as a complete *sūrah*. Even "backtracking" into the preceding *sūrah* to repeat parts of it is not uncommon. Despite the generous use of skips backward, the opposite practice of forward leaps is never found. Any such omission would probably arouse an on-the-spot correction of the *qārī'* by some member of the audience.

The pause or *waqfah* which separates every phrase in the chant from its neighbour is an important feature of *tartil al-Qur'ān*. According to a statement of Muḥammad ibn Ja'far al-Anbārī recorded by Suyūṭī,³² we are informed that "knowledge of the Qur'ān entails knowledge of stopping and starting". Suyūṭī himself defined *tartil* as "correct reading of the letters and knowledge of stopping".³³ We know that there are approved and disapproved stopping places,³⁴ but aside from a few actually prohibited or obligatory *waqfāt*, the *qārī'* is free to make his own decisions as to phrase length. The pauses should never, of course, distort the meanings conveyed by the words.

Each of the phrases of *tartil* explores a particular three-tone, four-tone or five-tone cluster, a series of contiguous tones. Of these, one – usually the lowest – is felt to be the cluster's tonal base and most important note. The *qārī'* explores the tones of one cluster, or *jins* as it is known by Arab musicians, for as many *āyahs* as he wishes. Then he moves to another tone cluster. The new cluster may be built from the same base tone or tonic (*qarār*) though it uses a new combination of tones above that tonic. At other times the *qārī'* will move his tonic higher or lower and use it as base for a similar or new three-, four- or five-tone combination on which to improvise. A third alternative is to move to the upper or lower octave equivalent of the opening cluster.

These changes of tone cluster or *jins* and tonic or *qarār* seem to have no relation to programmatic content. They may occur at a point of juncture in thought or at a point of poetic repetition. They may even occur where no break in the literary continuity can be discerned. Cantillations of *Sūrah*

55 (*al-Rahmān*) were investigated for evidence of correspondence between text and change of *jins* and tonic. Because of the availability of six different versions of this *sūrah* done by three different readers, and because of the many occurrences in it of a repeated refrain line,³⁵ it provided ample opportunity for such investigation. In none of the examples did any of the *qāri*'s give evidence that a return to the literary refrain line necessitates or is in any way more fitting with a return to the tonal or durational elements of an earlier version of that line. In fact, the changes of pitch, *jins* or tonic often occur at places of continuity rather than at disjunctive returns to a refrain line.

Durational features of *tartil* are no less demonstrative of its abstract, non-programmatic nature. Regardless of word content expressed, this improvised musical expression of Islamic culture retains a continuity which cannot be dissected into sections of greater or lesser activity, of greater or lesser frivolity, of greater or lesser grief. No rhythmic aspect of any portion of *qirā'ah* by any reader seems to express a mood or to depict an emotion or state which is different from any other portion by that same reader. No durational relation to programme could be discovered in the readings; neither did any informant feel that such a relation was proper in *qirā'ah*. No reader evidenced any change of tempo within a reading. Even moving to a different *sūrah*, whatever its word content, does not cause a reader to change from his established style.

Likewise, volume is constant throughout a reading. There are no fortissimo, no pianissimo sections or tones. Instead a moderate intensity is maintained from beginning to end. No change of mood occurs during the course of a recitation. Even though the tone clusters may vary, the same meditative seriousness prevails throughout. No recitation or portion can be said to be dominated by a gay mood while another gives an impression of sadness.

Though no programmatic connection seems to exist between the words and the tonal and durational content of *tartil al-Qur'ān*, one does notice that different readers favour certain combinations of tones and certain rhythmic patterns more than others. These preferences remain constant throughout the passage being chanted and even similar to different readings by the same *qāri*', regardless of the literary content.

There is no *iqā'*³⁶ pattern which rhythmically binds a Qur'ān reader or reading. The improvised *tartil*, never repeated exactly by a *qāri*' in a second rendering, is as free of a continually repeated rhythmic pattern as the lines of the *sūrahs* are free of the bounds of the poetic meters of classical Arabic poetry.³⁷ Even those few lines which fit the description of poetry, i.e., those involving meter as well as *tasjī'*, are not necessarily governed musically by a repetition of durational pattern.

While evidencing a disinterest in programmatic and mood-portrayal qualities, *tartil al-Qur'ān* examples emphasise instead the various literary

repetitive and symmetry devices known as *tawāzun*. The Qur'ān is replete with examples of *tawāzun*, usually occurring at the end of *āyahs* and musical phrases. Extraordinarily high or low pitch, extremes of volume (either very soft or very loud), unusually long or short durations – all these means are common as devices for musical emphasis in Western music. These, however, are inimical to proper *qirā'ah*. To point up the literary repetitions, the *qārī'* instead sets them to repeated returns to the tonic or progression to another important tone of the cluster in use. Muḥammad Rif'at, for example (Misraphon 631712), emphasises the poetic repetition of the final syllable “-ān” at the end of the opening *āyahs* of *Sūrah* 55 (al-Rahmān) with stunningly varied melodic returns to the tonic of the tone cluster. No two of these returns are identical; yet each *āyah*-ending is clearly an elaborately decorated, descending melodic pattern of three basic tones. In a reading of *Sūrah* 84 (*al-Inshiqāq*, Ṣawt al Qāhirah BKT 44, Side 1), Maḥmūd al-Ḥuṣārī emphasises the poetic *tasjī'* at the end of the opening *āyahs* by an insistent descending return from e to d, the tonic of the *jins*. In *āyahs* 16–19 of the same reading, the letter “qāf” closing penultimate syllables at the end of lines is pointedly stressed by repetitive returns to the tonic d.

Emphasis of *tawāzun* may also involve a short tonal and/or durational pattern which occurs with each literary element of repetition. Al-Ḥuṣārī in the *Sūrah* 84 reading mentioned above not only accompanies each final word in the opening *āyahs* (*shaqqat*, *huqqat*, *muddat*, *takhallat* and *huqqat* – all examples of *tasjī'*, rhyme) with a return to the tonic, but also reinforces them with a short-long pair of durational values (♩♩) at the end of each *āyah*. In the same *sūrah*, *āyahs* 16–19 each has a drop of indefinite pitch in the final syllable. Of the six *āyahs* 20–25 in the same reading, all but one end with the syllable “-ūn” pronounced to the repetitive pattern ♩♩. Four of these lines end on the tonic d.

The direction of melodic progression is still another means of highlighting repetition and symmetry. There is a tendency to start the phrase high, and then gradually to descend. The initial tone may be high in the cluster itself or the phrase may open with an upward leap from a lower pick-up tone. At other times there is an initial series of ascending stepwise tones. This high start and the small ascending leaps within the body of the phrase that are so ubiquitous in the melodic lines of all *qārī's*, balance the essentially descending stepwise movement which characterises the rest of the phrase. There are few ascending stepwise progressions internal to the phrase, and virtually no descending leaps. The melodic progression gives a consistent impression of descent to the tonic or its neighbours as it “zeros in” on the point of poetic repetition. These persistent descents are achieved in as many different patterns as there are phrases and returns.³⁸

Different *qārī's* evidence a partiality for certain tonal combinations within the general pattern just described. Muḥammad Rif'at's *tartil*, for example,

contains a great number of descending three-tone patterns of every possible rhythmic variety. His readings in addition tend to begin with a very limited range of three tones which is gradually expanded in the course of the reading to include lower and higher tones. In some phrases the range may reach as much as an octave span. In contrast, the *qirā'ah* of Maḥmūd al-Ḥuṣārī evidences a narrow range of tonal material. There is a very obvious adherence to the descending phrase idea described above and the final two tones of a phrase are almost always a descent of a half or whole step. In 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ's chant, descending stepwise progressions are also very common. Upward leaps of a third or fourth abound to counter the proliferation of descending patterns and keep the phrases within the desired range. Stepwise ascending passages tend to occur at beginnings of phrases.

The decorated musical phrases of *tartil al-Qur'ān*, like the arabesques of the visual arts in Islamic culture, are characterised by small, conjunct and complicated movements. They move within the confines of a limited tonal range. Chordal and large melodic leaps are avoided. Progression is primarily by whole steps, half steps, three-quarter steps and the step-and-one-half interval that forms the distinguishing feature of the *hijāz jins*. Leaps of thirds and fourths are found in ascent but are rare and, in some readers, almost non-existent in descent. The melodic arabesque undulates in an endless series of short ascents and steady and relentless descents to the area of the *qarār* or tonic of the *jins* being used. In all readers a descending second seems a favourite interval to close a phrase. Descending stepwise for three consecutive tones is also common. Melismatic (i.e., melodic ornamentation) devices increase the impression of complexity in tonal movement.

The *qirā'ah* arabesques reveal an equally complicated and continuous flow of small durational movements. The manuals on *tajwīd* describe the usual long syllable (called *al-madd al-aṣliyy* or *ṭabī'iyy*) as being equal to two short syllables or breves. There are thirteen occasions for using derivative long syllables (*madd far'ī*) which vary in equivalence from two to six breves.³⁹ With a sixteenth or eighth note as usual breve, notes corresponding to the longest *maddah* would equal no more than a dotted quarter (in the first case) or dotted half note (in the second). Such *maddāt* and corresponding tones are rare. On the whole, one finds a great proliferation of short note values which help maintain the typical arabesque movement with its conjunct and complicated character. Even at the *waqfah*, the final tone of the phrase is never longer than a quarter or dotted quarter tone and more often a quarter, eighth or sixteenth.

There is still one more characteristic of the arabesque which is evidenced in Qur'ānic chant. This is the *dafqah* which can be defined as the periodic "outpouring" of the emotions and imagination which occurs at the end of an arabesque visual or musical pattern. Each *qirā'ah* phrase is a sinuous

line of musical patterns – both tonal and durational – which make repeated attempts to progress to the important tone of the *jins*. The return is delayed as repeated interruptions relentlessly interject themselves. Sometimes the ongoing movement is delayed further by the *waqfah*. In such a case, the tension is carried over the silence, only to be renewed again in the succeeding phrase. This type of *waqfah* internal to the arabesque serves to increase the tension already mounted. Finally a resting place is achieved and the emotions experience a release of tension. It is at this point, when tension has been wound up in the listener by a complicated elaboration of the tonal and durational materials, that the phrase ends at a point of poetic and musical repetition, of *tawāzun*. This outpouring of the spirit in release of tension occurs at the end of an *āyah*, where it coincides not only with a return to an emphasised tone of the *jins* but also with a return to the expected *tawāzun* and tonal and durational patterns. The greater the complication in reaching that point of *dafqah* and the greater its delay, the greater will be the frustration experienced by the listener's emotions and the greater the feeling of relief experienced at its resolution.

Each of these progressions of musical arabesque to a *dafqah* could aesthetically be followed by another and yet another. None of them is conclusive or final. Hence the *qāri'* may stop after any *āyah* he wishes; the listener may hear as many or as few passages for which he has time or inclination. There is no necessary place to start, no definite place to end.

Reynold A. Nicholson has written that the Muslims are extraordinarily susceptible to music. Many have reached religious ecstasy and others are said to have even died from the emotion engendered by listening to religious music.⁴⁰ Although this cultivation of "mind-blowing" experiences through music is most commonly associated with Sūfī brotherhoods, there is no doubt that music, and certainly the musical rendering of the Qur'ān, produces a powerful effect on the Muslim listener. This is equally true whether he be a native Arab fully acquainted with the Arabic language, or a non-Arab Muslim from any other part of the world with only a limited background in the language. A reading by a capable *qāri'* will often cause a listener to sway back and forth, as though physically as well as mentally and emotionally moved by the chant. At pauses following phrases of special beauty, of prolonged tension, or of extraordinary complexity, the audience seems to "erupt" with the release of tension in spontaneous exclamations such as "Allah! Allahu Akbar!; Allah save you!; Allah give you strength!"; etc. It is such expressions that reassure the *qāri'* of his effectiveness and serve to inspire him during the course of the cantillation. At the end of a reading the listeners will be seen to pass the opened palms of their hands over their faces, as though to "pour" again on their minds and hearts the effect of the *tartil al-Qur'ān*. It is a gesture symbolic of yet another arabesque's being presented to the devout listener.

Notes and Sources

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- 2 Labīb al-Sa'id, *al-Jam' al-Ṣawṭiyy al-Awwal lil-Qur'ān al-Karīm*, or *al-Muṣḥaf al-Murattal* (Cairo: Dār al-Kātib al-'Arabī lil-Ṭibā'ah wal-Nashr, 1967), p. 324.
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 324–330.
- 4 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, tr. by Duncan B. Macdonald as "Emotional Religion in Islam as Affected by Music and Singing," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1901, Part I, p. 285.
- 5 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Jurjānī, *al-Ta'rīfāt* (Beirut: Maktabah Lubnān, 1924), p. 57.
- 6 al-Suyūṭī, p. 143.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 172.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 Abū Zayd 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, tr. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press Bolingen Series, 1967), vol. II, p. 403. See Regula Qureshi, "Tarannum: The Chanting of Urdu Poetry," *Ethnomusicology*, XIII, No. 3 (September, 1969), pp. 425–468, for a description of the contemporary use of this name by the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent.
- 10 Si Hamza Boubakeur, "Psalmodie coranique," *Encyclopédie des musiques sacrées*, ed. Jacques Parte (Paris: Laberge, 1968), p. 388.
- 11 Henry George Farmer, "The Religious Music of Islam," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1952, LXII, p. 62; "Mohammedan Music," *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. Eric Blom (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1955), V, p. 817, "The Music of Islam," *Ancient and Oriental Music*, vol. I of *New Oxford History of Music*, ed. Egon Wellesz (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 439; *A History of Arabian Music to the XIIIth Century* (London: Luzac and Co. Ltd., 1967, first pub. 1929), p. 33.
- 12 *Ta'bīr* is written *تعبير*; *taghbīr*, *تغبير*.
- 13 Ibn Khaldūn, p. 403.
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 Farmer, *A History of Arabian Music* . . . , pp. 17–19.
- 16 This included the *tahlil* ("praise of God") and *talbiyyah* ("response") chants. "*Labbayka*" ("Here I am") is the expression which starts the pilgrimage recitation even today.
- 17 Farmer, "The Religious Music of Islam," p. 60.
- 18 M. Talbi, "La qirā'a bi-l-alḥān," *Arabica*, 1958, V, p. 185.
- 19 al-Sa'id, p. 314.
- 20 'Abdullah lived under Ziyād, the viceroy of 'Irāq (d. 676 or 677). Ibn al-'Arabī and Ibn Qutaybah erroneously named him 'Ubayd Allah.
- 21 Abū Muḥammad 'Abdullah ibn Muslim al-Dīnawriyy ibn Qutaybah, *Al-Ma'āri* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1969), p. 533.
- 22 Talbi, p. 186.
- 23 Abū al-Faraj al-Isfahānī, *Kitāb al-Aghānī* (Cairo: Būlāq), vol. XV, p. 117.
- 24 Ibn Qutaybah, p. 533.
- 25 Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, p. 400.
- 26 Farmer, "The Religious Music of Islam" p. 62.
- 27 See particularly, al-Ghazālī, *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, part I, pp. 195–252; part II, pp. 705–748; Abū Naṣr 'Abdullah ibn 'Alī al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī, *Kitāb al-Luma' fī al-Taṣawwuf* (London and Leyden: Luzac and Co. and E. F. Brill, 1914), pp. 267–300; 'Alī Ibn 'Uthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwiri, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, ed. Reynold A. Nicholson,

vol. XVII of the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series (Leyden and London: E. J. Brill, Luzac and Co., 1911), ch. XXV, pp. 393–420. See also Farmer, *A History of Arabian Music* . . . , ch. II, pp. 20–38, for a discussion of the question of Islam's attitude toward music.

28 al-Suyūṭī, vol. I, p. 175.

29 al-Sa'id, p. 321. See also Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī, *Maw'izat al-Mu'minin min Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, tr. Arthur Jeffery in *Islam, Muhammad and His Religion* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc, 1958); Sayyid al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Maḥmūd, *Hidāyat al-Mustafid fi Ahkām al-Tajwīd* (Cairo: Al-Maktabah al-Mulūkiyyah, n.d.); and Muḥammad Muḥammad Shaqriyyah, *Kitāb Zinat al-Insān fi 'Ilm Tajwīd al-Qur'ān* (Cairo: Muḥammad 'Alī Ṣubayḥ and Sons, n.d.).

30 Ṣāliḥ Amin, an Egyptian musician, is reported by Labīb al-Sa'id (*op. cit.*, pp. 342–43) to have been engaged in setting the Qur'ān to notated music, but the latter condemns the operation. Another Egyptian, Muḥammad 'Abd al-Wahhāb wanted to work on a notation of the Quranic cantillation. The scholars at al-Azhar University made such a show of opposition that he was forced to give up his project.

31 Boubakeur, p. 393; Amnon Shiloah, "L'Islam et la Musique," *Encyclopédie des Musiques sacrées*, ed. Jacques Parte (Paris: Labergerie, 1968), vol. I, p. 417.

32 Suyūṭī, vol. I, p. 143.

33 *Ibid.*

34 al-Maḥmūd (*op. cit.*, pp. 32–33) lists and defines four types of stops or *waqfāt*: (i) *al-waqf al-tāmm* ("complete stop"), which occurs at a break in meaning as well as pronunciation; (ii) *al-waqf al-kāfi* ("sufficient stop"), which involves a break in pronunciation only; (iii) *al-waqf al-ḥasan* ("good stop") occurring at a break in meaning; and (iv) the forbidden *al-waqf al-qabīḥ* ("bad stop") in which the reader commits the error of stopping at a place where both meaning and pronunciation deny a break. The compound letter *lām-alif* (ل) marked in the margin of the Qur'ānic text indicates that a pause is prohibited at that point. A few places are marked for an obligatory pause by insertion of a tiny ف, ق, or ط in the text. A ج means that a pause is possible but not obligatory; قلى indicates that liason is tolerated, but a pause is preferable; صلى, that a pause is tolerated, but a liason is preferred.

35 *Fa bi 'ayyi-alā'i rabbikumā tukadhdhibāni?* (Then which of the favours of your Lord will ye deny?)

36 *Iqā'* is the Arabic musical term for rhythmic mode. It, like the *rāla* of Indian music, may be comprised of a regularly recurring group of identical members or percussions (e.g., a repeated three-beat measure) or it may include a series of members of varying lengths (e.g., seven beats internally organised as a three-beat, four-beat pattern).

37 These are the sixteen basic meters or *buhūr* (s. *bahr*) classified by Khalīl ibn Aḥmad in the eighth century A.C. They were increased in later classifications to include up to thirty-two *buhūr*.

38 One music scholar (Bernard Mauguin, "L'Appel à la Prière dans l'Islam," *Encyclopédie des Musiques sacrées* [Paris: Labergerie, 1968], vol. I, p. 405) has maintained that in the call to prayer (*adhān*), the repetitions of the word "Allah" are done to tones which emphasise a principal tone or tonic of the *maqām*. This sort of programmatic accent is certainly not evidenced in *qirā'ah*, and one wonders if the claim can be made for any Islamic religious chant.

39 al-Maḥmūd, pp. 17–18.

40 al-Ṭūsī, p. 287; al-Hujwiri, p. 407; Reynold A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Inc., 1966), pp. 63–64.

CHAPTER NINE

Terms and Concepts: Problems in Translating the Qur'ān

T. B. Irving

RECENTLY a friend of mine, a Middle Eastern specialist with wide experience in the dialects of Arabic, heard that I was working on a translation of the Qur'ān. He asked me why we need a new edition of this book in English. I, in turn, asked him whether he was satisfied with the translations we already have, and which one he preferred. He said they were all bad and the upshot of our conversation was a confession on his part that despite his authority on the linguistic geography of the Middle East, he had never read the entire Qur'ān in either English or Arabic. This may not be typical of every Middle Eastern expert, but it is common enough that I quote the story to show one of the reasons why we need a contemporary translation.

This need is becoming real for the people who are growing up in North America and Great Britain, where groups of Muslims and an increasing number of mosques can be found in the larger cities. There has been immigration especially from Pakistan, India, and South Africa, and recently the immigrants have been trained professional people whose language is English even when they arrive, and whose children are going to use it almost exclusively as they settle into their new communities. I can mention groups in Detroit, Toledo, Chicago and Cedar Rapids in the United States and Toronto, London and Edmonton in Canada. The older settlements in North America were generally of people of Arab stock who came from Lebanon or Syria, as well as Bosnians from Yugoslavia and some Albanians. Their assimilation is already in the second or third generation. There are also significant centres in Africa and the West Indies, notably Trinidad and Guyana, where the community language has become English and the original settlers never spoke Arabic.

Dr. Charles Adams of the Islamic Institute at McGill University in Montreal tells about the slight attraction of courses on Islam for North American students.¹ Could this be because the texts that these students must use are so unsympathetic to their subject, and often the professors who choose them are hostile too?

The Qur'ān, nonetheless, is a prime source for data which must be analysed in order to understand moral human conduct in a significant society of the world based on documented seventh century experience, and today, as always, it is the best place to begin to understand the Islamic world. Within Islamic circles we cannot even produce a good prayer-book unless this is based upon a reliable English version of the Qur'ān.

My purpose is not to enter into theological controversy, nor to test the ancestry of ideas that can be found elsewhere; I will not indulge in refutation, but let the text stand for itself. The Qur'ān has a long and dignified tradition which should be made part of the world heritage in a universal era.

Terms and Terminology

My aim is to achieve a translation which can be used and understood fairly easily. I have tried to employ the simplest word available so the Muslim child in this century and also the interested non-Muslim, can readily grasp its message. This involves creating a whole new vocabulary with attendant semantic difficulties rather than using shopworn terms which have their connotations in other fields. In this connection a problem that often presents itself to the translator is that of the proper choice between equivalents, one derived from the Latin and the other from either the Germanic or Anglo-Saxon roots. In writing for a contemporary North American audience, it is generally preferable not to rely on Latin expressions: "Motherhood" and "maternity" are, for instance, two English cognates, the former derived from our Germanic sources and the latter from a Latin root; but for us, the Germanic or Anglo-Saxon word has by far the warmer connotation. In this line, the monotheistic concept of "Oneness" should be compared with its Latin cognate "Unity". Moreover, European religious terms often have too Christian and especially too Catholic a shade of meaning.

There is a great wealth nevertheless in Arabic roots and their meanings such as $\sqrt{s\ l\ m}$ for "peace"; $\sqrt{sh\ r\ k}$, "association", etc. How do we follow these through and utilise them in English? Also note the shades of meaning to be found in the root $\sqrt{dh\ k\ r}$, both in its simple root meaning of "remember", "bear in mind", and in the II or intensive form to "recall", "cause to or make (someone else) remember"; then the V or reflexive intensive measure to "call to mind" and "bear in mind (for oneself)". Each distinction must be separated judiciously. Verbs are especially hard to establish because their semantic range is broad. Adjectives are fluid, especially when we approach the Ninety-Nine Names of the Deity. Let us consider some examples:

Belief is our first duty as Muslims. This means more than just formal observance or making a declaration of faith, because God wants us to fulfil our destiny and in order to accomplish this, we must act accordingly.

Believers must not only believe, have "faith" or *īmān*, but they must also practise their belief by keeping the peace 49:13-15. Let us therefore begin with the word *īmān* which means both "faith" when we use the Latin root, and "belief" with the Germanic, and follow it through its derived nouns, verbs and participles.

The verbal noun *īmān* is in the IV or causative measure of the root $\sqrt{m n}$ which appears in the common English word "Amen" where dictionaries give "so be it" as a meaning or, in other words, to show how we conform to what has just preceded it in our hymns or prayers, that we have "faith" in it. The participle *mu'min* formed from this root in the same IV measure means the "believer" or one with "faith". Belief moreover implies gratitude, just as disbelief implies ingratitude thanklessness or the rejection of favours. It should also be contrasted with *ibāda* for "(divine) service" or "worship" which in turn is derived from the root $\sqrt{b d}$, meaning to "serve" or "slave" for something or someone else.² The etymology of the English word "worship" means to give "worth" or value to. Devotion means to "devote" oneself or make a "vow" to serve, as we can see in the English verb, especially in its reflexive quality.

There is a double meaning for the Arabic root for "turning": $\sqrt{t w b}$ means both to "repent" when it is applied to man as a sinner, and to "relent" when God responds to this change of heart and accepts it. This power to "turn" in either direction should be shown in English in some way. This facet of Arabic semantics also appears in the phrase mentioned after the Prophet's name: *Ṣallā Allāh 'alay-hi wa-sallam* "May God accept his prayers and grant him peace" which is suggested in 33:56; but this formula is generally paraphrased badly.

Another difficulty has been to find a good basic root in English for the meanings implied in the nouns, verbs and adjectives which are derived from the root $\sqrt{w q y}$ in Arabic. Often this has been translated as to "fear" God, and its verbal noun *taqwā* is also rendered as the "fear" of God or "piety", 20:132. However the concept of piety plunges us into a string of meanings which lead back and forth through verbs, nouns, participles and adjectives. I have chosen "heed", which means to pay attention to, for the verb; while the noun *taqwā* generally becomes "heedfulness" or "heeding", according to the context. This is the devout fear or awe one feels when a believer is fully conscious as to Who God is. In our culture it describes the caution we take on passing near thorns or brambles, climbing a barbed-wire fence, or while pruning rosebushes.

Fear is not quite "heedfulness", for in English we heed our parents rather than fear them if the relationship is normal. The plural participle *muttaqqūn* in the VIII or personal measure of the verb, are the "heedful" in this translation, although the words "godfearing", "godly" or "pious" do not give too poor a rendering. The heedful, according to 21:48, are all those "who dread their Lord although [He is] Unseen". In 19:18 I translate the

adjective *taqīy* which is applied to the archangel Gabriel, as “pious”, one who does his duty. “Heeding” implies a keener sense than merely “fearing” God: Abraham showed fear towards the messengers sent to Sodom in 11:70. This other and more usual root for “fearing” $\sqrt{\text{kh w f}}$ is however enjoined directly in 3:175, though here it has just been preceded by “those who act kindly and heed” in 3:172. Cain said that he “feared” God in 5:28, as did Satan when he was in the divine Presence in 8:48. Moses’ mother was told not to show fear in 28:7.

At times a true fear of God is called for. One is told not to fear death but rather damnation, eternal torment for having done things so injudiciously that one merits punishment. God is never unjust 8:51; He leads no one astray, but He does let us wander off on our own way if we so desire, as happened with Noah’s people in 11:32–34. It is thus clear that punishment for such conduct is not the result of divine vengeance but rather the consequence of our own bad actions, especially if we have been duly warned that these are conscious deeds. Disbelievers are driven along to stern torment in 31:24. Torment thus means retribution for past action consisting of disobedience to God. Fire and Hell, and Paradise and Heaven, after all, belong to human linguistic vocabulary and thus have certain inherent limitations. These limitations are compounded by the limited capacity of the human mind to visualise the changed order of things in the life which will follow the disruption of the present order of the Universe. Hence the terms Heaven and Hell can at least help man visualise broadly, rather than accurately and vividly, human experiences in the after-world. (For an estimate of this limitation of our linguistic resources and cognitive capacity, see the Qur’ān 2:25.) Fire and Hell are, therefore, essentially the consequence of injudicious or imprudent conduct; the Hereafter consists of the constant building up of causes and effects which ends in consequences we do not enjoy, as we are told in 53:30–32. Heaven is the “Garden” while Hell is the “Fire”; Hades makes an alliterative twin for *Jahīm*, the Arabic alternative for *Jahannam* or “Hell”.

Al-samāwāt, the plural of *al-samā’* or “the sky”, I generally give as “Heaven” in either the English singular or plural, depending again upon the context. Collectives in Arabic are treated as abstract feminines, as we know from adjectival usage, where the inanimate plural generally comes but as a feminine singular abstract. I treat *al-samā’* as the physical “sky” we see every day when the clouds are cleared away 17:93. Heaven as Paradise is commonly called the “Garden” (THROUGH which rivers flow, for *tahta*, rather than “under” in more prosaic translation).

Al-Shayāṭīn or “the devils” is the plural of *Shayṭān* or Satan in the singular. I prefer to call him the “Outcast” for his epithet of *al-Rajīm* 16:98. The devils are too withdrawn to hear any warning 26:212, and Joseph’s father warned his son that Satan is the tempter who is eternally plotting against us 12:5. In other words, we should not serve Satan or our

own whims 19:59, 25:43. However in 16:98–99 the Devil is said to have no authority over believers. Satan, *Iblis* or Diabolis and the devil are all the same figure in 17:16–64, a fallen angel who defied God. Angels are created from fire or light, like the sprites, and they worship God according to 7:206. Our telegraphic or electronic impulses might perhaps help the modern man have some vague and dim conception of these beings, although of course quite inadequately and within the well-known limitations of human imagination, of their creation from fire or light.

Qawm and *ahl* are two difficult words to distinguish and translate properly. I generally render the first word *qawm*, as “folk”, those people who will literally “stand up” $\sqrt{q\ w\ m}$ with you to defend your common interests; and “people” for the second, which means someone from one’s own tent group out on the desert, and perhaps those “living down the block” or in the same apartment house in a modern urban complex. *Umma*, another synonym, means one’s “community” or “nation”, and stands for someone from your maternal stock.

Moses met a “company” or *umma* of such men at the well in Midian 28:23 as he went into exile there. This however implies not so much a natural as a religious kinship. *Sha‘b* for “people” is more modern in its usage, and is only suggested in cognates in the Qur’ān. The English word “man” presents similar difficulty, for it can mean the opposite of woman in *rajul* or *imra’*, and of animals and sprites in *nās*. Similarly the second person pronoun “you” is defective and must be translated with care to give its proper connotation in Arabic.

Another problem arises with the word *qalb*, the basic word for “heart”; because the word *fu‘ād* is also commonly translated as this organ of the body. English lacks a good term of its deeper sense of the seat of the emotions, and I have tried to keep it clear, especially with the plural *af’ida*, as our “vitals” or “vital organs”, somewhat like the German poet Goethe’s *Eingeweide* which has likewise been hard to translate in his song “None but the Lonely Heart”.

“[Divine] Support” is the title of Chapter 110, since another root $\sqrt{w\ n}$, especially in its IV measure, also means “help”. The latter is also the root we find in its X measure for pleading or aspiring which we find in the fourth line of the *Fātiha* or “Opening” Chapter of the Qur’ān: “from You do we seek help”. There are other verbs too which yield the meaning of “help”, “aid”, “support” and “assistance”, and these all give us synonyms with verbal strength in English.

Mulk is another difficult term. For the “realm” implied in *mulk* I have generally used “control” for both the verb and noun, especially in the great hymn which begins at 3:26:

SAY: O God, Holder of control!

You grant control to anyone You wish
and deny control to anyone You wish.

I use "sovereignty" for the more abstract *malakūt* 6:75; otherwise, it should be shown in a republican context today. Moreover the Prophet did not live in a royal fashion but in a burgeoning confederative society wherein he was achieving this control.

Next we have a contrast of night and daytime or daylight, *al-layl wa-al-nahār*, in 2:164, 17:12 and 28:73, as well as many other places. "Day" is a defective word in English, first as it is contrasted with night or *layl*, and then as a period of 24 hours within time which is contrasted with the week and month. This sidereal day, which serves to fix dates, is *yawm* in Arabic. I generally use "daytime" or "daylight" for the first concept; but only "day" alone for the second meaning, unless the contrast is clear. "Night" and "daylight" can be made to rhyme, but this must not become a jingle.

God's blessings begin with the quality of "mercy" or *rahma* which we meet constantly in the Islamic invocation: "In the name of God, the Mercy-giving, the Merciful." Here *al-Rahmān*, which gives its name to Chapter 55 and occurs throughout the chapter on *Mary* 19, refers to God in His aspect as the transcendental Being Who is overflowing with Mercy; His twin aspect *ar-Rahīm* I translate as the "Merciful", to give both concepts a clear cognate in English. With the concept of "kindness" we have *ihsān* meaning doing good to others; *faḍl* or "bounty", "grace"; *ni'ma* and "favour" (which gives a good verb to be used in this sense). I have tried to keep their roots close to these derivatives.

"Hallowed" is *ḥarām* and also *ḥurum*. The concept of things being "hallowed" or "sacred" derives from the root $\sqrt{\text{ḥ r m}}$ (which has entered the Western consciousness in the form of harem or *ḥarīm* with only mock respect, as the quarters of a house where the women and their affairs are inviolate). The concept $\sqrt{\text{ḥ r m}}$ however requires reverence and teaches us restraint before things holy, the mood of sanctity from which all authority derives. Authority is a relationship received from training which is established between people so that they can function normally and easily, both as individuals and within society. "Sacred" is used for *muqaddas*, a term applied to the Valley of Ṭuwā where Moses was instructed to take off his sandals 20:12, 79:16.

With another symbolic picture, I prefer to talk about the "Hawthorn" on the Boundary rather than the vague "Lote Tree" which can be confused with the Lotus or waterlily of oriental gardens; the "Hawthorn" thus offers the traditional golden moths settling down on it somewhat like the blossoms in spring which we have waited all winter to see. In 53:14 we see it on the Boundary just as it is used in Britain as a fence or hedge. Hawthorns also appear in 34:16 and 56:28.

A similar folkloric figure which I want to render more recognisable for our children is Solomon's *hudhud* (27:20) which has been called the "hoopoe" in previous translations. The "plover" or "lapwing" might seem more appropriate ornithologically, but I have chosen the American "roadrunner"

for this purpose since our Qur'ānic bird also brought messages. Likewise I do not want to create the impression that a *jinn* is some creature that crawls out of a bottle on some beach patronised by Sindbad in the *Thousand and One Nights*. By perpetuating these orientalist fantasies, we merely make the Qur'ān seem ludicrous to Western readers, so that it remains in the realm of folklore, which surely is not the intent of its teachings.

The word *āya* means both "sign" and "verse", and I have translated it according to its context. It may also mean a "portent" as in 19:58. A *bayyina* is a "token" or "proof", a visual formula or image like the Tremor that caught Shu'ayb's people in Midian in 7:85. *Sunna* is the custom, practice, law or institution which has been set up to be observed 3:137, 17:77 and 33:61. The term "tradition" in English comprises both *ḥadīth* or the informative anecdote which has been handed down orally as Eckermann did with Goethe; and also what English understands by *taqlid* or the pious practice of imitating ancestors or revered predecessors.

Finally, I use the term "Chapter" for *Sūra* since this is an exercise in translation, and all words that have an English equivalent should be so handled. We must employ the resources of contemporary English in all of its richness and forge our own terminology by using our own words to express this. For this reason too I prefer the English common names for Satan, Ishmael and Jesus, as well as Heaven, Hell and Hades, so that we can graft them all the more easily on to the English-speaking heritage in this century.

Concepts: Islam and God Alone

The preceding terms lead us to a higher level of concepts to which they should be referred. Everybody needs a religion which lays down some rules for conduct that he can live by. In Arabic these rules are summed up in what is called *dīn*; this means that our actions ultimately are "paid back" to God, or as the Latin word "religio" states it, they "bind us back" to Him.

The Arabic word *dīn* shows us how everything catches up on us. Since punishment is self-inflicted, it does not derive from God but from our own behaviour, from the deeds which we ourselves commit. As the root $\sqrt{d} y n$ implies a "repayment", I therefore render *yawm ad-Dīn* as the "Day for Repayment", that time when we must settle up our earthly accounts, and less frequently as "Doomsday" except for marginal headings.

Let us discuss some other secular virtues. First of all, *birr* is the basic one we meet in 2:177 for the first time; "righteousness" is old-fashioned and too distant for instilling such a norm in our children. Charity or *ṣadaqa* is the voluntary gift offered the needy which I will take up later; while *iḥsān*, which means "acting kindly" or "kindness" itself, and doing good by trying to help others generally. This might be called "beneficence", and those who use the adjective "Beneficent" to describe God should use

the Arabic word *Muhsin* rather than *Rahmān* or *Rahīm* for this attribute.

The word *Islām* in Arabic means first of all and quite literally a "commitment to (live in or at) *peace*", while the participle *Muslim* shows by its prefix *m* that it is someone who has accepted this commitment 3:19–20, 5:3.³ I use the phrase "commitment to *peace*" because it is more constructive in its meaning than other explanations we are offered: Islam does not mean "surrender" or "submission" in the manner that European commentators suggest, for these terms are abject; instead it is positive in its mood and assumes an active attitude towards life.

This brings us to ask what the word "peace" means as a concept? The simple verbal noun *salm* gives us the pure root, while *salām* from the III form relates it to persons, and becomes the greeting. *Islām* itself is the verbal noun of the IV or causative measure, and it means its achievement or attainment. *Islām* as a tradition began with Abraham, the patriarch of all the Semitic peoples 3:67; he was a *ḥanīf* or "Seeker" after Truth 6:161, and the first consistent monotheist recorded in human history. Abraham represents the beginning of our Semitic heritage which is as much a part of Western civilisation as it is of Middle Eastern; as the Qur'ān says, he brought the "true religion" when he and his Arab son Ishmael set up the worship of God Alone in Makka 22:26.

This pure theism stresses the strict Oneness of God; its basic preoccupation deals with the principle of divine Unity or, as I prefer to call the Arabic term *tawḥīd*, God's "Oneness"; and from this, to discovering what moral human conduct or normal behaviour should consist of 7:146. We realise thereby the oneness of the world and life, opposed to the chaos inherent in ancient and modern paganism (which is called "Ignorance" in Arabic), and in the dualism of the Persians or the trinity of Europe. This thoroughgoing monotheism insists on God's essential Oneness, and on reverence for Him within this context. God is a living Force and this strict monotheism is the basis of true Islam; God's Oneness is a fixation in Islam, and this concept of the Deity in His Oneness permeates our faith.

I use the word "God" in translating the Arabic word *Allāh*, for this strictly monotheistic Deity, of course capitalised as proper noun, and in all of its forms, pronouns and other manifestations; especially plus their possessive pronouns. "Allāh" is not pronounced properly by English speakers, and to attempt to indicate the Arabic pronunciation by means of diacritics makes the text grotesque and self-defeating with common English printing presses.

God cannot be seen by human eyes, as we are told in 7:143 with the story of Moses. This strict Oneness of God involves pure theism: Islam's personal Deity is as Close to every man as his jugular vein or his heart beat 50:16. God is called "Single" or "Unique", *Aḥad* in 112:1. He is God Alone, to use a plain English term which I use in 18:110, and in Moses' hymn 20:98:

Your God is God Alone;
there is no other deity than Him!
He is Vaster than anything in knowledge.

To achieve this vision requires an intense intellectual effort or, as the Qur'ān states it, a *faḥz* which I translate either as a "triumph" or an "achievement" 6:16, 9:72, 33:71. The great preoccupation on divine Unity and moral human conduct saturates the Qur'ān as well as Islamic society. Our risk lies in not trying to meet God 2:223, for meeting the Deity is the supreme achievement of the believer 75:21–23; to see God or to enter the divine Presence is the culmination of all desires, the ultimate goal or *Maṣīr* for the believer.

The omnipresence of the Divinity is felt throughout the Qur'ān as the Book hymns His glory and the transcendence of God's Oneness in a continuous message. God is the Name which exists above all other names; reverence is due to it. However to discuss the Ninety-Nine Names at this time requires too much intellectual effort; adjectives are too fluid, while hunting down the telling word is almost as futile as trying to cap the Ninety-Nine with a hundredth. Names become a mere mathematical contrivance in this way instead of a vivid poetic figure. God has too many aspects: His "finest names" are mentioned in 59:28 as well as other places.

A few of these adjective attributes nonetheless follow. I have tried to render the attributes 'Alī as "Lofty" (or occasionally "Sublime"), and 'Azīz as "Powerful", respectively. *Al-'Azīm* I am translating consistently as the "Almighty". *Ra'ūf* is "Compassionate" or "Gentle" 9:117. God is "quite Aware", *A'lam* in 17:47, being the superlative absolute of the root to "know", whose simple adjective form is 'Alīm or "Aware". As the transcendent Deity Who needs nothing, God is Free from all wants 35:15. Wealth and property all belong to Him, Who has given them to man so the latter may use them in a proper fashion.

Al-Ghayb 16:77 represents the "Unseen", the "Absent" factor, all of those things we cannot know. Consciousness of this leads to an awareness of the "Unseen"; here we encounter something else that merits reverence, and we ask ourselves: What is a Mystery? Its keys are hymned in 6:59–62:

He holds the keys to the Unseen;
only He knows them! He knows
everything on land and at sea;
no leaf drops down unless He knows it,
nor any seed in the darkness of the earth,
nor any tender [shoot] nor any withered [stalk]
unless it is in a plain Book.

A mystery is more important than its solution, for it cannot exist once it has been solved. However it symbolises our endless quest for knowledge.

God represents ineffable Intelligence; He is the ultimate Source for everything 112:2, especially of reverence and authority. Man must not risk becoming isolated, lest he thereby lose his grasp on reality and become insane.

The rhythm we discover in life and the sense of reality which it invokes both lead us on to understand the Universe. Rituals involve initiation and passage; we thereby learn the secret or mystery as to why we have been created in the first place: as men and women, or as men facing the animals, and the sprites, or within the world itself. The next form of creation is what we experience in reproduction, which has come to each individual among us. Let us now study some further implications of these concepts.

Five Pillars and Three Sins

The Five Pillars which uphold the principles of Islam are not quite comparable to the dogmas in other religious systems. Likewise, the significance of the three great sins or *kabā'ir* in Islam seems to be that they are likely to hinder our progress towards meeting God and prevent us from attaining our self-fulfilment. A perusal of the Five Pillars of Islam will show that it has a conspicuous accent on righteous conduct. The beliefs to which man is required to subscribe in Islam are few, and these too are simple, straightforward, easy to comprehend, and rationally acceptable. Moreover, even these beliefs serve as a basis for supporting righteous conduct and in helping man orient his life to goodness.

The dignity of the convinced Muslim who assumes his obligations before God and man impresses other people and creeds. As that infamous Spanish genocide, Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros, lamented: "They [the Muslims] lack our faith, but we lack their works", before he proceeded to exterminate the Muslims of Granada following its capture in 1492. Being good is a form of discipline, and it does not mean to serve Satan, nor one's whims. A Muslim is not required merely to profess faith; this profession must be accompanied by true belief and worship in order for the *mu'min* or believer to find acceptance with God. We must furthermore make a collective effort in order to be moral. For catechistic purposes, the prescribed rites are called the Five Pillars or *Arkān* (sg. *rukn*) of Islam; they are listed as follows:

- (1) Faith or Belief (*Imān*), which was discussed earlier. Its profession or *shahāda* (the "witness" of one's faith, which also means a "certificate" in formal proof) is recited with the index finger raised when one is saying it while seated in prayer. Simple faith is not sufficient for a true Muslim; it must be accompanied by true belief and worship in order for the true believer or *mu'min* to find acceptance with God as well as respect within his own community. Believers thus must practise their faith by keeping the peace and contributing to

moral stability 49:13–15. Faith in God involves adopting a personal mode of living, a true life-style. It also implies gratitude just as disbelief means ungratefulness.

- (2) Prayer comes next. This can be either spontaneous appeal or *du'ā'* (17:11); or it can be formal and ritual *ṣalāt* (17:78, 29:45). The stimulus of the senses which is found in liturgy and ceremony comes from an action which is repeated for a purpose and conveys both a social and an individual meaning. The times for prayer as worked out by tradition are five times each day. Prayers are also held on Friday in congregation and on special occasions like marriages, festivals and funerals.⁴ Prayers are only acceptable from someone who is in a state of grace, and not while he is sinning or defiled; therefore washing or "ablution" before performing formal worship is not only symbolic but necessary. The idea of the *qibla* or direction of prayer (2:142) involves a "confrontation" or placing something one respects in *front* of you; with prayer, the whole Islamic world rings around this centre which is the Ka'ba in Makka, and as you arrive in that holy city and see this dramatic "circling" or *ṭawāf* within the hallowed shrine, you become intimately aware of the strength of this world-wide practice.
- (3) The formal tithe or Welfare Tax called *zakāt* in Arabic has rarely been explained in satisfactory English. It literally means "purification" or "sweetening", and stands for the tax which is collected to support Islamic social services. I prefer "welfare tax" to the terms "charity" and "alms" which confused me for so many years, although I am not quite satisfied with this rendering. In 64:17 it is called a loan to God which will be doubled when He returns it. *Zakāt* is also mentioned in connection with the boy John in 19:13, where I have translated it as "innocence", which shows some of its range of meaning.

Giving alms is not quite this formal. This is *ṣadaqa* in Arabic, and is voluntary 9:104, though occasionally it might be *ihsān* which we meet generally as the IV measure verb and its participle *muḥsin*, "one who acts kindly", and which I generally render as "kindness" (or "beneficence" and "beneficent" if we choose a Latin root). Books on Islam rarely define the difference between alms and charity on the one hand, and the formal outlay for community welfare on the other.

- (4) Fasting or *ṣawm* as the simple verbal noun, and *ṣiyām* as the personally assumed obligation of the III measure, takes place during the hallowed month of Ramaḍān. Like the Pilgrimage and similar rites, it moves forward ten days each solar year.
- (5) Finally, the Pilgrimage to Makka or *Ḥajj* must be mentioned. This duty is incumbent only on those who can afford it. The Pilgrimage

shows a great levelling quality with everybody dressed in the simple wrapping or *ihrām*, and also an awareness of the world which centres in the Ka'ba as the pilgrims dramatically "wheel" (√ ṭ w f) around it.

One more point might be mentioned: *Jihād* or the spiritual "struggle" or "striving" is not one of the Five Pillars of Islam (49:15). In proper translation it does not mean "holy war" except by extension, but it has been debased by this meaning, which is a journalistic usage.

The opposite side of the picture should be a discussion of sins and similar failings. In order to understand what are the mortal sins in Islam it is essential to remember that the mainspring of all sins is the lack of a true vision of, and faith in the one true God. The mortal sins (*al-kabā'ir* 4:31, 42:37) in Islam are three in number:

- (1) Disbelief or *kufr*;
- (2) Association or *shirk*; and
- (3) Arrogation or *ʿuḡhyān*.

These names have all caused difficulty in translation, especially when they are combined with verbs, participles and other derived forms, so they need discussion.

Kufr with its alternatives of *kafūr* and *kufūr* (which are really augmentative nouns) means first of all "disbelief", but its range is much wider.⁵ The gamut runs from "disbelief", "unbelief", "ingratitude", "rejection", etc. (17:99); but the first and fourth choices are the only ones which can be used with an English verb. In Arberry's translation one wearies of being "cried lies to" for the verbs *kafara* and *kadhhaba*, when "denied" and "rejected" would be both clearer and more direct. I prefer the term "disbelieve" and use it fairly consistently for the verb *kafara* rather than "reject"; just as the sinners or *kuffār* are "disbelievers", or "rejectors". The old chestnut of "infidels" is a translator's treason which has become another Western newspaperman's stock in trade. Quibblers go around tearing the Qur'ān apart 15:90–91; while asking too many questions can turn people into disbelievers 5:102.

The second and more grievous sin is *shirk* (4:48) which is usually translated as "polytheism" or "idolatry" by Christians, in order to dodge the fact that their dogma of a trinity is the respective context for their form of this error. The active noun "idolatry" and its derivative "idolator" might be used, but their verb to "idolise" does not fit satisfactorily at all times. "Polytheism" is even less acceptable. The sin of dualism is part of Association too; on the other hand, what can be called the ancient "Persian error" of Zoroastrianism and Manicheism which the troubadours shared in southern France considers the presence of evil to be necessary and exalts other pairs like Light and Darkness, Night and Day, Fire and Earth (2:164). The very worst sin thus consists of "associating" someone or something else in our pure worship of God. This gives us the convenient

words of "association" for the sin itself, and "associate" and "associator" (*mushrik*) for the participles, plus the verb to "associate" 9:31, 34:22. Passions and whims are false gods and should not be followed either. In order to be forgiven, associators must repent, learn to believe properly, and then act honourably 28:67.

The third great sin is *ʿuḡhyān* which I translate as "arrogation" or "arrogance". This sin is poorly understood both in the West and by Muslim apologists. It can be a civil or a secular failing: Pharaoh is the great tyrant or "arrogant" being in the Qur'ān, a supreme example when he assumes that he is self-sufficient and thinks he should be worshipped 20:43, 79:17. This can be overweening confidence in an individual 2:15, 21:29. For the ancient nation of Thamūd it was their Thunderbolt 69:5 *aṭ-Ṭāghiya*, while water can be arrogant and overflow 69-11; and of course man himself is called "arrogant" or presumptuous in 96:6. In consolation however, we are told in 2:256-7 following the noble Verse on the Throne that: "Anyone who disbelieves in the arrogant ones and believes in God has grasped the Firmest Handle which will never break".

After these three sins, the others are easily defined, especially since most of them would be classified as secular crimes committed in *al-dunyā* or "this world". Lesser faults can be called misdeeds or failings, while wrong conduct, if it is repeated wilfully, a vice, which is a conscious, repeated sin.

Final Note

This presentation is intended to produce sincere thought in our search for terms and concepts with which to explain Islam to the English-speaking world at the end of the twentieth century in the Western era or to begin the new fifteenth century of the Hijrah, which is coming in two years (1980 A.D.). It is important for us to clarify these terms in our own words so that we may discuss them properly and remove them from Western folklore and sociological jargon. Many Muslim apologists often show they have not been talking to anyone outside of their own circle; and by confining themselves to their own friends, they hurt even their political propaganda and become frustrated. We need not use the original Arabic term like *zakāt* with outsiders more than once or twice in any discourse; if we do, we are not speaking freely to them. Nor should we talk of "surrender" to God as if it were the true meaning of our religion when others developed this interpretation for us. Even *Islām* as a strictly Arabic word needs clarification when it becomes an English word.

Lastly, no syntax has been discussed here; my ideas on that are set forth briefly in the article published in the English fortnightly *Impact* in its issue for 8th-21st September, 1972, pp. 8-9 on "A Contemporary Translation of the Qur'ān". I have tried to work all of this out earnestly and prayerfully, not in order to produce controversy, but to invoke thought and

friendly discussion. As Muslims we urgently need to provide ourselves with the tools we must use for intelligent expression.

Notes and Sources

- 1 Charles J. Adams, "Islam, Religion (Part II)", *MESA Newsletter*, 1 February, 1971, vol. 1, 9-25.
- 2 Notice also the title to ch. 32 *As-Sajda* which I have preferred to translate as *Worship* since there it means "Bowing Down (on one's knees)" in reverence. "Prostration" has too nervous a connotation in colloquial English. The root $\sqrt{s}j d$ has always been awkward to translate precisely and elegantly, both with the verb and the noun, and this offers special difficulty in a republican society.
- 3 The spelling "Moslem" for the man with this peaceful mission is incrustated in newspapers and other sources of misinformation on the Middle East; spelled in this fashion, it is almost impossible for the naïve English-speaking person not to mispronounce it, especially by giving it different vowels than Arabic, and by voicing the unvoiced -s-, so it becomes *Mudhlim*, *Muzlim* or its exact opposite.
- 4 We urgently need a suitable prayer manual formulated in contemporary English where matters like the conditions incumbent on the believer in preparation for it should be explained and defined.
It needs to be pointed out that the prayers at the time of marriage consist of *du'ā'* rather than *Ṣalāt*, the latter having a prescribed form in Islam.
- 5 Professor Toshihiko Izutsu is excellent in explaining this in his book *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'ān* (Montreal 1966, McGill University Press), p. 9, n. 6.

CHAPTER TEN

Early Tafsīr – A Survey of Qur'ānic Commentary up to 150 A.H.

Mujāhid Muḥammad Al-Sawwāf

IN TRACING the early development of *Tafsīr*, one must first make an attempt to appreciate the problems which confronted the early Muslims concerning the proper understanding of the Qur'ān, for it is these problems which led to the development of this branch of learning. The Qur'ān was revealed, as we all know, in the Arabic language, and it follows the literary style of the Arabs which made it possible for the Arabs at the time of the Holy Prophet (peace be on him) to grasp its message and comprehend its tenets and injunctions.¹ The first requirement for a profound understanding of the Qur'ān, therefore, has always been the knowledge of Arabic language and literature. The fact that Arabic was the mother tongue of the Arabs placed them in an advantageous position *vis-à-vis* the understanding of the Qur'ān. Nevertheless, all native speakers of a tongue could not be expected to understand alike. Even the Companions of the Prophet (peace be upon him), although they were Arabs, sometimes found it difficult to understand certain parts of the Qur'ān, or their understanding mutually differed. For example, Ibn 'Abbās has said: "I did not know the meaning of *fāṭir* until two bedouins came to me quarrelling about a well; one of them said: "*Anā faṭartuhā*, and he meant 'I originated it'."² It can be assumed that some of the Companions did not know the meaning of some verses and words but might have felt hesitant to ask the Prophet (peace be upon him) lest they might be acting against the Qur'ānic directive: "O believers, question not concerning things which if they were revealed to you, would vex you." (Qur'ān 5:101). Other Companions, however, kept on making inquiries so as to solve the problems posed by the relatively difficult parts of the Qur'ān.

After the return of the Prophet (peace be on him) to the mercy of God, people were helped in solving problems relating to the proper explanation of the Qur'ān since at times there are several verses relating to the same subject, supplementing each other. To take a particular case, the story of Adam is mentioned in many chapters of the Qur'ān, in some of them briefly, in others in greater detail.³ Thus, the Qur'ān itself has served as the prime

source of *Tafsir*, one part of which helped to elucidate the others. When various related verses are compared, the generalised (*mujmal*) Qur'ānic statement is elucidated in the light of the specific (*mubayyan*) one. To take a concrete example, God says: "Permitted to you is the beast of the flocks, except that which is now recited to you." (Qur'ān 5:1). The purpose of this statement becomes comprehensible in the light of another verse of the same chapter: "Forbidden to you are carrion, blood, and the flesh of swine . . ." (Qur'ān 2:173). Similarly, explaining the absolute (*muṭlaq*) by the restricted (*muqayyad*) and the general ('āmm) by the particular (*khāṣṣ*) is a part of the method of explaining parts of the Qur'ān in the light of other related parts of the Qur'ān. By applying this method Muslim scholars also try to obviate the problems posed by the verses which seem to be mutually contradictory. The work of Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767), *Mutashābih fī al-Qur'ān*,⁴ is a good example of a relatively early grappling with this problem.

The *qirā'āt* too provide useful clues for *tafsir*. For example, the reading of Ibn Mas'ūd, "or till you possess a house of gold (*dhahab*)" explains the famous reading which is "a house of *zukhruf*".⁵ In other *qirā'āt* there are certain explanatory additions which sometimes help clarify the ambiguity in the text, and specify the required meaning so as to avoid confusion in interpretation.⁶ An example of this is the reading of Sa'd b. Abi Waqqās: "If a man or a woman has no direct heir, but has a brother or a sister – on the maternal side – to each of the two a sixth." In this, "on the maternal side" is added and explains the famous reading (Qur'ān 4:12).⁷ After reading the *qirā'ah* of Ibn Mas'ūd, Mujāhid b. Jabr states: "Had I read the *qirā'ah* of Ibn Mas'ūd before, I would not have enquired of Ibn 'Abbās about many things regarding which I enquired of him."⁸ Thus the *qirā'āt* are functionally a part of *Tafsir* and provide clues to answer many questions which arise in connection with a thorough understanding of the Qur'ān.

In addition to the *qirā'āt*, another important source on which *Tafsir* draws are Traditions from the Prophet (peace be upon him). Allah says: "We have sent down to thee the Remembrance that you may make clear to people what was sent down to them; and so haply they will reflect." (Qur'ān 16:44). Thus the clarification of the meaning of the Qur'ānic verses was one of the main functions of the prophetic office. Ibn Khaldūn said: "The Prophet (peace be upon him) used to clarify the *mujmal* and to distinguish between the abrogating verses and the abrogated ones, and to make this clear to his Companions."⁹ We learn from Traditions that the Prophet (peace be upon him) at times used to explain some verses. For example, he explained that the words: "those with whom Thou art wrathful" (occurring in chapter I) allude to the Jews. Again, he explained "nor of those who are astray" (in the same chapter) as alluding to the Christians.¹⁰ There are several other instances of the same nature in *Hadith* works which illustrate this point.

When the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) was asked about some verses, the answers he gave became authoritative explanations of those verses. For instance when the verse 6:82 was revealed, people found it difficult to comprehend its import, and hence asked the Prophet (peace be upon him) as to who of them did not commit wrong against himself. The Prophet (peace be upon him) made it clear that here it meant "associating others with Allah," which has been characterised elsewhere in the Qur'ān (31:13) as a "mighty wrong".¹¹ There were occasions when the Companions consulted the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his silence, or corrections were themselves considered a kind of commentary. When the verse 2:187 was revealed ("And eat and drink, until the white thread shows clearly to you from the black thread"), 'Adī b. Ḥātim took two robes, one white and the other black, and looked at them, but failed to distinguish one from the other. Then he went to the Prophet in the morning and told him about what had happened. The Prophet explained that what was meant by it was day and night.¹² This Prophetic Commentary (*al-Tafsīr al-Nabawī*) is to be found in the collections of traditions made by al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Tirmidhī, and others.¹³

One finds, however, that these traditions are not all on the authority of the Prophet, indeed some of them are from Ibn 'Abbās¹⁴ or 'Ā'isha¹⁵ and some are even the sayings of *al-Tābi'ūn* such as those of Mujāhid. The Commentary of the Prophet on the Qur'ān is not a complete one, although al-Bukhārī and others arranged it according to the chapters of the Qur'ān. There might be traditions from the Prophet (peace be upon him) relevant to three or four verses of a chapter while there might be nothing relating to its remaining verses. There are scholars, however, who believe that the Prophet commented on the whole Qur'ān, and one of these is the famous scholar Ibn Taimiyya.¹⁶ What seems more plausible is the statement of 'Ā'isha: "The Prophet (peace be upon him) commented only on some verses of the Book of Allah [and his commentary consisted of] what Gabriel had taught him."¹⁷ A possible objection to this view might be found in the tradition in which the Prophet (peace be upon him) states: "I have been given the Book and as much again with it. Will a well-fed man, resting on his sofa, say, 'Take the Qur'ān: permit what it permits and forbid what it forbids'. . ."¹⁸ The implication is that the man who is comfortably situated will think that if he obeyed the Qur'ān even though he might have neglected the tradition has done his duty. This particular *ḥadīth* has been adduced in modern times by the Ahl al-Sunna against the so-called *Ahl al-Qur'ān* (a negligible group found in Pakistan), who are inclined to disregard *Ḥadīth*. It will be noticed, however, that this tradition does not refer specifically to "Prophetic Commentary," although of course the pronouncements of the Prophet (peace be upon him) which have any bearing on Qur'ānic verses are quite obviously their most authoritative explanations.

When the Prophet (peace be upon him) died, the Companions were

deprived of their living source of guidance and were left to their own understanding and knowledge for the solution of ever-new problems so that they felt the need for the explanation of more and more verses. As with any new thing, there were people who welcomed it and others who rejected it. Thus, *Tafsir* faced difficulties and opposition right in the beginning and it was after some difficulty that it began to be regarded as a religiously acceptable branch of learning, for some Companions feared to explain anything in the Qur'ān. This might have been because they considered that to be the privilege of the Prophet alone. It is related that Abū Bakr was once asked about the meaning of verse 4:85 and his answer was: "Which sky could provide me with shade and which earth could bear me if I were to say something concerning the Book of God which I do not know".¹⁹

On the other hand there were people who used to comment on the Qur'ān even in the presence of the Companions. 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb used to give priority to Ibn 'Abbās over the Companions, so they complained to him about this. 'Umar called Ibn 'Abbās, and asked the Companions about the explanation of chapter 110: "When comes the help of Allah and victory." The Companions remained silent. Then Ibn 'Abbās said that it referred to the time of the death of the Messenger of Allah. 'Umar endorsed that opinion and thereby justified his preference for the young Ibn 'Abbās.²⁰ It is significant that there is no explicit mention in the chapter of the time of death of the Prophet. What the statement of Ibn 'Abbās implies is that when victory comes everything is completed, meaning that the Prophet (peace be upon him) had completed his task. Hence, nothing lay in store for him except to return to the mercy of Allah. One might be inclined to call this *ta'wil* rather than *tafsir*.

After some time Abū Bakr seems to have changed his view about *tafsir*.²¹ and he began to comment on some verses, as is found in his commentary on *kalāla*, "when one dies leaving no direct heir".²² Likewise, whereas many Companions commented on verses, opposition to the idea of *tafsir* persisted so that even up to 216/831 there were scholars such as al-Aṣma'ī who kept apart from *tafsir* for pietistic reasons.²³ Nevertheless, the number of works on *Tafsir* increased and the output in this field became increasingly rich.

Among the Companions who commented on the Qur'ān are the first four Caliphs,²⁴ although the *riwāyāt* from the first three are rather few. Their names, however, took the first place in the list of commentators. Since they are held to be the best people after the Prophet (peace be upon him), one would expect to find their names as first authorities in many fields, and *Tafsir* is one of those fields. It may be said that the paucity of *riwāyāt* from the first three Caliphs is due to their early death and their being pre-occupied with problems relating to the governance of the state. The *riwāyāt* from 'Alī are quite numerous, especially within the Shi'ī circles.

Once while preaching 'Alī is reported to have said: "Ask me about the Book of Allah. By Allah, there is no verse but I know whether it was revealed at night or in the daytime, and whether it was revealed on a mountain or a plain."²⁵ Although it is well known that 'Alī was a great scholar of the Qur'ān, one cannot agree with the view that he wrote a *tafsīr* (which has been attributed to him), the *Jam' al-Qur'ān wa Ta'wīlih*.²⁶ In this alleged work, 'Alī organised the Qur'ān according to its chronological order. So it may be a codex. Several considerations, however, make this seem implausible. First, 'Uthmān had all the copies of the Qur'ān burnt, and when 'Alī came to power he could scarcely have had time to write a full commentary on the Qur'ān in view of his many political and military involvements. But his views on the matter of Qur'ānic Commentary are recorded both in the Sunnī and Shi'ī collections of *Ḥadīth* – although even if they had been collected they would not form a complete *tafsīr*. Nevertheless, the Shi'īs have attributed some other books to 'Alī besides the one just mentioned; one of them is a work which allegedly includes sixty sciences of the Qur'ān.²⁷ Another work, *al-Jāmi'a*, is a book which, according to some Shi'ī claims, is seventy *dhirā'* long which the Prophet had dictated and 'Alī is said to have written, and was counted among 'Alī's works because he had written all that is forbidden and permitted.²⁸

In addition to the four early Caliphs, the recognised scholars of *Tafsīr* during the first decades of Islam were 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abbās (d. 68/687), 'Abd Allāh b. Mas'ūd (d. 32/653) Ubayy b. Ka'b (d. 20/040), Zayd b. Thābit (d. 45/665), Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī (d. 44/664) and 'Abd Allāh b. al-Zubayr (d. 73/692).²⁹ The leaders of *riwāyāt* in *Tafsīr*, taken in order of the amount they related, were: Ibn 'Abbās, Ibn Mas'ūd, 'Alī, and Ubayy b. Ka'b. Ibn 'Abbās was called the rabbi of the community (*hibr al-umma*), the interpreter of the Qur'ān (*tarjumān al-Qur'ān*), and the Sea (*al-Baḥr*). It was related that Gabriel told the Prophet (peace be upon him) that Ibn 'Abbās was the best (*khayr*) of the community.³⁰ Ibn 'Abbās, as Goldziher has observed, was the father of *Tafsīr*. His wide knowledge in many fields assisted him in this. His knowledge of the Arabic language and literature too was very extensive, which is illustrated by the following incident. Nāfi' b. al-Azraq once asked him a large number of questions relating to the Qur'ān, asking him to provide corroborative evidence from Arabic poetry. Ibn 'Abbās gave the meanings of two hundred words and a verse of pre-Islamic poetry for each in proof of his contentions.³¹

Many Companions of the Prophet were proud of Ibn 'Abbās and praised him. Among them was 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib who said of his *Tafsīr*: "It is as if he were looking at the unseen through a thin veil." There was also Ibn 'Umar who said: "Ibn 'Abbās is the most knowledgeable person of the community of Muḥammad about what was revealed to him (peace be upon him)."³² His being the forefather of the 'Abbāsids no doubt played some part in the attribution of a large number of traditions to him.

The views of Ibn 'Abbās on *Tafsīr* are to be found in all the books of commentary and the collections of Tradition. There is even a book entitled *Tanwīr al-Miqbās fī Tafsīr Ibn 'Abbās* which exists in several editions and purports to be the *Tafsīr* of Ibn 'Abbās. As Goldziher says, however: "Nothing can be said about the authenticity of this *Tafsīr* and its belonging to Ibn 'Abbās."³³ He goes on to say that serious research needs to be done about this *Tafsīr* and its relation to Ibn 'Abbās. But al-Dhahabī strongly denies its being the work of Ibn 'Abbās.³⁴ The authenticity and reliability of this *Tafsīr* has also been disputed and challenged by such an important scholar as al-Shāfi'ī. It has been stated that al-Shāfi'ī was unwilling to authenticate more than one hundred traditions from Ibn 'Abbās.³⁵ But as Goldziher has said, this book needs a comparative study in terms of the quotations from Ibn 'Abbās in later *tafāsīr*, and it would be unwise to judge its authenticity before such a study has been undertaken.³⁶ Not all scholars agree with al-Shāfi'ī about which of the traditions of Ibn 'Abbās are to be considered authentic.

Ibn Mas'ūd is recognised as the second scholar in *Tafsīr* after Ibn 'Abbās. He is a well-known authority in the field of Commentary and the Companions were agreed concerning his erudition. When asked about Ibn Mas'ūd, 'Alī said: "He knows the Qur'ān and the *Sunna*, and his knowledge is the best."³⁷ His *qirā'a* is well known, and his opinions relating to *Tafsīr* in the books of *Ḥadīth* and *Tafsīr*. After Ibn Mas'ūd comes 'Alī followed by Ubayy b. Ka'b. Ubayy was one of the Prophet's amanuenses and therefore he is a great authority in Qur'ānic Commentary. Ḥajjī Khalīfa states: "There is a big copy which Abū Ja'far al-Rāzī related from al-Rabī' b. Anas from Abū al-'Āliya from Ubayy b. Ka'b."³⁸ Nothing is known of what happened to this copy but his explanatory opinions are found in the books of *Tafsīr* and *Ḥadīth*. Those four Companions were the greatest Companions in the field of *Tafsīr* and much more is related from them to others. There are some Companions who related traditions relevant to questions of *Tafsīr* such as 'Ā'isha (d. 58/675), Abū Hurayra (d. 57/67), 'Abd Allāh b. 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ (d. 63/683), 'Abd Allāh b. 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 73/692), Jābir b. 'Abd Allāh al-Anṣārī (d. 74/693), and Anas b. Mālīk (d. 91/709).³⁹

The explanatory notes of the Companions enjoyed great respect among Muslim scholars. Ibn Kathīr says: "If we do not find the commentary of the Qur'ān in the Qur'ān itself, or in the Traditions we should turn to the sayings of the Companions, who knew about it best. This is because of the evidence they had seen and the conditions they had known, and because of the true nature of understanding, right knowledge and good deeds which they possessed."⁴⁰ The Companions did not comment on the Qur'ān as a whole, but they did comment on some verses and generally they did not commit their commentary into writing. Moreover, during this period *Tafsīr* remained a branch of *Ḥadīth*.

Time passed, and Qur'ānic Commentary was felt to be necessary by the community on those verses which the Companions had not commented upon. The Companions were dead, and the *Tābi'ūn* (Successors) took upon themselves this responsibility. Some of the great Companions had disciples whom they had taught. There were three main schools of Qur'ānic Commentary which had developed by the end of the first half of the first century. The first was that of Makka whose master was Ibn 'Abbās and whose students were Sa'id b. Jubayr (d. 94/712 or 95/713), Mujāhid b. Jabr al-Makkī (d. 104/722), 'Ikrima, the *mawlā* of Ibn 'Abbās (d. 105/723), Ṭāwūs b. Kaysān al-Yamānī (d. 106/724) and 'Aṭā' b. Abī Rabāh (d. 114/732).⁴¹ The second school was that of Iraq which recognised Ibn Mas'ūd as its master (and also some other Companions, but the school accepted him to be its main authority). Its students were 'Alqama b. Qays (d. 102/720), al-Aswad b. Yazid (d. 75/694), Masrūq b. al-Ajda' (d. 63/682), Mara al-Hamadānī (d. 76/695), 'Āmir al-Sha'bī (d. 105/723), al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 121/738), Qatāda al-Sadūsī (d. 117/735), and Ibrāhīm al-Nakha'i (d. 95/713).⁴² Finally, there was the school of Madina which, as the first capital of the Islamic Caliphate, was full of Companions and Muslim scholars, the most famous being Ubayy b. Ka'b. His students were Abū al-'Āliya (d. 90/708), Muḥammad b. Ka'b al-Qarzi (d. 117/735), and Zayd b. Aslam (d. 130/747), under whom his son 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Zayd and Mālik b. Anas studied.⁴³

These schools were not in rivalry with each other, nor was there any marked difference in their methods of *tafsir*. However, the schools of Makka and Madina were somewhat closer to each other in comparison with the school of Iraq, which was famous as the school of *ahl al-ra'y*. The scholars may say that Ibn Mas'ūd was the man who built the base of the latter school;⁴⁴ but this does not mean that the other schools did not use *ra'y*. Mujāhid, the Makkan used it and so did others.

The works of *Tafsir* at this stage included comments on more verses than before, and the Successors (*Tābi'ūn*) began to compose their Commentaries as well. Although some of them transmitted the opinions of Companions outside their school, most of their material was attributed to the founder of their own school. In the immediately following period we find the following prominent scholars in the field of *Tafsir*: Ismā'il al-Suddī (d. 128/745), al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Muzāhim (d. 105/723), al-Kalbī (d. 146/763), Muqātil b. Ḥayyān (d. before 150/767), and Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767).

During the reign of 'Alī, or soon thereafter, the Muslims began to split up into different sects. This affected many sciences including *Tafsir*. One finds from this time onwards different views existing among scholars and commentators who attempted to justify the doctrines of their own sect by adducing Qur'ānic verses. Goldziher aptly portrays this, especially in respect of the extremist sects which arose among the Muslims, when he says:

"It could be said about the Qur'ān, what the evangelist theologian who belonged to the new church, Peter Werenfels said, 'Everyone searches for his view in this Holy Book'." ⁴⁵

These three schools of *Tafsīr* continued to develop and in the course of time branched into many sects. All of them advanced arguments drawn from the Qur'ān in support of their opinions. It is said that Qatāda was a Qadari and that this affected his commentary so that some people objected to accepting traditions from him. Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī comments on the Qur'ān in an effort to prove his theological standpoint. ⁴⁶ Goldziher's work on the different schools of *Tafsīr* illustrates the divergent theological trends of that time and their reflection in the works of *Tafsīr*. As we are concerned with an historical account we shall not deal in detail with what Goldziher has written, nor discuss his many views with which we disagree.

In order to see when Commentary began to separate from Tradition, one has to determine when it was first written down and who was the first Commentator. According to al-Dhahabī: "The separation of *Tafsīr* from *Ḥadīth* and the growth of the former into an independent science was a development which was completed by Ibn Māja (d. 273/886), Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/930), Abū Bakr b. al-Mundhir al-Naisābūrī (d. 318/930), Ibn Abī Ḥatīm (d. 327/938), Abū al-Shaykh b. Ḥibbān (d. 369/979), al-Ḥākim (d. 405/1014), Abū Bakr b. Mardawayh (d. 410/1019), and others." ⁴⁷ One cannot agree with al-Dhahabī, whose date for the separation of the *Tafsīr* from the Tradition appears to be too late. ⁴⁸ It can be said that it separated from Tradition when the first *Tafsīr* was written, although the collections of traditions and the books of *Sīra* used to incorporate *tafsīr* material regarding many verses in the form of traditions. Examples of this may be found in Yazīd b. Hārūn al-Sulamī (d. 117/735), Shu'ba b. al-Ḥajjāj (d. 160/776), Waki' b. al-Jarrāḥ (d. 197/812) and Sufyān b. 'Uyayna (d. 198/813). It is also difficult to accept Ḥajjī Khalifa's statement that these men were the first scholars who wrote on *Tafsīr*. If one were to consider as *mufasssirūn* those who collected commentary on some Qur'ānic verses or Tradition, one must start with 'Abd Allāh b. 'Amr b. al-Āṣ (d. 65/684). It is said that he composed a collection of traditions of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) called *al-Ṣādiqah*, and Mujāhid asserts that he saw it in the possession of its compiler. ⁴⁹ Commentary on some verses did exist at this early period. However, the chapters on *Tafsīr* in these collections cannot be considered fully-fledged works of *Tafsīr*.

Some scholars claim that the first *mufasssir* was al-Farrā' (d. 207/822). With reference to him, Ibn Abī Mulayka said: "I have seen a complete book of *Tafsīr*." ⁵⁰ This date appears to be very late. Mujāhid b. Jabr asked Ibn 'Abbās about Commentary, carrying his tablets. "Ibn 'Abbās said, 'Write'; and Mujāhid asked him about all the Commentary of the Qur'ān." ⁵¹ It can be deduced from this statement that Mujāhid used to write the *Tafsīr* of Ibn 'Abbās, not his own; therefore it may be assumed that he wrote his

own *Tafsir* after the death of Ibn 'Abbās. 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwān (d. 86/705) asked Sa'id b. Jubayr to write a *Tafsir* on the Qur'ān.⁵² Aḥmad Riḍā says: "The first book of Commentary to appear was by Sa'id b. Jubayr."⁵³ This commentary should have been written before 86/705 as 'Abd al-Malik died in that year and Sa'id b. Jubayr was killed in either 94/712 or 95/713. Other scholars suggest the name of Abū al-'Āliya (d. 90/908) as the first one who wrote *Tafsir*. If Ibn Jubayr's *Tafsir* was written before the death of 'Abd al-Malik, then he would have been the first, otherwise Abū al-'Āliya might be the first one. But there is a point which needs clearing up. Goldziher in *Richtungen* (p.65) counted Sa'id b. Jubayr among those who, out of piety, did not want to comment on the Qur'ān. Goldziher based his view on a statement by Ibn Khallikān, who says: "A man asked him [Sa'id] to write a *tafsir* of the Qur'ān and he replied: 'If half of me drops down it is better for me than that'."⁵⁴ Goldziher's conclusion is doubtful on the ground that we do not know the extent of the reliability of the transmitter. Moreover, this tradition might have an altogether different significance than the one deduced by Goldziher. As Sezgin has pointed out, it seems to signify his opposition to the use of writing for the purpose of transmitting religious learning.⁵⁵ Al-Ṭabarī strengthens our view when he cites Sa'id's description of those people who recite the Qur'ān without commenting on it as "blind and ignorant men".⁵⁶ Ibn Sa'd relates that he always used to "verify his Book of *Tafsir*".⁵⁷ So from this statement one is sure of the existence of his *Tafsir*.

It is difficult to state who was the first Commentator since we have no copies of these early commentaries. For our purposes here, it can be said that Commentary separated from Tradition in the second half of the first century of *hijra*.

After Ibn Jubayr's *Tafsir* many scholars of *Tafsir* wrote their works between the years 86/705 and 150/767. A few are still extant. It used to be widely held that the oldest extant *Tafsir* is that of al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/922), and that all the books of Commentary written before that had perished.⁵⁸ This view is not tenable at all since the Commentaries of the following scholars are still extant:

(1) Mujāhid b. Jabr al-Makkī (d. 104/722).⁵⁹

(2) Zayd b. 'Alī (d. 122/740).⁶⁰

(3) 'Atā' al-Khurāsānī (d. 133/755).⁶¹

(4) Muḥammad b. al-Ṣā'ib al-Kalbī (d. 146/763).

(5) Muqātil b. Sulaymān al-Khurāsānī (d. 150/767).⁶²

The name of Ibn Ishāq, the famous author of the *Sira*, is not mentioned here though his book contains some *Tafsir*, because we are dealing with fully-fledged works in that field.

Notes and Sources

- 1 See Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah* (Cairo, n.d.), p. 382.
- 2 Al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn, *al-Itqān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān* (Calcutta, 1856), p. 267. There are many examples of this. For another example see al-Mabānī, *Muqaddimatān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*, ed. A. Jeffery, (Cairo, 1954), p. 183.
- 3 Qur'ān, 2:30–38, 7:11–24, 17:61, 18:50, 20:116–123.
- 4 As far as is known, there is no copy of this book extant. All that survives of it is twenty pages quoted by Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Malaṭī, *al-Tanbih wa al-Radd*, (Istanbul, 1936), pp. 44–63. For the Commentary of the Qur'ān by itself see Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, *al-Burhān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*, ed. M. Ibrāhīm (Cairo, 1957–8), vol. 2, p. 125; and Muḥammad al-Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa al-Mufasssīrūn* (Cairo, 1961–2), vol. 1, pp. 38–39.
- 5 Al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 40.
- 6 Goldziher, I., *Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranauslegung*, Arabic translation A. H. al-Najjār, *Madhāhib al-Tafsīr al-Islāmī* (Cairo, 1955), p. 16.
- 7 al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 40.
- 8 al-Tirmidhī, Muḥammad b. 'Isā, *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* (Bulaq, 1875), vol. 2, p. 157.
- 9 *al-Muqaddimah*, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
- 10 Tirmidhī, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
- 11 al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 46.
- 12 Muḥammad b. Ismā'il al-Bukhārī, *al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, on the margin of *Faṭḥ al-Bārī* (Cairo, 1901–11), vol. 3, p. 64 and Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Razī al-Jaṣṣās, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān*, (Istanbul, 1916), vol. 1, p. 288.
- 13 al-Bukhārī, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 60–137; Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Qushayrī, *al-Ṣaḥīḥ* (Bulaq, 1873), vol. 2, p. 398, and al-Tirmidhī, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 156–242.
- 14 al-Bukhārī, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 63; Muslim, *op. cit.*, pp. 400–1.
- 15 *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 65 and vol. 2, p. 399.
- 16 al-Suyūṭī, *op. cit.*, p. 822 and al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 49.
- 17 al-Mabānī, *Muqaddimatān*, p. 182; *al-Muqaddimah*, p. 263.
- 18 al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 45.
- 19 *Muqaddimatān*, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
- 20 Muḥammad 'Alī al-Sāyis, *Tafsīr Āyāt al-Aḥkām* (Cairo, 1953), vol. 4, p. 128. The incident of 'Umar stated above is a good example of 'Umar's reaction.
- 21 See his saying cited above and n. 19.
- 22 *Muqaddimatān*, *op. cit.*, p. 187.
- 23 Brockelmann, *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Weimar, 1893), vol. 2 (Berlin, 1902), Supplement 3 vols. (Leiden 1937–42), 105 Anm: 1, and Goldziher, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
- 24 Ḥajjī Khalīfa, *Kaṣḥf al-Ḍunūn*, (Istanbul 1941), vol. 1, p. 480; al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 63.
- 25 al-Suyūṭī, *op. cit.*, pp. 908–9. A similar statement was made by Ibn Mas'ūd.
- 26 Muḥammad al-Amin Al-Ḥusaynī, *A'yān al-Shi'a* (Damascus, 1934), vol. 1, p. 154.
- 27 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 154–5.
- 28 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 166.
- 29 al-Suyūṭī, *op. cit.*, p. 968.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 909.
- 31 *Ibid.*, pp. 282–309 and see *Masā'il Nāfi' b. al-Azraq*, Ms. al-Zāhiriyya no. 3849, fols. 108–119.
- 32 al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 69.
- 33 Goldziher, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
- 34 al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 82.
- 35 Al-Sharabāshī, *Qīṣṣat al-Tafsīr* (Cairo, 1962), p. 68.

- 36 The present writer hopes to do this in the future.
- 37 al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 86.
- 38 Ḥajjī Khalifa, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 429.
- 39 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 430.
- 40 Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm* (Cairo, 1937), vol. 1, p. 3.
- 41 Ḥajjī Khalifa, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 430 and al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 101.
- 42 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 118.
- 43 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 114.
- 44 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 118.
- 45 Goldziher, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
- 46 al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 131.
- 47 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 141.
- 48 *Op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 430, and Aḥmad Amin, *Fajr al-Islām*, (Cairo, 1928), p. 247.
- 49 Guillaume, *The Traditions of Islam*, (Oxford, 1924), p. 16. The name mentioned in this book is Ibn 'Umar which is a mistake.
- 50 Aḥmad Amin, *Ḍuḥā al-Islām* (Cairo, 1962), vol. 2, p. 141.
- 51 Ibn Kathīr, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 4.
- 52 Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhib al-Tahdhib* (Hyderabad, 1907–9), vol. 7, p. 198.
- 53 *Kalima fī al-Tafsīr*, an introductory article to *Majma' al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* (Sidon, 1914), vol. 1, p. 7.
- 54 *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, vol. 1, p. 256.
- 55 Fuat Sezgin, *Geschichte der Arabischen Schrifttums*, vol. 1, (Leiden, 1967), translated into Arabic by F. Abū al-Faḍl, *Ta'rikh al-Turāth al-'Arabī* (Cairo, 1971), vol. 1, p. 175.
- 56 *Jāmi' al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* (Bulaq, 1922–30), vol. 1, p. 81.
- 57 *al-Ṭabaqāt* (Beirut, n.d.), vol. 6, p. 266.
- 58 Aḥmad Amin, *Fajr*, p. 274; al-Dhahabī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 209.
- 59 In course of publication for the Gibb Memorial Series, edited by the present writer.
- 60 The present writer hopes to edit this in the near future. The authenticity of this book is not discussed here.
- 61 To be published shortly.
- 62 His *Tafsīr* was edited by the present writer and forms part of his doctoral thesis submitted to Oxford University.

An Early Discussion on Islamic Jurisprudence: Some Notes on *al-Radd 'alā Siyar al-Awzā'i*

Zafar Ishaq Ansari

OF THE major religious communities of the world perhaps none has had to concern itself with complexities of international relationship as soon after its inception and to as great an extent as the Muslims. From the very outset their historical career has been marked by a high degree of involvement with other political entities, entailing a wide variety of relationships, from active belligerency to co-operation and friendly alliance. At the same time, Islam fostered an attitude of mind which prompted the Muslims to judge matters primarily in the light of their religious norms.¹ The questions which the Muslims faced in their relationship with non-Muslim communities were no exception to this. In fact in that regard the Prophet (peace be on him) and the early caliphs had to engage in a series of wars and to contend with scores of problems. As a result the Muslims have had a considerable wealth of precedents to guide them in grappling with questions of war and peace and all the related problems arising therefrom. Thanks to all this, the Muslims have always considered themselves bound by certain norms rather than free to pursue their collective self-interest untrammelled by religious compunctions. To cite just a few examples: the Muslims considered themselves bound to observe many a principle even on the battlefield, to abide faithfully by the agreements they had concluded, and to honour the safe-conduct granted to non-Muslims even by an ordinary Muslim. Likewise, even while engaged in hostilities, the Muslims made a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants and did not consider it lawful to kill the latter. They also considered destruction of trees, harvests, livestock, etc., to be reprehensible unless that was dictated by compelling necessity.

It was probably owing to this strong religious influence – specially the influence of the life of the Prophet (peace be on him) – on the outlook of the Muslims to questions concerning relationship with non-Muslim

communities that the word "Siyar" was chosen to designate what has been termed as the Islamic law of nations. For this word, as we know, is the plural of *sīrah*, which in its technical usage means the biography of the Prophet.²

Before Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150), "Siyar" does not seem to have enjoyed the sustained attention of many jurists and thus its development into a full-fledged, separate branch of Islamic law was relatively slow. Among the scholars of the first century, we know that the Kufan traditionist and jurist Sha'bi (d. 104) had devoted considerable attention to the subject, and presumably his doctrines influenced Abū Ḥanīfah. Among the contemporaries of Abū Ḥanīfah, the Iraqi scholar Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 162) also took a keen interest in "Siyar". The main credit for a thorough and systematic treatment of this branch of Islamic law, however, must go to Abū Ḥanīfah (and his circle of jurists) and to al-Awzā'i (d. 157), the famous jurist of Syria; and of these two, particularly to the former.³

Abū Ḥanīfah had attempted to formulate his doctrines in consultation with his large group of disciples and fellow-jurists of Iraq covering all the different branches of law. He did the same in the field of "Siyar" so that his two distinguished disciples, Abū Yūsuf Muḥammad b. Ya'qūb al-Anṣārī (d. 182) and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189) collected the relevant doctrines of their master and committed them to writing. It seems plausible, as the traditional sources state, that one of these works viz. Shaybānī's *al-Siyar al-Ṣaghīr*,⁴ which was a record of Abū Ḥanīfah's doctrines on "Siyar" as dictated to its author by his senior fellow-disciple, Abū Yūsuf, came to the notice of Awzā'i. In turn Awzā'i wrote his comments on this work, expressing in a succinct form his disagreements with the doctrines of Abū Ḥanīfah. Subsequently, Abū Yūsuf wrote a rejoinder to Awzā'i's work, and incorporated this material into a book called *al-Radd 'alā Siyar al-Awzā'i*.⁵ This, along with the comments of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfi'i (d. 204), has come down to us in his *Kitāb al-Umm*.⁶

Coming to Abū Yūsuf's *Radd*, it is the earliest extant work devoted to "Siyar"⁷ and indeed one of the earliest extant works on *Fiqh* as such. It is a precious source of information for the doctrines of the second century jurists on "Siyar". Moreover, it is an even more precious source of information about the opinions, and the attitudes of the jurists of that period towards *uṣūl al-fiqh*, – and it is in this respect that we shall examine the book here.

At the time when *Radd* was written, a great wealth of legal doctrines had already accumulated in the various centres of *Fiqh*. The bulk of the questions which form its subject matter had already been considered and an attempt was then being made to systematise it. Thus, it was a period of intense activity in the field of Islamic law. This seems to have been stimulated, *inter alia*, by the increased contacts between the scholars of the various centres of Islamic scholarship which led to an increasing awareness

of disagreements among the jurists.⁸ As a result of this, the jurists could no longer afford to rest merely at stating their positive doctrines. They were rather forced to vindicate them by referring them to a set of commonly accepted, objective criteria.⁹ Controversies about the validity of different positive doctrines thus led to a keener interest in, and an enhanced awareness of the problems relating to the legal theory and methodology of *Fiqh*. The real significance of *Radd* lies in its being a work of *fiqhī* controversy of this kind. For, besides embodying the divergent opinions of several jurists, *Radd* also mentions the grounds on which those jurists sought to validate their doctrines. It is for this reason that *Radd* illuminates the contemporary attitudes of jurists towards *uṣūl al-fiqh* to an extent that hardly any other work of that period does. These discussions shed a good deal of light on what was then taken for granted and was undisputed and clear, as well as what was controversial and vague. Even though the statements embodied in the book were designed to express the actual theoretical positions held by the discussants, those discussions were bound to have a cumulative effect and to gradually bring about subtle modifications in the attitudes of the discussing parties. Controversial discussions such as these virtually forced the participants to abandon arbitrariness and refer the various disputed questions to common and objective criteria of judgment. In short, *Radd* can safely be assumed to have contributed to a clearer perception and formulation of the *uṣūl al-fiqh*. It can be reckoned as one of those books which, step by step, paved the way for Shāfi'ī's formulation of a magnificently coherent and consistent theory of *Fiqh* a generation later. In this regard *Radd* resembles and anticipates *Kitāb al-Hujaj*¹⁰ of Shaybānī (d.189) and *Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth* and several treatises of Shāfi'ī in his *Kitāb al-Umm*.

Radd follows the case method and its form of composition is the following: Abū Yūsuf first states a doctrine of his master, Abū Ḥanīfah, and then reports the variant doctrine of Awzā'ī on the same question. Since the original work of Awzā'ī seems to have been composed with the object of recording his disagreements with the doctrines of Abū Ḥanīfah on "Siyar", the book generally records – though briefly – some evidence in support of the doctrines of the former.¹¹ This is followed by Abū Yūsuf's own arguments aimed at establishing the validity of the doctrines which he holds to be sound, and in all save a very few cases he supports the doctrines of his master.¹² In so far as *Radd* faithfully reports the conflicting doctrines of those jurists, it is a pioneering work in a branch of *Fiqh* literature which was to become popular subsequently and to be known as *Ikhtilāf*. In this respect, *Radd* resembles another work of Abū Yūsuf, namely *Ikhtilāf Abi Ḥanīfah wa Ibn Abi Laylā*.¹³ It is unlike that work, however, in so far as the primary role of Abū Yūsuf in *Ikhtilāf* is that of an impartial reporter, whereas in *Radd* he is also a full-fledged and zealous participant in the discussion. Almost invariably Abū Yūsuf's report of the doctrines of Abū

Ḥanifah and Awzā'ī in *Radd* is followed by detailed comments mentioning the arguments in support of the doctrines of the former.

This brings us to consider, even if *en passant*, another significance of *Radd*. Hitherto Islamic *Fiqh* had known only one division: the geographical one. The doctrines of each centre seemed to be somewhat distinct, either in substance or in approach, from the doctrines of other centres. The attitude of Abū Yūsuf in *Radd* (as well as in his other works *Kharāj*, *Ikhtilāf* and *K. al-Āthār*)¹⁴ reflects, to some extent, this earlier geographical division. At the same time it reflects a change of considerable importance – the gradual fading out of the geographical centres of *Fiqh* and the emergence of legal schools around the doctrines of certain highly outstanding jurists. *Ahl al-'Irāq* and *ahl al-Ḥijāz* at this point were on the way to becoming Ḥanafis and Mālikis. *Radd*, like the other works of Abū Yūsuf and his somewhat younger fellow disciple, Shaybānī, clearly reflects this development and possibly also contributed to it.

Islamic jurists, as we know, enunciated their theory about the sources ("roots") of positive doctrines through the well-known formula of "four-fold *shar'ī* proofs" (*adillah arba'ah*): the Qur'ān, the *Sunnah*, *Ijmā'* and *Qiyās*. Even though the extant writings of the second-century jurists do not seem to contain this formula in this form, the formula does portray, in substance, what the *fuqahā'* of that period considered to be the main sources of their doctrines. It should be added, however, that the nature of *qiyās* is significantly different from that of other sources, specially the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*. Shaybānī brilliantly pointed out this distinction by opposing *khābar lāzim* to *qiyās*,¹⁵ stressing thereby the different nature and superior position of the former.

a. The Qur'ān

That the Qur'ān was recognised by the Muslims as an authoritative source of law from the very beginning is perhaps too evident to be stressed.¹⁶ The influence exerted by the Qur'ān on positive legal doctrines appears in two forms. First, it is reflected in the doctrines which are directly based on the verses of the Qur'ān. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the Qur'ānic legal norms stimulated a large number of questions around which *fiqhī* discussions in Islam have revolved for centuries.¹⁷ In fact it is this which was largely responsible for the infra-structure of unity of Islamic law despite the diversity of positive doctrines.

In the writings of early Muslim jurists, explicit statements to the effect that the Qur'ān is an authoritative source do not occur very frequently. The Qur'ān seems to have been taken for granted so that such a statement would have been a platitude. There are in *Radd*, nevertheless, a few statements about the Qur'ān which do indicate its paramount authority – statements which were occasioned by the difficulties which the jurists sometimes encountered in resolving the conflicts between the materials

bearing on legal questions found in the different authoritative sources. Abū Yūsuf, for instance, points out that pronouncements about what is *ḥalāl* (lawful) and *ḥarām* (unlawful) should be based on categorical Qur'ānic verses rather than on anything less authentic and authoritative, including the inferential and explanatory opinions based on the Qur'ān.¹⁸ The implication was that when there are no categorical Qur'ānic verses relative to a question, one should refrain from characterising things as lawful or unlawful. Rather than that, Abū Yūsuf points out, on such occasions the earlier jurists were wont to use milder expressions such as "there is no harm in it," etc.¹⁹

There did occasionally arise problems as to the nature of relationship between Qur'ānic legal prescriptions and other authoritative sources of law such as traditions specially when the latter seemed to contradict or restrict the scope of the former. In the early writings of Muslim jurists we have several examples of rejection of traditions on the above ground. This attitude can be appreciated by keeping in mind that before the coming into existence of the canonical collections of traditions, it was difficult for scholars to be sure which of the traditions were authentic and which were not. In such circumstances, one of the purposes that the Qur'ān served (along with well-established *Sunnah*, and *ijmā'*), was that of a criterion for the acceptance or rejection of traditions. Thereby the Qur'ān served as a barrier against the possible intrusion of foreign elements in the body of Islamic law. This seems to be illustrated by the following statement of Abū Yūsuf which he makes after pleading that none except the well-established and widely-known traditions be accepted.

The Prophet said: "Verily *ḥadīth* from me will spread. Whatever comes to you and agrees with the Qur'ān is from me; whatever comes to you from me which does not agree with the Qur'ān is not from me" . . . *Riwāyah* multiplies so that some of it [sc. traditions] which is traced back through chains of transmission is not well-known to the *fuqahā'*, nor does it agree with the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. Beware of the *shādhah* tradition and follow the *ḥadīth* which is accepted by the community and which agrees with the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* . . .²⁰

In *Radd* we do have a few concrete examples of divergence between the import of Qur'ānic verses and that of authoritative traditions. For instance, one comes across this with regard to the question whether it is permissible for the Muslims to cut down and burn trees and destroy the enemy property which they were unable to carry away. Awzā'i was of the opinion that it was not permissible. He based his doctrine on the famous instructions of Abū Bakr. Abū Yūsuf, following Abū Ḥanifah, considered those acts permissible and argued in support of this view by referring to a Qur'ānic verse (LIX.5), which permitted cutting down of trees in seeming contradic-

tion to Abū Bakr's instructions, or at least to Awzā'ī's inference from those instructions.²¹ Awzā'ī held on to his opinion and pleaded that "Abū Bakr and his Companions knew the meaning of this verse better than Abū Ḥanīfah".²² In other words, Awzā'ī's argument was that since it was Abū Bakr who had issued the instructions, they could not possibly be contrary to the intent of the Qur'ān. On the other hand, Abū Yūsuf did not dispute the authenticity or validity of Abū Bakr's instructions. He came forward with two ingenious reasons in support of the doctrine of his school. First, he claimed that the instructions had been issued by Abū Bakr since he knew that the territory concerned would fall to the Muslims²³ (and that the cutting down or burning of trees, etc., would, therefore, be injurious to Muslim interests). The second, and even more subtle reason which he advanced was that the instructions referred to destruction after victory had been achieved, rather than before it. Abū Yūsuf's closing sentence, however, is significant: "The Book of Allah has greater claim to be followed."²⁴

In *Radd* we also encounter another question in which Abū Yūsuf seems to take the position which Awzā'ī took in the case just cited. Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf were of the opinion that it was lawful for Muslims to shoot arrows at the non-Muslims whom they had besieged if the latter tried to shield themselves behind Muslim children.²⁵ Awzā'ī, on the contrary, was opposed to this, and supported his viewpoint by applying analogy from the Qur'ānic verse XLVIII.25.²⁶ Abū Yūsuf opposed Awzā'ī by pointing out that he had misunderstood the true import of the verse concerned. He refuted Awzā'ī by drawing another analogy. The Prophet, he said, had prohibited the killing of all women and children (including non-Muslim ones). Nevertheless, he besieged the people of al-Ṭā'if, Khaybar, Qurayzah and al-Naḍir, and caused the Muslims to overrun their towns and fortresses and even used *manjaniq* although obviously these places would not have been empty of infants, women, age-stricken people, etc. Subsequently too the presence of women and children in the fortresses and other places under the occupation of non-Muslims – whom the Muslims are not permitted to kill – has never prevented the Muslims from shooting arrows aimed at them. This, in Abū Yūsuf's view, proved that the purpose of the Qur'ānic verse was different from what Awzā'ī had understood it to be.²⁷

Thus, while the position of the Qur'ān was undisputed, disagreements arose because the jurists at times disagreed about the legal bearing of the verses concerned. On other occasions, disagreements among them were caused by the fact that some Qur'ānic verses were liable to a restricted application if some authentic, authoritative tradition or "practice" seemed to demand that.²⁸

b. *Sunnah*, Traditions, "Practice"²⁹

Much more frequently than to the Qur'ān, the jurists of the period with which we are concerned referred legal questions to *Sunnah*. The ways of

referring to *Sunnah*, however, were not quite standardised. At times a jurist would support his doctrine and make the claim that it conformed to the *sunnah* of the Prophet or of some of his Companions³⁰ without caring to adduce a formal tradition embodying the *sunnah* in question.³¹ On other occasions, the jurists cited traditions from the Prophet and Companions, and the opinions of Successors and distinguished jurists, frequently without necessarily citing the full *isnād* of those traditions. On still other occasions, a jurist would refer to established "practice" which meant the norms which were continuously operative in the Muslim society and enjoyed its approval, specially that of the religious scholars.³² On the conceptual plane there was no ambiguity or disagreement about the overriding authority of the *sunnah* of the Prophet. There was little unanimity, however, as to how one knew for sure in a particular case what the precept or the practice of the Prophet was. As the knowledge of *Ḥadīth* and *Fiqh* became more widely diffused and contacts between scholars of different regions increased, the lack of unanimity mentioned by us above became untenable and gradually a set of objective criteria for judging legal questions emerged. It is for this reason that many attitudes and doctrines of jurists during the period of transition – and it was in such a period that *Radd* was written – appear as arbitrary, illogical and confused to a student of Islamic jurisprudence who is familiar with the finalised formulations of Islamic legal theory. The same was the reaction of Shāfi'ī whom we find continually lashing out at the ancient schools of law and branding their doctrines and reasoning with arbitrariness and inconsistency.³³

It requires considerable sympathetic imagination to be able to appreciate the situation. In this connection it would be helpful to bear in mind that the prime motive which had actuated the early juristic activity was a practical one: the necessity to enunciate Islamic norms relative to actual life-situations. The *primary* concern of the early *fuqahā'* was not to establish the soundness of their legal doctrines by adducing persuasive arguments: it was rather to discover them. The attitude of the early jurists towards the "roots" was, for many reasons, relatively informal and was characterised by a general trust in the soundness of the doctrines of those who were acknowledged as authorities, by a robust confidence in the continuity and purity of those "practices" which constituted the Islamic way of life. As long as this confidence remained unchallenged, formal and objective criteria played a less important role in deciding which out of the numerous "roots" ought to prevail in a given case. Thus the personal judgments of jurists, which were considerably influenced by subjective considerations – by the discretion of the *fuqahā'* accompanied by a broad understanding of the spirit and goals of Islam – played a fairly important part in the early Islamic legal thinking.³⁴

It was approximately around the year 100 and subsequently that this attitude began to lose its hold. Hitherto the doctrines of local lawyers seem

to have been accepted with little questioning. This confidence in the authority of local lawyers, combined with relatively undeveloped material conditions which hampered a speedy and regular diffusion of doctrines and the non-existence of collections of authoritative traditions which might be regarded by scholars of different regions as authentic, had led to the growth of regional schools of *Fiqh* during the later part of the first century. It was again because of this confidence that the jurists of the first century felt less impelled by the need to support their doctrines by consistently adducing systematic or traditional arguments. In short, unless there were strong reasons which called for the scrutiny of a particular doctrine or "practice" accepted in one's region, the general assumption was that it was sound.³⁵

With the passage of time this confidence suffered rude shocks, (particularly in Iraq which was ethnically, culturally and religiously more heterogeneous than other regions of the Muslim world). The rise of numerous sects, the enhanced awareness of diversity of legal doctrines and the meddling of unqualified persons – ignorant rulers, incompetent judges, etc. – in legal matters combined to undermine this confidence. In this changing climate of opinion, legal doctrines could often no longer be accepted as readily as in the past if an attempt was made to validate them merely by vague claims of uninterrupted "practice", or even by invoking the authority of the jurists of a relatively late period. These doctrines were rather required to be backed by authentic traditions from the Prophet or from Companions. But that was not all. Even those traditions were increasingly required to meet certain formal and objective criteria of authentication. The doctrines which were divergent from those of one's school began to be put to rigorous scrutiny, which forced each school to put forth arguments in their defence. And this could have been done only by referring legal questions to objective, and to a great extent, generally accepted criteria.³⁶

The second century was essentially a century of transition. It inherited from the preceding century its share of informality and confidence in the authority of local jurists. As a result of that, undocumented reference to "practice" continued, though its incidence decreased. For the same reason the objective criteria which had come to be recognised regarding traditions (e.g. that the chain of transmission should be complete, all the transmitters should be well-known and trustworthy, etc.), were not always followed. On the other hand, an increasingly rigorous, formal attitude was emerging. The impact of this attitude was that statements about the doctrines of one's school began to be accompanied increasingly (though not consistently) by their supporting evidence, and reference to formal traditions from the Prophet and from Companions increased. The actual application of these emerging formal criteria was naturally bound to serve more – thanks to human nature – as a tool of criticism of the doctrines of other schools than as a means for a critical scrutiny of those of one's own school. Gradually,

however, it served the latter purpose as well which is evident, for instance, from the abandonment by the jurists of many doctrines of the elders of their own school on the ground that those doctrines did not conform to the generally accepted formal criteria.³⁷

It is owing to the co-existence of these two divergent attitudes – the old and the new, the informal and the formal – that the legal writings of this period appear confusing and full of apparent inconsistencies. Abū Yūsuf, for instance, rejects Awzā'i's claim that a certain "practice" had continued since the time of 'Umar and 'Uthmān because that claim did not fulfil the formal requirements of authentication of traditions.³⁸ He also blames the Syrians and Hijazis for claiming the sanctity of *Sunnah* in favour of the practices introduced by administrative officials or incompetent jurists.³⁹ He also opposes *Sunnah* to solitary traditions and considers the latter irregular and unacceptable.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, he himself does not seem to care much to follow these standards strictly, and quite frequently he adduces traditions which are unsatisfactory according to the criteria which he himself propounds.⁴¹

An extremely important factor responsible for this paradox was, as we have already pointed out, the absence of exhaustive *Hadith* collections which could be recognised by all concerned as embodying authentic traditions. Hence a formal tradition going back to the Prophet did not necessarily enjoy the same authority which it began to do after the famous six or more canonical collections had been made after their being subjected to rigorous scrutiny according to the canons of *Hadith*-criticism.

With this background, let us revert to *Radd* to examine what light it sheds on the concept of *Sunnah*, specially *Sunnah* of the Prophet, and to study its relationship with traditions and "practice" as it obtained about the middle of the second century and the succeeding decades.

Let us first consider Awzā'i. He does not use the expression "*sunnah* of the Prophet" very frequently. This terminological phenomenon is of little significance since the concept which that expression embodies is clearly found in the few fragments of his doctrines which have survived. He cites the Qur'ānic verse: "Certainly you have in the Messenger of Allah a good example" (XXXIII.21),⁴² and states that "the one who has the greatest right to be followed as an example and whose *sunnah* one must adhere to is the Messenger of Allah".⁴³ Moreover, throughout *Radd*, Awzā'i's main argument in favour of his doctrines consists of pointing out their conformity with the practices introduced by the Prophet which were continually followed by the Muslims.⁴⁴ In fact, except for a very few cases, his reference to "practice" of the Muslims is preceded by reference to the Prophet as the initiator of those practices.⁴⁵ Moreover, even when Awzā'i does refer merely to "practice", he seems to claim its authority on the ground that the practice concerned enjoyed the approval of all Muslims, particularly of the '*ulamā*'. In fact when Awzā'i cites a practice without claiming it to have

been introduced by the Prophet, he seems to support it on the ground of *ijmā'*.⁴⁶

However, Awzā'i's references to the practices of the Prophet are usually not embodied in formal traditions, let alone in traditions which meet the required criteria of authentication such as *isnād*. This was perfectly understandable in the generation of Awzā'i and reflects the hold of the attitude characteristic of the earlier period of Islamic law.⁴⁷ All this was, however, fast becoming anachronistic owing to an increasing degree of consciousness regarding *uṣūl al-fiqh* and the advancements made by the science of *Hadīth* so that Abū Yūsuf found in Awzā'i's doctrines and reasoning a great many vulnerable points.⁴⁸

Coming to Abū Yūsuf, it seems evident that he was closer and more responsive to the new trends in *Fiqh*. To be sure, his exposition of the legal theory was less thorough and circumspect than Shāfi'i's.⁴⁹ Moreover, on several issues, his ideas were significantly different from those of Shāfi'i. One of these issues was that of solitary traditions. Abū Yūsuf seemed to attach considerably less importance to them than Shāfi'i for whom they were identical with the *sunnah*. Nevertheless, in this attitude he is closer than Awzā'i to the legal theory of Shāfi'i, as we shall see.

What distinguishes Abū Yūsuf from Awzā'i is the theoretical position of the former that the claim of *Sunnah*, if it is not backed by any documentation, is not authoritative.⁵⁰ It is on this ground that he ridicules and blames both the Syrians and Hijazis – and he considers both like-minded – and claims that their reference to "practice" was devoid of any formal evidence. Abū Yūsuf himself adduces formal traditions in favour of his doctrines quite frequently, though not invariably. Moreover, those traditions often have *isnād*, even though often they might be interrupted – the criterion which Shāfi'i later emphasised.⁵¹

In his insistence that when one invokes the authority of *Sunnah*, his claim should be backed up by definite traditions mentioning its transmitters Abū Yūsuf speaks in the vein of Shāfi'i. He cares little for "practices" as such, and again, like Shāfi'i, is not prepared to concede that "practice" embodied *Sunnah* for they might at times be merely administrative fiat of officials⁵² or legal formulations of incompetent scholars.⁵³ Thus, in Abū Yūsuf, emphasis shifts from undocumented practice to formal traditions.

There are, nevertheless, fairly important points of disagreement between Abū Yūsuf and Shāfi'i. One of these is that Abū Yūsuf emphasises the *sunnah* of Companions along with that of the Prophet, a feature which he shares with other Kufan jurists as well as his contemporaries elsewhere.⁵⁴ In our view, this point of difference is perhaps not as radical as it seems at first sight. Shāfi'i's objection to it is partly a manifestation of his concern with terminological accuracy, for he continued to adduce traditions from Companions, although theoretically he narrowed down its scope.⁵⁵ Another point of serious disagreement between Abū Yūsuf (and, for that

matter, the ancient schools of Islamic law) and Shāfi'i is the extent of the authority of solitary traditions. For the ancient schools did not consider solitary traditions trustworthy enough to prevail over those doctrines which had been hallowed by consensus or continued practice or enjoyed the approval of the lawyers. Traditions could be deemed authoritative only if they had been transmitted in a manner that rendered them safe from the possibility of error, and this was doubted in regard to isolated traditions. It was owing to this deficient confidence in solitary traditions that Abū Yūsuf tried to develop certain criteria of *Ḥadīth*-criticism so that the traditions which did not conform to them, might be rejected. In his opinion traditions should be accepted as authoritative only if they are:

- (1) in agreement with the Qur'ān;⁵⁶
- (2) in agreement with the *sunnah* – a *sunnah* which is so well known (*sunnah ma'rūfah*) and has been received in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of doubt about its authenticity;⁵⁷
- (3) widely-diffused and generally accepted by the community;⁵⁸
- (4) transmitted by and/or known to, and accepted by scholars and jurists;⁵⁹
- (5) transmitted by people well-known for integrity and trustworthiness;⁶⁰
- (6) in harmony with the general spirit of Islamic teachings;⁶¹
- (7) representative of the normative conduct of the Prophet rather than that which is uniquely related to him.⁶²

Were we to compare Awzā'i and Abū Yūsuf, however, we find that "practice" in the theory of the former played a much more important role whereas formal traditions were not all that prominent. Abū Yūsuf and other jurists of the Kufan school made a definite departure from this attitude. This is evident from the fact that they supported their doctrines much more frequently by referring to formal traditions from the Prophet and Companions. Shāfi'i later developed and formalised this trend and applied it with his characteristic rigour and consistency. The major departure of Shāfi'i from the Kufan legal theory lay in his unwavering confidence in all well-authenticated traditions from the Prophet, including the solitary traditions. The uncompromising consistency shown by Shāfi'i on this point partly reflects his mental disposition and temperament. At the same time, it also reflects, in no small measure, the progress made by the science of *Ḥadīth*. It is this progress which paved the ground for that robust confidence in the authenticity of formal traditions from the Prophet which were in circulation in the time of Shāfi'i. Had there been no solid ground for this confidence, Shāfi'i's theory would not have had any feet to stand upon.

All this shows that in respect of his attitude to *Sunnah*, practice and traditions, Abū Yūsuf – and the Kufan school for that matter – occupied an intermediary position between the early attitude as represented by Awzā'i and the emerging attitude which was to find later a very worthy representative in Shāfi'i.

c. *Ijmā'*

The general recognition of a "practice" by the community (or by its scholars in general) as normative was considered by the ancient schools of law to be one of the essential characteristics of the *Sunnah*. If there had come down some "practice" from the past which had generally been considered meritorious or at least unobjectionable by the Muslims, this naturally strengthened the case for its being regarded as valid. In this context it is not difficult to imagine how greatly important the role of *ijmā'* (consensus) was during the first and second centuries when the collections of well-authenticated traditions were in the process of being made – a process which later greatly facilitated legal judgments by enabling the jurists to refer to a known body of authoritative traditions. During the period of our concern, however, not only did "agreed practice" serve as a barrier against isolated traditions, but was also used quite frequently as an argument for further authentication of traditions.⁶³ Moreover, in some cases consensus was even adduced independent of any tradition to validate it. In *Radd*, there are numerous instances of supporting doctrines on the ground of consensus, specially by Awzā'i.

In a majority of cases in which Awzā'i refers to "consensus", his reference to it is preceded by the mention of the practice or doctrine in question as going back to the Prophet. Thus, operationally speaking, consensus constitutes a supplementary argument which corroborated the claim that the practice in question was *Sunnah*,⁶⁴ or that it reinforced the evidence of the traditions adduced on the question concerned which, as we have noted in the case of Awzā'i, are devoid of *isnād*. However, aside from resorting to consensus as corroborative evidence, consensus has also been invoked in a manner which shows that it was also deemed to be an independent source of law. Even though such instances in Awzā'i are not numerous, they do exist.⁶⁵

The references to consensus in Awzā'i are found in negative as well as positive forms. He supports a certain practice, for example, on the ground that "none has denounced this: neither any *wāli* of the *jamā'ah* (community) nor any '*ālim*'".⁶⁶ Besides this, however, there are also instances of claim of positive consensus expressed by derivatives from "*ajma'a*"⁶⁷ – which clearly indicates a conscious position on the part of Awzā'i *apropos* consensus.

The notion of consensus in Awzā'i is essentially that of continued Muslim practice, maintained not only actually, but also normatively, i.e., practice backed up by the conviction of its being appropriate on the part of both the rulers and the '*ulamā*'.⁶⁸ The reference to '*ulamā*' seems to guarantee that the practice in question was religiously unobjectionable. Besides the consensus of *a'immat al-hudā*⁶⁹ and *a'immat al-Muslimin* and '*ulamā*', Awzā'i also makes use of the concept of the "consensus of all Muslims". Of these the last, however, is rather rare.⁷⁰

Coming to Abū Yūsuf, there are several examples of his statements in *Radd* and elsewhere on consensus which shed some light on his attitude. Abū Yūsuf, like Awzā'i, expresses this concept in negative as well as positive forms. In the negative form it assumes the form of such a statement as: "No disagreement on the question has come down from anybody".⁷¹ More frequent, however, is his reference to positive agreement, specially that of the *fuqahā'*. Abū Yūsuf, for instance, says: '*Alā' hādihā jamā'at fuqahā'inā lā yakhtalifūn* (a claim of *ijmā'* backed up by a tradition from the Prophet).⁷² It is striking, however, that in the discussions in *Radd* Abū Yūsuf does not invoke the authority of consensus very frequently. We have discussed this phenomenon and its significance elsewhere, noting the characteristic attitude of Abū Yūsuf and the Kufan school to consensus.⁷³ From an operational point of view, the importance of consensus seems to be inversely related to that of formal traditions. This is a feature noteworthy about the Kufans in general, and also about Shāfi'i.⁷⁴ Abū Yūsuf's attitude as expressed in *Radd* seems to illustrate and confirm this conclusion.

d. *Ra'y*, *Qiyās* and Technical Legal Thought

The activity of the *fuqahā'* essentially consisted of determining the legal bearing of the materials contained in the authoritative sources, and we have already noted some aspects of this activity in the foregoing sections. The *fuqahā'* were often faced, however, with questions for which explicit directives were not found in the authoritative sources. In such cases they either had to resort to their considered personal opinion (*ra'y*) or to analogical reasoning (*qiyās*), which meant extending the legal injunction found in the sources regarding one case to the parallel cases. This kind of activity, specially *ra'y*, was of a delicate nature since it involved the use of human reasoning in the handling of materials provided by revelation, and hence the danger of exceeding the proper limits was ever present. It is this which explains the scornful nuance which the word *ra'y* came to acquire. On closer examination, however, it appears that *ra'y* has had both an acceptable and an opprobrious connotation in Islamic writings.⁷⁵ Resorting to *ra'y* was considered in general to be acceptable, and even praiseworthy, when it was used not as an alternative to *khavar lāzim*, but as the means whereby its legal import was determined and whereby, in the absence of *khavar lāzim*, legal doctrines were formulated. It is to *ra'y* in this sense that the *fuqahā'* in the early centuries of Islam resorted and in its actual use were guided by common sense, considerations of equity and common good and the broad interests of Islam.⁷⁶ Gradually, a standard and commonly acceptable form of *ra'y* called *qiyās* emerged, whereafter the scope of *ra'y* naturally became relatively restricted.⁷⁷ It seems partly because of the greater use of both *ra'y* and *qiyās* in Iraq that the Iraqi legal school came to be known as the school of *ra'y* and *qiyās*.⁷⁸

In *Radd* we hardly ever come across any sustained discussion about the legitimacy or otherwise of *ra'y* and *qiyās* as such.⁷⁹ The book is replete, however, with instances of the use of *qiyās* both by Awzā'ī and by the Kufan jurists. A comparative study of their *qiyās* shows not only a much more frequent use of *qiyās* by the Kufans, but also a greater maturity and finesse in its use. This coheres with the overall picture of the Kufan school as one relatively more advanced than the other contemporary schools of law. We reproduce below a few instances of the use of *qiyās* in *Radd* to enable us to have a vivid picture of *qiyās* during the second century. On the question whether a person could use arms from the stock of booty which the Muslims had captured, Awzā'ī expressed the view that he could do so as long as the actual fighting was going on. Awzā'ī considered taking arms without permission of the commander and returning them after the end of the war to fall under *ribā al-ghulūl* which the Prophet had urged the Muslims to abstain from. Abū Yūsuf, on the contrary, supported the variant opinion of Abū Ḥanifah that one could make use of the arms without the permission of the commander even if the actual fighting was not going on. He argued by saying that the case of the person was analogous to that of the Muslim who is in *dār al-ḥarb* and who has neither any animal to ride, nor do other Muslims have any animals to spare for him except the ones captured by them as booty. In such a case there is no harm if the Muslims offer him an animal from the stock of booty. Abū Yūsuf uses this doctrine as the basis for his analogical reasoning which he applies to the cases of arms, food and clothing which a person might need in *dār al-ḥarb*.⁸⁰

In regard to a question already mentioned by us,⁸¹ Awzā'ī expressed his judgment on the basis of the Qur'ānic verse XLVIII.25. Abū Yūsuf, on the other hand, considered the verse inapplicable to the question, and supported the variant doctrine of his school on the ground of analogical reasoning based on a tradition from the Prophet.⁸²

On the question whether it is lawful to eat the animals slaughtered by an apostate who had become a Jew or Christian, Awzā'ī considered it to fall under the rule that it was lawful to eat the animals slaughtered by the Jews and Christians [i.e. *ahl al-Kitāb*]. Abū Yūsuf disagreed with this and argued that the position of the apostate was different from that of *ahl al-Kitāb*. He attempted to establish this by pointing out that whereas *jizyah* might be accepted from *ahl al-Kitāb*, it could not be accepted from apostates. He also points out that if a [Muslim] woman were to become a Christian, it would not be lawful for any Muslim to marry her even though a Muslim may, as a rule, marry a Christian woman.⁸³ (In other words, Abū Yūsuf's doctrine was that the position of the person as an apostate was his dominant characteristic and it is that position which should serve as the basis of analogical deduction rather than his being from the *ahl al-Kitāb*.)

If one of the *ahl al-ḥarb* enters *dār al-Islām* either with safe-conduct and then embraces Islam there, or embraces Islam prior to his entry into *dār*

al-Islām, what would be the legal position of the property which such a person might have deposited with some *ahl al-ḥarb* as a trust and which the conquering Muslim soldiers had seized as booty? Abū Ḥanīfah thought it would be treated as *fay'*. Awzā'ī opposed this opinion on the ground that the conduct of the Prophet in regard to the people of Makka at the time of the conquest of that city was different [viz. he had left them in possession of their properties]. Abū Yūsuf repudiated this by pointing out: "Other people are not like [literally: do not resemble] the Messenger of Allah . . . nor is the ordinance respecting the non-Arabians or the People of the Book like the ordinance respecting the Arabians. Do you not think that one should not accept *jizyah* from the Arabian polytheists who are not *ahl al-Kitāb* . . . while *jizyah* may be accepted from the non-Arabian polytheists . . ."84

Even as *qiyās*, the technical legal thought of the Kufans – as embodied in *Radd*, and in other early works of *Fiqh* – was more advanced than Awzā'ī's. *Radd* is full of examples which show a greater degree of explicit legal reasoning, a greater concern for systematic consistency and a greater interest in the specifically technical legal aspect of the problems on the part of the Kufan jurists.⁸⁵ The overall higher level of the juristic speculation of the Kufan school⁸⁶ is well reflected in the field of "Siyar" as well as where it seems that the Kufan jurists preceded others in formulating a fairly elaborate set of principles to govern the relations of the Muslims with other communities. Compared with the Kufans, Awzā'ī seems to have been concerned mainly with questions relating to laws of war, specially the treatment of enemy persons and distribution of booty. On the basis of the information contained in *Radd* and other early works, it can hardly be sustained that Awzā'ī had attempted a comprehensive study of the problems relating to the external relations of Islam.⁸⁷

In the field of "Siyar", the characteristic contribution of the Kufan school seems to be its emphasis on an elaborate legal classification of persons,⁸⁸ and even more than that, of territories, and its insistence that legal judgments rested on both those considerations. The territorial classification of the world into *dār al-ḥarb* (Territory of War) and *dār al-Islām* (Territory of Islam) seems to have weighed very heavily with the Kufans and was the fundamental basis of their disagreement with Awzā'ī on a very large number of questions recorded in *Radd*,⁸⁹ and was a clear indicator of technical legal orientation of their doctrines.

From the discussion above, a few points seem to emerge. First, one is impressed with the crucial role played by the *Ikhtilāf* works – the genre of *Fiqh* works to which *Radd* belongs – in the development of Islamic jurisprudence. A keener awareness of disagreements fostered by such works led the jurists to seek to validate their respective legal doctrines, and this eventually made them face serious questions relating to legal theory and methodology. This significantly reduced the influence of the relatively less formal

and less objective considerations and ultimately enabled the elaboration of Islamic legal theory and methodology which, in their broad essentials, came to enjoy the agreement of the overwhelming majority of Muslim jurists. Secondly, there is overwhelming evidence – including the work concerned – which establishes that both in respect of its attitude to *uṣūl al-fiqh* and in respect of the finesse of legal reasoning, the Kufan school occupied an intermediary position between the early schools of law and Shāfi'i⁹⁰, in whom Islamic law and jurisprudence seem to reach the highest point of clarity and refinement.

Notes and Sources

- 1 See this writer's Ph.D. thesis, "The Early Development of *Fiqh* in Kūfah," (McGill University, Montreal, 1966), (typescript), p. 27 ff. (Cited hereafter as "Early Development"). Cf. I. Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, tr. C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern, vol. I, (London, 1967 C.E.), chap. I, and T. Izutsu, *Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'ān*, (Montreal, 1966 C.E.), *passim*.
- 2 In addition to *ṣirah* the other commonly used word for the biography of the Prophet (peace be on him) was *maḡhāzī* (literally, "military campaigns"). (See, for instance, the *Maḡhāzī* of al-Wāqidī, d.207). It is also significant that even in the works entitled as *Ṣirah* (such as that of Ibn Ishāq, d.151), the military campaigns of the Prophet (peace be on him) are treated in such details that they seem to dominate the entire Medinan period of his life. For the concept of "Siyar" as a branch of Islamic law as distinct from the biography of the Prophet see Majid Khadduri in his "Introduction" to *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī's Siyar*, (Baltimore, Md., 1966 C. E.), p. 39 ff. (Cited hereafter as *Islamic Law of Nations*). See specially the definition of "Siyar" by two outstanding Muslim jurists, al-Sarakhsī (d.483) and al-Kāṣānī (d.587) cited in *ibid.*, p. 20.
- 3 This is well borne out by a study of the works which embody the doctrines of the early jurists in the field of "Siyar" specially Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī's *Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā': Kitāb al-Jihād wa Kitāb al-Jizyah*, ed. J. Schacht, Leiden, 1933 C.E. (Cited hereafter as Ṭabarī, *Ikhtilāf*). See also *Islamic Law of Nations*, p. 22 ff. For Abū Ḥanīfah's doctrines on "Siyar" see specially Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Radd 'alā Siyar al-Awzā'i*, ed., Abū al-Wafā al-Afghānī, (Cairo, 1375), (also embodied in Shāfi'i, "Kitāb Siyar al-Awzā'i" in *Kitāb al-Umm*, 7 vols., Bulaq, 1321–5, vol. VIII, pp. 303–36); *Idem.*, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, (Cairo, 1352); Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, *al-Siyar al-Kabir* in Sarakhsī's *Sharḥ al-Siyar al-Kabir*, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, 3 vols., (Cairo, 1957–60 C.E.), *Idem.*, *Kitāb al-Aṣl*, (considerable part still in manuscript; so far six volumes of it have been published in recent years from Hyderabad. Its sections on "Siyar" have been translated into English by Khadduri, *Islamic Law of Nations*. See also Sarakhsī, *Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ*, 30 vols., (Cairo, 1324–31), vol. X, pp. 2–144; Ṭabarī, *Ikhtilāf*, *passim*.
- 4 For a brief description of the circumstances which led to the composition of *Radd* by Abū Yūsuf, see Afghānī's Introduction to *Radd*, pp. 2–4. The epithet *ṣaḡhir* in the title of several works of Shaybānī seems to denote those works in which Shaybānī depended too heavily on, or which were dictated to him by Abū Yūsuf, as distinguished from those works which were his own. It seems to have been used specially when Shaybānī himself later composed a more detailed work than the one he had composed earlier on the same subject under the direction of Abū Yūsuf. This

point seems well established by a comparative study of Shaybānī's *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḡhir*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥayy al-Lakhnawī, (Lucknow, 1310) and *al-Jāmi' al-Kabir*, ed. Abū al-Wafā al-Afghānī, (Cairo, 1356). For this see also Sarakhsī, *Sharḥ Kitāb al-Siyar al-Kabir li Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī*, *op. cit.*, p. 3, (Cited hereafter as Sarakhsī, *Sharḥ*). Cf. Khadduri, who takes a somewhat different view in *Islamic Law of Nations*, p. 37.

- 5 Unless indicated otherwise, references to this Book will indicate its sections and paragraphs as divided by J. Schacht in *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, II impression, (Oxford, 1959 C.E.), p. 335. (Cited hereafter as *Origins*). In the cases wherein page numbers of the book have been specified, they refer to the Cairo edition.
- 6 For *Kitāb al-Umm* see n. 3 above.
- 7 The work of a distinguished contemporary and fellow-disciple of Abū Yūsuf and Shaybānī called Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Fazārī (d. 188) on "Siyar" is still in manuscript, and only very small fragments of it are found in some later bibliographical dictionaries or other legal works. For Fazārī see F. Sezgin, *Geschichte der Arabischen Schrifttums*, Band I, (Leiden, 1967 C.E.), p. 292; M. Khadduri in *The Islamic Law of Nations*, p. 26, nn. 56 and 57; and N. Abbott, *Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri*, vol. II, (Chicago, 1967 C.E.), p. 232 ff.
- 8 Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. circa 140) provides a good contemporary testimony to these disagreements. See his "Risālah fi al-Ṣaḥābah", in Muḥammad Kur.d 'Alī, *Rasā'il al-Bulaghā*, IV edition, (Cairo, 1954 C.E.), *passim*, specially p. 126.
- 9 For this development see "Early Development", p. 222 ff.
- 10 (Lucknow, 1888 C.E.). An edition of this work has recently appeared from Hyderabad under the title *Kitāb al-Ḥujjah 'alā ahl al-Madinah*, ed. Abū al-Wafā al-Afghānī, 4 vols., (1385-90).
- 11 The striking fact that almost every variant doctrine of Awzā'i mentioned in this book is accompanied with some argument in support of it, whereas Abū Ḥanīfah's doctrines are stated without any supporting argument seems to provide an internal evidence in support of the view that Awzā'i's aim in composing the work was to record his variant doctrines.
- 12 As far as I have been able to note, in the whole book Abū Yūsuf expresses his disagreement with Abū Ḥanīfah on no more than four issues. See 3, 34, 36 and 40.
- 13 Ed. Abū al-Wafā al-Afghānī, (Cairo, 1357); also embodied in *Umm* vol. VII, pp. 87-150. (Cited hereafter as Abū Yūsuf, *Ikhṭilāf*).
- 14 Ed. Abū al-Wafā al-Afghānī, (Cairo, 1355).
- 15 See his observations cited by Shāfi'i in "Kitāb al-Radd 'alā Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan", *Umm*, vol. VII, p. 280. The relationship between *qiyās* and the other three "roots" seems to this writer to be somewhat similar to the relationship between the empirical method of the scientist and the physical phenomena. Both these three authoritative legal "roots" and the physical phenomena provide the basic data to the *fuqahā'* and the scientists respectively. If this basic data is handled according to the appropriate method, it is likely to yield the right conclusions.
- 16 See "Early Development", p. 179 ff.
- 17 See *ibid.*, pp. 75 ff. and 179 ff. Cf. *Origins*, p. 224 ff.
- 18 *Radd*, 23. See also *ibid.*, 5, where Abū Yūsuf mentions the Qur'ān along with the *Sunnah* as a decisive criterion for the acceptance or rejection of traditions. Cf. *ibid.*, 24, where Abū Yūsuf points out that the question of *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām*, instead of being decided according to "practice", ought to be decided on the basis of "*Sunnah* from the Prophet and forbears: his Companions and the *fuqahā'*". This apparent lack of circumspection is an index of the vastly superior exposition of *uṣūl al-fiqh* by Shāfi'i, specially in his *Risālah*, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākīr, (Cairo, 1940 C.E.).
- 19 *Radd*, 23. For a statement by Awzā'i bearing on the same problem see p. 152 ff. above, specially p. 164, n. 26 below.

- 20 *Radd*, 5. Cf. the translation of this passage in F. Rahman, *Islamic Methodology*, (Karachi, 1965 C.E.), p. 35, from the early part of which I have benefited. As for the last sentence of the passage, my understanding of it is somewhat different from that of Rahman. Cf. also Schacht's translation in *Origins*, p. 28, which seems inaccurate. See also "Early Development", ch. IV, n. 49.
- 21 *Radd*, 28 f. See also Shaybānī in Sarakhsī, *Sharḥ*, p. 41 ff., specially p. 52; *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, p. 194 ff., *al-Mabsūt*, vol. X, p. 31.
- 22 Ṭabari, *Ikhtilāf*, p. 81.
- 23 *Radd*, 29.
- 24 *Loc. cit.*
- 25 *Radd*, 21; Ṭabari, *Ikhtilāf*, p. 6.
- 26 *Radd*, 21; Ṭabari, *Ikhtilāf*, p. 4. He also applied it to a similar case: whether it is lawful to raid an enemy ship which is also carrying Muslim captives? See *ibid.*, p. 5.
- 27 *Radd*, 21; see also Ṭabari, *Ikhtilāf*, pp. 7-8.
- 28 For this see p. 152 ff.
- 29 For this writer's detailed views on the attitude of the second century jurists to *Sunnah*, traditions and "practice", see "Early Development", p. 193 ff.
- 30 It should be stressed that it was Shāfi'i who used the term *sunnah* uncompromisingly with reference to the precepts and practices of the Prophet *alone* (as embodied in well-authenticated formal traditions). See this writer's paper, "Islamic Juristic Terminology before Shāfi'i", *Arabica*, Tome XIX, *passim.*, specially p. 280. (The conclusions of the paper are based largely, though of course not exclusively, on a careful analysis of *Radd*. In the following pages we have reproduced some of our statements and materials from that paper, without always referring to it). The practice of Shāfi'i's predecessors was different. They sometimes used *sunnah* in a wider context, and particularly with reference to Companions. (*Loc. cit.*). Shāfi'i's strictness in using the term *sunnah* did not mean, however, his refusal to recognise the authority of Companions. (See "Early Development", p. 217).
- 31 See Awzā'i's references to the *sunnah* of the Prophet in *Radd*, *passim.* But other contemporary jurists were also wont to do this as the early works of *Fiqh* show.
- 32 See "Early Development", p. 210 ff.
- 33 See *Umm*, *passim.*; specially vol. VII.
- 34 See "Early Development", p. 218 ff.
- 35 See *ibid.*, p. 207 ff., and p. 223.
- 36 See *ibid.*, p. 224 ff.
- 37 For some illustrations see *ibid.*, p. 203 ff.
- 38 *Radd*, 1 and 2.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 1 and 3. See also *Origins*, p. 191, n. 6.
- 40 See *Radd.*, 5, 9 and 38, and Shaybānī in Sarakhsī, *Sharḥ al-Siyar al-Kabīr*, vol. I, p. 213.
- 41 See, for traditions cited by Abū Yūsuf without *isnād*, *Radd*, 1, 2, 3, 15, (p. 50), 16, etc. For traditions with interrupted *isnād*, see 1, (pp. 10 and 11), 5, 6, 30, etc. Quite often instead of the actual names of transmitters, Abū Yūsuf either refers to "some of our shaykhs" [see 1, 5, (p. 24 ff.) and 31], or merely to "a man".

As for the question of "isolated traditions", it is true that at times Abū Yūsuf rejects them on the ground of being irregular (see n. 40 above), but in many other cases such traditions form the basis of his doctrines. The case of other contemporary jurists is not much different. A careful examination will show that the above instances do not necessarily establish the inconsistency of Abū Yūsuf (or of other contemporary Muslim jurists such as Awzā'i, Mālik, and others). Were one to study specific cases, the context itself would make it clear as to when an isolated tradition was set aside, and that was in the event of the existence of a more authentic and more authoritative evidence. In *Radd*, 38, for instance, Abū Yūsuf's rejection of the tradition concerned was based on the consideration that its import was in opposition to

a Qur'ānic verse (IV. 3); in *ibid.*, 5, he again rejects certain traditions, but does so on the ground that they are divergent from the traditions which are followed by the generality of the Muslims, and which are known to the *fuqahā'*, or are divergent from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, specially the former. In *ibid.*, 9, he rejects Awzā'i's doctrine on the ground that it is only based on an isolated tradition, and isolated tradition is *shādhah* (irregular). He also criticises the tradition for being irregular on the ground of its anonymity since the tradition neither specifies the rulers nor the scholars who enforced or accepted it. (In any case, Abū Yūsuf later changed his opinion on the subject and reverted to Awzā'i's position. See *Radd*, Cairo edition, p. 41, n. 2. Cf. *Kharāj*, p. 19, Ṭabari, *Ikhtilāf*, p. 38 ff.).

42 See *Radd*, 23.

43 *Ibid.*, 50.

44 For instances of such reference see *ibid.*, 1 (a practice of the Prophet); 2 (a saying of the Prophet); 3 (a practice of the Prophet); 4 (the denial of the religious relevance of an institution because of its non-existence in the time of the Prophet); 5 (a practice of the Prophet continued by *a'immat al-hudā'*); 6 (a practice of the Prophet subsequently followed by the Muslims); 7 (a practice of the Prophet also followed subsequently). It is somewhat significant that once Awzā'i objected even to making reference to a practice related to the *diwān* in legal questions on the ground that *diwān* did not exist in the time of the Prophet. (*Ibid.*, 5).

45 For instances of reference to "practice" without the mention of the Prophet, see *ibid.*, 3, 6, 9, 14, 19, 25, 32. As for references to "practice" as a supplementary evidence with the claim of its introduction by the Prophet, see its instances in n. 44. For the relationship between *sunnah* and the actual customs and practices of the Muslim society, see this writer's "Islamic Juristic Terminology", *op. cit.*, p. 274 ff. I have argued that the actual practice was not considered *per se* to be identical with the *Sunnah*.

46 See *ibid.*, 6, 9, 19, 25 and 32. In several of these, the reference is to the *a'imma* and/or the '*ulamā'*' which shows the continuity of practice and thus reinforces the claim of *ijmā'*. The reference to the '*ulamā'*' seems to be motivated to ensure that the practice concerned was religiously unobjectionable. It should be added that Awzā'i refers only rarely to Companions. For these few references see *ibid.*, 22, 28, 32 and 42.

47 See above p. 12 ff.

48 See *Radd*, 1, 3, etc.

49 For one such instance see p. 151 above.

50 See *Radd*, 1.

51 See *ibid.*, and other works of Abū Yūsuf, *passim*. For Shāfi'i's emphasis on uninterrupted *isnād*, see *Umm*, vol. VII, p. 249, and often elsewhere in his writings.

52 *Radd*, 1. Abū Yūsuf's remarks are very much like those of Ibn al-Muqaffa' who had protested against careless or unjustified claims of *sunnah*. See Ibn al-Muqaffa', *op. cit.*, p. 126.

53 *Radd*, 1 and 7.

54 See "Early Development", p. 149 ff. For use of *sunnah* in this context see *Radd*, 18. For other general statements implying the authority of Companions see *ibid.*, 10, 18, 24, 25.

55 See "Early Development", p. 217 ff. and 247 ff.

56 See *Radd*, 5, 15. See also "Early Development", p. 186 ff. For Shāfi'i's attitude see "Siyar al-Awzā'i", *op. cit.*, 5; *idem.*, *Risālah*, p. 228 ff.

57 *Radd*, 5, 7, 8, 14, etc.

58 *Ibid.*, 5 (pp. 24 and 31 ff.). and often.

59 *Ibid.*, 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 24.

60 *Ibid.*, 1, 2, 4 and often.

61 *Ibid.*, 5 (p. 29): *Annahu al-ladhi huwa ahdā' . . . atqā . . . ahyā.*

- 62 The basic idea was that sometimes when the Prophet acted in exercise of his unique prerogatives, his conduct was not normative for others since they had not been granted those prerogatives. In such cases, his conduct need not be followed. Thus, as a source of law the *sunnah* of the Prophet was binding except in those very few cases where he had acted in this unique capacity. See *ibid.*, 5 (pp. 24 and 34), 39 and 50.
- 63 See *ibid.*, *passim*, and n. 64 below.
- 64 For examples of Awzā'i's reference to consensus as a supplement to the claim that the doctrine in question was based on the "*sunnah* of the Prophet", see *Radd*, 2 (an uninterrupted practice backed by a saying of the Prophet), 3, 5, 13, 31. For a doctrine based on Abū Bakr's interpretation of the Qur'ān and followed by the Muslims subsequently, see *ibid.*, 29.
- 65 See *ibid.*, 5, 14, 15, 24 and 32. Awzā'i's statement (*ibid.*, 9) apparently is a reference to consensus independent of traditions, etc., but Abū Yūsuf's observation (*loc. cit.*) indicates that a tradition on that question did exist. This also seems to be presupposed in Awzā'i's statement, but was not explicitly mentioned. See also *Ikhtilāf*, p. 83 where Awzā'i does claim the support of a tradition (*athar*) known to *ahl al-ilm*.
- 66 *Radd*, 6. For a similar expression, see *ibid.*, 14. In his reference to consensus as a supplementary argument the usual form that Awzā'i employs is to claim lack of disagreement, (see *ibid.*, *passim*., e.g. 3) or to claim that the original practice introduced by the Prophet remained in operation until the assassination of al-Walid II (d. 126) (*ibid.*, 1 and 3).
- 67 See *ibid.*, 5 and 31. (On both the occasions *ijmā'* has been claimed with regard to a practice or doctrine introduced by the Prophet.)
- 68 See *ibid.*, 6, 9 and 14. In fact the actual practice might have ceased to be in operation. See, for example, *ibid.*, 1 and 24.
- 69 This meant the first four Caliphs. See "Islamic Juristic Terminology" *op. cit.*, p. 266 and n. 2.
- 70 See, for instance, *Radd*, 3 (where reference has been made to uninterrupted adherence by the Muslims to a practice initiated by the Prophet without ever disagreeing about it, a statement which seems to be motivated by the purpose of reinforcing the claim that the practice in question was in fact a *sunnah* of the Prophet), and 24 (where reference has been made to an uninterrupted and undisputed practice of the Muslims until the time of the assassination of al-Walid II, but without any explicit reference to the Prophet).
- 71 *Kharāj*, p. 48. For another instance see *Radd*, 17 and 42 (a statement about consensus made in the positive form, supplemented by the claim of absence of disagreement).
- 72 *Ibid.*, 42. See also *Kharāj*, pp. 165, 166 and 174, wherein he refers to the consensus of Companions or of the jurists of his own school.
- 73 See "Early Development", p. 225 ff., and "Islamic Juristic Terminology", p. 285 ff.
- 74 See "Early Development", p. 252 ff.
- 75 See "Islamic Juristic Terminology", p. 288 ff., and "Early Development", p. 268 ff.
- 76 For some instances of *ra'y*, see *Radd*, 3 (specially Abū Ḥanīfah's reasoning concerning whether a horse-rider was entitled to twice or thrice the share of the foot-soldier, that he disliked giving an animal preference over a Muslim) and 18. In general, however, the doctrines mentioned in *Radd* have been supported either on the basis of authoritative sources, or of *qiyās*.
- 77 See *ibid.*, p. 113. Cf. I Goldziher, *The Zāhiris: Their Doctrine and their History*, tr. W. Behn, (Leiden, 1971 C.E.), chapter 2.
- 78 See "Early Development", p. 113, and ch. 2, n. 149.
- 79 The only significant statement that one finds is a brief one from Awzā'i in which he quotes the following opinion of the famous Kufan scholar and judge, Shurayh

(d. circa 80): “*Sunnah* has preceded your *qiyās*. Follow, therefore, and do not innovate; for you will not stray as long as you resort to *athar*” (*Radd*, 50).

80 *Ibid.*, 2.

81 See above p. 152.

82 *Radd*, 21.

83 *Ibid.*, 41.

84 *Ibid.*, 48 and 49. See also *ibid.*, 50. For some other instances of *qiyās*, see *ibid.*, *passim*, but specially 2.

85 See “Early Development”, ch. V.

86 See *ibid.*, p. 325 ff.

87 See Khadduri, p. 23 ff.

88 For this legal classification of human beings and for instances of its effect on legal doctrines, see *ibid.*, *passim*, specially 41.

89 *Radd* is literally replete with this, but see specially 1, 27, 33 and 34.

90 This has been argued by this writer at length in “Early Development”.

PART III

*Islamic Society,
State and Economy*

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Concept of Community in Islam

Abdo A. Elkholy

IF THE significant distinction of man is his possession of culture, the ideological concepts may be regarded as the blueprint of any specific culture. Man does not act haphazardly. His actions follow mental models which constrain the area of his freedom.

In groups and organisations man's behaviour is designated by the status model which requires certain roles prescribed by the specific culture according to its prevailing ideology. The fact that the springs of ideology are influenced by and in turn influence the topography of any social structure is responsible for the variation of societies and for changes in social structures.

There are two ways of understanding the social structure. The first is inductive, aiming at the collection of detailed facts to construct the general ideological model of the structure. The second is deductive which aims at the blueprint to perceive a meaningful, harmonious whole out of the seemingly nebulous, unrelated parts.

It is quite difficult to comprehend the social structure and to be able to predict the direction of social change in the contemporary Middle East without understanding the concept of Community in Islam. Such a concept will serve as the thread stringing the beads of incidents in the Middle East.

At this point I would like to call attention to the "universalistic" nature of concepts in Islam as a means of achieving a politically unified human society through an internalised set of peaceful ideologies rather than coercion.

I

The universal God, propounded by the Qur'an fourteen centuries ago, is unsurpassed by any other concept on its level of abstraction. Now, in the twentieth century, social scientists are in a position to appreciate this. In our distinction between organisations and institutions we insist on the level of abstraction for the latter. Its abstraction, however, does not affect its importance nor does it dilute its existence.

The idea of God is central in the Islamic concept of Community. The perception of Islam elevated God from the concrete tribal and ethnic organisational level to the abstract universal level of institutions that are considered prerequisites for the existence and perpetuation of any human society. Since human knowledge is limited, the assumption of an original source for this universe, as postulated in Islam, can never be refuted scientifically.

But what counts in our human society is neither science nor logic alone. The tremendous literature in the area of collective behaviour indicates the importance of contagious sentiments and emotions in motivating action and interaction and in the formation and continuity of organisations. Belief, as an important component of our attitudes, has always permeated life. Belief is the organising force without which life loses its full meaning. Those who do not believe in a purpose or goal toward which they strive are not productive members. Belief in a supernatural power reduces both man's vanity and despair. This is to say that belief makes man, for man is kept active oscillating between vanity and despair. Belief in the existence of a limitless universal God is a priceless heritage of our human society arrived at after a long period of trial and error as a means of a wider concept of human society and perpetuating the order of our expanding meaning of life.

In one of his concluding lectures during a seminar on social change, Professor Wilbert Moore predicted the ultimate materialisation of a "Human State" with an executive central government invested with federal coercive power. I could not understand what he meant and argued with him about the possibility of materialising such a future state. The fallacy of my argument, which prevented my understanding, sprang from the fact that I perceived the hypothetical ideal state of the future from the viewpoint of the prevailing conditions of colonialism, imperialism, exploitation, greed, and suspicions, all of which deter such an international community and, instead, promote conflict rather than co-operation.

The idea was still in my subconscious when I decided to investigate the ebb and tide of the Islamic Community. After reading a sizable number of references on the issue I found myself exposed to the usual extremes of criticism and praise. I decided, therefore, to rely heavily on the original source, the Qur'ān.

The political Islamic Community, which has existed for more than thirteen centuries, differs from any other preceding and succeeding community in one sense: it is an open-end community under one universal God. The significance of this lies in the absence of any racial, territorial, political, or any other exclusivism. The password for any nation to join is the acknowledgment of the one principle: the universality of the One God. This simply means the creation, for the first time in human history, of a universal community based on complete equality, regardless of the considerations of race, colour and ancestry.

The presentation of a brief set of community concepts by some leading Western authorities on the subject will be helpful here. The meaning of community, as defined by political and social scientists, ranges from a small "locality group"¹ within a society to "any area of common life, village, or town, or district, or country"² or even wider area.³ Arensberg and Kimball "start with the notion of a community as a master system encompassing social forms and cultural behaviour in interdependent subsidiary systems (institutions)".⁴ They add that "what distinguishes communities from other human associations based upon territoriality and land use is precisely their repetitive characters (patterns) and their wholeness and inclusiveness".⁵ Elliott and Merrill consider the community as "a complex social system with both a physical locus and a socio-psychological consensus".⁶ Blackwell finds the term community, in its intimate application, to cover:

- (a) "a population aggregate
- (b) inhabiting a contiguous area
- (c) possessing a heritage of common experience
- (d) having a set of basic service institutions
- (e) conscious of its local unity
- (f) able to act as a whole in solving problems involving the public good".⁷

Nelson, Ramsey and Verner make it clear that "the community is composed of the relationship among the people living in the local area". They ask: "If the essence of the community is neither area nor people, what then is the community?"⁸

The leading denominator of the Western concept of a community is "geographical locality and physical territoriality".

The Arabic Islamic term of community is *Ummah*, derived directly from *Umm*, meaning mother. *Ummah* in Islam means more than the mother-land in its geographical-territorial limitation. It means FAITH and CREED. *Ummat al-Islām* encloses the entire collectivity of the Muslims living anywhere regardless of their geographical boundaries. When the Muslim defends his community he is defending more than a piece of land. He is protecting his faith. He may happily die for its protection and preservation. By the same token, when he spreads the word of Faith, his aim is not expansion of territory, but spreading the Faith and ideology of equality and human brotherhood. In early Islamic history up to the Abbāsīd Caliphate (750–1258), the word "conquer" was alien to the Islamic terminology. The Muslims simply claimed that they were opening new territories and not conquering nations. The expression *al-futūḥāt al-Islāmiyah* dictates specific sets of attitudes and behaviour different from those typical of conquerors in general. Once the area was opened, it became a part of the Muslim Community. The original inhabitants were given protection and security. Whoever accepted the universal membership in the Muslim Community by acknowledging the cornerstone ideology of the Oneness of

God was treated as a fully-fledged member. The builders of the early Muslim Community differed from those of Western empires in the following ways: they did not aim at either human or material exploitation; their integration with the indigenous people resulted in the cross fertilisation of the two cultures; the continuous contact enriched the Islamic culture as well as those African and Asian cultures which came under the Islamic influence.

The concept of community in the mind of the Muslims helped and is still helping the continuity of this sort of fluid and swift amalgamation whenever the Muslims move anywhere in God's domain.

When the Muslim is politically oppressed and is unable to change the prevailing system, he is religiously required to migrate to any other place, where he has greater freedom. "When those who had done themselves injustice die, the angels will ask them: in what were you engaged? They will say: we were oppressed in the land. The angels will admonish them saying: Wasn't God's globe spacious enough that you could have migrated therein? For this, their resort will be Hell, the worst habitation."⁹ "He created for you all that is in the earth"¹⁰ is the underlying universal theme, which motivated and guided the builders of the early Muslim Community up to the end of the Abbasids (750-1258). Before his death (632), the Prophet laid the foundation of the community on complete equality regardless of colour, race, ethnic origin, or social stratum. The declaration of the Prophet (peace be on him) that "There is no merit of an Arab over a non-Arab except through piety"¹¹ strengthened the twin principles of equality and human brotherhood. "O people, all of you descended from Adam, and the origin of Adam is dust."¹²

During the Makkan period the Qur'ān directed its appeal to all races, reminding people of their common origin. The Qur'ān even provided a logical explanation of cultural diversities as a means of group identifications and inter-group acquaintances for the sake of human merits, and not as a cause for intra-group conflict. "We made you tribes and nations to get acquainted."¹³ According to the Qur'ān people began to form different communities as a result of their differences. "God by His Will guided the believers, for their motive was to seek the truth."¹⁴

With the new universal ideology of religious brotherhood, the early Muslims dissociated themselves from their disbelieving blood kins to construct a new unique union in Madina, which was based on creed and faith alone. In the first capital of the developing Muslim society, which, in less than one century, encompassed more than half of the old world, the following features started to crystallise:

- (1) Islam became not only a religion, but the supreme unifying social bond. The Madinans affiliated themselves as brothers and sisters with the Makkan immigrants. They voluntarily and gladly shared with the Makkans their entire property.


- (2) This type of affiliation was not motivated by any kind of gain or profit, or even a promise of gain or profit. It was simply motivated by conviction, commitment and dedication.
- (3) The new principle of sharing was established. The early Muslim drew a great amount of satisfaction from offering his help, property, and life for the cause of what he believed to be the ultimate truth. All he owned, including his life, was a means and all was dedicated to this end.
- (4) Being secured in its own territory for the first time and after giving up hope of gaining the confidence of the people of the preceding Books (Jews and Christians), Islam started to delimit and fortify its boundaries.
- (5) Like every mature and well-rounded movement with a strong universal ideology and dedicated adherents, Islam envisaged a universal Community whose limit is humanity. Muḥammad, the Prophet, never lost sight of that far-reaching goal while codifying for his ever-expanding Community.
- (6) Neither success nor defeat influenced the pioneers who always kept the ultimate goal in mind. Their aim was not material gain or influential positions in the social hierarchy, but the accomplishment of their mission to which they had committed themselves.

In its early stages, Islam was considered, by the believers, to be the "Community of God".¹⁵ The early Muslims believed that they were merely the instruments of God's will to establish His Community on earth. Nothing, of course, could stand in the way of the invincible will of God.

II

Arabic, the official Islamic language, "became an invisible bond between diverse clans and formed, whether consciously or not, the basis of a national community of sentiment".¹⁶ Islam, therefore, was swiftly able to undermine the narrow pre-Islamic boundaries and concept of community which devastated Arabia physically, socially, economically, religiously, politically, and morally. This devastation, which was conducive to the emergence, appeal, and rapid diffusion of Islam, gave the pre-Islamic period the label of "era of ignorance".

Pre-Islamic Arabia did not know or use the concept of *Ummah*. All it knew was the tribe. It was possible for a stranger to become a member of that *Gemeinschaft* pattern of community if a tribe member sponsored him. Another tributary of the pre-Islamic community was slavery. The former slave had to be sponsored by his emancipator. The ascriptive link and the explicit or implicit contractual sponsorship constituted the web of the pre-Islamic community.



As exogamy was encouraged for the reason of gaining new members with strong biological characteristics, the pre-Islamic tribe ramified and extended itself by way of affiliating the tribes of the alien wives.

A third factor which aided in the final preparation of the emerging pattern of the community was the mobile nature of the pastoral Bedouin tribes. In the light of the limitless desert and nomadic way of life the geographical connotation was finally ready to be stripped out of the concept of community. This non-geographical concept contributed to Islam the sense of universalism and generality in order to appeal to mankind on an equal basis anywhere and at any time.

Social concepts are shorthand symbols for complex ideological and philosophical orientations. Once internalised, they may determine the social structure, change the institutional patterns, and influence human perception and behaviour.

One of the most distinctive marks of Islam, compared with the other great religions, is, as Gibb notices,¹⁷ the variety of peoples and races who have embraced it. Islam fostered in the hearts of those various peoples a strong feeling of brotherhood and a sense of harmony through a wider and higher concept of community. Watt notices that: "There is nothing comparable until the nineteenth century expansion of Christianity, and that is generally held to have been less successful so far in producing a sense of brotherhood".¹⁸ Watt also observes that "perhaps a study of the achievements of Islam may throw some light on how the integration of world society is likely to come about, and may even suggest ways in which man may consciously contribute to this process".¹⁹

The new Islamic Community concept worked in two different directions: it discouraged tribalism and encouraged personal initiative. Islam undermined and even condemned the traditionally fragmental pre-Islamic social structure by attacking its blood kinship foundation which had been responsible for generating a series of emotional revenges and counter-revenges and had plagued the social order.

The tribal community, which was prerequisite for the nomadic survival, soon became malfunctional in the new cosmopolitan structure of Madina. One of the main attractions, which presumably led to the wholesale conversion of Madina to Islam (with, of course, the exception of the Jews), was the disgust of the inhabitants with tribalism and its continuous social disruption. The people of Madina saw a permanent solution in the unifying social force of Islam. In Islam, tribalism has a bad connotation and is synonymous with narrow chauvinism, emotionalism, irrationalism, and social injustice.²⁰

On the other hand, Islam fostered personal initiative and responsibility and thus encouraged a larger measure of individualism. The Qur'an insistently and consistently reminds people that they are judged on their own merits as independent, responsible individuals.

These two seemingly paradoxical concepts of universalism on the one hand, and individualism on the other, paved the way for the limitless boundaries of the Islamic Community so as to enable it to include a variety of races, nations, and peoples.

III

It would, of course, be short-sighted of Islam to assume the complete conversion of mankind to Islam. Islam accepted, as inevitable, religious variations and differences. Islam classified people under three categories:

- (1) Muslims,
- (2) People of the Books such as Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and the like, and
- (3) Pagans.

It is worth noting that intolerance towards paganism and tolerance towards the people of the heavenly Book is consistent with the functioning of the Islamic state. The loyalty of the pagans is to their idols, symbolising varieties of local and tribal values which may contradict one another and may ultimately lead to the disintegration of the state. There must be a unifying theme for any organisation. The symbol of some themes might be as narrow as an idol or a tribe. When they malfunction, the only alternatives are either elimination or conversion. And this has been the attitude of Islam toward paganism. The people of the heavenly Book do not constitute any serious threat to the universal theme of monotheism in Islam. Therefore, they share essentially the same privileges and duties as the Muslims. Their social, political, and religious rights are completely protected in the Muslim state.

This tolerant attitude and practice of the Muslim state toward the people of the Book made Islam welcome to them as a force which liberated them from their oppressors.

It is useful at this point to distinguish *Ummat al-Islām* from *Dār al-Islām*. The first has the social connotation of the Islamic Faith as a denominator, the second the political-legal aspect of the sovereign state with its territorial delimitations. The Muslim anywhere at any time considers himself a member of the former even if he is not a member of *Dār al-Islām*. He might be living in a non-Muslim country in Europe or America. But he is still a member of *Ummat al-Islām*. But where is *Ummat al-Islām*? This is the point which I am submitting: *it does not have time or space limitations. The Muslim is linked to the traditional and present Ummah through the Faith and Creed of Islam.*

Politically the world is divided into a Muslim state (*Dār al-Islām*) and a non-Muslim state (*Dār al-Ḥarb*). Within the Muslim state the people of

the Book are citizens with equal rights. In the non-Muslim state the Muslim is supposed to have the equal rights of the citizens of the majority, including his personal freedom of worship. The concept of the Islamic Community makes it the collective duty (*farḍ kifāya*) to see to it that the personal freedom of worship is respected in the non-Muslim state. Any political or religious oppression to which the non-Muslim state subjects the Muslim minority would necessitate reprisal measures or even a state of war in which the entire Muslim Community must participate. The history of Islam is full of such incidents of immediate responses of the caliphs to oppressed citizens who cried "*Wā Islāmāh!*"

Reciprocating the continuous and immediate protection the Muslim Community is expected to render its members, the Muslim anywhere and at any time feels it his duty to assist and be emotionally involved with the welfare of the collective community. As Arberry puts it: "From the Atlantic Coasts to the borders of China the call to prayer, in the tongue of Makka, rang out from minarets summoning the faithful to prostrate themselves to the Lord".²¹

The covert sentiment toward the *Ummah* becomes overt behaviour whenever two Muslims meet and greet each other: *al-salāmu 'alaykum*. The Western form of nationalism is a partial and organisational application of the wider Islamic concept of community.

IV

What are the elements correlated with the stability, expansion, and long life-span of the organisational application of the Islamic Community? Grunebaum speaks of "the persistence of the Muslim political community"²² as the outstanding feature of the Muslim state. He rules inadequate as a cause "for the stabilisation of the Muslim unity", which characterised the "Muslim Community" the lack of any serious danger "by an outside government bent on conquest or reconquest".²³ Thus, we must look for some positive merits rather than relating that magnificent history to power vacuum or negative factors. Grunebaum relates the persistence of the Muslim political community to "the higher civilisation of the more complex ideologies"²⁴ of Islam. In the unique application of the processes of acculturation, Grunebaum, following the same theoretical approach of most of the Orientalists, claims that "The Arab Muslims used the *superior* achievements of the conquered to debarbarise and amalgamate the alien culture under their leadership".²⁵ This theme simply aims at stripping Islam of any positive contributions. Furthermore, it seems that Grunebaum and the rest of the Orientalists could not distinguish between the level of organisation and that of institution. The greatest contribution of Islam to the different cultures and national organisations was, and still is, the diffusion of the higher concept of humanity and brotherhood of the Muslim Community.

Lacking the claim or even the notion of the chosen race, which, in fact, opposes the very spirit of Islam, the doors of the Community have been open to welcome all varieties of racial, national, ethnic, and religious groups. This unique open-end Community has been continuously producing a unique blend of cross fertilisation. Islam has never been claimed as the monopoly of the Arabs in the manner Judaism was considered the monopoly of the Semitic race. Furthermore, the Muslims, throughout their territorial diffusion, have never felt that they were building an empire or became intoxicated with their continuous advance. They never dealt with the people of the new territories as subjects but rather as citizens. In Islamic history the word expansion was never used or known. The expression used is *al-futūḥāt al-Islāmiyah*, which means that Islam was unlocking the doors to display its humanistic ideology of One universal God and one human community. Most of the Orientalists failed to recognise that the general unifying factor of this "highly complex" Muslim Community is the spiritual identification of each cell with the system as the historical manifestation of this universal Community. The principles of human liberty, equality, and fraternity, advocated by Islam fourteen centuries ago, may be considered a frame of reference for the rise and decline of the Muslim societies, past, present and future.

V

The decline of the Islamic society came about when the Muslim state went far away from the ideal principles of the Islamic Community. The emotional bond became loose when the rulers started to exploit their societies and to consider the citizens to be their subjects. The traditional sense of the mutual responsibility of the *Ummah* disappeared. The application of the Islamic Community makes the official leader responsible for the welfare of not only every citizen, but also every living being.²⁶ 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the Second Caliph, says: "If a goat on the highest mountain of the Muslim state dies of starvation, I consider myself responsible". When an Egyptian Copt wrote to him complaining of the injustice of his commissioner, he took it on himself to investigate the case. The Caliph's words, when admonishing the commissioner: "Since when have you enslaved the people whereas their mothers bore them free?" are a golden manifestation of that universal human concept and practice of the Muslim Community. Under the concept of a Muslim Community the entire Middle East along with North Africa adopted the Faith and became integrated into the Muslim society.

This concept of an Islamic Community disappeared under the Turkish rule because of exploitation and degradation of the citizens to second class subjects. It marked the first phase of the collapse of the Muslim society.

The second phase of the collapse came at the hands of the European powers which, along with the colonial spirit, have been motivated by the

ever-lasting spirit of the medieval Crusades. They dismembered the Muslim society.

To hit two birds with one stone, Great Britain, during the First World War, introduced to the Arab leaders the Western concept of nationalism and promised them an Arab nation out of the Arab region under the collapsing Ottoman Empire. The price was to help Great Britain against Turkey. When Great Britain, with the help of the Arab region, was about to achieve its goal and the defeat of Turkey became evident, the Arab leaders started to negotiate for the political shape of an Arab nation. However, Great Britain realised the seriousness of materialising this dream it had fostered. Following the very well-known British principle of "Divide and Rule", Great Britain fostered another opposing dream by issuing the Balfour Declaration of 2nd November, 1917. The British promise to help establish a Zionist state in the heart of the Arab region was not motivated by love for the Jews. The real motive was to maintain the balance of power by preventing the materialisation of one Arab nation so long as the Zionist state exists.

While the British motive was to keep the region under its influence through the creation of two opposing nationalisms, the Western motive, championed by the official attitude and consistent behaviour of the United States, was and still is anti-Islamic. The missionary history of the United States in the Middle East as well as the theological background of its Secretaries of State and of a sizable number of the officers in the Middle East Section of the State Department, might explain the hostile American policy toward the predominantly Muslim Arab states. To the United States, the question of the Middle East with its Arab refugees is not a question of justice or humanity.

An additional factor for the weakness of the Islamic society and its departure from the Muslim Community is the Western-educated and Western-oriented *élites*. Those *élites*, following their self-interest, maintained these fragmentalised political structures of fourteen independent states out of one region.

Does this mean the final collapse and surrender of the Muslim Society as the Western powers desire to see it? There still remains *a sense of awareness of mutual rights and obligations binding the Muslims to their Faith throughout time and space*. This sense is what I term the "Community institution" which has been inspiring so many historical and contemporary movements.²⁷ It is responsible for the erection of so many political states, each of which tried to approximate its ideal. The Muslim Community still remains an unreached ideal, but it shines like a guiding star ever stimulating the Muslims to strive toward ultimate unity.

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- 9 Qur'an, IV, The Women, 97.
- 10 Qur'an, II, The Cow, 29.
- 11 Traditions, from the Farewell Speech.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 Qur'an, XLIX, The Private Apartments, 13.
- 14 *Ibid.*, II, The Cow, 213.
- 15 G. E. von Grunebaum, "Islam in a Humanistic Education", in Stewart-Robinson, ed., *The Traditional Near East*, New Jersey, 1966, p. 37.
- 16 R. A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, Cambridge, 1969, p. 72.
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- 18 W. M. Watt, *Islam and The Integration of Society*.
- 19 Idem., *Sociology of Religion*.
- 20 The Arabic expressions used to designate the attitude of mind of pre-Islamic Arabs are: *al-'aşabiyah al-qibaliyah*, and *ḥamiyat al-jāhiliyah*.
- 21 A. J. Arberry, *Aspects of Islamic Civilization*, Univ. of Mich. Press, Ann Arbor, 1967, p. 12.
- 22 G. E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity*, New York, 1964, p. 3.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 26 Tradition: "There is a religious reward in dealing kindly with everything of wet-liver".
- 27 Particularly mentionable are:
 the Mahdi Movement of the Sudan,
 the Wahhabi Movement of Saudi Arabia,
 the Sanūsī Movement of Libya,
 the contemporary movement of Muslim Brotherhood,
 the creation of Indonesia and Pakistan, and
 the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Is the Muslim Definable in Terms of His Economic Pursuits?

Ismā'īl Rājī al-Fārūqī

IF ANY group of Muslims anywhere were to be polled on this question, the majority will probably answer with Jesus of the Gospels, "Man does not live by bread alone" (*Matthew* 4:4; *Luke* 4:4), and go on to agree with the Christians of history that matter is evil, that the world which they misunderstand the Holy Qur'ān to mean when it says *الدنيا أو الحياة الدنيا* is evil, and would rank themselves as belonging to the *spiritual* Orient rather than the *material* West. Indeed, the majority of Muslims today agree that the spiritual and the material constitute a dichotomy, indeed a polarity; and prize themselves and Islam as standing on the side of the spiritual. And if asked the question of this paper, is man definable by his economic pursuits, their unanimous answer would be an emphatic "No", a contemptuous "No", a "No" deriding economics and materialism in the name of Islam. Indeed, to the majority, my raising the question may even be impertinent, suggestive of the greatest aberration, viz., Marxism or dialectical materialism. The suspicion of the majority is correct. For I indeed plan to answer the question in the affirmative and do so in the name of Islam.

I. The Christian Answer

Several centuries before the Prophet Muḥammad, *ṣallā Allāhu 'alayhi wa sallam*, Jesus had conveyed a divine message in which the proposition: "Man does not live by bread alone", was of prime importance. Matthew and Luke, the writers of the Gospels ascribed to them, have linked this proposition of Jesus to a question by Satan testing Jesus' power, allegedly as "Son of God", to turn the stones of the desert into bread in a moment of weakness since he was hungry after a fast of forty days in the wilderness. The attempt to link this statement with Jesus' being the "Son of God" is so *mal-à-propos* that it does not need to divert our attention from the statement itself which is beautiful and valid without Satan's challenge. To a man who has fasted forty days as Matthew claims with no little exaggeration, ready-

made bread would be the ultimate challenge, not the sonship of God. Let us note that Jesus' answer as reported by Matthew and Luke was not a straight denial of the proposition that man does live by bread, but of the qualified assertion that man lives by bread *alone*.

Had Jesus' denial been an outright denial and hence, a condemnation of material life itself, this would not have been a pronouncement of a Semitic mind. Rather, it would have been the judgment of a Hellenic mind wholly converted against itself. For, having first identified divinity with nature, and having then been disappointed and frustrated with its own creation, the Homeric mind turned against itself in Gnosticism, the opposite extreme, and asserted a spirituality utterly opposed to and disparate from nature or matter. Other passages in the Gospels which express such total condemnation of the material world, notably *Matthew 6:11ff*, were dictated by Gnostic attitudes. The statement in question, however, preserved a moral balance typical of *din al fiṭrah*, the religion of God, of nature and reason, of balance and the golden mean. For it sought to condemn not the material, but the violation of the moral. It simply denied that man lives by bread *alone*. Hence, it represents a singularly Semitic, probably prophetic, attitude in a Hellenic world.

In the hands of the Christians of history, however, this statement of Jesus became the cornerstone of an anti-materialist ideology. It grew to a total condemnation of matter, of the world, of history. It developed an isolationist ethic of asceticism, of political cynicism, of monkery. It became the war-cry of a new religiosity, which transformed the religion of Jesus into Christianity, the religion of Paul, Athanasius, Tertullian, Augustine, of the imperial Roman Church.

Jesus was sent to the Jews to put an end to their crass materialism and to liberate them from the extreme legalism to which their rabbis had subjected them. His solution had to be the re-emphasis of the spiritual, the internal, the personal, which was weakened or lost in the literalist conservatism of the rabbis. The call was corrupted by his followers into another extremism based on the degrading of the material, the external and public, the societal. "Man does not live by bread alone" became the misplaced, abused motto of this movement.

II. The Islamic Answer

A. *Islam and the Religions*

From a wider world-perspective, Islam constituted a genuine breakthrough from the fixation into which the world had fallen, divided as it was between Indian religiosity and Hellenic religiosity. Indian religiosity maintained that the universe was itself the absolute (Brahman), not in its ideal form, but in an objectified, individuated and particularised form which it condemned. Objectification of Brahman, the absolute spirit, is

undesirable. In consequence, the religious/moral imperative was conceived of as escape from the realm of objectification (creation) which it condemned as evil, to the realm of the absolute (Brahman, Nirvana). Under this view, cultivation of the material world, i.e., procreation, and mobilisation for food production, education, rendering the world into a garden and making history, are definitely evil because they spread, intensify or prolong the state of objectification. Evidently the only morality which harmonises with this view is individualistic and world-denying. Jainism and Theravada Buddhism remained true to this essential vision of the Upanishads. Hinduism accepted the vision for the benefit of the endowed *élite*. It propounded a popular religiosity in which the castes look forward to release from their travails only in afterlife, while continuing to labour in their appointed stations in this life with no little amount of joy and complacent satisfaction that they are fulfilling the purpose of their existence. Likewise Mahayana Buddhism kept this vision as a background and constructed its religiosity out of native Chinese worldly morality, and appointed Bodhisattvas (human ancestors apotheosised into saviours) to redeem men from the afflictions of existence.

Combining elements of Egyptian and Greek religion, of Mithraism and Near Eastern mystery cults, Hellenism engulfed the Semitic movement of Jesus which sought to reform the legalism and ethnocentrism of Judaism. Hence, the Greco-Egyptian element which identified God with the world was retained but modified and diluted in the doctrine of the incarnation which made God become man and enabled man to associate himself with divinity. Hence too, the resentment of the downtrodden of the Empire, Gnostic aversion to matter and the world, and the redemptionist hope of Mithraism and Judaism, all combined to give historical Christianity its judgment of creation as fallen, of the world as evil, of state and society as the devil's handiwork, and of the moral life as individualist and world-denying.

It was a refreshing clarification that Islam achieved. It put aside the claims of India and Egypt which identified the absolute with the world, the Creator with the creature, whether to the advantage of the creature as in Egypt and ancient Greece, or to that of the "Creator" as in India. It reaffirmed the ancient Mesopotamian vision of the utter disparateness of Creator and creature, and of man as servant in the manor of God. Benefiting from history, Islam's reaffirmation was to be a crystallisation of this ancient wisdom, *Din al Fitrah*, as the Holy Qur'an has called it.

It was in this context that our Prophet was sent by Allah to redress the balance, to correct the misunderstanding and re-establish the proper relation between the material and the spiritual. What did our Prophet teach? What is the essence of the message he delivered?

B. *The Implications of Tawḥīd: Worldism*

Let us begin at the beginning by taking a look at the presuppositions, or first principles, of Islam. The essence of religious experience in Islam is *tawḥīd*; that is, the recognition that there is no god but God (*Lā ilāha illā Allāh*). What is distinctly Islamic – and hence novel – in *tawḥīd* as a meta-physical principle, is the negative aspect of its statement. That no being of whom Godhead is predicated is god except God, strikes at Jewish, Christian and pre-Islamic Arab notions of associating other beings with God. *Tawḥīd* purged religion absolutely clean of all doubt regarding the transcendence and unicity of the Godhead. Thereby, it accomplished a double purpose: that of acknowledging God as sole Creator of the universe, and that of equalising all men as creatures of God, endowed with the same essential qualities of creaturely humanity, with the same cosmic status.

To *tawḥīd* belongs another aspect, namely the axiological. To assert *Lā ilāha illā Allāh* means that Allah is the sole and ultimate value, that everything else is only an instrument whose value depends upon God for its valueness, and whose goodness is measured by its actualisation of ultimate, divine goodness. It means that God is the final end of all desire, that He is the one and only Master Whose will is the ought-to-be of all that is. Under this view man is a servant whose vocation and destiny is the service of God, or fulfilment of the divine will; that is, the actualisation of value in space and time.

Certainly God has been loved and obeyed by men before. However, in Indian religion He (the impersonal Absolute) was loved and obeyed as the opposite of the material world and so through denial of that world. In Egyptian and Greek religion God was loved and obeyed as the material world itself, and therefore through attunement with the call of that world. Only in the Semitic stream of religion was God loved and obeyed as non-nature, the immaterial Master of nature and matter. But the Semitic stream had fossilised in Rabbinic Judaism, dissipated itself in romanticism and hedonism in Arabia, and combined with Mithraism and Hellenism to form Roman Christianity out of the liberating breakthrough of Jesus. *Tawḥīd* was hence necessary to restore the Semitic stream to its original position, namely, that creation, or space-time, is the medium, the *matériel*, in which the divine will is to be actualised; that it is certainly good, but that its goodness is that of a *materia prima*, a necessary theatre for the embodiment or concretisation of the divine will. وما خلقتنا السموات والأرض وما بينهما إلا بالحق^١ (٣: ٤٦) هو الذي خلق السموات والأرض في ستة أيام وكان عرشه على الماء ليبلوكم إياكم أحسن عملاً^٢ (٧: ١١)

Every component of creation is therefore good, and creation is not only the best of all possible worlds; it is flawless and perfect. الذي أحسن كل شيء خلقه^٣ (٧: ٣٢) ما ترى في خلق الرحمن من تفاوت فارجع البصر هل ترى من فطور ثم ارجع البصر كرتين ينتقلب إليك البصر خاسئاً وهو حسير^٤ (٣: ٦٧ – ٤)

Indeed, creation filled with value by man through moral vision and action is itself the divine purpose of creation. الذي خلق الموت

(٢:٦٧) ^٥أحسن عملاً Consequently, enjoyment of its elemental or utilitarian values is innocent; a valuefull world is a monument to God whose preservation and enhancement are acts of praise and worship on the part of man. As an instrument for the realisation of the absolute, every object in creation is invested with higher cosmic value. Just as there can be no discrimination between men except in righteousness, there can be no discrimination between points of space-time except as to their instrumentality for man's transformation of the world into the pattern Allah has revealed. No material object is evil *per se*.

Two more first principles of Islam corroborate the thesis of Islam's worldism: Islam's ethic of action and its eschatology.

a. *Worldism and the Ethics of Action* – *Tawhīd* commits man to an ethic of action; that is, to an ethic where worth and unworth are measured by the degree of success the moral subject achieves in bettering the flow of space-time, in his body as well as around him. It does not deny the ethic of intent, but demands fulfilment of its requirements as a preliminary prerequisite for entering into fulfilment of those of the ethic of action. Disturbance of the flow of space-time, or transformation of creation, therefore, is the moral imperative of the Muslim. He must enter the rough and tumble of history and therein bring about the desired transformation. He cannot lead a monastic, isolationist existence except as an exercise in self-discipline and self-mastery. Even then, if the exercise is not conducive to the end of achieving greater success in the transformation of space-time, it is doomed as unethical egocentrism; for the purpose would in that case be self-transformation as an end in itself, not as a preparation for transforming the world. You will recall that the Prophet, *ṣallā Allāhu 'alayhi wa sallam*, used to retire, to isolate and discipline himself, especially before revelation. Indeed, it may be said that revelation was the climax of his *taḥannuth*. The Ṣūfīs claim that communication with the divine such as the Prophet enjoyed in the cave of Ḥirā' is the *summum bonum*, and that Muḥammad's coming down from the cave to Makka was an *Untergang*. But we know that it was Allah *subḥānahu wa ta'ālā* Who ordered him not only to go down, but also to outwit his opponents when they plotted to kill him, to build a community, to emigrate, to build a state, to promote and govern the material life of his people. Muḥammad could have been another Christianist Jesus concerned only with the spiritual world, and giving himself to his enemies for crucifixion. That is by far the easier course. Instead, our Prophet faced reality – political, economic, military reality – and made history. He was husband and father, tradesman and provider, statesman and judge, military leader, *dā'iyyah* and prophet, all at once. The revelation which came to him and of

which he was the first embodiment left nothing without guidance or direction (ما فرطنا في الكتاب من شيء⁶ (٢٨: ٦). Islam is not possible without the *shari'ah*, without a state and courts of law to administer it, because Islam is a religion of action, and action is public and societal whereas an ethic of intent is personal and has no need to go outside of conscience.

b. *Worldism and Islamic Eschatology* – Secondly, Islam's eschatology is radically different from that of Judaism and Christianity. In the former, the "Kingdom of God" is an alternative to the Hebrew situation in exile. It was the Kingdom of David projected nostalgically by those who have lost it and who presently stand at the nethermost level of captivity and degradation. As for Christianity, its main thrust was to combat the materialist, externalist, enlandising ethnocentrism of the Jews. Hence it was necessary for Christianity to spiritualise the Kingdom of David and remove it altogether from space-time. The "Kingdom of God" became an "other-world" and this world became the temporary theatre of Caesar, the devil, the "flesh", "where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal". Islam, *per contra*, countenanced one and only one kingdom, one and only one space-time. All that ought to be ought to and can happen in it through man's agency. Once it comes to an end, only award and execution of judgment, consummation of reward and punishment can take place. الدار الآخرة is not an alternative to this world. There is no آخرة that is not earned in this world; and what is thus earned by means of *taqwā* or righteousness is a transcendent reward, not an exchange of a better kingdom for a bad kingdom. That is why exit from this world by means of asceticism does not mean entry into the other. *وابنغ فيما اتاك الله اندار الآخرة ولا تنس نصيبك من الدنيا*⁷ (٢٨: ٧٧). Allah said: He did not say: Seek the other world (الآخرة) at the cost of this one; nor did He council us to neglect this world or allow it to drop from our view.

We may conclude from this first part that Islam is a worldist religion; that for Islam, space-time is indeed the realm where the absolute is to be realised, and so by man. "Excellence in the deed", "*falāh*" or felicity through works, in terms of which the Holy Qur'ān describes the purpose of creation as a whole, can have no other meaning than the transformation of the materials of creation, i.e., men and women, rivers and mountains, forests and wheatfields, villages and towns, countries and peoples. Evidently, filling this world, this space and this time with value is not only important for religion, but is the whole business of religion.

C. *Islamic Worldism and Man's Material Endeavour*

a. *The Moral Subject and His Own Person* – What does it mean in practical concrete day-to-day terms to say that Islam is worldist? It means that the Muslim – the Muslim in fact, not merely in profession – is the person whose deeds are determined by the *shari'ah*, or law of Islam. Some

of these laws have to do with his own person, such as those which pertain to rituals, seeking to affect either his state of consciousness or his body. The former, as we have seen, are not meant to produce the hollow, disembodied spirituality of Christianity or Buddhism, but that of Islam which is only a dimension of man's deeds in the concrete world, never a replacement for these deeds. On the other hand, those which seek to affect his body are material by nature. To fulfil them is to act economically, i.e., to produce what the subject can in fact produce and to do so in excess of his need so that the excess may be traded for those commodities and services which he himself cannot produce. The Muslim ought to provide for himself food, raiment, lodging and medical service. His moral merit on that front is directly proportional to his success in seeking Allah's bounty.

كلوا من طيبات ما رزقناكم⁹ (١٧٢:٢ ، ١٦٠:٧) · إن الشيطان يعدكم الفقر⁸ (٢: ٢٦٨) ·
كلوا واشربوا من رزق الله¹⁰ (٢: ٦٠)

The ethic of Islam clearly counsels against begging, against being a parasite living on the labour of others. *Al-Sunnah al-Sharifah* recorded for us a number of occasions on which man's economic endeavour was praised and economic resignation condemned. And the *shari'ah* defined the dependents of a man or of the state in terms of distinct categories such as physical handicap, old age, childhood, womanhood, disease, thus making it illegitimate for the healthy adult male to be a dependent of someone else or of the state. Indeed, the Holy Qur'an severely condemned the destitute refugees as people responsible for the politico-economic predicament in which they stood.

قالوا فيما كنتم قالوا كنا مستضعفين في الأرض قالوا ألم تكن أرض الله واسعة فتهاجروا فيها فأولئك مأواهم جهنم وساءت مصيرا . إلا المستضعفين من الرجال والنساء والولدان لا يستطيعون¹¹ (٩٧-٩٨) حيلة ولا يهتدون سبيلا

It is indeed a remarkable expression of the peculiar worldliness of Islam that even the laws which have to do with the Muslim state of consciousness, such as the laws pertaining to the Islamic rituals, do not require performance of purely personal exercises; i.e., activities whose purpose or end is purely a state of consciousness of the subject. It is well known that *ṣalāt* which does not produce righteousness in the other activities of daily life, and hence in the subject's dealings with other persons, is worth nothing. To enter into the lives of other persons, and to influence or change them for the better is the general purpose of all Islamic laws. The Muslim is hence the diametrical opposite of the *monastes*, whether Buddhist or Christian, who withdraws from the other persons precisely in order to work on himself alone. For in such understanding, salvation and felicity consist of a state of consciousness which the person alone realizes in himself and of which he alone can be the judge. To enter into the personal lives of the other persons, and there to deflect all activities towards goals prescribed by the Holy Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, is a predicament which makes the Muslim the most

gregarious member of creation. The greatest and saintliest state of consciousness in Islam, namely the prophetic state of Muḥammad, was not meant to be for the personal enjoyment or elation of Muḥammad, but a means for the remoulding of the life of the least as well as of every man on earth.

b. *The Moral Subject and the Other Persons* – The laws of the *shari‘ah* which have to do with other persons – and they are the majority – may again be divided into those which have to do with their bodies and those which have to do with their consciousness.

The latter cover an area which may best be described as education and counselling. The Muslim is obliged to educate his dependents and the whole of mankind and give them perpetual counsel – all to the purpose of their making their lives fulfill the divine pattern ordained by Allah. Education and counselling of Muslims by the Muslim moral subject is so serious and grave a matter that Allah has equated it with felicity:

كنتم خيرامة
أخرجت للناس تأمرون بالمعروف وتنهون عن المنكر وتؤمنون بالله¹² (١١٠: ٣)

Command of the good and the forbidding of evil is education in its highest sense. Virtue and righteousness are the ultimate end of all education in Islam, a religion which does not at all countenance either a knowledge for its own sake or an art for its own sake. Education for utility, i.e., for the usufruct of nature, production of commodities and services, has an obvious reference to the material needs of man and their satisfaction.

Finally, we come to the laws which have to do with the other man's body, i.e., with the satisfaction of the material needs of other men. Here we are again faced – and struck – by the totalist declaration of the Holy Qur‘ān:
أرأيت الذي يكذب بالدين . فذلك الذي يدع اليتيم . ولا يحض على طعام المسكين¹³ (١٠٧: ١ – ٣)

Religion, the whole of it, is made equivalent with the material category of “pushing away the orphan and neglecting the feeding of the destitute”. The brief *sūrah* ends with a condemnation of those who claim Islam and stand in the way of assistance to the needy, as if again religiosity, the whole of it, is equivalent to satisfaction by the Muslim of the material needs of other men.
فويل للمصلين الذين هم عن صلاتهم ساهون والذين هم يراؤون ويمنعون الماعون¹⁴ (١٠٦: ٤ – ٧)

Early Islamic history has given us a remarkable exemplification of this Islamic view. That is Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddiq's declaration of all-out war against those tribes which stopped paying the *zakāt* into the central treasury upon the death of the Prophet. What is remarkable is the charge brought against them. They were accused of *riddah*, i.e., apostasy, as if the religion itself was what they denied. Abū Bakr's understanding, like that of the Prophet, was indeed that religion and satisfaction of the material needs of others are equivalent.

It is in those laws which have to do with the other persons' bodies that the *Shari'ah* put its genius. These comprise the greater bulk of Islamic legislation and practically constitute the whole ethic of Islam. The first category belongs to the institution of *zakāt* which is oft mistranslated as "charity", "alms", or "poor-due". In fact, it is none of these; for they are all voluntary contributions meant at least as much to relieve the need of others as to extend the giver's self and make it more altruistic. Jesus was right when he deemed the materially-worthless secretive charity of the old woman worthier in God's eyes than the wealth-displaying charity of the rich, despite its obviously greater material benefits.

Christianity has consistently assigned priority to charity precisely because of its power, when deliberate and meant for no ulterior purpose, to purify the soul and induce the saintly state of self-giving and self-sacrifice for the sake of God. Islam does not deny any of this and has instituted *ṣadaqah* precisely to cultivate these moral qualities in the individual. *Ṣadaqah* is charity in the best and complete sense of the term. Indeed, its etymological derivation points to the genuineness of the conviction (literally truthfulness) of the person committing the charitable act.

Zakāt builds over *ṣadaqah* without denying it. It prescribes with the force of law that the Muslim gives of his wealth to the state, or society. It specifies an exact percentage, namely $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ per year of all wealth appropriated during the year, not for trade, but for keeping as private property. It is the third pillar in Islam, hardly ever mentioned in the Qur'ān without the first two to which it is joined as of equal necessity and obligation. The Prophet (peace be on him) collected it regularly and Abū Bakr, the first Caliph, declared war on those who refused to pay it to the state at Madīna after the Prophet's death. Muslim society had understood it as an apostate. The Muslims have well understood and heeded the divine word quoted earlier (al-Qur'ān, 107: 1-7).

Why, one may ask, was this assertion made by Islam with such strength? Obviously, the need for charity on the part of the giver and recipient is as old as man. No religion but has stressed its importance. But no religion has raised it into a public law, promulgated it with sanctions, used force to collect it, hereticated and declared war against the delinquent community. Why?

The answer to this question, to repeat, is that Islam regarded religion as the way to conduct life on earth. Religion has no other business than this purpose. It is a dimension of earthly life, realized in full when that life is lived morally under God, i.e. responsibly to nature, to oneself and to society. Unlike the other religions which erect for themselves a whole Kingdom other than the world where they rule "beyond" life on earth, Islam declared itself the conscience of this earth, this life.

Life on this planet is made felicitous or miserable by the attitudes and deeds of men to one another, surely not in the abstract, nor in so far as

those commodities devoid of economic value are concerned. The world and life of the inhabitant of the forest is not made happy or miserable by whether his fellow men are liberal in giving him leaves, branches or trees, air or water, but by their liberality in sharing with him the game they catch, the lumber they dress up for construction, or the water already carried from the river to the habitat. In other words, if charity is to have "teeth", if it is to serve as a tool of religion whose purpose is the well-being of mankind, then it must have for its object goods of economic value. Man's economic behaviour makes or unmakes the felicity of life on earth. That is why religion seeks to subject it to the norms of morality, of responsibility. Islam, the religion of world-affirmation *par excellence*, naturally seeks to order human life so as to make it actualize the pattern intended for it by its Creator. Hence the Islamic dictum: انما الدين المعاملة or the "Religion is indeed man's treatment of his fellows".

Furthermore, Islam paid great attention to every aspect of the material life of men and women and legislated for it. It built its social system around specific patterns of wealth distribution. The conclusion cannot therefore be avoided that in Islam, economic endeavour and the enjoyment of its fruits constitute the be-all and end-all of morality. Islam is indeed an ideology in the sense that the *shari'ah*, its law, has given us a pattern of material wealth distribution with which to order our lives.

c. *Worldism and Homo Economicus*: The answer to the question – "Is man definable in terms of his economic pursuits?" – must be affirmative. Man is indeed a *homo economicus*, not in Max Weber's sense of man's subjection to sovereign economic laws which dominate his activity. In themselves economic laws may be sovereign; but the economic pattern to which man subjects his life is deliberate choice. Man is free to govern his life by one of many economic patterns. He is *homo economicus* in the sense that the economic pattern to which he subjects his life is definitive of his nature, of his idea of himself.

It is therefore in terms of his economic pursuits that the Muslim is definable. The prime content of the Islamic worldview is the pattern it envisages for interhuman relations; and the most important of these are those which have for their object economic values. Even those which seem independent of economic value, like family relations, Islam buttressed with the laws of support. Every man is by law entitled to the Muslim's support if he can prove his need, the Muslim's capacity to support him and that the Muslim in question is the nearest present relation to him. This was strengthened by Islamic laws of inheritance which were based on the family tie, however remote. The purpose is always to inject morality (i.e. responsibility) into the fabric of human relations. So that how the Muslim earns his livelihood (the laws against exploitation, hoarding, interest, cheating, theft, unlawful dispossession, etc.), how he spends his wealth (the laws of *zakāt*, *sadaqah*, support of his dependents, *iḥṣān* and *ma'rūf*, etc.) and finally how

his wealth is to be disposed of after his death – all these are the very stuff of which the *shari'ah*, and hence Islam, religion itself, is made. Through them and in them, Islam justifies its claim as the religion of God, not a phantasmagoric play addressed to the imagination and the emotions; but as the religion of the world, of this world, where goods of economic value alone test and challenge man's moral fibre. Finally, it is through and in these laws that Islam justifies itself as the religion of man, as the new humanism which honours and ennobles man by giving him his due as it takes from him the due of his own peers, all of whom absolutely without distinction except in *'ilm* (knowledge) and *taqwā* (righteousness) are his equals, his fellow creatures before the Almighty.

Notes and Sources

- 1 "We created not the heavens and the earth and all that is between them save with truth" (al-Qur'an, translation by M. Pickthall, 15:85).
- 2 "And He it is Who created the heavens and the earth in six days – and His Throne was upon the water – that He might try you, which of you is best in conduct" (*Ibid.* 11:7).
- 3 "Who made all things good which He created" (*Ibid.* 32:7).
- 4 "Thou (Muhammad) canst see no fault in the Beneficent One's creation; then look again: Canst thou see any rifts? Then look again and yet again, thy sight will return unto thee weakened and made dim" (*Ibid.* 67:3–4).
- 5 "Who hath created life and death that He may try you, which of you is best in conduct" (*Ibid.* 67:2).
- 6 "We have neglected nothing in the Book (of Our decrees)" (*Ibid.* 6:38).
- 7 "But seek the abode of the Hereafter in that which Allah hath given thee and neglect not thy portion of the world" (*Ibid.* 28:77).
- 8 "The devil promiseth you destitution" (*Ibid.* 2:268).
- 9 "Eat of the good things wherewith We have provided you" (*Ibid.* 2:57, 2:172, 7:160, 20:81).
- 10 "Eat and drink of that which Allah hath provided" (*Ibid.* 2:60).
- 11 "(The angels) will ask: In what were ye engaged? They will say: We were oppressed in the land. (The angels) will say: Was not Allah's earth spacious that ye could have migrated therein? As for such, their habitation will be Hell, an evil journey's end; except the feeble among men, and the women, and the children, who are unable to devise a plan and are not shown a way" (*Ibid.* 4:97–98).
- 12 "Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency; and ye believe in Allah" (*Ibid.* 3:110).
- 13 "Hast thou observed him who believeth religion? That is he who repelleth the orphan, and urgeth not the feeding of the needy" (*Ibid.* 107:1–3).
- 14 "Ah, woe unto worshippers who are heedless of their prayer; who would be seen (at worship) yet refuse small kindnesses!" (*Ibid.* 107:4–7).

The Islamic Welfare State and its Role in the Economy

M. Umar Chapra

ISLAM has a set of goals and values encompassing all aspects of human life including social, economic and political. Since all aspects of life are interdependent and the Islamic way of life is a consistent whole, its goals and values in one field determine the goals and values in the other fields as well. This paper seeks to examine the interrelationship between the economic and political content of the Islamic way of life and discusses the functions and nature of the Islamic state in the light of its basic imperatives within the framework of financial constraints.

a. The Basic Imperatives

The Islamic way of life, being goal-oriented, is inconceivable without an organised community governed in accordance with the tenets of Islam. The Qur'ān unequivocally condemns disorder and anarchy (2: 205) and the Prophet (peace be on him) stressed the need for organisation and authority in Muslim society. This stress is also vividly reflected in several statements as well as the actual behaviour of his Companions and in the thinking of Muslim jurists. 'Umar, the second Caliph, emphasised that there could be no organised society without an *imām* (sovereign) and that there could be no *imām* without obedience.¹ The famous jurist Shāfi'i recorded the mood of his age (A.H. 150–204) by stating that there is *ijmā'* (consensus) among Muslims that there must be a caliph.² Likewise, Ibn Ḥanbal stressed that the absence of an *imām* could only result in disorder.³

This teaching of Islam with respect to authority and organisation has continually influenced all Muslim political thinking except perhaps that of the Khawārij. Abū Ya'lā and Māwardī, both contemporaries in Baghdad during the first half of the fifth century of the *Hijrah* (eleventh century C.E.), and both writing on the characteristics of an ideal state, stressed that the exercise of *imāmah* (sovereignty) is an absolute necessity.⁴ Māwardī went even further, stating that the existence of an *imām* was as necessary as the striving for truth and the acquisition of knowledge.⁵ Ibn Khaldūn emphasised that the institution of caliphate is a *shar'ī* obligation and that Muslims are obliged to establish and maintain it.⁶ Similar ideas

were expressed by Ibn Taymiyah,⁷ Shāh Wali-Allāh⁸ and a number of other scholars. Such an attitude toward the state is quite natural since Islam advocates certain goals and ideals which would be difficult of realisation without a value- and goal-oriented state. This idea was expressed beautifully by the famous Muslim poet-thinker Muḥammad Iqbāl (d. 1938) when he stated that "the state according to Islam is only an effort to realise the spiritual in human organisation".⁹

Thus the state is viewed by Islam as an instrument for the realisation of the ultimate goals, both spiritual and material, of the Islamic society. However, the authority exercised by the state is not absolute. It is a trust from God and is to be exercised in accordance with the terms of the trust as laid down in the *Shari'ah*. Two of the most important terms of this trust are that the state should be democratic and welfare-oriented.

Democratic Orientation

Sovereignty, according to Islam, vests in God. It is only His Will that should prevail in this world. Says the Qur'ān:

Is it not His to create and to govern? (7: 54)

Sovereignty is for none but God. (12: 40)

Follow the Revelation sent to you from your Lord, and follow not, as friends or protectors, other than Him (7: 3).

The sovereignty of God implies the rule of the Divine Law as revealed by Him in the Qur'ān to the Holy Prophet and as elaborated in the Prophet's *sunnah* during the course of his mission. Man as vicegerent of God on earth (2: 30, 6: 165) can neither make nor abrogate the Divine Law. Man must necessarily submit to it if he realises that the All-knowing God in His Great Wisdom is the best guide of man in all his affairs. Given the Divine Law, all individuals who submit to it must be partners in its implementation. Hence, once the sovereignty of God is recognised, the authority for its establishment is vested in the whole *ummah* and is to be exercised in the light of the Qur'ān and *Sunnah* through the democratic process of consultation with the *ummah*,¹⁰ (or its rightful representatives) as the Qur'ān enjoins:

And consult them in affairs. (3: 159)

And they conduct their affairs by mutual consultation. (42: 38)

Welfare Commitment

The mission of the Holy Prophet is defined by the Qur'ān to be a merciful blessing (*rahmah*) for all mankind (2: 107). Some manifestations of this merciful blessing are stated explicitly in the Qur'ān. These include, among others, the fostering of "good life" (*ḥayāt ṭayyibah*) and "welfare" (*ḥalāl*),¹¹ provision of ease and alleviation of hardship,¹² generation of prosperity,¹³

nurturing a climate of love and affection,¹⁴ and ensuring freedom from moral corruption,¹⁵ hunger, fear¹⁶ and mental tensions.¹⁷ Hence, all organisations and institutions, including the state, should reflect the character of merciful blessing, and cater to the "welfare" of all people.

The welfare function of the Islamic state was particularly stressed by the Prophet when he stated: "Any ruler who is responsible for the affairs of Muslims but does not strive sincerely for their well-being will not enter Paradise with them."¹⁸ The Companions of the Prophet clearly appreciated this welfare role of the Islamic state as is evidenced by numerous utterances of the early caliphs and their instructions to their governors. 'Umar, the second Caliph, wrote to Abū Mūsā, the governor of a province: "The best of men in authority is he under whom people prosper and the worst of them is he under whom people encounter hardships."¹⁹ Muslim jurists have unanimously held that catering to the welfare of the people and relieving them of hardships is the basic objective of the *Shari'ah* and hence of the Islamic state.²⁰ The letter addressed to Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd by his Chief Justice, Abū Yūsuf, vividly clarifies the welfare character of the Islamic state,²¹ and the same stress is evident in the writings of medieval Muslim thinkers like Māwardī, Abū Ya'lā, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyah. The evidence in the Qur'ān and *Sunnah* and the writings of Islamic scholars for the welfare function of the Islamic state is so overwhelming that it would be absolutely unjustified not to term the Islamic state as a "welfare state".

Strategy of Welfare

But there are other political systems which also claim to be welfare-oriented. The difference lies essentially in their basic philosophy of what constitutes human welfare. Islam distinguishes itself by its own unique philosophy of welfare which is comprehensive and consistent with its concept of human nature. Man has been created from matter²² but has been infused with a part of the Divine spirit.²³ The matter and the spirit together constitute the indivisible human self which is free but responsible before God for all its actions within the frame of reference of Divine guidance. He is intelligent and capable of differentiating between right and wrong and acting on his own initiative. His mission is to fulfil his obligations as the vicegerent of God on earth. He is not only a member of the brotherhood of Islam but also a part of mankind, the family of God.²⁴ Only that philosophy of welfare is best suited to man which enables him, firstly, to attain a fuller realisation of his complete indivisible self (spiritual as well as material) in keeping with his status as vicegerent of God and, secondly, to make the optimum all-round contribution to his *ummah* and to mankind.

The concept of welfare in Islam can hence be neither exclusively "other-worldly" nor purely "this-worldly". While urging Muslims to gain mastery

over nature and utilising the resources provided by God for the service and betterment of mankind, Islam warns Muslims against single-minded concentration on material acquisitions as the highest measure of human achievement and ignoring the indispensable spiritual content of the human self. Islam rather provides a spiritual orientation to all material effort and creates a harmony between the innate spiritual and material urges of individuals and groups. Islam has so firmly and exquisitely dovetailed the spiritual and material aspects of life that they may serve as a source of mutual strength and together serve as the foundation of true human welfare and happiness. According to Islam, negligence of either of the two aspects of life will prevent mankind from achieving true welfare. In fact there is no division between material and spiritual aspects of life in Islam. All human effort whether for "material", "social", "educational", or "scientific" goals is spiritual in character as long as it conforms to the value system of Islam. Working hard for the material well-being of one's own self, family and society is as spiritual as the offering of prayers, provided that the material effort is guided by spiritual values. This synthesis of the material and the spiritual is what is missing in the welfare concept of the other two systems, capitalism and socialism, as they are morally neutral.

This teaching has infiltrated all Muslim thinking throughout the ages. Ghazālī defines the objective of the *Shari'ah* to be the promotion of welfare of people which lies in safeguarding their faith, their life, their intellect, their posterity, and their property, and concludes that whatever ensures the safeguard of these five serves public interest and is desirable.²⁵ Ibn al-Qayyim emphasised that the "basis of the *Shari'ah* is wisdom and welfare of the people in this world as well as the Hereafter. This welfare lies in complete justice, mercy, welfare, and wisdom; anything that departs from justice to injustice, from mercy to harshness, from welfare to misery and from wisdom to folly has nothing to do with the *Shari'ah*".²⁶

This is, of course, a general indication of what is implied by welfare in Islam. More specific positions have been taken by the *Shari'ah* on many issues, which need not be elaborated here. In brief it may be stated that the welfare of individuals in an Islamic society may be realised if there is a proper environment for:

- (a) a fuller realisation of Islamic spiritual values in the individual as well as in society,
- (b) an adequate fulfilment of all basic material needs of life.

These are briefly discussed below under the spiritual and material roles of the state. This dichotomy is only for the convenience of discussion and does not imply a separate identity for the two roles which are closely integrated.

Spiritual Uplift

Since Islam lays a preponderant stress on moral values, the Islamic state cannot be a passive observer of the ethical scene in society. It is the responsibility of the Islamic welfare state to look after the spiritual health of its people. Hence the need of taking practical measures by the state to bring to a living reality the moral code of Islam has been stressed by all Muslim political thinkers and jurists. This does not necessarily imply that the Islamic state is a police state forcing people into certain channels of behaviour by use of its coercive power. There is some kind of built-in indoctrination in all systems, including the capitalist, and the Islamic system is no exception. The Islamic system, however, in compliance with the spirit of the Qur'ānic verse: "There is no compulsion in religion" (2: 256), shuns the extreme course of regimentation of thought and action, as it gives significant value to individual freedom. It is for this reason that Islam lays stress on education and creation of conditions conducive to the practice of the moral norms on which the edifice of the whole Islamic way of life is raised.

The realisation of the spiritual values of Islam in the individual and society demands that the Islamic state should strive in three major directions. First, it must foster conditions conducive to the creation of homes which would inculcate respect for and adherence to Islamic moral teachings in the rising generation. Islam has provided a blueprint for fostering love and affection, and mutual help and co-operation among the members of the family (nuclear as well as extended), and for generating a suitable environment for the proper upbringing of children. Second, the Islamic state must cast the educational system in the mould of Islam so that educational institutions produce young men and women imbued with the ideals of Islam. Third, the state should enforce those norms and values of Islam which are amenable to legal enforcement and should inflict the prescribed penalties for violations so that they serve as a deterrent to prospective violators.

Material Well-being

Adequate fulfilment of basic material needs is, in the Islamic frame of reference, as necessary for human welfare as spiritual uplift. Therefore, while arranging for the spiritual guidance of men by a chain of prophets to all people through space and time, God has also provided all necessary resources for his material well-being. Says the Qur'ān: "He it is Who has created for you everything on earth" (2: 29) and "has made subservient to you whatever is in the heavens and the earth and granted you His bounties, manifest and hidden" (31: 20, see also 4: 32-3, 16: 12-14, 22: 65 and 45: 12). Two fundamental principles may be derived from these verses. One, that God-given resources are for "you", which is addressed to all people and not to any privileged group or class; and two, that they are meant for

general human welfare, and at least, for eradicating poverty and fulfilling the basic material needs of all people.

There can be little dispute that some of the basic material needs of individuals that must be satisfied are:

- (i) training and education to develop the innate abilities of the individual and to enable him to cater for his well-being independently without becoming a burden on others;
- (ii) a suitable job, profession, or trade in keeping with his aptitude, ability, ambition, and needs of society so that he and society both benefit from his ability and training;
- (iii) adequate food and clothing;
- (iv) comfortable housing;
- (v) a generally healthy environment combined with appropriate medical facilities, and
- (vi) adequate transport facilities to enable a worker to commute to his place of work without unreasonable discomfort and to convey his product to appropriate markets at reasonable cost.

These material needs of the individual and their fulfilment have been so explicitly recognised by the *Shari'ah* that quotations from the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* and Islamic writings would be tantamount to elaborating the obvious.²⁷

The fulfilment of these spiritual and material needs of individuals and society would naturally necessitate the playing of a vital role by the state in the economic system of Islam. Nevertheless, it may be stressed here for the sake of clarity, that it is basically the moral responsibility of the individual to cater for his own needs through his own volition and effort. Islam categorically condemns begging and sloth and places great stress on hard work. The Prophet enjoined: "Beg not anything from people"²⁸ and that: "A man has not earned better income than that which is from his own labour."²⁹ Umar, the second Caliph, symbolised this Islamic teaching for earning one's own livelihood through hard work by saying: "No one of you should stay away from seeking livelihood and say: 'O God! Give me sustenance', for the sky will not rain gold and silver";³⁰ and that: "Seek of the bounty of God and be not a burden on others".³¹

The individual is not only expected to work for his own livelihood and welfare but is also expected to do his best on every job or mission he undertakes. "God desires that whenever anyone of you performs a job he does it perfectly."³² In fact the spiritual and material goals of the Islamic society cannot be fully realised until all Muslims, men or women, put forth their best in keeping with the optimum potential of their God-given talents.

Although it is essentially the responsibility of the individual to depend on himself and to try to do his best, the market forces need not always automatically be conducive to this. And even if the individual does his

best it is a well-recognised fact that the blind operation of market forces may not always reward him optimally for his socially-productive effort. It would hence be the responsibility of the state to play a positive role in guiding and regulating the economy to ensure that the objectives of the *Shari'ah* are fulfilled. This positive role of the Islamic state cannot be equated with the term "intervention" of the state under capitalism. The term "intervention", in addition to carrying an opprobrious connotation, smacks of commitment to *laissez faire* capitalism under which the best state is the one which plays the least role.

The question is: what specific role should the Islamic state play in the economy and how much regulation or control should it exercise? In principle it may be stated that the state should play an adequate role to bring to fulfilment the goals of the Islamic system without unduly sacrificing individual freedom or compromising social welfare. An important measure would be to contain the self-interest of individuals within moral restraints so as to prevent the individual from exploiting society to gratify his self-interest, and to safeguard against society exploiting the individual by curbing his inherent rights or preventing him from enjoying the lawful fruits of his labour and skill. The goal should be to bring about a healthy balance between the interests of the individual and of society in harmony with one of the fundamental teachings of the Prophet: "The individual should not inflict harm [on others] nor should any harm be inflicted on him [by others]." This brings all instruments of direct and indirect controls, including wage-price controls and nationalisation, to the extent considered necessary in the overall interest of the Muslim society, within the tool-kit of the Islamic state. What instruments are to be used and to what extent, would be determined essentially by circumstances, given the guiding principles of the *Shari'ah* and particularly the commitment of the Islamic state to social welfare in a manner that would not destroy individual freedom.

Specification of certain essential elements of the positive role, or the essential economic functions of the Islamic welfare state hence becomes necessary. The following section of this paper briefly specifies these functions.

b. Economic Functions

Some of the essential functions of the Islamic welfare state with respect to the economy may be stated to be:

- (1) to eradicate poverty and create conditions for full employment and a high rate of growth;
- (2) to promote stability in the real value of money;
- (3) to maintain law and order;
- (4) to ensure social and economic justice;

- (5) to arrange social security and foster equitable distribution of income and wealth;
- (6) to harmonise international relations and ensure national defence.

There is no specific significance in the order in which the above functions have been stated. All the functions are important and none may be ignored. Each of these functions is briefly discussed below.

(1) *Eradication of Poverty, Full Employment and Optimum Rate of Growth*

Since economic resources are a trust from God, it is the moral obligation of the trustee to employ these resources efficiently to realise the purpose of the trust which is the welfare of all the vicegerents of God. This naturally implies: firstly, eradication of poverty and satisfaction of all basic human needs; secondly, full and efficient employment of all human and material resources to attain an optimum rate of economic growth and improve the standard of living of all people; and, thirdly, avoidance of conditions generating deficient or excess demand and leading to unemployment or inflation. The word "optimum" has been preferred here in place of "maximum" or "high" to allow for a margin for harmony with the goals of spiritual uplift and social welfare. This is because economic growth is not an isolated phenomenon and is to be viewed against its impact on the moral fabric of Muslim society, the goal of social and economic justice, and the overall "welfare" of *all* people.

For a realisation of this objective it would be incumbent upon the Islamic state not to leave the essential function of allocation of resources, particularly scarce resources, or the determination of aggregate demand to the unhindered operation of blind market forces. It should itself play a positive role and consciously contribute towards the attainment of desired goals through (i) rational planning, and (ii) building the necessary physical and social infra-structure.

(i) *Planning*: It is now widely recognised that undisciplined self-interest and unguided play of market forces may not always work out for the best of all strata of society and may not necessarily lead to optimum efficiency in the use of resources because of limitations of individual horizon, lack of awareness or appreciation of social costs, and unbalanced growth in different sectors of the economy unrelated to the welfare needs of the people. The Islamic state should, therefore, resort to planning and play an active role in the implementation of its plans.

The need for planning does not imply that the Islamic state can resort to regimentation or unscrupulous control of the private sector. What it does imply is that instead of leaving the allocation of resources and the management of aggregate demand primarily to the blind interplay of market forces, the state should play an active and conscious role in not only determining priorities and guiding or channelling the scarce resources in

the light of those priorities, but also regulating demand so that occurrence of recession or inflation is avoided.

Priorities should, of course, be determined in accordance with, firstly, the terms of the trust as laid down in the *Shari'ah* by the Creator of all resources, and secondly, the needs and general overall welfare of God's vicegerents. The basic teachings of the *Shari'ah* are eternal and universal but the needs of man might differ with changes in time, geographical environment, stages of economic and social development and progress of technology. It may be stated that in general the efficient use of resources for the satisfaction of fundamental needs of *all* trustees should receive the utmost priority.

(ii) *Physical and social infrastructure.* For the growth of an economy and the development of a healthy and prosperous society, the existence of a basic physical and social infrastructure is generally recognised to be an absolute necessity. Much as investment in necessary physical capital leads to the development of an economy, the provision of such capital does not appeal to private entrepreneurs because direct monetary returns for investors are small and the amount of capital required is generally beyond their capacity. But since social benefits are so much in excess of private benefits, investment in these sectors must rank high in the development plans of an Islamic state as it should in the development plans of any developing economy.

The Qur'an enjoins upon Muslims to gather whatever strength they are capable of (8: 60). The significance of "strength" here need not be confined to military strength. It could also be implied to refer to the economic strength which, among others, lies at the root of military strength. An essential part of this latter strength is the provision of an infrastructure through the improvement and extension of roads and highways, building of dams and bridges, provision of irrigation networks, construction of ports, airports and telecommunication services, and furnishing of facilities essential for providing external economies to different sectors of the economy. The role of the state here is obviously of primary importance. Therefore, whenever the Prophet appointed a governor, he instructed him to strive for creating ease rather than hardship for the people.³³ One of the means by which the state could generate prosperity is to provide the necessary infrastructure. Public works programmes, therefore, received significant attention during the days of 'Umar and other caliphs.

The provision of social capital (education, public health, etc.) should also be an undisputed area of the activity of an Islamic state. The general case for education is obvious. Since according to the Prophet, "acquisition of knowledge is obligatory for every Muslim",³⁴ public investment in education is necessary. Educational efforts must, however, go beyond attempts to increase the degree of literacy, for literacy is only a means to real education and not an end in itself. The general aim of education in

Muslim society must be to raise Muslims who would conform to the ideals laid down in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, to introduce the process of change that would bring about the Islamic environment, to teach ever-new skills, and to stimulate the incentive for research and invention of new techniques of production and distribution so as to utilise God-given resources more efficiently. The education system, in addition to building upright moral character, should also inculcate in the student the spirit of hard work and efficiency, economy and frugality, avoiding waste and extravagance, and making productive investment of savings so that in addition to the individual, it benefits society in general as well.

If education is one sphere of social capital towards which the government should take positive steps, another is public health. The Prophet declared that "a strong Muslim is better and more beloved before God than a weak one",³⁵ and that "cleanliness is half of faith".³⁶ Therefore, it may be inferred that it is the responsibility of the Islamic state to provide a healthy environment combined with adequate medical facilities so as to improve the health and efficiency of people and to reduce suffering from sickness and disease. With respect to a clean and healthy environment one may also argue in favour of better sanitation facilities, curbing of pollution, provision of clean and safe water supplies, hygienic and comfortable housing, and clearance of slums.

(2) *Stability in the Real Value of Money*

One of the most serious problems of contemporary society is persistent inflation with accompanying decline in the real value of money and monetary assets. This is not because inflation and growth are necessary counterparts of each other but because of a number of inflation-prone post-War phenomena which it is not necessary to delve into in this paper. In fact stability in the real value of money is vitally important not only for the continued long-term growth of an economy but also for social justice and economic welfare.

Honesty and justice in all measures of value has been unequivocally stressed in the Qur'ān:

And give full measure and weight with justice (6: 152).

So give full measure and weight without defrauding men in their belongings and do not corrupt the world after its reform. This is better for you, if you are believers (7: 85; see also, 11: 84-85, 17: 35, and 26: 181).

These verses should be considered to apply not only to individuals but also to society and the state and should not be confined merely to conventional weights and measures but should also encompass all measures of value.

Money also being a measure of value, any continuous and significant

erosion in its real value may be interpreted in the light of the Qur'an to be tantamount to corrupting the world because of the adverse effect this erosion has on social justice and general welfare which are among the central goals of the Islamic system. This implies that any activity or behaviour of individuals, groups, or institutions in an Islamic state which significantly erodes the real value of money should be considered to be a national issue of paramount importance and treated with a sense of concern. Nevertheless, there are other goals which are of equal, or greater, importance. If there is an unavoidable conflict between the realisation of these goals and a compromise becomes inevitable then the goal of stable real value for money may be somewhat relaxed provided that the damage done by such relaxing is more than offset by the realisation of other indispensable national goals.

It may hence be considered obligatory for the Islamic state to resort to healthy monetary, fiscal and incomes policies and appropriate direct controls when necessary, including wage-price controls, to minimise erosion in the real value of money, thus preventing one group of society from knowingly or unknowingly shortchanging others and violating the Islamic norms of honesty and justice in measures.

This does not imply that Muslim countries, individually or collectively, would be able to stabilise the value of their currencies by their own effort. In a world where all countries are mutually interdependent and where the monetary and fiscal policies of some major industrial countries are responsible for a substantial degree of price instability, it may not be possible for the small and open economy of an individual Muslim country to achieve the desired stability unless the major industrial countries follow saner policies. However, what it does imply is that an Islamic state should itself be clear about its role with respect to price stability and should be determined to contribute whatever it can for the attainment of that goal.

(3) *Law and Order*

The importance of this universally recognised function of the state cannot be overstressed. This is because the degree of law and order in a society and the extent of security of life and property are one of the prime determinants of growth and stability of an economy and the inner happiness of individuals. In his remarkably terse but powerful farewell pilgrimage address, in which the Holy Prophet forcefully enunciated a number of principles for the socio-politico-economic system of Islam, he declared: "Your lives and your properties are as sacred as this day of *Hajj*."³⁷ On another occasion he emphasised: "Whatever a Muslim possesses is unlawful for another Muslim, his wealth and property and his life."³⁸ On the basis of this, Muslim jurists have unanimously stressed the duty of the Islamic state to safeguard the life and property of all individuals within its boundaries³⁹ so that, in the words of the Prophet, "a woman

travelling alone from Hira' to the Ka'bah feels such security that she has fear of none but God".⁴⁰

(4) *Social and Economic Justice*

Since Islam considers mankind as one family, all members of this family are alike in the eyes of God and before the Law revealed by Him. There is no difference between the rich and the poor, the high and the low, or the white and the black. There is to be no discrimination due to race, colour or position. The only criterion for a man's worth is character, ability, and service to Islam and humanity. Said the Holy Prophet: "Certainly God does not look at your faces or your wealth; He looks at your heart and your deeds."⁴¹ "The noblest of you are the best in character."⁴² To be even more emphatic the Prophet warned of the disastrous consequences of discrimination and inequality before the Law for an individual or a nation:

Communities before you strayed because when the high committed theft they were set free, but when the low committed theft the Law was enforced on them. By God, even if my daughter, Fāṭimah, committed theft I will certainly cut her hand.⁴³

Whoever humiliates or despises a Muslim, male or female, for his poverty or paucity of resources, will be disgraced by God on the Day of Judgment.⁴⁴

'Umar, the second Caliph, wrote to Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī, one of his governors, asking him to treat everyone before him alike in respect so that the weak did not despair of justice from him and the high did not crave for undue advantage.⁴⁵ This spirit of social justice thoroughly permeated the Muslim society during the period of the first four caliphs, and even in the later period, though a little subdued, did not fail to find its manifestation on several occasions. It may be pertinent to quote what the renowned jurist Abū Yūsuf wrote in a letter addressed to Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd: "Treat alike all individuals irrespective of whether they are near you or remote from you", and that "the welfare of your subjects depends on establishing the Divine Law and eliminating injustice".⁴⁶

The Islamic teaching of brotherhood and equal treatment of all individuals in society and before the Law would not be meaningful unless accompanied by economic justice so that everyone gets his due for his contribution to society or to the social product and that there is no exploitation of one individual by another. This point is also very well stressed in Islamic writings. The Qur'an urges Muslims to "withhold not what is justly due to others" (26: 183),⁴⁷ implying thereby that every individual must get what is really due to him, and not more by depriving others of their share. The Prophet aptly warned: "Beware of injustice for injustice will be equivalent to darkness on the Day of Judgment."⁴⁸ This warning against injustice and exploitation is designed to protect the rights of all individuals in society

(whether consumers or producers and distributors, and whether employers or employees) and to promote general welfare, the ultimate goal of Islam.

Of special significance here is the relationship between the employer and the employee which Islam places in a proper setting, specifying norms for the mutual treatment of both so as to establish justice between them. An employee is entitled to a "just" wage for his contribution to output and it is unlawful for a Muslim employer to exploit his employee. Three persons, declared the Prophet, who will certainly face God's displeasure on the Day of Judgment are: he who does not fulfil his covenant with God; he who sells a free person and enjoys the price; and he who engages a labourer, receives due work from him, but does not pay him his wage.⁴⁹ This *hadith*, by placing exploitation of labour on an equal footing with contravention of the covenant with God and enslaving of a free person suggests how repugnant exploitation of labour is to the spirit of Islam. Besides being paid the "just" wage, Islam requires that labourers should not be made to work so hard or in such miserable conditions that their efficiency declines, their health deteriorates, or their ability to enjoy income or participate in family life gets impaired. If they are made to perform a task which is beyond their capacity they should be provided with sufficient help (manual or technical) to enable them to do the job without undue hardship. Said the Holy Prophet:

Your employees are your brethren whom God has made your subordinates. So he who has his brother under him, let him feed him with what he feeds himself and clothe him with what he clothes himself and not burden him with what overpowers him. If you do so then help him.⁵⁰

On the basis of these teachings, fixation of minimum wages and maximum working hours, creation of appropriate working conditions, enforcement of precautionary measures against industrial hazards, and adoption of technological innovations to reduce hardships would be fully in conformity with the spirit of Islamic teachings.

While this is the treatment expected of an employer to his employees, Islam, because of its commitment to justice, protects the employers by placing certain moral obligations on the employee as well. These include, among others, honesty, diligence and efficiency in the performance of the function for which the employee has been hired. "An employee who excels in his devotion to God and also renders to his employer the duty, sincerity and obedience that he owes him, for him there is double reward [with God]."⁵¹ In this field, the Islamic state could play an important role through inculcation of Islamic work ethics in employees and imparting of appropriate vocational education.

(5) *Social Security and Equitable Distribution of Income and Wealth*

Given the commitment of Islam to human brotherhood and to social and economic justice, gross inequalities of income and wealth could only be repugnant to its spirit. Such inequalities could only destroy rather than foster the feelings of brotherhood that Islam wishes to create. Besides, since all resources are gifts of God to all human beings (al-Qur'ān, 2: 29), there is no reason why they should remain concentrated in a few hands. Hence, Islam emphasises distributive justice and incorporates in its system a programme for redistribution of income and wealth so that every individual is guaranteed a standard of living that is humane and respectable and in harmony with the dignity of man inherent in his being the vicegerent of God on earth. A Muslim society that fails to guarantee such a humane standard is really not worthy of the name as the Prophet declared: "He is not a true Muslim who eats his fill when his next-door neighbour is hungry."⁵²

Hence Islam emphasises distributive justice and incorporates in its system a programme which seems to contain the following five essential elements: one, as discussed earlier, making arrangements for training, and then rendering assistance in finding gainful employment to those unemployed and looking for work in accordance with their ability; two, enforcing a system of "just" remuneration for those working; three, making compulsory arrangements for insurance against unemployment and occupational hazards, old-age pensions and survivors benefits for those who can afford to provide for this; four, providing assistance to those who, because of disability, physical or mental handicaps, or obsolescence are unable to support themselves or to attain a respectable standard of living by their own effort; and five, collecting and distributing *zakāt* and enforcing Islamic teachings related to the division of the estate of a deceased person to accelerate the distribution of income and wealth in Muslim society so that, in the words of the Qur'ān: "wealth does not continue to circulate merely among your rich" (59: 7).

It is the duty of the Islamic state to ensure a respectable standard of living for every individual, who is unable to take care of his own needs and hence requires assistance. The Prophet clearly declared that: "He whom God has made an administrator over the affairs of Muslims but remains indifferent to their needs and their poverty, God will also be indifferent to his needs and poverty".⁵³ He also said that: "He who leaves behind him dependants, they are our responsibility"⁵⁴ and that "the ruler [state] is the supporter of him who has no supporter".⁵⁵ These and other similar *hadiths* lay down the gist of Islamic teachings in the realm of social security.

'Umar, the second Caliph, explaining redistributive justice in Islam, emphasised in one of his public addresses that everyone had an equal right in the wealth of the community, that none, not even he himself, enjoyed a greater right in it than anyone else, and that if he were to live longer, he would see to it that even a shepherd on Mount Sinai received his share from

this wealth.⁵⁶ Caliph 'Alī is reported to have stressed that "God has made it obligatory on the rich to provide the poor with what is adequate for them; if the poor are hungry or naked or troubled, it is because the rich have deprived them [of their right], and it will be proper for God to hold them responsible for this deprivation and to punish them".⁵⁷ The jurists have almost unanimously held the position that it is the duty of the whole Muslim society in general, and of its rich in particular, to take care of the basic needs of the poor, and if the well-to-do do not fulfil their responsibility in spite of their ability to do so, the state should compel them.

The Islamic concept of justice in the distribution of income and wealth does not require equal reward for everyone irrespective of his contribution to society. Islam tolerates some inequalities of income because all men are not equal in their character, ability, and service to society (6: 165, 61: 71, and 43: 32). Therefore, distributive justice in the Islamic society, after (i) guaranteeing a humane standard of living to all members through proper training, suitable job, "just" wages, social security and financial assistance to the needy through the institution of *zakāt*, and (ii) intensifying the distribution of wealth through its system of dispersal of the estate of a deceased person, allows such differentials in earning as are in keeping with the differences in the value of the contribution made or services rendered to society.

The Islamic stress on distributive justice is so emphatic that there have been some Muslims who have been led to believe in absolute equality of wealth. Abū Dharr, a companion of the Prophet, was of the opinion that it is unlawful for a Muslim to possess wealth beyond the essential needs of his family. However, most of the Prophet's companions did not agree with him in this extreme view and tried to prevail upon him to change his position.⁵⁸ But even Abū Dharr was not a protagonist of equality of flows (income). He was in favour of equality of stocks (wealth accumulations). This, he asserted, could be attained if the entire surplus of income over "genuine" expenses (*al-'afw*) was spent by the individual in improving the lot of his less fortunate brothers in particular and society in general. The consensus of Muslim scholars in spite of being intensely in favour of distributive justice, has, however, always been that if a Muslim earns by rightful means and from his own income and wealth fulfils his obligations toward the welfare of the society by paying *zakāt* and other compulsory and voluntary contributions, there is nothing wrong in his possessing more wealth than other fellow Muslims.⁵⁹

In reality, however, if the Islamic teachings of *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* about income and acquisition of wealth are sincerely followed, if the norm of justice to employees and consumers is applied, if provisions for redistribution of income and wealth are implemented, and if the Islamic law of inheritance is enforced, there will remain no gross inequalities of income and wealth in Muslim society.

(6) *International Relations and National Defence*

With respect to the wider sphere of mankind and the Muslim *ummah*, it is the responsibility of the Islamic state to try to make as rich a contribution as it can toward the spiritual and material uplift of mankind. If resources permit, it should provide assistance to relieve hardship and promote growth and accelerated development in deserving countries. The guiding principles of its policies in international economic relations may in the light of Islamic teachings be briefly stated to be: one, to co-operate in all matters contributing to "righteousness" and "piety" and to refrain from co-operating in "aggression" and "sin",⁶⁰ and two, to work positively for the welfare of mankind because it is the family of God.⁶¹

These principles, of course, relate to all countries and all peoples to whom the Islamic state is linked by bonds of universal human brotherhood as propounded by Islam. However, with Muslim countries to which the Islamic state is also united by bonds of common ideology, it should manifest greater solidarity and co-operation in all fields of life to enhance the unity and dignity of the *ummah* and the glory of Islam.

The Islamic state should also promote international understanding and peace in keeping with the teachings of Islam which by its very name stands for peace. It should encourage and support any constructive move towards peace, and should honour all treaties and agreements to which it is a partner. Nevertheless, while working for peace as a basic objective, the Islamic state should do its utmost to strengthen its defences so as to prevent or frustrate any aggression against its faith, territory, freedom and resources since the Qur'an enjoins: "And prepare against them whatever force you can" (8: 60). This may be understood to imply preparedness in terms of both men and hardware, including compulsory military service, efficient training, high morale, and diversification of sources of supplies if these cannot be produced locally or in collaboration with other Muslim countries. Nevertheless, in compliance with Islamic teachings, the military strength of the Islamic state should be used only for a "just" cause in a "just" manner against those who nurture, or resort to, aggressive designs:

And fight in the way of God against those who fight against you, but do not transgress limits for God loves not the transgressors (2: 190).

c. **The Wherewithal**

To live up to all the above obligations, the Islamic state would naturally stand in need of adequate financial resources. This is not the subject of this paper but without its review, even though it might have to be confined to a consideration of some of its basic principles, the paper would remain incomplete.

One principle which is clearly recognised by all jurists is that the state

has no right to acquire resources by *confiscating* property duly possessed by individuals or groups.⁶² However, if income or property has been wrongfully acquired, then the state not only has the right to confiscate it, rather it is its moral responsibility to rectify this state of affairs.

As for the means of income of the Islamic state, they are the following:

The Primary Sources

If the acquisition of resources through either confiscation or nationalisation without just compensation is to be ruled out then the primary sources left would be the following *in addition to the sale of relevant services*.

- (i) *Zakāt*;
- (ii) Income from natural resources;
- (iii) Taxation; and
- (iv) Borrowing.

In this paper these different heads cannot be treated in detail. What we are attempting to do below is merely to state some broad principles.

(i) *Zakāt*

To enable Muslims to bring to fulfilment a society which is like a single nuclear family, where wealth is equitably distributed and where the essential needs of all deserving individuals are met primarily by mutual help with the planning and organisational assistance of the state, Islam has instituted a powerful social security system giving it a religious sanctity which it enjoys nowhere else in the world. It is a part of the religious obligations of a Muslim to pay *zakāt* at a prescribed rate on his net worth or specified income flows to the *zakāt* fund.⁶³ Of such great significance is the institution of *zakāt* in Islam that whenever the Qur'ān speaks of the obligation to establish prayers it also simultaneously stresses the obligation of Muslims to pay *zakāt*. The Prophet went so far as to declare that "whoever offers prayers but does not pay *zakāt*, his prayers are in vain".⁶⁴

There is a general consensus among jurists that collection and disbursement of *zakāt* is essentially the responsibility of the Islamic state.⁶⁵ This was the practice during the days of the Prophet and of the first two Caliphs, Abū Bakr and 'Umar. Abū Bakr even used coercion against those who refused to pay *zakāt* to the state. It was 'Uthmān, the third caliph, who allowed the payment of *zakāt* directly to the needy. Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣās, the renowned commentator of Qur'ānic legal injunctions, argues on the basis of the Qur'ānic verse: "Take alms out of their assets to cleanse and purify them thereby" (9: 103), that it is the duty of the state to institute a system for the collection of *zakāt*.⁶⁶

However, even if the state collects *zakāt*, the proceeds are likely to be limited. Moreover, the expenditure heads for *zakāt* are clearly enumerated in the Qur'ān.⁶⁷ Even though some jurists have widened somewhat the

coverage of the expression *fī sabil Allāh* (in the way of Allah), it can hardly be made to include all expenditure heads of the Islamic state. Thus, if the Islamic state is to live up to its obligations it must have access to resources beyond the *zakāt* collection. In view of this the contention of some jurists that the state has no claims on the wealth of individuals beyond the *zakāt* is simply not tenable. Revenues would have to be raised through other means.

(ii) *Income from Natural Resources*

It has already been established that natural resources have been provided by God for the welfare of all people. The monetary benefit derived from these resources should, therefore, permeate to all people and should not under any circumstances be allowed to be diverted solely to certain individuals or groups. The acceptance of this principle does not necessarily restrict the management of these resources to the state alone. Whether the state or private enterprise should manage the exploitation of these resources should be determined by the criterion of efficiency. However, even if private enterprise is to manage and operate these resources the profit derived by it should not be more than what is justified by the services rendered and the efficiency attained.

In countries with abundant natural resources to contribute an adequate income to the state treasury to finance public expenditure (as is the case in some major oil-producing Muslim countries) there may be little need for additional sources of revenues. However, countries where income from this source is either not available, or if available, is not sufficient, the state would have to supplement its income by resorting to taxation and/or borrowing if necessary.

(iii) *Taxation*

The right of the Islamic state to raise resources through taxes cannot be challenged provided that taxes are raised in a just manner and are within a certain "bearable" limit. This right is defended on the basis of the Prophetic saying that "in your wealth there are also obligations beyond the *zakāt*"⁶⁸, and one of the fundamental principles of Islamic jurisprudence that "a small benefit may be sacrificed to attain a larger benefit and a smaller sacrifice may be imposed in order to avoid a larger sacrifice".

Most jurists have upheld the right of the state to tax. According to Marghinānī, if the resources of the state are not sufficient, the state should collect funds from the people to serve the public interest because if the benefit accrues to the people it is their obligation to bear the cost.⁶⁹ Abū Yūsuf also supports the right of the ruler to increase or decrease taxes depending on the ability of the people to bear the burden.⁷⁰ However, only a just tax system has been held to be in harmony with the spirit of Islam. A tax system which is oppressive and too onerous as compared with

the ability of the people to bear has been unanimously condemned. All rightly-guided caliphs, particularly 'Umar, 'Alī, and 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz are reported to have stressed that taxes should be collected with justice and kindness, that they should not be beyond the ability of the people to bear, and should not deprive the people of the basic necessities of life.⁷¹ Abū Yūsuf indicated that a just tax system could only lead to an increase in tax receipts and the development of the country.⁷² Māwardī emphasised that taking more is iniquitous with respect to the rights of the people, whereas taking less is unfair with respect to the rights of the public treasury.⁷³

Ibn Khaldūn genuinely reflects the trend of thinking during his time on the question of justice in the distribution of the tax burden by quoting from the letter of Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusain to his son who was the Governor of a province:

So distribute [taxes] among all people with justice and equity, making them general and not exempting anyone because of his nobility or wealth, and not exempting even your own officials or courtiers or followers. And do not levy on anyone a tax which is beyond his capacity to pay.⁷⁴

In view of the goals of social justice and equitable distribution of income a progressive tax system seems to be perfectly in harmony with the goals of Islam. It must, however, be emphasised that from the discussion of the jurists what is relevant from the point of view of modern times is the right of the Islamic state to tax with justice. It would not be proper to conclude that taxation should be strictly confined to the items mentioned by the jurists. Circumstances have changed and there seems to be the need for devising a tax system which is in harmony with the goals of Islam and yields sufficient revenue to allow a modern Islamic state to discharge its functions as a welfare state.

(iv) *Borrowing*

If total revenue from all the above sources (including sale of services) is not sufficient, the Islamic state would stand in need of borrowing. In this case because of the Islamic injunction against interest, the borrowing would need to be free of interest.

For certain sound income-yielding projects amenable to sale of services and distribution of dividends it may be possible to raise funds on the basis of profit-sharing. However, the scope for this is limited in the case of most public projects. In case profit-sharing is not possible or feasible, the Islamic state may have to borrow funds and this would be possible only if the private sector of the Muslim society is so highly inspired by the ideals of Islam that it is willing to forego the return. In modern acquisitive Muslim societies imbued perhaps more with hedonistic ideals of the economic

man as conceived by Adam Smith rather than by the altruistic teachings of Islam, and with continuous erosion of the real value of savings because of the high rate of inflation, it may be expected that borrowing without any return may tend to be unproductive unless it is made compulsory.

Expenditures financed by borrowing from the central bank tend to be inflationary, unless accompanied by a corresponding increase in the supply of goods and services, thus violating the norm of monetary stability as already discussed. Therefore, under normal circumstances borrowing from the central bank may be resorted to when a corresponding increase in output can be more or less ensured. Borrowing from the central bank may also be defended under certain special circumstances even if there is no corresponding rise in output provided it is felt that damage done by a small degree of inflationary financing is more than offset by other economic or non-economic gains that are likely to be realised. This seems to conform to the principle that a smaller sacrifice may be imposed to avoid a larger sacrifice and that the smaller of two evils may be tolerated.

“Richest” or “Ideal”

It may be contended here that all Islamic states may not have access to “adequate” resources to finance the functions discussed above and could not hence become “ideal”. Here it is important to clarify that the “ideal” Islamic state should not be confused with the “richest” one. The ideal is to be construed in the light of general spiritual and material welfare attained for God’s vicegerents within the framework of resources. Hence an Islamic state may be considered to have attained the position of “ideal” if it has at least (i) elevated the spiritual level of the Muslim society and minimised moral laxity and corruption; (ii) fulfilled its obligations for general economic welfare within the limits of its resources; and (iii) ensured distributive justice and has weeded out exploitation. Adequacy of resources is a relative term and is to be judged against attainable standards in the light of the stage of economic development.

It is, of course, the duty of the Islamic state to make a concerted effort to muster the maximum feasible level of resources and to harness them as efficiently as possible for fulfilling the widest possible range of responsibilities. Resources at the disposal of any society, rich or poor, may generally be expected to be scarce compared with the demands on them and every Islamic state would have to establish a schedule of priorities in the light of the *Shari‘ah* and the welfare needs of the people. Planning would hence be an essential function of every state. Since planning could be misdirected to satisfy certain vested interests, decision-making in planning should be through the Islamic process of consultation so that different viewpoints and interests are given due consideration.

Raising an optimum level of resources and utilising it efficiently within the framework of a “just” plan demands unscrupulous honesty on the part

of the common man as well as government employees. This demands that, on the one hand, the common man should be willing to provide honestly to the treasury the resources needed for attaining general social welfare, and, that on the other hand, corruption, including offering of gifts, let alone undisguised bribery, for obtaining an undue advantage in money, position, jobs or contracts is to be completely eliminated:

And swallow not your wealth among yourselves by false means, nor seek to gain access thereby to judges to swallow other people's property wrongfully with knowledge thereof (2: 188).

The Prophet (peace be on him) is reported to have said:

"How can a governor I have appointed say, this is for you [the treasury] and this is a gift for me! Why doesn't he sit in his parent's home and see if he gets those gifts? By God, in Whose Hand is Muḥammad's life, anyone of you who takes [unduly] anything from this [what belongs to the treasury] will have it around his neck on the Day of Judgment." The Prophet then raised his hands and said twice: "O God! Have I conveyed?"⁷⁵

While this honesty is expected in both the public and the private sectors, there are certain additional demands which public sector employees must fulfil. A Muslim public servant would be failing in his duty to God and society if he takes his remuneration but does not render his due in terms of diligence, efficiency and conscientiousness:

Any Muslim ruler entrusted with the affairs of Muslims who dies while he was cheating the people will find Paradise foreclosed for him.⁷⁶

Unless this level of honesty is attained and every individual works diligently and conscientiously for the implementation of Islamic teachings, the Islamic ideal of a morally-orientated welfare state cannot be fully realised. The ruler and the ruled must work hand in hand for the realisation of these goals. While the state stands duty-bound to make an honest effort to create the ideal conditions which Islam visualises, it is also obligatory for the public to render to the state their best in terms of co-operation and goodwill to crown the state efforts with success. It must be fully realised that the extent of movement towards the "ideal" Islamic state would necessarily depend on the quality and character of the people and the power *élite* in Muslim society.

d. Nature and Identity

The above discussion indicates that the Islamic state is essentially a welfare state and is duty-bound to play an important role in the economy for the fulfilment of the goals of the *Shari'ah* in the economic field as

briefly specified above. This welfare role is, however, to be played within the framework of individual freedom which Islam values greatly. The most important pillar of the Islamic faith is the belief that man has been created by God and is subservient to none but Him (13: 36) and that one of the primary objectives of the prophetic mission of Muḥammad (peace be on him) is to release mankind from all burdens and chains enslaving it (7: 157). This provides not only the essence of the Islamic charter for individual freedom from all bondage but also subjects man to the sovereignty of God in all aspects of life which essentially implies subordination of man to the moral law as specified in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*.

Because man is born free, no one, not even the state, has the right to abrogate this freedom and to subject him to regimentation. It is this respect for freedom which prompted 'Umar, the second caliph, to declare: "Since when have you begun to enslave people although their mothers bore them as free men?"⁷⁷ This commitment of Islam to individual freedom has led to a consensus among Muslim jurists that in normal circumstances restrictions may not be imposed on a free and sane adult. Thus freedom of expression, occupation and movement are assured in an Islamic state.

It is to realise this norm of individual freedom that Islam has incorporated in its economic system the essential elements of free enterprise after conditioning it to its own norms and values. The institution of private property along with the market mechanism has been integrated into the Islamic system in such a manner that an "appropriate" part of the production and distribution of goods and services is left to individuals and voluntarily-constituted groups enjoying freedom in their dealings and transactions.⁷⁸ The profit motive has also been upheld as, besides being consistent with human nature, it provides the necessary incentive for efficiency in the use of resources which God has provided to mankind.

However, since social welfare has a place of absolute importance in Islam, individual freedom – though of considerable significance – does not enjoy a place independent of its social consequences. It is sacred only as long as it does not conflict with the larger social interest or the overall spiritual and material goals of Muslim society, or as long as the individual does not transgress the rights of others. Property can be owned privately but is to be considered a *trust* from God and is to be acquired and spent in accordance with the terms of the trust. The profit motive has also been subjected to certain moral constraints so that it serves individual interest within a social context and does not lead to economic and social ills or violate the Islamic goals of social justice and equitable distribution of income and wealth.

Mixed Capitalism? Socialism?

All these various considerations make the Islamic state completely distinct from both the socialist and the capitalist systems. First of all,

socialism, as conceived by Marx, is basically amoral and based on the concept of dialectical materialism; while capitalism, being a secular ideology is, at best, morally neutral. In contrast Islam lays emphasis on both the moral and the material aspects of life and erects the edifice of economic well-being on the foundation of moral values. The foundation being different, the superstructure is bound to be different too.

Moreover, Islam is also fully committed to human brotherhood with social and economic justice, to equitable distribution of income, and to individual freedom within the context of social welfare. Although both socialism and mixed capitalism also claim to pay allegiance to social justice, the concept of justice in socialism or mixed capitalism is not based on human brotherhood reinforced by inviolable spiritual criteria for social and economic justice. In fact Marxist socialism under the influence of dialectics condones injustice done by one group to the other and even the annihilation of one group by the other. In *laissez faire* capitalism with its slogan of "Don't interfere, the world will take care of itself" there was no innate ideal of social justice to be attained through conscious state effort, while in mixed capitalism the roots of social justice lie in group pressures rather than in an intrinsic belief in human brotherhood.

Although capitalism also recognises freedom of the individual there are no spiritual constraints on this freedom. The constraints that do exist are determined primarily by the pressures of competition or the coercive power of the state, and secondarily by changing social norms without any spiritual sanctity. In the Islamic system, however, the individual is subject to inviolable spiritual values in all aspects of life, including the acquisition, spending and distribution of wealth. Islam normally recognises, like capitalism, the freedom of enterprise with the institution of private property, the market system and the profit motive, but it differs from capitalism because, as already indicated, property in Islam is a trust from God and man as trustee and vicegerent of God is responsible to Him and subject to His guiding principles.

Although both socialism and capitalism recognise equitable distribution of income, in capitalism this recognition is again an outcome of group pressure while in socialism it is accompanied by negation of individual freedom. Islam achieves this equitable distribution within the framework of individual freedom but with spiritual and legal imperatives to safeguard public interest, moral constraints against unearned income, and social obligations to ensure a just distribution of income and wealth.

The Islamic welfare state is hence neither capitalist nor socialist. It is based on its own values and guided by its own goals. It has its own identity and bears no resemblance to any other form of state.

Notes and Sources

- 1 Yūsuf ibn 'Abd al-Barr al-Qurṭubī, *Jāmi' Bayān al-'Ilm wa Fadluh* (Madina: al-Maktabah al-'Ilmiyyah, n.d.), vol. 1, p. 62.
- 2 Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī, *al-Risālah* (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1940), ed. Aḥmad M. Shākir, p. 419: 1154.
- 3 Abū Ya'lā Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah* (Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1938), p. 3.
- 4 Abū Ya'lā, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
- 5 Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah* (Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1960), p. 5.
- 6 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah* (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyyah al-Kubrā, n.d.), pp. 191–96.
- 7 'Abd al-Salām ibn Taymiyyah, *al-Siyāsah al-Shar'iyyah fī Iṣlāḥ al-Rā'i wa al-Ra'iyyah*, ed. Muḥammad al-Mubārak (Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-'Arabiyyah, 1961), pp. 138–44.
- 8 Shāh Wali-Allāh al-Dihlawī, *Hujjat-Allāh al-Bālighah*, Urdu translation by 'Abdul Raḥīm, (Lahore: Qawmī Kutubkhānā, 1953), vol. 2, p. 601.
- 9 Muḥammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Shaikh Muḥammad Ashraf, 1954), p. 155.
- 10 For a discussion of the essential difference between Islam, democracy and theocracy, the significance of man's vicegerency and the implication of this for the political system of Islam, see Abul A'lā Mawdūdī: "Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur'ān" in M. M. Sharif (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), vol. 1, pp. 193–4 and 197, and *Khilāfat wa Mulūkiyyat* (Lahore, Islamic Publications, 1966), pp. 31–36 and 69–70, *The Political Theory of Islam* (Lahore, 1960), and *Islamic Law and Constitution*, (Karachi 1955).
- 11 "Whoever, male or female, does good and is a believer, We shall certainly make him live a good life and give him his reward for the best of what he did" (16: 97). "Serve your Lord and do good that you may have welfare (*falāḥ*)" (22: 77).
- 12 "God desires ease and not hardship for you" (2: 185).
- 13 "And if the people of the towns had believed and kept their duty, We would certainly have opened for them blessings from the heavens and the earth" (7: 96). "And the good land – its vegetation comes forth abundantly by the permission of its Lord. And the bad land, its vegetation comes forth but scantily. Thus do We repeat the messages for a people who give thanks" (7: 58).
- 14 "Those who believe and do good deeds for them the Beneficent will surely bring about love" (19: 97).
- 15 "If you do it not there will be discord and great mischief" (8: 73). "Corruption has appeared in the land and sea on account of what people have done to make them taste a part of their doing so that they may return" (30: 41).
- 16 "And Allah sets forth a parable: A town safe and secure to which its provisions come in abundance from every quarter; but it was ungrateful for Allah's favours, so Allah made it taste a pall of hunger and fear because of what they did" (16: 112). "So let them serve the Lord of this House who feeds them against hunger and gives them security against fear" (106: 4).
- 17 "Those who believe and whose hearts find peace in the remembrance of Allah. Surely it is in the remembrance of Allah that hearts find peace" (13: 28).
- 18 Abū al-Ḥusayn Muslim al-Nisābūrī, *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* (Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1955), vol. 1, p. 126.
- 19 Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb ibn Ibrāhīm, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, 2nd ed. (Cairo: al-Maṭba'ah al-Salafiyyah, A.H. 1352), pp. 14–15.
- 20 Muḥammad Abū Zahrah, *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1957), p. 355.

- 21 Abū Yūsuf, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–17.
- 22 "He it is Who created you from clay" (al-Qur'ān, 6: 2).
- 23 "And when thy Lord said to the angels: 'I am going to create a mortal of sounding clay, of black mud fashioned into shape; so when I have made him complete and breathed into him of My Spirit, fall down making obeisance to him' " (15: 28–29).
- 24 "But if they repent and keep up prayer and pay the *zakāt* they are your brothers-in-faith" (9: 11).
- 25 "The believers are nothing but brethren; so make peace between your brethren and keep your duty to Allah that you may be treated mercifully" (49:10).
- 26 "Mankind is the family of God and the most beloved of them before Him is he who is best to His family", Wali al-Dīn al-Tabrizī, *Mishkāt al-Maṣābiḥ* (Damascus: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, A.H. 1381), ed. M. Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, vol. 2, p. 613: 4998.
- 25 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *al-Muṣtaṣfā* (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyah al-Kubrā, 1937), vol. 1, pp. 139–40.
- 26 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, *I'lām al-Muwaqqi'in* (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijāriyah al-Kubrā, 1955), vol. 3, p. 14.
- 27 By way of example it may be pointed out here that Ibn Ḥazm, on the basis of the Qur'ānic verse: "Then if one of them does wrong to the other, fight the one who does wrong until he returns to the command of God" (49: 9), argues that it is proper to fight with those who deprive others of basic necessities of life because the one who has denied his brother his due right has in essence wronged him. He also argues that it is the responsibility of the rich in every country to fulfil the needs of the poor and the ruler [state] should compel them to provide the necessary sustenance, protective clothing, and housing that ensures protection and privacy. He also quotes the following *ḥadīth* of the Prophet narrated by Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī: "He who has a surplus animal to ride on should give it to one who has none, and he who has surplus provisions should give them to him who has none, and the Prophet mentioned so many items of wealth that we felt none of us has any right over his surplus wealth" (Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Muḥallā*, vol. 6, pp. 156–59: 725). See also p. 200 ff. above.
- 28 Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī, *Sunan Abū Dāwūd* (Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1952), vol. 1, p. 382.
- 29 Muḥammad ibn Yazīd ibn Mājah al-Qazwīnī, *Sunan Ibn Mājah* (Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1952), vol. 2, p. 723: 2138; and Abū 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Shu'ayb al-Nisā'i, *Sunan al-Nisā'i* (Cairo: Muṣtafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1964), vol. 7, p. 212.
- 30 'Alī al-Ṭanṭāwī and Nājī al-Ṭanṭāwī, *Akhbāru 'Umar* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1959), p. 268.
- 31 Qurṭubī, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 15.
- 32 Cited on the authority of Bayhaqī, *Shu'ab al-Imān* by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḡīr* (Cairo: 'Abd al-Ḥamid Aḥmad Ḥanafī, n.d.), vol. 1, p. 15.
- 33 Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 1358; and Abū Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 559.
- 34 Muḥammad ibn Yazīd ibn Mājah al-Qazwīnī, *Sunan Ibn Mājah* (Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1952), vol. 1, pp. 81–224; see also, Qurṭubī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 3–13.
- 35 Ibn Mājah, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 31: 79.
- 36 Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 203 :1.
- 37 Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 889: 147; and Ibn Mājah, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 1297: 393.
- 38 Abū Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 568.
- 39 Abū Ya'lā, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Māwardī, *op. cit.*, p. 16; and Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāyah* (Cairo, 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1965), vol. 2, pp. 98 and 132.
- 40 Muḥammad ibn Isma'īl al-Bukhārī, *al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḡīh* (Cairo: Muḥammad 'Alī Ṣubayḥ, n.d.), vol. 4, p. 239.
- 41 Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, p. 1987: 34.
- 42 Bukhārī, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, p. 15.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 199.

- 44 *Musnad al-Imām Zayd wa 'Alī al-Ridā ibn Mūsā al-Kāzim* (Beirut: Maktabah al-Ḥayāt, 1966), p. 478.
- 45 Abū Yūsuf, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
- 46 *Ibid.*, pp. 4 and 6.
- 47 See also 83: 1–3: “Woe to the cheaters; who when they take the measure [of their due] from men, take it fully. And when they measure out to others or weigh out for them, they give less than is due”.
- 48 Reported on the authority of *Musnad* of Aḥmad and Bayhaqī, *Shu'ab al-Iman* by Suyūfī, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 8.
- 49 Bukhārī, vol. 3, p. 112.
- 50 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 15–16. The word used in the *ḥadīth* is “slaves” and not “employees” as in the translation. If a humane treatment is expected to be meted out to slaves, then employees are certainly entitled to an even better treatment.
- 51 *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 186. See also footnote 50.
- 52 Abū 'Abd-Allāh Muḥammad ibn Ismā'il al-Bukhārī, *al-Adab al-Mufrad*, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Quṣayy Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, A.H. 1379), p. 52: 112.
- 53 Abū Dāwūd, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 122.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 124.
- 55 *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 481.
- 56 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, *al-Fārūq 'Umar* (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdah al-Miṣriyah, 1964), vol. 2, p. 233.
- 57 Abū 'Ubayd Qāsim ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-Amwāl* (Cairo: at-Maktabah al-Tijāriyah al-Kubrā, A.H. 1353).
- 58 See the comments on verse 34 of *sūrah* 9 of the Qur'ān in the commentaries of Abū al-Fidā' Ismā'il ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm* (Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 352; and Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, *Aḥkām al-Qur'ān* (Cairo: Maṭba'ah al-Bahīyyah al-Miṣriyyah, A.H. 1347), vol. 3, p. 130. See also Mawdūdī, “Economic Teachings of the Qur'ān” *op. cit.*, p. 179, for a critical discussion of the effort by some writers to establish “equal” distribution from verse 10 of *Sūrah* 41 of the Qur'ān: “And He made in it [the earth] mountains above its surface, blessed it, and placed therein provisions in due proportion, in four days, alike for [all] seekers”. The implication here is that provisions are equally accessible to all seekers.
- 59 See the commentary of Ibn Kathīr, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 350–3.
- 60 Help one another in righteousness and piety but help not one another in sin and aggression (5: 3).
- 61 Mankind is the family of God and the most beloved of them before Him is the one who is best to His family (*Mishkāt*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 613: 4998). Be kind to those on earth and He who is in the Heavens will be kind to you (*Ibid.*, p. 608: 4669).
- 62 For example, Abū Yūsuf expressly voices this feeling by stating that “the state has no right to acquire forcibly the property that rightly belongs to an individual except by duly established methods”. (Abū Yūsuf, *op. cit.*, p. 117).
- 63 For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see, Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī, *Fiqh al-Zakāt* (Beirut, Dār al-Irshād, 1969), 2 vols.
- 64 Abū 'Ubayd, *op. cit.*, p. 354: 919.
- 65 Qarḍāwī, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 747–91.
- 66 Jaṣṣāṣ, *op. cit.*, see the commentary on verse 103 of *Sūrah* 9, vol. 3, pp. 190–92.
- 67 “The *zakāt* is for the poor, the needy, those employed to administer it, those whose hearts are desired to incline (to the Truth), freeing the slaves, those in debt, the way of Allah and the wayfarer – an injunction from Allah. And Allah is Knowing, Wise” (9: 60).
- 68 'Abd-Allāh ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Dārimī, *Sunan al-Dārimī* (Damascus: Maṭba'ah al-I'tidāl, A.H. 1349), vol. 1, p. 385. For a detailed discussion of this subject see Qarḍāwī, *op. cit.*, pp. 963–92.

- 69 *al-Hidāyah*, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, p. 105.
- 70 Abū Yūsuf, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
- 71 *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 16 and 86.
- 72 *Ibid.*, p. 111.
- 73 Māwardī, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
- 74 Ibn Khaldūn, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
- 75 Muslim, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 1463: 26.
- 76 Mishkāt, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 321: 3686.
- 77 Ṭanṭāwī and Ṭanṭāwī, *op. cit.*, p. 268.
- 78 The word "appropriate" may appear to be in contrast with "every" used by Mawlānā Mawdūdī: "The economic scheme presented in the Qur'ān is based entirely on the scheme of individual ownership in every field" – "Economic Teachings of the Qur'ān", *op. cit.*, p. 179. It is, however, not because he qualifies his statement on p. 180 by indicating that "there is nothing in the Qur'ān to prevent a certain thing being taken over from individual control and placed under collective control, if necessary". Thus the choice of which sectors should be in private ownership and which should be nationalised would be made essentially on the basis of public interest.

Economic Development in an Islamic Framework

Khurshid Ahmad

A MAJOR challenge confronts the world of Islam: the challenge of reconstructing its economy in a way that is commensurate with its world role, ideological, political and economical. What does this demand: economic development with a view to “catch up” with the industrialised countries of the West, Capitalist or Socialist, according to one’s inclination and sympathy, or politico-economic dependence? Or does it demand total socio-economic reconstruction in the light of a basically different model, with its own set of assumptions, ideals and growth-path, something that would be unique and value-specific? Whether the Muslim world is clear about this fundamental question or not, we will try to see in a moment. It is, however, clear from the topic we propose to discuss that our primary concern is not with the “catching up” ideology. Instead, our objective is to discern the nature and ethos of economic development in an Islamic framework.

The subject can, however, be approached in a number of ways. One may try to explore the nature and processes of economic development as they may unfold themselves in a society that is Islamic in actuality, or at least where some approximation with the norm has been achieved. This approach has a number of merits but its immediate relevance to the Muslim world situation is somewhat limited. What is more relevant and pressing is the need to clearly identify the Islamic ideal of economic development, to measure the distance between this ideal and the present-day reality of the Muslim world and to formulate appropriate strategy/strategies for pursuing developmental efforts in such a way that an Islamic framework of life may ultimately be evolved. This formulation of the problem has immediate relevance for the Muslim economist and planner. It would be naïve to think that correct answers to this problem have already been found or can be developed in one or a few papers, or even in one or a few conferences. It would be only through sustained research by a team of economists, by unceasing original thinking and, above all, by a great deal of practical experimentation that we might be able to discover an Islamic road to economic development.

We must not rule out the possibility of the appearance of a number of approaches within an Islamic framework and we should be prepared to

examine them carefully and even experiment if they merit such a response. It may be worthwhile to distinguish between an *Islamic economy* and an *Islamising economy* and to admit the possibility of a multiplicity of approaches/models, although with a strong central core of unity and uniformity. What follows is just one person's reflection on the problem under discussion. It is being presented as tentative formulations primarily in order to provide a basis for discussion and further exploration.

The Starting-point

Muslim countries suffer from widespread economic underdevelopment, i.e. non-utilisation and/or underutilisation of human and physical resources with consequent poverty, stagnation and backwardness. Even those countries which are resource-rich, the state of their economies remains predominantly underdeveloped. The standard of living of the common man is generally low. Some Muslim countries have over the last two decades maintained an above average rate of growth (i.e. average rate of growth of all the less developed countries), nonetheless, there has been little real economic development.¹

There are gross structural deformities within the economies of the Muslim countries. Whatever development is taking place is contributing, *inter alia*, to the aggravation of these deformities, viz. gross inequalities in distribution of income and wealth, severe imbalances between different geographic regions, between economic and social sectors, between sectors within the economy, particularly agriculture and industry, and a number of imbalances and iniquities within the industrial and agricultural complexes.

Most of the Muslim countries have been unable to internalise the engine of growth. Their economies are dependent on the Western countries in a number of ways – for the import of foodstuffs, manufactured goods, technology, etc. on the one hand, and for the export of their primary products on the other. Some of them are suffering from the effect of lingering legacies of colonial economic relationships and appear as perfect examples of a “centre-periphery” relationship.²

The paradox of the Muslim world is that it is resource-rich, but economically poor and weak. Development planning has been introduced in a number of Muslim countries. In some, the art is now at a fairly advanced level. Nigeria, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia are some of the instances. But in almost all these countries developmental effort is modelled after the prototypes of growth developed by the Western theorists and practitioners of planning and “sold” to the planners in the Muslim countries via international diplomacy, economic pressurisation, intellectual infiltration and a number of other overt and covert means. Whatever be the source of inspiration – the Capitalist economies of the West or the Socialist models of Russia and China – no effort worth the

name seems to have been made to rethink the basic issues of development economies in the light of the ideals and values of Islam and its world strategy. A very simplified version of economic development has been adopted as policy ideal: industrialisation. This is believed to depend, primarily and predominantly, on capital formation. Industry is regarded as the leading sector and expanding investment in it is believed to be the royal road to development Utopia. A rather quick way to achieve this objective is import substitution. This approach is based on extensions and variations of the Harrod-Domar model of macroeconomic planning.³ Under this approach growth prospects are constrained by the operation of two "gaps" (deficiencies): the domestic "savings gap" and the "balance of payments gap"; and these gaps can be filled by one talisman – foreign aid.

It is interesting to note that even those countries which have not formally subscribed to the Western growth models and have claimed to follow some kind of a socialist path to development have pursued a similar capital- and aid-centred strategy. Kalecki and Lange models both assign a central role to investment in development. Russia's international economic policy has broadly pursued this very approach.⁴

A comparative study of the development policy and of actual economic performance of the Muslim countries shows that the strategy of imitation has failed to deliver the goods.

How do this policy and the actual developments stand in relation to Islam? It would be correct to say that developmental policies have been more or less Islam-neutral. It is our submission that as far as Islam is concerned it cannot be neutral *vis-à-vis* economic development. But there is no evidence to support that generally speaking the policy makers derived any inspiration worth the name from Islam and tried to translate its economic ideals into development policies, some lip-service here and there notwithstanding. Actual policies have had little or no relation to Islam with the result that the economies of the Muslim world have failed to be transformed towards Islam and the deformities and iniquities inherited from the colonial period and beyond have generally aggravated.⁵

A survey of the literature dealing with Islam and development shows that even at the academic level discussion has hovered around a few points of general significance only. Western writers⁶ have mostly dwelled upon the alleged "fatalism" in Muslim society and on lack of "achievement-motivation". Muslim writers have tried to show that Islam provides for all those factors which are needed for economic development. Some work has been done to suggest the broad objectives of economic effort and enterprise that Islam wants to be pursued by the individual and society.⁷

Excepting one or two tentative yet pioneering works no serious effort has been made to spell out the implications of these goals for development strategies and policies.⁸ Moreover, the effect of the work that has been done so far is hardly discernible at all on the actual development processes.

All the evidence suggests that the actual movement towards development is altogether bereft of Islamic inspiration. If Islam comes into the picture, it is at a later stage, and mostly in either of the following two forms:

- (a) Some people bring it into the debate to legitimise certain policies;
- (b) Others use it as a point of reference for criticising certain policies and actual developments.

There is, however, one point which came out prominently in this debate and discussion: Islam's main concern is in *encouraging* economic development *with* social justice and not in disregard of the demands of social justice.

Our Approach: Assumptions and Commitments

The primary task of any theory of development is to examine and explain the nature of the processes of development and factors responsible for it, to identify and analyse principal obstacles to development in a given situation, and to try to prescribe the most desirable and the most efficient ways and means to remove those obstacles and achieve various dimensions of economic development.

It can hardly be overemphasised that such an effort must be made with academic rigour and scholarly detachment. Nonetheless, it would be idle to assume that this theorising can take place in a climate of positivistic objectivity and of complete value-neutrality. Most of the economic thinking that masquerades as value-neutral turns out, on closer scrutiny, to be otherwise. The result of this approach, however, is that its value-assumptions remain apparently hidden. They remain implicit, and as such, are not susceptible to evaluation in an ordinary way.⁹

This is unfair and improper. We agree with Myrdal that "efforts to run away from the valuations are misdirected and foredoomed to be fruitless and damaging" and that "the only way in which we can strive for objectivity in theoretical analysis is to lift up the valuations into the full light, make them conscious and explicit, and permit them to determine the viewpoints, the approaches and the concepts used. In the practical phases of a study the stated value premises should then, together with the data established by theoretical analysis with the utilisation of those same value premises – form the premises for all policy conclusions".¹⁰

The major contribution of Islam lies in making human life and effort purposive and value-oriented. The transformation it seeks to bring about in human attitudes and *pari passu* in that of the social sciences is to move them from a stance of pseudo-value-neutrality towards open and manifest value-commitment and value-fulfilment. The first premise which we want to establish is that economic development in an Islamic framework and Islamic development economics are rooted in the value-pattern embodied in the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*.¹¹ This is our basic frame of reference.

Our second premise is that this approach clearly rules out imitateness. The Capitalist and the Socialist models can have no place as our ideal-types, although we would like to avail from all those experiences of mankind which can be gainfully assimilated and integrated within the Islamic framework and can serve our own purposes without in any way impairing our values and norms. But we must reject the archetype of capitalism and socialism.¹² Both these models of development are incompatible with our value system; both are exploitative and unjust and fail to treat man as man, as God's vicegerent (*khalifa*) on earth. Both have been unable to meet in their own realms the basic economic, social, political and moral challenges of our time and the real needs of a humane society and a just economy. Both are irrelevant to our situation, not merely because of the differences in ideological and moral attitudes and in socio-political frameworks, but also for a host of more mundane and economic reasons: differences in resource bases, changed international economic situations, bench-mark differences in the levels of the respective economies, socio-economic costs of development, and above all, for the fundamental fact that the crucial developmental strategy of both the systems – industrialisation through maximisation of investible surplus – is unsuited to the conditions of the Muslim world and the demands of the Islamic social ideals.¹³

The body of knowledge and experience developed and structured in the form of development economics is important and useful but its real relevance and applicability to our situation is rather limited. Although literature on development economics is burgeoning, it fails to come to grips with real complex problems of the less developed countries in general, and of the Muslim world in particular. Development theory as it has developed in the West (both in the Capitalist and Socialist countries) has been conditioned by the unique characteristics, specific problems, and explicit and implicit values and socio-political infra-structure of the Western economies. This theory cannot be indiscriminately applied to Muslim countries. Moreover, a major part of the Western development theory remains an outgrowth of the capital theory.¹⁴ Because of this fundamental weakness, it fails to tackle adequately the multi-dimensional problems of development.

Two major areas of development in recent development theory relate to the realisation that investment in man – education, health, etc. – is a strategic factor in the economic development of a society, and that socio-political factors play an important part in growth and non-growth alike. It is interesting to observe that the "investment in man" approach is leading to some widening of the "capital theory" as it has thrown new light on a somewhat neglected aspect of capital – the human capital.¹⁵ Consequently, a more comprehensive and integrated view of capital is being developed,¹⁶ as such a promising opportunity to rethink the basic premises of economics and the place of man in the total framework has almost been lost. The socio-economic factors, despite an increasing awareness of them, still

continue to be treated outside the mainstream of the theory of development and may perhaps remain so unless an interdisciplinary theory of development is evolved.¹⁷

It is instructive to observe that despite all differences in emphasis on a socio-political framework, the socialistic theory of growth also treats the problem of capital-formation and investment as the real key to growth. Both the Kalecki and Lange models assign a central role to investment.¹⁸

Development economics is presently passing through a period of crisis and re-evaluation. It is coming under attack from a number of directions. An increasing number of economists and planners are becoming sceptical about the whole approach of contemporary development economics.¹⁹ There are others who consider the application of a theory based on Western experience to a different socio-economic situation, as is being done in the less developed countries, inappropriate and injurious to the prospects of development.²⁰ There are others who are critical of the tools and instruments of development planning and regard the alleged sophistications and mathematical refinements as pseudo-scientific inasmuch as they contain elements of simplification, abstraction and even falsification.²¹ There are still some others who are becoming disenchanted with the very idea of growth – some because of its socio-economic and ecological costs²² and others because they have begun to see the limits of growth.²³ In the light of this and other considerations it can realistically be suggested that the state of development economics today is not a very healthy one.²⁴ We, therefore, suggest that the central ideas of development economics and its suggested remedies deserve to be re-examined. A much more critical approach deserves to be adopted towards the panaceas that have been "sold" to the Muslim countries.

The above submissions spell out some of the negative aspects of our approach, that is, what an Islamic approach to development should not be. On the positive side we submit that our approach should be frankly ideological and value-oriented. In development economics, as in economics or in any branch of human activity, there is an area which deals with technological relationships. But such technological relationships *per se* are not the be-all and end-all of a social discipline. Technological relationships are important and they should be decided according to their own rules. But technological decisions are made in the context of value-relations. One effort is to weld these two areas and to make our values explicit and to assign to them the role of effective guide and controller. This means that as against an imitative stance, our approach must be original and creative. It is only through a thorough understanding of the social ideals and values of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* and a realistic assessment of our socio-economic situation – resources, problems and constraints – that we can adopt a creative, innovative strategy for change. As such our approach would be ideological as well as empirical and somewhat prag-

matic – pragmatic not in the sense that ideals and values can be trimmed to suit the exigencies of the situation, but pragmatic in the sense that ideals and values are to be translated into reality in a practical and realistic way.

Islam stands for effort, struggle, movement and reconstruction – elements of social change. It is not merely a set of beliefs. It also provides a definite outlook on life and a programme for action, in a word, a comprehensive milieu for social reconstruction. We would, therefore, conclude this section by submitting some basic propositions about the dynamics of social change as they reveal themselves by reflection on the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. They also provide some indicators for purposes of policy.

- (a) Social change is not a result of totally pre-determined historical forces. The existence of a number of obstacles and constraints is a fact of life and history, but there is no historical determinism. Change has to be planned and engineered. And this change should be purposive – that is, a movement towards the norm.
- (b) Man is the active agent of change. All other forces have been subordinated to him in his capacity as God's vicegerent (*khalifa*). Within the framework of the divine arrangement for this universe and its laws, it is man himself who is responsible for making or marring his destiny.
- (c) Change consists in environmental change and change within the heart and soul of man – his attitudes, his motivation, his commitment, his resolve to mobilise all that is within him and around him for the fulfilment of his objectives.
- (d) Life is a network of inter-relationships. Change means some disruption in some relationships somewhere, as there is a danger of change becoming an instrument of disequilibrium within man and in society. Islamically-oriented social change would involve least friction and disequilibria, and planned and co-ordinated movement from one state of equilibrium to a higher one, or from a state of disequilibrium towards equilibrium. As such change has to be balanced and gradual and evolutionary. Innovation is to be coupled with integration. It is this unique Islamic approach which leads to revolutionary changes through an evolutionary trajectory.

These are some of the major elements of healthy social change through which Islam wants man and society to move from one height to another. The task before the Islamic leadership, intellectual as well as politico-economic, is to clearly formulate the objectives and strategy of change and the ways of achieving it and also to establish institutions and inaugurate processes through which these policies could be actually implemented.

Islamic Concept of Development

Now we would like to elaborate on some of the essential elements of the Islamic concept of development.

Economic development, according to the current literature on development, consists of a "series of economic activities causing an increase in the productivity of the economy as a whole and of the average worker, and also an increase in the ratio of earners to total population".²⁵ It is looked upon as a dynamic process, involving structural changes, which produce a significant and sustained improvement in the performance of the economy, actual as well as potential, measured usually in real per capita terms and which is spread over a fairly long period of time. Its substance lies in enabling a people to meaningfully control their economic environment so as to improve the quality of life.²⁶

Islam is deeply concerned with the problem of economic development, but treats this as an important part of a wider problem, that of human development. The primary function of Islam is to guide human development on correct lines and in the right direction. It deals with all aspects of economic development but always in the framework of total human development and never in a form divorced from this perspective. This is why the focus, even in the economic sector, is on human development with the result that economic development remains an integrated and indivisible element of the moral and socio-economic development of human society.

The philosophic foundations of the Islamic approach to development, discussed by us in detail elsewhere,²⁷ are as follows:

- (1) *Tawhīd* (God's unity and sovereignty). This lays the rules of God-man and man-man relationship.
- (2) *Rubūbiyyah* (divine arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and directing things towards their perfection). This is the fundamental law of the universe which throws light on the divine model for the useful development of resources and their mutual support and sharing. It is in the context of this divine arrangement that human efforts take place.
- (3) *Khilāfah* (man's role as God's vicegerent on earth). This defines man's status and role, specifying the responsibilities of man as such, of a Muslim, and of the Muslim *ummah* as the repository of this *khilāfah*. From this follows the unique Islamic concept of man's trusteeship, moral, political and economic, and the principles of social organisation.
- (4) *Tazkiyah* (purification *plus* growth). The mission of all the prophets of God was to perform the *tazkiyah* of man in all his relationships – with God, with man, with the natural environment, and with society and the state.

We would submit that the Islamic concept of development is to be derived from its concept of *tazkiyah*, as it addresses itself to the problem of human development in all its dimensions and is concerned with growth and expansion towards perfection through purification of attitudes and relationships. The result of *tazkiyah* is *falāḥ* – prosperity in this world and the hereafter.

In the light of these foundational principles, different elements of the concept of development can be derived. We would submit the following as its essential features:

- (a) The Islamic concept of development has a comprehensive character and includes moral, spiritual and material aspects. Development becomes a goal- and value-oriented activity, devoted to the optimisation of human well-being in all these dimensions. The moral and the material, the economic and the social, the spiritual and the physical are inseparable. It is not merely welfare in this world that is the objective. The welfare that Islam seeks extends to the life hereafter and there is no conflict between the two. This dimension is missing in the contemporary concept of development.
- (b) The focus for developmental effort and the heart of the development process is man. Development, therefore, means development of man and his physical and socio-cultural environment. According to the contemporary concept it is the physical environment – natural and institutional – that provides the real area for developmental activities. Islam insists that the area of operation relates to man, within *and* without.²⁸ As such human attitudes, incentives, tastes and aspirations are as much policy variables as physical resources, capital, labour, education, skill, organisation, etc. Thus, on the one hand, Islam shifts the focus of effort from the physical environment to man in his social setting and on the other enlarges the scope of development policy, with the consequent enlargement of the number of target and instrument variables in any model of the economy. Another consequence of this shift in emphasis would be that maximum participation of the people at all levels of decision-making and plan-implementation would be stipulated.
- (c) Economic development is a multi-dimensional activity,²⁹ more so in an Islamic framework. As efforts would have to be made simultaneously in a number of directions, the methodology of isolating one key factor and almost exclusive concentration on that would be theoretically untenable. Islam seeks to establish a balance between the different factors and forces.
- (d) Economic development involves a number of changes, quantitative as well as qualitative. Involvement with the quantitative, justified and necessary in its own right, has unfortunately led to the neglect

of the qualitative aspects of development in particular and of life in general. Islam would try to rectify this imbalance.

- (e) Among the dynamic principles of social life Islam has particularly emphasised two: First, the optimal utilisation of resources that God has endowed to man and his physical environment, and secondly, their equitable use and distribution and promotion of all human relationships on the basis of Right and Justice. Islam commends the value of *shukr* (thankfulness to God by availing of His blessings) and '*adl* (justice) and condemns the disvalues of *kuf*r (denial of God and His blessings) and *ẓulm* (injustice).

In the light of this analysis the development process is mobilised and activated through *shukr* and '*adl* and is disrupted and distorted by *kuf*r and *ẓulm*.³⁰

This is basically different from the approach of those who look upon production and distribution in either/or relationship with the development process and is a much wider and more dynamic concept than that of the role of production and distribution in development. The developmental effort, in an Islamic framework, is directed towards the development of a God-conscious human being, a balanced personality committed to and capable of acting as the witness of Truth to mankind.

We may, therefore, submit that in an Islamic framework economic development is a goal-oriented and value-realising activity, involving a confident and all-pervading participation of man and directed towards the maximisation of human well-being in all its aspects and building the strength of the *ummah* so as to discharge in the world its role as God's vicegerent on earth and as "the mid-most people". Development would mean moral, spiritual and material development of the individual and society leading to maximum socio-economic welfare and the ultimate good of mankind.

Goals of Development Policy

In the light of this concept we can formulate in some detail the general goals of development policy and the more specific targets for a developmental plan for a Muslim society.

(A) *Human resource development* should be the first objective of our developmental policy. This would include the inculcation of correct attitudes and aspirations, development of character and personality, education and training producing skills needed for different activities, promotion of knowledge and research, and evolution of mechanisms for responsible and creative participation by the common people in key developmental activities, in decision-making at all levels and finally in sharing the fruits of development. This would call for a high priority for the expansion and Islamisation of education and for the general moral orientation of the people and for evolving a new structure of relationships based on co-opera-

tion, co-sharing and co-participation. This would also entail a highly efficient machinery for the mobilisation of human resources and the inculcation of a spirit of self-sacrifice and the individual's maximum contribution towards the achievement of social goals.

(B) *Expansion of useful production.* Continuous and sustained increase in the national produce would be an important objective, but our concern would be on the one hand, with the quantum and efficiency of production, and on the other with the achievement of a correct product-mix. Production would not mean production of anything and everything which may have a demand or which the rich may be able to buy; production would be concerned with things which are useful for man in the light of the value-pattern of Islam and the general experience of mankind. The production of all those things whose use is forbidden in Islam would not be allowed; those whose use is discouraged, their production would be discouraged, and all that is essential and useful would be given priority and encouragement. In the light of this policy, the pattern of production and investment would be moulded according to the priorities of Islam and the needs of the *ummah*. We feel that three priority areas would be:

- (i) Abundant production and supply of food and basic items of necessity (including construction material for building houses and roads and basic raw materials) at reasonably cheap prices.
- (ii) Defence requirements of the Muslim world.
- (iii) Self-sufficiency in the production of basic capital goods.

(C) *Improvement of the quality of life.* Efforts should be made towards improving the real levels of living of *all* people and towards the achievement of their moral, economic and social welfare. This would call for a high priority for at least the following:

- (i) Employment creation, with all its consequent structural, technological, investmental, regional and educational adjustments.
- (ii) An effective and broad-based system of social security, assuring the basic necessities of life for all those who are unable to undertake gainful employment or otherwise deserve society's help and assistance. *Zakāt* should be the nucleus of this system.
- (iii) Equitable distribution of income and wealth. There would be an active income policy directed towards raising the income level of the lowest income groups, reducing the ratio of inequality concentration in society, and leading to a greater diffusion of wealth and power in society in general. A reduction in the extent of income differentials would also be one of the indicators of developmental performance. To serve this purpose the tax system will also have to be reorganised.

(D) *Balanced development*, that is balanced and harmonious development of different regions within a country and of the different sectors of society and the economy. Decentralisation of the economy and proper development of all parts and sectors is not only a demand of justice, but is also essential for maximum progress. This would also remedy economic dualism from which most of the Muslim countries suffer and would lead to greater integration within each country. This is an area in which principles of regional analysis and use of developments in the fields of econometric techniques and input-output analysis can be immensely useful.

(E) *New technology*, that is evolution of indigenous technology, suited to the conditions, needs and aspirations of the Muslim countries. The development process would become self-sustained only when we become not only independent of foreign aid, but when after mastering the technology that has grown in a different economic and cultural environment we are able to internalise the process of technological creativity and begin to produce technology that bears the stamp of our distinctness. This would call for a high priority for research and a new spirit to face the challenges of our times.

(F) *Reduction of national dependency on the outside world and greater integration within the Muslim world*. It is a direct demand of the *ummah's* position as *khalifah* that its dependence upon the non-Muslim world in all essentials must be changed to a state of economic independence, self-respect and gradual building-up of strength and power.³¹ The defence and independence of the Muslim world and the peace and serenity of mankind are objectives that reign prominently in our developmental planning.

If these are to be the objectives of our developmental policy then we will have to make some major changes in the content and methodology of our developmental planning. Some areas where new approaches and new techniques will have to be evolved are as follows:

- (a) We will have to abandon the use of all those simplified aggregative growth models which concentrate on the maximisation of the growth-rate as the sole index of development as basis for planning. The limitations of these models and of exclusive concentration on the growth-rates are being increasingly realised by development economists.³² But we will have to undertake a much more fundamental and thorough re-examination of the entire apparatus of planometrics.³³ Our problem is extensive development of technical capacity to formulate operational plans to achieve our socio-economic objectives and to evolve new techniques through which we may arrive at more realistic decisions in the fields of investment planning, incomes and wages policy, location and regional develop-

ment, reconstruction of tax structure and policy and in the evaluation of developmental performance. The writer feels that in the first phase we may avoid using growth-models for purposes of actual decision-making, although we may continue to experiment with them at a more theoretical level and further intensify our search for more appropriate techniques. In the meanwhile, on an experimental basis, techniques of system analysis and of input-output analysis (with a much widened matrix which may include a number of social inputs and outputs, as is also being suggested by some planners),³⁴ may be tried and further developed. Similarly efforts may be made to develop a series of composite indexes to measure the effects of developmental effort on different social and economic indicators (each given certain weight in the light of its position in our priority matrix), which should include indicators that may reveal aspects of the moral health of the nation (e.g. crime rate, divorce rate, level of corruption, litigation rate in selected areas, participation rate, industrial disputes, etc.). A number of efforts are being made in this direction³⁵ and there is no reason why we cannot give these techniques a more useful and meaningful twist.

- (b) We have to adopt a multi-objective approach to development. Instead of being bogged down in econometric approaches whose usefulness is doubtful, it may be advisable to develop a more problem-oriented approach and evaluate the success of planning and development efforts on the basis of improvements in specific problem areas.
- (c) Given the conditions of international instabilities and exploitation, of internal imperfections and market deformities and the tremendous demands of developmental efforts, it is suggested that the Muslim countries and a number of new social institutions and organisations specially established for specific objectives should play a much more positive role. At the moment governments are ill-equipped to perform this role as are private individuals. But it is easier for a government to remedy its weaknesses and establish institutions which can rectify the situation. Since one of the objectives of policy would be decentralisation, we would submit that local government authorities should be developed with a more powerful base in the local population, with greater participation from the people and with a system of checks and balances and national vigilance and guidance to make them unique agencies for multi-purpose development. Even though comprehensive planning should be resorted to, it would be inadvisable to proceed in that direction without achieving efficient decentralisation of power and control and without reducing the bureaucratisation of society. We believe that small- and medium-scale private enterprise

should be encouraged and developed. Local and regional authorities should not become substitutes for small and medium private enterprise; they should create the proper environment for work and development and undertake all that is needed for purposes of efficient and equitable growth of this type of enterprise. They should, however, undertake the enterprises which call for larger investment and organisation and should act as national-service institutions and not degenerate into profit-making public corporations. Profit should not be the purpose of these agencies. They should be genuine instruments for value-oriented economic development and the distribution of the benefits of development to the people.

- (d) Research and Planning. Another very important area is the organisation of short-period and long-period (more basic) research to think out problems and ways to seek creative solutions, reorganisation and development of statistics, and planned growth of research organisations in areas where they are needed to prepare more realistic plans for the future. We need a new strategy for research to serve the ideological demands of the future.

Notes and Sources

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- 3 See Hershlag, Z. Y., "Growth Models for the Middle East", in Cook, M. A. (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, *op. cit.*, pp. 373–96; Myrdal, Gunnar, *Asian Drama, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, London: Allen Lane, 1968, vol. III, Appendix 3, pp. 1843–2003.
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- 6 See Waardenburg, J. D. J., "Notes on Islam and Development", *Exchange*, (Netherlands), 1973, pp. 3-45; Alfian, "Religion and the Problem of Economic Development in Indonesia", *Indonesia Magazine*, no. 9 (1971), pp. 16-26; Geertz, Clifford "Modernisation in a Muslim Society: The Indonesian Case", in Bellah, Robert N., *Religion and Progress in Modern Asia*, New York: The Free Press, 1965, pp. 93-108; Rodinson, Maxime, *Islam and Capitalism*, London: Allen Lane, 1974. For a recent empirical study evaluating the relationship of religion and economic and social development see Adelman, Irma and Morris, Cynthia Taft, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries*, Stanford University Press, 1973, pp. 38-39. Cf. the views of some Muslim scholars e.g., Rahman, Fazlur, "The Impact of Modernity on Islam" in Jurji, Edward J. (ed.), *Religious Pluralism and World Communications*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969, pp. 248-262; and Arkun, Muhammad, "Islam Facing Development", mimeographed paper circulated at JCM European Conference on East-West Relations (November 1974).
- 7 See Mawdūdī, Abul A'lā, "Islāmī Nizām-i Ma'ishat kē Uṣūl awr Maqāsid" (Principles and Objectives of the Islamic Economic Order) in Mawdūdī: *Ma'āshiyāt-i Islām*, Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1969, pp. 141-164; Siddiqi, M. N., *Some Aspects of the Islamic Economy*, Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1970, (Ch. III: "The Quranic Norm", pp. 27-40); Chapra, M. Umar, *Economic System of Islam*, London: Islamic Cultural Centre, 1970. For a brief but candid review of this aspect of literature on Islamic economics see Siddiqi, M. N., "A Survey of Contemporary Literature on Islamic Economics", mimeographed paper presented to the International Conference on Islamic Economy held at Makka (February 1976), pp. 20-21 and 70-73.
- 8 The *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* Pakistan tried to suggest an alternative strategy in its *Manifesto for the 1970 Elections*. It is brief but succinct and thoughtful. The Economic Programme Committee of the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* Pakistan tried to prepare a more comprehensive statement of Islam's economic strategy. See *Mawjūdah Ma'āshī Buhrān awr Islāmī Hikmat-i Ma'ishat* (The Contemporary Economic Crisis and Islam's Economic Strategy), Lahore: *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* Pakistan, n.d. (1970). A recent doctoral dissertation makes a similar effort in the context of the problems of environmental engineering. See Hussaini, S. Waqar Ahmad, *Principles of Environmental Engineering System Planning in Islamic Culture: Law, Politics, Economics, Education and Sociology of Science and Culture*, presented to Stanford University, California, 1971. See particularly ch. VI. See also Siddiqi, Na'im, "Islām kā Mizānī Nazāriyah-i Ma'ishat" (Islam's Balanced Ideology of Economics) in *Chirāgh-i Rāh: Socialism Number*, Karachi, 1967, pp. 496-525.
- 9 Gunnar Myrdal writes in *Asian Drama*, (op. cit., vol. I, pp. 31-32): "The problem of objectivity in research cannot be solved simply by attempting to eradicate valuations . . . every study of a social problem, however limited in scope, is and must be determined by valuations. A "disinterested" social science has never existed and never will exist. Research like every other rationally pursued activity, must have a direction. The viewpoint and the direction are determined by one's interest in a matter. Valuations enter into the choice of approach, the selection of problems, the definition of concepts, and the gathering of data, and are by no means confined to the practical or political inferences drawn from theoretical findings. The value premises that actually and of necessity determine approaches in the social sciences can be hidden. In fact, most writings, particularly in economics, remain in large part simply ideological . . . Throughout the history of social studies, the hiding of valuations has served to conceal the inquirer's wish to avoid facing real issues" . . . See also Myrdal, G., *Value in Social Theory; A Selection of Essays on Methodology*, London, [c. 1958].
- 10 Myrdal, G., *Asian Drama*, op. cit., p. 33.
- 11 A number of development economists have confessed that development planning

cannot be ideologically neutral and that development economics is a "normative" discipline. Dudley Seers says that development is "inevitably a normative term" (Seers, D. "The Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, December, 1969, p. 2). Galbraith asserts that "Economic development is an intrinsically normative subject" (Galbraith, John K., *The Underdeveloped Country*, Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 1965, p. 20); Lauchlin Currie says that in the field of development "a non-normative approach is especially sterile". (Currie, L. *Obstacles to Development*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1967), p. 45.

- 12 For a more detailed discussion, see Ahmad, Khurshid, *Socialism yā Islām* (Socialism or Islam), Karachi: Chirāgh-i Rāh Publications, 1969.
- 13 See Ahmad, Khurshid, "The Third World's Dilemma of Development", *Non-aligned Third World Annual*, edited by Andrew Carvely, St. Louis, Missouri: Books International, 1970, pp. 3-18. See also Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, *op. cit.*, particularly vol. I, pp. 5-35, vol. II, pp. 709-955, vol. III, pp. 1843-2003. See also Viner, Jacob, "The Economics of Development", in Agarwala and Singh, *The Economics of Underdevelopment*, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1958; Kuznets, Simon, "Underdeveloped Countries and the Pre-Industrial Phase in the Advanced Countries", in Agarwala and Singh, *ibid.*, pp. 135-153; Welch, Claude E., "The Challenge of Change: Japan and Africa", in Spiro, Herbert, J., *Patterns of African Development: Five Comparisons*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1967, pp. 63-90.
- 14 "Post-Keynsian capitalist growth theory for the mature economy generically has insisted in placing capital accumulation at centre stage and focussing on the resultant secular increases in labour productivity. It has consistently emphasised the twin conditions governing such increases; the willingness of a society to refrain from consumption and the fact that the investment into which savings may be channelled will result in increased productive capacity along with increased flows of income. In the language of the Harrod-Domar tradition, it is the propensity to save and the marginal capital output ratio which determine the growth rate. One hardly needs to be reminded that the body of contemporary capitalist growth theory consists of a series of extensions and modifications of this basic Harrod-Domar relationship." Gustav Ranis, "Theories of Economic Growth in Capitalist Countries", *Problems in Economic Development*, ed. E. A. G. Robinson, London: Macmillan, 1965, p. 4. For a brief but precise review of contemporary growth theory see Ranis, *loc. cit.*; also idem, "Economic Growth: Theory", *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*, vol. IV, London: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 408-17; Hahn and Matthews, "Theories of Economic Growth: A Survey", *Surveys of Economic Theory*, vol. II, London: Macmillan, 1965; Kregel, J. A., *The Theory of Economic Growth*, London: Macmillan, 1972.
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- 19 See Martin, Kurt and Knapp, John, (eds.), *The Teaching of Development Economics*, Chicago: Aldine, 1967, Part IA and Part IIA; Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, op. cit.; Streeton, Paul, *The Frontiers of Development Studies*, London: Macmillan, 1973. Schumacher, E. F., *Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered*, London: Blond Briggs, 1973.
- 20 See Baur, P. T., *Dissent on Development*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971; Seers, Dudley, "The Limitations of the Special Case", in Martin and Knapp, op. cit.
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- 24 For a more detailed discussion of this issue by this writer see "The Third World's Dilemma of Development", *Non-aligned Third World Annual*, St. Louis: Books International of DHTE International Inc., 1970, pp. 3-18. For a recent brief but succinct statement: see Adelman, Irma, "On the State of Development Economics", *Journal of Development Economics*, 1974, pp. 3-5.
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- 27 See this writer's *Islam and the Contemporary Economic Challenge*, mimeographed paper presented to the International Youth Seminar, Riyadh, December, 1973.
- 28 "God does not change the condition of a people unless they first change that which is in themselves" (The Qur'an, 13: 11).
- 29 This is being increasingly realised by development economists. One of the lessons, insists Max F. Millikan, we must learn from the developmental experiences of mankind is to see development "as a systematic interaction of a large number of elements". See Millikan, Max F., "A Strategy of Development", in U.N., *The Case for Development*, New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1973, p. 25.
- 30 The Qur'an says: "It is God who has created the heaven and the earth. He sends down rain from the skies, and with it brings out fruits to feed you. It is He who has made the ships subject to you, that you may sail through the sea by His command. He has also harnessed the rivers for you. And also the sun and the moon, both diligently pursuing their courses. He has subdued for you the day and the night and has given you of all that you ask for. If you try to count God's favours to

you, you would never be able to count them all. But man is given up to injustice and ingratitude" (14: 33-34). In the context of this divine policy for human sustenance and development, it is very important to say *inna al-insāna la-ẓalūmun kaḥḥār*. This refers to things that disrupt and destroy the process of human development. Reference as to the disvalues of ingratitude, i.e. non-utilisation of what God has given, and injustice, i.e. their misuse in the social sense, see al-Ṣadr, M. Bāqar, *Iqtisādunā*, (Beirut, 1968).

- 31 See the Qur'ānic injunction: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies of God and your enemies and others besides whom you may not know" (8:61).
- 32 See U.N., *The Case for Development*, *op. cit.*, particularly chs. 1 to 3. A joint study by the World Bank Research Centre and the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, *Redistribution with Growth* (Hollis Chenery, Montex Ahluwalia, C. Bell, John Dulcy and Richard Jolly) London: Oxford University Press, 1974, breathes some fresh air into the debate although the canvas still remains very limited.
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The Muslim Minorities

M. Ali Kettani

NUMERICALLY speaking, the Muslim minorities form a significant proportion of the total Muslim population of the world – a proportion perhaps greater than is generally recognised. These Muslim minorities, totalling about a third of the Muslim *ummah* or about 270 million Muslims, are the cumulative result of emigration of Muslims, the conquest of Muslim territories by non-Muslim powers, and the conversion of elements from the local population. Their situation differs from country to country, and so do their problems and prospects. Nevertheless, the basic problem which confronts them all is how to ensure their survival as a distinct religious community, a community committed to the ideals of Islam. This paper attempts to make a general survey of how the Muslim minorities came into being, the problems and challenges which they face and the prospects that the future holds for them.

I

In order to achieve clarity in our discussion it seems necessary to have an operational definition of the terms “Muslim” and “minority” at the very outset. I have used the word “Muslim” to denote any person who affirms Muḥammad (peace be on him) to be the last messenger of God and holds his teachings to be true, irrespective of the extent to which he is able to live up to the ideals of Islam. In other words, I consider a person “socially” Muslim as long as he feels to be part of the overall Muslim *ummah*, wherever he might be. There is no other possible definition of Muslims in a study dealing with Muslim minorities, especially in view of the extremely severe conditions which have confronted these Muslims in the past and are confronting them now. As for the expression “Muslim minority”, it signifies a group of Muslims living in a political entity in a state of numerical inferiority in comparison to the non-Muslims. However, it is difficult to be rigidly consistent in the use of this expression, since there are cases in which a Muslim community might be numerically inferior but superior politically or socially. In such a case, the group cannot be considered a minority. This would apply, for instance, to the Muslims in Mughul India. On the other hand, a Muslim community might be numerically superior to the non-Muslims but might be relegated to a position of insignificance and

ineffectiveness by the more powerful non-Muslims. In this case, the Muslims should be considered to be a minority. This was the case of the Muslims of Sicily when it was invaded by the Normans in 1061, and is the case in Ethiopia and Tanzania today. In a way Lebanon might also be included in this category. Therefore, the numerical strength of a Muslim community is not always a decisive factor. Thus the Muslims of India under the Mughul emperors were not a minority, whereas the Muslims of Ethiopia are.

II

Speaking historically, Islam itself began as a minority, a minority of one person, namely that of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him). But the quality of that God-chosen man made that minority grow despite all persecutions. It eventually became a majority in Arabia before the death of Muḥammad (peace be on him) in a span of time shorter than a quarter of a century.

Islam discourages a Muslim to acquiesce wilfully to a state of minority if he cannot exercise his right to worship the One True God. In this case the Muslim is required to emigrate to a more propitious land, with the intention of returning to his original homeland and securing his right to live according to his religion. Emigrating for the protection of one's belief is an act of religious merit; in some cases it is even a religious duty. Such a man is a *muhājir*, but not a refugee. He is required to work hard to prepare for his return, and the Muslim community at large is required to help such *muhājirs* even if there might be no other way for them to return except by force. This was the case of the first Muslim wave of emigrants from Makka to Abyssinia during the Prophet's lifetime. This was the case in a more drastic way of the emigration of the Holy Prophet Muḥammad (peace be on him) from Makka to Madina with the entire Muslim community. So important was this event for the Muslims that it became the starting point of the Muslim calendar. The Prophet (peace be on him) returned to Makka with the Muslims when they were able to fight their way back to their homeland. Therefore, when the right of a Muslim to practise his faith is denied by any power, he must either fight back in self-defence, and become a *mujāhid*, or if he cannot fight or fails in this fight, he should emigrate and become a *muhājir*. If he can do neither, he should keep his faith, even secretly if he has to, and try his best to pass it on at least to his descendants.

A Muslim may also emigrate either in search of knowledge or for material benefits, etc., as long as his faith is not endangered. In this case he should try to present the living example of a good Muslim by his actual conduct and should also be the carrier of the message of Islam to the people around him.

III

The first Muslim minorities came into being as a result of the Muslim merchants settling down in foreign port-towns for commerce. In the beginning these merchants were ambassadors of a strong state and carried all the prestige that it implied. These were the first Muslim communities of the coasts of India, Ceylon, China, East Africa, the Indonesian and Philippines archipelago and the islands of the Indian Ocean. In the course of time these merchants married local women and the second and third generations became a part of the land. Often local populations were converted to the new faith, giving numerical strength to the Muslim community. In several areas these conversions went on on such a large scale that what appeared in the beginning as insignificant minorities became in the course of time, fully-fledged majorities, as in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia.

The Muslim state expanded dramatically after the death of Muḥammad (peace be on him). For over a century the Muslims remained organised as one political entity, but later this broke into several fragments. Despite political fragmentation, the Muslims were held together by a common religious outlook, a common standard of moral evaluation and a common legal system. Moreover, their religious idealism provided them with the impetus to develop one of the greatest civilisations of human history so that for many centuries they remained the leaders of all mankind in all spheres of life. But the success of no nation abides for ever, and eventually their civilisation was also subjected to decline. This manifested itself in the shrinking of the Muslim states and the conquest of Muslim territories by non-Muslims. The result was that many Muslim majorities were brought under non-Muslim powers. The development usually takes the following pattern. First a community is reduced to ineffectiveness despite its numerical majority because of non-Muslim occupation; and when the occupation lasts long enough, the majority is transformed into a numerical minority because of large-scale expulsion of Muslims, immigration of non-Muslims, and low rates of natural increase among Muslims owing to abnormally difficult conditions. In this category fall the minorities of the Soviet Union, occupied Palestine, and to a certain extent Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia.

There is another type of Muslim minority which is slightly different from the one mentioned above. This is the case when Muslim rule in a land did not last long enough, or the efforts to propagate Islam were not vigorous enough to transform the Muslims into a numerical majority. As soon as their political power collapses, the Muslims find themselves reduced to the status of a minority in their own country. This applies in the case of India and the Balkans.

The future of a Muslim minority depends on two factors. First of all, it depends on the quality of the founding fathers of that community in terms

of their attachment to Islam, their enthusiasm and capacity to propagate it, their social influence, etc. In the second place, it depends on the conditions under which they have to live. It is perhaps not enough for the Muslims constituting a minority to be just "good" Muslims, in the narrow sense of the term, to ensure the survival of the community. If those Muslims do not have the means and the desire to propagate their religion to the forthcoming generations, the community is likely to stagnate, then dissipate and ultimately disappear altogether.

Maintenance of ties with the main body of Islam (*dār al-Islām*) is a very potent factor to counteract these developments. Historically speaking, the *Hajj* has played a major role in the maintenance of these ties and in nourishing among the Muslims all over the world a sense of mutual belonging, let alone strengthening and activating their faith in Islam. In addition to that, education of the Muslim children, both religious and cultural (i.e. Arabic, Muslim history, geography of Muslim lands, etc.) should be the first priority of the Muslim community.

Another problem should be considered and this is the internal unity of the Muslim minority communities. The minority community is already handicapped by its minority status. Its condition is bound to become hopeless if it is further divided along national or sectarian lines. The Muslims living in lands outside *dār al-Islām* should, even more than those living within it, consider themselves Muslims first and before anything else, and unite their efforts to safeguard their patrimony. The doors of their community and of the organisations which it sets up should be open to all Muslims irrespective of their geographical and sectarian affiliations.

A Muslim community might move from mere defensive concerns when it will try to spread the message of Islam outside the community. If successful, the community is likely to become a majority community in the course of time.

The fact that Islam has no clergy should not be misleading. Islam is a way of life as well as a religion. When Muslims find themselves outside *dār al-Islām*, it becomes their duty to organise themselves in order to be able to safeguard as much as possible of this way of life. Most Muslim minorities have done this by electing their own *qā'id*s and nominating their own *qāḍi*s.

In general, a Muslim minority declines when it is deserted by its *élite*. This sets in motion a vicious circle from which it is extremely difficult for the community to escape. Most often the *élite* deserts by emigration to *dār al-Islām*. Sometimes it jeopardises the future of Islam by the adoption of a non-Muslim culture. When either occurs, the community becomes unable to face the changed circumstances in such a way as to retain the former hegemony of Islam in their lives. This in turn leads to a continuous erosion of its organisation with the result that the Muslim community becomes more and more confined to people who lack influence and social status.

Eventually, the community would start to absorb un-Islamic traits that would influence its sense of Islamic identity. In the end, mixed marriages would increase dramatically and instead of being a means of enhancing the growth of the Muslim community, would help to reduce its numbers. The cases of wilful conversion to other religions, however, are usually rare. Such a community would disappear in the course of time, if not helped effectively by *dār al-Islām*. Contra-distinguished from such a minority is a successful Muslim minority. Its members remain as close as possible to the Muslim ideal and remain concerned with spreading their faith. Such a community grows constantly and eventually becomes a majority.

Let us now consider closely several Muslim minorities around the world, examining how they came into being and how they are faring.

IV

Muslim Minorities in Europe

I start with the European continent since it is the one in which there existed some of the most outstanding Muslim communities: Spain and Sicily. These were followed later by the Balkans, and in present times Muslim communities have sprung up due to the emigration of labourers all over the continent. Excluding the Soviet Union, there are no less than sixteen million Muslims in Europe today.

Christianity, in its Western European version, has been the chief persecutor of Muslim minorities. This is due to the inherent difference in attitude between Islam and Christianity towards proselytism. Islam likes people to come to it of their own free will. The Qur'ān categorically states: "There is no compulsion in religion" (II: 256). Hence, Islam spreads slowly, but having been spread as a result of genuine change of conviction, it endures. There are very few instances of forced conversion by Muslims and whenever these occurred they were frowned upon, even strongly opposed by the Muslim '*ulamā*'. In European Christianity, the outlook has been different. People have been expected to follow the religion of their rulers. If they resisted, they were converted forcibly. The only exception has been the attitude of Christianity towards Judaism because of the historical link between the two religions. The Jews, in spite of all forms of discrimination, were tolerated to survive as a group all over Europe except in Christian Spain. The Muslims were given no such chance. The following examples are revealing.

a. Al-Andalus¹

Before the arrival of the Muslims, the Iberian peninsula was overrun by German overlords, the descendants of the Vandal invaders. They persecuted the local population to the extreme. After a call for help by the Iberians, Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr, the Arab Muslim general of the North African

armies sent his lieutenant, the Berber Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād at the head of an army of 30,000 people, made up mostly of Muslim Berbers. The liberation of the peninsula was accomplished quite speedily, between the years 711–713 C.E.

The territory opened up for Islam included the whole of the present-day Portugal and Spain, as well as the south-eastern corner of France. It did not include, however, the extreme north-western strip of Iberia. These territories were organised as a sub-province and placed administratively under the province of Maghrib which had its capital at Qayrawān (in Tunisia today). A small stream of Muslim immigrants kept moving to al-Andalus and a much bigger population movement came from Northern Morocco. But most of the strength of Islam was in the conversion *en masse* of the Iberian population.

When ‘Abd al-Raḥmān I (al-Dākhil), the Umayyad prince came to al-Andalus, the Muslim population constituted already a sizable percentage of the population of the peninsula. The year was 756 C.E. (six years after the fall of the Umayyads of Damascus). ‘Abd al-Raḥmān founded the Umayyad state of the west, and with it al-Andalus became an independent Muslim state with its capital at Qurṭubah (Cordoba). During the Umayyad era, the Muslim population became an overwhelming majority in the peninsula, and al-Andalus reached the highest levels of sophistication and civilisation in the world. The Christians became a tiny minority which gradually lost a great many of its cultural characteristics and became thoroughly arabised, even in name. But they have always remained a fifth column in the Muslim state, ready to strike as soon as the opportunity arose. Most of the Christian resistance was organised in the mountainous territories of the North-West which had been overlooked by the Muslims.

The Umayyad state reached its height of power and influence under ‘Abd al-Raḥmān III (al-Nāṣir) during his long reign 912–961 C.E. However, the dynasty lost much of its hold during the regency of al-Manṣūr ibn Abī ‘Āmir over the grandson of al-Nāṣir. Al-Manṣūr was himself a great statesman and an able soldier. He once again united the Iberian peninsula under Islam, but he committed a terrible mistake which eventually did great harm to the future of al-Andalus. He destroyed the Umayyad dynasty without bringing anything to replace it. After his death the collapse seemed to be complete, and for all practical purposes Islam would have been finished in al-Andalus if it were not for the holding intervention of the Moroccans. The Muslims of al-Andalus were deeply divided along racial lines: the Arabs, the Berbers, the Iberian Muslims forming the mass of the population, and the Sicilian Muslims forming the officer corps. Because of these divisions, when the Umayyad dynasty collapsed, al-Andalus lost its unity and became divided into a multitude of small petty states organised along racial lines: these were the (*Ṭā’ifah*) kingdoms. It became, therefore, easy for the Christian reconquest to proceed at a fast rate at

the expense of these tiny states. When the Christians swept over the Muslim territories, Andalusians were quick to call for help from the growing al-Murābiṭ (Almoravid) power of Morocco. The great Murābiṭ Amīr Yūsuf ibn Tāshfin checked the Christian advance at his memorable victory of Zallāqah in 1086 C.E. He united what was left of al-Andalus to North Africa. The same scenario was repeated by the Moroccan Muwaḥḥidūn (Almohades) 59 years later.

The Muwaḥḥid power collapsed in 1212 C.E. at the battle of al-'Uqāb (Las Navas de Tolosa) where they were defeated by the Christians. The Marinids intervened again from Morocco, but the Muslims of al-Andalus were then a spent force. Most of the Muslim territories were taken by the Christians including the great metropolises of Ishbiliyah (Seville) and Qurṭabah (Cordoba). The Muslim power survived only in a small territory in the south eastern corner of Iberia until 1492 C.E. when Gharnāṭah (Granada) fell to the enemy after heroic resistance. No help came from the Muslims abroad this time, whereas the whole of Christian Europe was helping the Castilians.

Up until 1492 C.E. there remained large Muslim communities in the territories annexed by the Christians. These were called al-Mudajjanīn (the tamed ones!). They lived as Muslims for centuries. They were tolerated as quasi-slaves. They were subjected to continuous pressure, similar to the one exerted today by the Jews in Palestine. Slowly they started losing their majority, first by a continuous stream of Muslim emigration to territories left in Muslim hands, then by continuous colonisation of the conquered Muslim lands by the Christians coming from Galicia in North-Western Spain and from Southern France.

This policy of continuous annexation and persecution was changed after the fall of their last stronghold, Gharnāṭah (Granada). By the turn of the sixteenth century (1502 for Gharnāṭah and 1525 for Balarsiyah) Muslims were forcibly converted to Christianity in Spain. This act opened an era of Muslim heroism, unparalleled in Muslim history. For about 120 years, the Muslims of Spain fought to keep their faith against extremely heavy odds. These baptised Muslims, called Moriscos by the Spaniards, were subjected to the Spanish Inquisition. They were ceremoniously burnt alive at the stake or tortured as soon as they were discovered to be Muslims. They fought hard, sometimes militarily as they did in 1568-71 in the al-Busharat mountains south of Gharnāṭah under their leader Muḥammad ibn Ummayyah, who had been baptised by the Christians under the name of Fernando de Valor, and finally they succeeded in winning the right to emigrate to the Muslim lands of North Africa. By a royal decree of 22nd September, 1609, they were expelled from their beloved land with barely the clothes on their bodies and under inhuman conditions. The exodus lasted for five years². But they were happy, happy to be free in the land of Islam. Their numbers amounted to somewhere between 600,000 and

2,000,000 people in a country that at that time had no more than 8,000,000 people. To this day, Spain is empty without them. In a land where Muslim presence lasted more than 900 years (711–1614), one no longer hears the call to prayer. Nevertheless, al-Andalus is very much alive in the heart of every Muslim, particularly every Muslim of North Africa.

b. Sicily³

In 827, Euphemius the Sicilian leader, who liberated the island from the Byzantines, asked the Muslim Aghlabids for help against further Byzantine aggression. Palermo, renamed by the Muslims as al-Madīnah, was thus liberated in 831 C.E. and became the centre of Muslim expansion in the island. By 902 the entire island of Sicily lay in Muslim hands.

The history of Ṣaqqaliyah (Muslim Sicily) is similar in every respect to that of al-Andalus. It remained part of the Aghlabid dominions up to 909, when it passed under the Fātimids. Sicily became an independent Muslim state by 950 under the Kalbid dynasty. When the dynasty collapsed, the Island was divided into a multitude of petty kingdoms similar to the (*Tāi'fah*) states of al-Andalus. This made the island an easy prey to the Christian invaders. This time, the invasion was Norman and was blessed by Pope Nicholas II. The Norman Roger I took advantage of the division of the Muslims and landed near Messina which he took in 1061. Palermo was conquered in 1072, and by 1091 the entire island was in Norman hands.

Thus the Muslim power in Sicily lasted for 260 years. During this period, however, the majority of the Sicilians had turned into Arab Muslims so that when the Normans landed in Sicily they found Muslims to be the majority of the population. These Muslims were subjected to continuous persecution. The Muslims of the cities, especially Palermo, were slightly free for some time, but those of the countryside were reduced *en masse* to the status of quasi-slaves. Muslim scholars emerged in Palermo even under the Normans, the most famous being al-Idrīsī, the famous Muslim geographer.

However, there was continuous depletion among the Muslims through emigration of their leaders to Muslim territories and forced conversion. The Normans brought colonists from the Italian mainland. This explains the fact that Sicily, which was Greek Orthodox in terms of both language and religion before it became Arab Muslim, is now Roman Catholic by religion and Italian by language.

When the Andalusian traveller Ibn Jubayr visited the Northern shores of the island in 1185 C.E., ninety-four years after the Muslims had lost their last stronghold, entire areas still had Muslims in the majority. Palermo, the capital, was still practically a Muslim city, and only Messina had lost most of its Muslim population.

The situation of these Muslims as described by Ibn Jubayr was horrible.

It was nevertheless considered tolerable by European standards, since the Muslims were not forcibly converted *en masse* to Christianity. Their situation is summarised by Ibn Jubayr⁴ in the following words:

The Muslim people of this island suffer, amongst other tribulations, one that is very sore. Should a man show anger to his son or his wife, or a woman to her daughter, the one who is the object of displeasure may perversely throw himself into a church, and there be baptised and turn Christian. . . . The Muslims of Sicily, therefore, are most watchful of the management of their family, and their children, in case this should happen. The most clear-sighted of them fear that it shall chance to them all as it did in earlier times to the Muslim inhabitants of Crete. There a Christian despotism so long visited them with one painful circumstance after the other that they were all constrained to turn Christian. . . .⁵

And indeed this did happen to pass a few generations after the visit of Ibn Jubayr and today the only Muslims in Sicily are a few thousand Tunisian workers. North Africa has been the inheritor of their civilisation, and one of the most prestigious families of Morocco bear to this day the eponym al-Ṣaqallī. They had taken refuge in Sicily because of the persecution of the descendants of the Holy Prophet (peace be on him) in the Muslim East and trace their lineage to Ḥusayn, son of 'Alī (*raḍīa Allāh 'anhumā*).

c. The Balkans⁶

The Balkans were inhabited by Illyrian tribes since time immemorial. These were invaded by Rome during the second century C.E. and then by Constantinople in 395 C.E. In the seventh century Slavic tribes invaded the area from the east; these were followed centuries later by Asiatic tribes such as the Magyars and the Bulgars. The impact of these invasions remains to this day; only the Albanians are considered to be the descendants of the Illyrians, the original inhabitants of the land.

Religiously speaking, all the invading tribes followed polytheistic religions. They became a fertile ground for Christian proselytism. However, Christianity was divided between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, and the tribes formed themselves into feuding kingdoms. The Croats and the Magyars were Catholic, the Serbs and the Bulgars were Greek Orthodox. Islamic ideas spread much earlier than the arrival of the Ottoman armies. They were embodied in the Bogomilist revolution which has been called "heresy" by the Christians. Bogomilists rejected the divinity of Jesus, the worship of images, baptism, the ornamentation of churches, etc. This led to their persecution. When a Catholic king put a decree of forcible conversion to Catholicism of all Bogomilists, they asked for help from the Ottoman Muslims in 1463. At that time the Ottomans were the rising

Muslim power of the area. They won a decisive victory at Gallipoli in 1354 C.E. and in 1371 they defeated a Christian coalition of Serbia, Bulgaria and Byzantium. After a second defeat of the Serbian armies in 1389 at the hands of the Ottomans, all the Balkans became open to the Muslims. Bogomilist territories of Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Albania were, however, not molested. When the Bogomilists cried for help, Muḥammad al-Fātiḥ (*rahimahu Allāh*) complied and granted freedom of worship to all.

It was then that a process of continuous and accelerated conversion to Islam started among Bogomilists, among which there were many pockets of Muslim converts already. Eventually, all of the Bogomilists became Muslims. Many of these Muslims lost their language in favour of Turkish, but the majority kept their distinctive heritage: such as the Bosnians, the Albanians, and the Bulgarian Pomaks. After about two centuries of Muslim presence three areas of the Balkans came to have a Muslim majority: Bosnia and Hercegovina (in Yugoslavia today), Albania and Thrace. Large Muslim minorities were thriving in Bulgaria and Greece mostly through conversion to Islam but also through immigration, not only from Turkey but also from Spain. Most of what is presently known as Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Greece and Albania was by the end of the fifteenth century in Muslim hands. The Muslims lost all these territories during the nineteenth century, with the exception of eastern Thrace. The Muslims found themselves to have been reduced to the position of a minority in the new political entities (with the exception of Albania) and automatically became subjected to more or less open persecution. Their percentage with respect to the overall population was reduced because of the emigration of Muslims and immigration of Christians. The Christian persecution has been followed after World War II by the Communist one which it resembles in every detail.

Today the Muslim minorities of Greece, Romania and Hungary are fast disappearing. Those of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are holding their own both numerically and Islamically, in spite of persecution. The Bulgarian Muslims were forced in 1972 to drop their Muslim names for Christian ones. Yugoslav Muslims are faring much better nowadays. Percentage-wise, the Muslims increased from 11.2% in 1931 to 17% in 1972 in Yugoslavia (3,500,000 Muslims) and from 13.3% in 1949 to 17% in 1971 in Bulgaria (1,450,000 Muslims). The status of the Muslim communities is rather critical. Their situation, especially in Bulgaria and with the exception of Yugoslavia, seems similar to that described by Ibn Jubayr in regard to the Sicilian Muslims.

d. Western Europe

We are witnessing at present the growth of new Muslim minorities of a different type in Western Europe. This comprises emigrant workers from almost all over the Muslim world.

The growth of colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries put most of *dār al-Islām* in the hands of the Western European powers. The days of Muslim hegemony were gone, and the entire Muslim *ummah* became a kind of minority! This minority saw its cultural traits being assaulted, and yet was unable for some time to defend itself because of its severe deviation from the Islamic ideals. To break up the universal Islamic allegiance, the West introduced the new concept of nationalism, and a deliberate effort was made to revive and glorify the pre-Islamic past of the different Muslim countries. In this way, the different Christian powers of Europe were able to exploit Muslim territories for raw materials, and use the Muslim labour for their own benefit, not only in industry but also for military purposes to gain more Muslim lands.

Liberation movements caught up, however, in the twentieth century; they were motivated wholly or partly by Islam. Eventually, most of the Muslim countries of Asia and Africa won their political freedom and became more or less part of a liberated *dār al-Islām*. However, the old colonial pattern did not change with this emancipation. Muslim countries kept selling raw materials and buying manufactured goods, and the exchange patterns of trade remained the same as in the days of colonial rule. The different Muslim entities could not introduce any change in this sad state of affairs because they found themselves completely sealed off from other Muslim neighbours. There is no more free movement of goods and people between Muslim lands. This indeed is the first true disintegration of *dār al-Islām*.

Meanwhile, European economic growth continued, and a point was reached where the manpower of Europe was not enough to run its economy. Europe turned once more to *dār al-Islām* to import not only raw materials, but labour as well. *Dār al-Islām* today finds itself as a whole in the pathetic situation of exporting raw materials, manpower, brain-power and funds, while it is crying for the need to overcome under-development.

The recent emigration to Western Europe has all the characteristics of a temporary one and all the similarities of modern slavery. Most often the immigrants take up the jobs which the Europeans do not want any more. They are denied most of their human rights. In general, they lack Islamic organisation. They are often unable to bring their children and families, and when they do, they are subjected to a terrible pressure of assimilation. They have few mosques, very few Islamic schools, and unless something drastic is done by the countries of their origin and themselves, these minorities might not be able to maintain their Islamic entity.

Numerically, however, these minorities are impressive: about 700,000 in Britain, around 1,500,000 in Germany and 2,000,000 in France in 1973, with hundreds of thousands of Muslims in other countries of Western Europe. Their number could be estimated to be as high as 5,000,000 Muslims for the countries of the Common Market. Politically, their influence

is negligible. Muslims around the world should seriously tackle this problem. Lately, these Muslims of Western Europe have begun to organise themselves. Islamic centres have sprung up in several Western European metropolises. An Islamic Council for Europe was founded in 1973, raising hopes for a better future.

V

Muslim Minorities in Asia

Asia was traditionally the land of Muslim strength. It is the homeland of Muslim peoples whose name itself in the course of history became identified with Islam: the Arabs, the Persians, the Turks and the Malays. But Islamisation of two great peoples remained incomplete; these are the Chinese and the Indians.

Traditionally, Asian Muslim minorities never knew the type of persecution to which their brethren were subjected in Europe. When this happened, it was temporary as during the Ching dynasty in China; or it was Christian-European inspired such as the Russian orthodox persecution in Central Asia which was inherited by the communists of Russia (and later spread to China as well); the British Protestant persecution in India later inherited by the Hindus; the Spanish Catholic persecution of the Muslims of the Philippines, which was inherited by their present-day converts. Let us now consider each area separately in some detail.

a. Central Asia⁷

Central Asia had become a Muslim majority area during the first centuries of the 'Abbâsid dynasty. Transoxania became the heartland of Muslim learning and Arabic studies. This pre-eminence was stopped temporarily during the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, but was revived in the later centuries under the Timurids of Samarqand. Central Asia was not only the land of Muslim majority; it was also the centre of Islamic expansion in Eastern Europe and India.

The carriers of Islam in the later centuries were the Turks who joined Islam tribe after tribe with great enthusiasm until they all became Muslims by the end of the eighteenth century, with the exception of some small elements on the fringe of the Turkish land.

The Muslim power in Siberia and Eastern Russia already showed signs of weakness at the turn of the sixteenth century. From then on the expansion of the Russian state was continuously at the expense of the Muslim territories. The first Muslims who fell into a status of minority to the Russians were the Tatar Muslims of Kazan, when the Russian Ivan stormed Kazan and conquered it in 1552. After the fall of Kazan the Muslims who came under the Russians were subjected to a persecution comparable only to the Spanish Inquisition. The attempt to convert them

forcibly to Christianity failed, however, and they came back to Islam after many years of apparent profession of Christianity. They are Muslims to this day.

After Kazan, the Muslim lands fell one after the other into Russian hands: Crimea (1783), Kirghizia (eighteenth century), Caucasia (early nineteenth century) and finally Transoxania (*Māwarā' al-nahr*) with its Islamic centres of Bukhārā and Samarqand (1847–81).

By the turn of the present century, these Muslim territories witnessed an unprecedented Islamic revival which centred, of all places, in Kazan itself, the first Muslim city to have fallen to the Russians. This was cut short by the Communist revolution which continued where the Czars left off. Persecution of Islam is continuing to this day.

Just before the October 1917 Revolution, the Communists praised the Muslims and Islam and promised the Muslim population freedom from the Czarist yoke. When after 1917 the Muslims discovered that they had been betrayed, they rebelled against the new Communist colonialism: in Bashkiria; in Crimea under the leadership of Shalabi; and in Bukhārā under the leadership of its Emir Sa'īd 'Ālim. These revolutions were put down mercilessly, and hundreds of thousands of Muslims were slaughtered between 1917 and 1921. In 1926, the Communists decided to enforce an "agricultural reform" in Kazakhstan by nationalising the entire herds of the nomads. One million Muslims died of starvation as a result.

When the revolts of the Muslims failed, a Tatar Emir Sayyid Sultan Ali Uglu (called by the Russians, Sultan Galiev) came out with an original idea. He proposed to Stalin the creation of a Muslim state federated with the Russian state. He was hanged in 1937 for his boldness as an "enemy of the people" (may God have mercy on him).

The Communist regime followed a policy of cultural suppression of the Muslims. Their languages have been broken up into a multitude of dialects. Arabic, which was an official language among some populations, as in Daghestan, has been eliminated. Arabic script was replaced, first by Roman script, then by Cyrillic script. It is interesting to note that the Communist "reformers" did not consider it necessary to change the peculiar Armenian and Georgian scripts. The history of all the Muslim peoples has been subjected to a thorough distortion to fit the Noble-Serf or class system of the defunct Christian Orthodox Russian establishment. Worse, freedom has been granted to the state and its functionaries to attack Islam, whereas the Muslims have no right to refute these propagandist attacks and defend Islam. Needless to say mosques have been closed. Some have, however, been reopened lately. Islamic schools are all but non-existent. Some form of Islamic organisation under the control of the Communist State has been tolerated to exist.

The Russians (Christians and Communists) practised toward Muslims the same policy which was followed by the Castilians in al-Andalus, the

Normans in Sicily, and the Jews in Palestine. They brought a flow of Russian immigrants to the Muslim countries, and often converted the Muslims forcibly before 1917 to Christianity, and after 1917 to Communism. When they failed they forcibly evicted them from their homeland. Today the Muslims are no more in Crimea and they are a minority in the biggest of their states, Kazakhstan. It is estimated that more than six million Russians have been settled in Muslim territories since 1939, quite obviously with a view to rendering the Muslims ineffective.

Numerically, however, the Muslim population under the Russians is quite impressive. They numbered in 1971 about 36,000,000 people and their percentage increased from 11.3% in 1939 to 13.6% of the total population of the Soviet Union in 1971. Lately they have evinced signs of Islamic revival. Their future seems to be promising despite the hostile policy of the Soviet government since they have weathered the fiercest storms and have established their capacity to survive.

b. India

Islam in India has been present since the Umayyad period, and a considerable part of India has been under Muslim rule most of the time. It is, therefore, not easy to understand how the Muslims remained in numerical minority up to this day.

When the British took over India, the Muslims lost more and more of their influence until it declined to a level much below their numerical strength. The loss of power and influence for the Muslims in the areas under the Mughul emperor came as a sudden shock when the revolution of 1857 was brutally suppressed and the British government formally seized control of almost the entire subcontinent and pursued a conscious policy of reducing the Muslims to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water. The same policy was being actively pursued earlier by the British in the areas which were under the control of the British East India Company.

When the British were about to leave, it appeared that under the future regime which would be based on a "one man, one vote" principle, the Muslims would be left at the mercy of a Hindu majority which was bent on obliterating their language, culture and religion. The Muslims understandably looked at the future with fear and suspicion. They finally came up with the idea of forming an Islamic state – Pakistan – in areas where they were in a majority. This area was kept by the British to a minimum.

On the other hand, the establishment of Pakistan left the Muslims of India in an even weaker position. Percentage-wise they are no more than 12% of the total population and they are subjected to a pressure they have never known before. Altogether they form a tenth of the Muslim body (about eighty million), yet their survival is at stake and gigantic efforts are required to ensure it. The Muslims in India are subjected to a continuous erosion of their positions in all fields. Politically they have been contin-

ually eliminated from most positions of decision-making; worse, they have been continuously eliminated from public functions, their percentages in the different ministries of the nation is becoming tragically small (often a mere 1%). Their language, Urdu (written in Arabic script), is being systematically destroyed in favour of a hinduised language, Hindi. In the name of a secularism which barely covers Hindu fanaticism, Muslim institutions are being weakened, sometimes utterly eliminated. The case of the Muslim University of Aligarh is just an example. The Muslims are being kept continually in a state of insecurity of their lives and property because of large-scale killings which take place from time to time and are encouraged by criminal parties which are allowed to take part in the so-called democratic process.

In spite of all that, the Muslims of India have managed to keep increasing in number and percentage. They remain an active part of the Muslim *ummah*. It is remarkable that Islam has been able to become an indigenous religion in the teeth of the worst kinds of fanaticism and bigotry. Thus, Islam holds out a great promise to purge the Indian society, which is suffering from injustice and inequality as few other societies of the world are, of some of its most deeply-rooted ailments. At present, Islam is passing in that country through a phase of test and trial, but its potential is gigantic and its mission indeed remains to be completed. The fact that among the Indian Muslims are found some of the most outstanding leaders of Islamic thought and some of the most active Islamic movements reinforces one's optimism about their future.

c. China⁸

Islam came to China with Muslim traders along two routes: the inland route and the sea-route during the first Islamic century. The Muslim community increased slowly but continuously through immigration, mixed marriages, and conversions.

Except for East Turkestan, which is really part of the Turkish world, the Muslims never formed a political entity in China. Under the Mongol dynasty, they were very influential to the point that that dynasty was considered by many as a Muslim one. The Muslim power collapsed with the Mongols and they suffered the Manchu persecution for 267 years. In the nineteenth century the Chinese Muslims fought bloody wars to rid themselves of this persecution, in Yunnan, Khansu and Sinkiang. They were militarily routed which worsened their situation.

There was an Islamic revival in China after the nationalist revolution of 1911. However, this revival was cut short by the Communists after their take-over in 1948. Under the new regime the Muslims are a non-entity; their numbers may be as high as eighty-million people, but the Communists claim that they are only ten million. Their situation is one of the worst in the whole world.

With the exception of the Eastern Turks, the Muslims are not even allowed to be a different "nationality" as is the case in the Soviet Union. All their mosques have been closed down with the exception of one mosque in Peking which is used as an exhibition piece for foreign dignitaries. Islamic schools have been closed down, and Islam is taught nowhere. The Muslim family itself has been broken up in an effort to accelerate the Muslim integration into the mainstream of Communism. Islamic leadership has often been physically eliminated. Nevertheless, Islam has shown a power of survival hardly paralleled by other Muslim minorities, and as late as 1967 during the Cultural Revolution the Muslims demonstrated violently in Peking itself.

d. The Philippines⁹

The carriers of Islam in South-East Asia were the Malays who themselves became Muslims as a result of merchant emigration from South India and South Arabia. The Muslim minorities expanded very fast in the islands that form Indonesia today as well as in Malaysia, until they became majorities.

In the Philippines of the sixteenth century, the same process of Islamisation was going on. Most of the islands were seats of Muslim states; and Manila itself (the present capital of the Philippines) was the capital of a Muslim principality. It was just a matter of time for the population to absorb the new religion and thus for the Muslims to become a majority.

However, the unpredictable happened. Philip of Spain sent in 1565 a fleet under Miguel de Legaspi "to settle the land and convert the people", and Manila was taken in 1570. The job was entrusted to five fanatical Catholic orders: the Augustinians, the Dominicans, the Franciscans, the Jesuits, and later the Recollects. When the Spaniards discovered the presence of Muslims in these islands, they identified them with the Spanish Muslims and called them Moros. Wars between Muslims and Spaniards and their Christian converts were long and bloody, but the Muslims were able to hold their own in the Southern islands of Palawan, Sulu and Mindanao, where they formed powerful and thriving states. A *status quo* was more or less maintained until the Muslims suffered a grave defeat at the hands of the Spaniards in 1848. In spite of this defeat, the Spaniards and their ally converts were never able to conquer the territories where the Muslims were in a majority. These territories remained in the hands of the independent Muslim state of Sulu.

In 1896, President William McKinley of the U.S.A. decided to occupy the Philippines (named after the Spanish King who conquered them) "to Christianise and civilise the people". The Americans succeeded in taking over the Spanish Colony in 1899, but the Muslim state resisted. The Americans fought a bloody war against the Muslims which lasted until 1914 when the Muslims were completely defeated for the first time in their history.

On 11th March, 1915, the reigning Muslim King (*Sultan*) was forced to abdicate his throne, but was allowed to remain the head of the Muslims. In April 1940 the Americans abolished the Sultanate completely and the Muslim territories were incorporated in the Philippines.

The difficulty was that these territories formed a third in area of the entire present-day Philippines, and the Muslim population had been depleted by centuries of warfare. The crime committed against the Muslims by the American colonial administration was that they opened the Muslim territories to Christian immigration from the North. Immigration was slow at first, accelerated in the 1920's and has grown rapidly since 1939. After the independence of the Philippines, the national government began to pursue the same fanatical policies as practised against the Muslims by the Spanish and the Americans. The Muslims were considered outcasts in their own land. Criminal bands of religious fanatics were allowed to take over Muslim lands by force and entire Muslim populations were butchered; others discovered themselves refugees overnight. The established Catholic Church encouraged, the state connived at, and the army actively helped people to perpetrate the carnage of the Muslims. The Muslims found no other way but to fight for their physical existence. But they are fighting a lone battle. The Muslim world at large seems to have lost its sense of history and treats the problem as if it were a purely internal affair of the Philippines and as if the Muslims were always ruled by a Catholic establishment.

The reaction of the Philippines government to the present war is identical to that of the previous colonial governments. The Muslims are being suppressed, even being obliterated by brute force. Even in areas of their greatest concentration they are allowed no autonomy in their own affairs. In every respect the Muslims of the Philippines are the successors of the Muslims of Spain. The fall of Sulu in 1940 reminds one of the fall of Gharnāṭah in 1492. The Muslims are no more than 10% of the total population of the Philippines (about 4,000,000 Muslims now). They are being subjected to conditions that are hardly any different from those of the Spanish Inquisition. Our only hope is that they will escape the Andalusian fate.

VI

Muslim Minorities in Africa¹⁰

Muslim minorities in Africa comprise all the three types of Muslim minorities mentioned above. Minorities in East Africa as well as in Ethiopia are mostly from the former Muslim territories which came under non-Muslim rule. The Muslim minorities of Western Africa are altogether of a different nature since they are a continuation of the process of Islamisation of Africa which started centuries ago. Many of the states of Western Africa are witnessing the process of transformation of Muslim minorities

into majorities during our own time. This is the case of Upper Volta and Gabon, for instance. In East Africa, however, the situation is quite grave since the Christian missions, backed by fantastic resources, are engaged in a concerted effort to Christianise this area. There are minorities in South Africa which are the result of immigration from Indonesia and the Indian sub-continent. In general, Islam is gaining ground in Africa even in the territories where resistance against it is quite fierce, such as the Portuguese colonies and South Africa. This is due to the fact that the African nationalist of today prefers to identify himself with Islam rather than with Christianity. This is for quite understandable reasons: Christianity repels the African because of its association with imperialism and colonialism and because of its identification with the racist attitudes of his former (at places even present) oppressors. On the contrary the Muslims led the fight against imperialism and colonialism, and Islam is certainly not identified with any particular race. Moreover, the pronounced equalitarian accent and other attractive features of Islam because it embodies the last guidance sent by the Creator, lends it a special appeal to the hearts and minds of the newly awakened Africans, as it did to so many other nations. By contrast, Christianity continues to remain associated with the oppressive and exploitative system under which they have suffered so long. Add to that the incomprehensible, let alone irrational, nature of its dogma, and the tremendous doctrinal schisms of the different Christian churches, and it would be clear why Christianity has lost its appeal despite the fantastic resources at its disposal and the highly organised missionary work directed to convert people to Christianity. Africa as a whole is the only continent where the Muslims are in a majority, and where the minority status of the Muslims in some areas might be considered as a temporary phase that will change in the course of time. Islam could be the driving force for the unification of the entire continent as it has been for centuries. For this reason we do not see the need for treating the different areas separately, although the subject of Islam in Africa deserves a thorough study.

VII

Islam in the Americas¹¹

To the layman, Islam in America seems to be a newcomer. To the student of history, Islam set its foot there at the latest with the discovery of that continent. There is strong evidence that Andalusian Muslims visited the American continent long before the Europeans did (*al-Shubbān al-maghūrūn*). It is a known historical fact that the Portuguese and Spanish discoverers were led by Andalusian Muslim mariners who knew better about the high seas. Some of the discoverers themselves were Moriscos, probably Muslims secretly. It is also a known historical fact that the Andalusian Muslim *Muhājirūn* of al-Ribāṭ and Salā on the Moroccan

coast, led the fight against the Spanish and Portuguese ships in the Atlantic down to the Caribbean coasts.

Along with the colonisation by the Europeans of North and South America, Andalusian Muslims flocked to the new continent with the Spanish and Portuguese armies, all of them with the Christian names which had been forced upon them. But many of them kept their faith as is well shown by the decrees of inquisition imposed by the Portuguese monarch for the Brazilian colonies against the "Moors". These Andalusian Muslims reached even the northern part of the continent with the Spanish bands which arrived in what is now Arizona, Florida and California. This wave of Muslim arrivals could not stand up to the passing of time. These Muslims fled from the Spanish and Portuguese inquisition in Europe only to fall a prey to the persecution of the same type that did not give them a chance to reaffirm and reassert their identity. From time to time a visitor to South America might find some families of Spanish and Portuguese descent still holding a copy of the Holy Qur'ān inherited from their ancestors; some of them even had the courage to return to Islam. This first attempt of Islam to establish itself in the Americas, however, failed.

The second wave of Muslim arrivals occurred centuries later in the seventeenth century, when the African slaves were brought by the European slave traders to work the fields of the northern and southern American continents. Many of these Africans were Muslims and when they arrived, they did everything that was humanly possible to keep their faith. The oppression of the slaves by their masters was extreme and the living conditions were intolerable. As time passed, the traditions of Islam could not be propagated from one generation to another. Out of this wave of Muslim arrivals only some vestiges are left. The one group which remained Muslim much longer than others is made up of the African Muslims, who were brought to Brazil. These Muslims kept their faith for centuries and revolted several times against their masters in the nineteenth century. A severe persecution by the Brazilian authorities suppressed these revolts. It practically destroyed all the Islamic institutions and eventually led to the extirpation of Islam from these groups. However, a visitor to the Bahia province in Brazil will still find that some black families are Muslim. Many descendants of the Muslims who fled from the nineteenth century persecution are living nowadays in the ports of West Africa. They still bear Portuguese names and speak a Portuguese dialect in spite of the fact that they have kept Islam as their religion. They form today a thriving Muslim community.

The trend among the blacks of North America, the Caribbean and South America is to go back to Islam as the religion of their ancestors which they had lost as a result of the inhumanity of the slave traders and the enslaving societies that oppressed them. This trend is widespread and is gaining momentum as the years pass.

In the United States, the trend is nearing the state of a mass return to Islam. There are more than forty Islamic centres which have been established by Americans of African ancestry, dispersed all over the country. They are in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, California, Maryland, Florida, and even Georgia, among other states. The capital of the United States has four such centres. These Muslims (numbering today about 500,000 people) usually try to go back to the model of the Prophet himself (peace be on him) and it is really impressive to see how effective they sometimes are. It is a real miracle how much knowledge they are able to acquire despite the fact that Arabic is a foreign language to them.

The forces resisting Islam were, however, able to support financially and morally, aberrant sects among the Afro-Americans that have nothing of Islam but the name. One of the most famous of these sects are the so-called Black Muslims led by Elijah Muhammad. Others call themselves by such names as Hebrew-Muslims or Nubian Muslims. These groups are allying themselves with the enemies of Islam and doing much harm to Muslims, sometimes by the naked use of violence.

When slavery was abolished by the British and other European powers in the mid-nineteenth century, the need for labour in the sugar fields was fulfilled by indentured labour. This was barely-covered slavery of a new kind. The newcomers were brought by the British from the Indian sub-continent and by the Dutch from Java. This new wave of Muslim arrivals has been more fortunate in keeping their faith, and, thank God they form nowadays large communities in Surinam, Guyana and Trinidad (a total of about 350,000 Muslims).

A more recent addition to this Islamic presence is the arrival of immigrants, those who fled from bad economic and political conditions in the Muslim countries, or from other regions where the Muslims are in a minority. In some areas these newly arrived immigrants are in such an advanced state of disintegration and assimilation that the survival of Islam through them appears uncertain. In other areas such as Canada (85,000 Muslims), United States (total 1,000,000 Muslims), Brazil (200,000 Muslims) and Argentina (300,000 Muslims), the Muslim communities were able to give themselves some kind of organisation. If helped, they might become the carriers of the light of Islam in that continent. All in all, there are now about two million Muslims in the Americas. Economically speaking they are often doing well; Islamically speaking, they are crying for help.

VIII

Historically the immigration of Muslims, whether by choice or compulsion, was often not motivated by service to the cause of Islam. It was dictated by economic and other reasons. However, a Muslim is by definition a preacher of the faith and wherever he may be he can be of service to

Islam. The secret of the Muslim communities which have been able to survive across the centuries and generations lies in one word: *organisation*. Islam cannot survive if individual Muslims believe in it as a personal affair. Islam is an all-embracing way of life which should be shared by all those who believe in it. When a group of Muslims is formed the first thing they should do in order to keep Islam among themselves is to organise themselves on an Islamic basis. To keep Islam alive from one generation to another, they should establish two basic Islamic institutions: the mosque and the school. The mosque in its true Islamic meaning is the community centre for worship as well as for social, cultural, political, and artistic activities. The school is the place where the coming generations are taught the precepts of Islam. The implementation by the minority Muslim community of a minimum amount of the *shari'ah* precepts is also necessary if it is to stay in touch with the main body of Islam. Without the establishment of an organisation, a mosque and a school, there is no hope for the survival of Islam in the foreign environment even if there is no oppression from the non-Muslim community.

Islam is not a religion that can survive in small groups or can be the patrimony of a closed group. A Muslim community should be by definition an open one, ready to accept whoever may be willing to join it. On the other hand, when the Muslims have internal divisions on grounds of nationality, race, or sect, their situation in a non-Islamic environment becomes extremely precarious. Unless the Muslim community identifies itself with Islam before everything else, its future as a Muslim community would be rather bleak.

Islam is the religion of all humanity. It is not the patrimony of one single country, race, or nation. The true Muslim is a citizen of the world and he should be able to live as a Muslim wherever he may be. Many nations claim to apply the principles of tolerance and acceptance of others, principles known and cherished by the Muslims as an integral part of their religious heritage. Many of them are trying to put these claims into practice. It is up to the Muslims now to stop blaming their problems on others and start solving them themselves in the light of the teachings of Islam.

Notes and Sources

- 1 For the history of Muslims in the Iberian peninsula see E. Levi-Provencal, *Histoire de l'Espagne Musulmane* (Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 1967), 3 vols.
- 2 Islam was not obliterated, however, from Spain by the inhuman decree of 1609. Islamic presence remains stubbornly, up to this day. On the surface, the profession to Islam is conspicuously missing. But Islam remained alive in the hearts of those Muslims (and of their descendants) who had been forced into the fold of Christianity. Those people have not altogether forgotten their Islamic past, and occasionally return to the faith of their ancestors. The following story might be revealing.

During the fall of 1973 I met a young Muslim from Gharṇāṭah who is very active in Muslim affairs. I asked him: "How did you become a Muslim?" His answer was: "I never was otherwise!" Then he continued: "I remember vividly when I was eleven years of age, my grand-mother was dying. She pulled me to her side and whispered in my ear: 'Look son, Christianity is not our religion, and it is not the true one. When you grow up seek your own path'." He continued: "When I grew older I understood what she meant. I learnt Islam and came back to it".

- 3 For the Muslims of Sicily, see M. Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia* (Catania, 1933-39), 5 vols.
- 4 Born at Valence in 539 A.H.; died at Alexandria (Egypt) in 614 A.H.
- 5 *Rihlat Ibn Jubayr*, (Beirut, Dār al-Turāth, 1968), p. 280.
- 6 For this section, see A. Bailiya, *Les Musulmans Yougoslaves* (Alger, 1940). See also M. Ali Kettani, *Al-Muslimūn fī al-Mu'askar al-Shuyū'i* (Makka, 1974).
- 7 and 8 See M. A. Kettani, *al-Muslimūn fī al-Mu'askar al-Shuyū'i* (Makka, 1974).
(Editors' Note: It should be noted that this paper was written in 1974 and hence some factual statements, e.g. those about the "Black Muslims" in America, are not quite up-to-date.)
- 9 C. Majul, *The Muslims of the Philippines*, (Manila, University Press, 1973).
- 10 See J. Kritzeck and W. H. Lewis, *Islam in Africa* (Princeton, Van-Nostrand Reinhold, 1969).
- 11 See A. A. Elkholy, *The Arab Moslems in the U.S.A.* (New Haven, University Press, 1966); E. K. Lovell, "A Survey of the Arab-Muslims in the United States and Canada", *Muslim World*, vol. LXIII (1973), pp. 139-154; H. B. Barclay, "The Perpetuation of Muslim Tradition in the Canadian North", *Muslim World*, vol. LIX (1969), pp. 64-73; Rolf Reichert, "Musulmans No Brasil", *Almenara*, Madrid, vol. I, Spring 1971, and Rolf Reichert, "Os Documentos Arabes do Estado da Bahia", *Afro-Asia* (Universidade Federal da Bahia, Brasil), 1966 (nos. 2-3) - 1967 (nos. 6-7).

PART IV

Scholars and Reformers

Mawlānā Abul A‘lā Mawdūdī – A Personal Account

Altaf Gauhar

I

I FIRST heard of Mawlānā Mawdūdī in the early forties in New Delhi. I was then working in the Finance Department of the late Government of India. Someone among my colleagues mentioned that his writings were having a great influence on the Muslims of India. Then came independence in 1947 and the great exodus of the bureaucracy to Karachi. Everyone was caught in a tremendous upsurge of nation-building activities. The Muslims of the subcontinent of India had succeeded in establishing a home-land of their own and now looked forward to the evolution of a distinctly Islamic social and political order in the country.

I arrived in Karachi before the carnage in Delhi began, and was soon totally engrossed in administrative work. Harrowing stories of mass killings, and endless streams of refugees struggling across the new frontiers in a pitiless state only urged one to greater national service. A rudimentary administrative structure based on the British pattern, the only one with which we were familiar, was soon established and the same old bureaucratic routine became the way of life. In a few months Karachi started looking like a miniature New Delhi. The Sind Assembly building, where some of the Ministries of the Central Government were initially housed, was humming with the same kind of activities and arguments to which we had become accustomed in the North Block in New Delhi. The same laws, the same procedure, the same files with the all too familiar notings, turned the new nation into an imitation of the past.

Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly used to meet in the same building and one would see members of the Assembly sitting in groups in the cafeteria talking animatedly about their regional or personal problems. The bureaucrats remained aloof but were always interested in “paddock” intelligence – who was in good form, and who was likely to stay the course. I would sometimes go to hear the speeches in the Assembly. An interminable debate seemed to be going on in an unreal atmosphere, as if the country had been in existence for a thousand years, and the few problems still requiring the attention of the Constitution makers were traffic rules,

regional shares in Government jobs, or the revalidation of existing laws. They argued with great earnestness and passion about the unsatisfactory road communications in their respective areas. Occasionally, there would be a sudden crisis, and a great deal of hurry and flurry in the corridors of the Assembly, when it would appear that the country could split up on the question of allocation of resources. Passionate orations would then be made demanding a more equitable distribution of revenues. The central ministers would maintain a stolid front against which the waves of provincial aspirations would break in vain. The primary responsibility of the Assembly, which was to frame the Constitution of the country, appeared to have receded into the background. Special committees and sub-committees were always being set up by the Assembly to examine particular constitutional problems, while the Assembly was content to dedicate itself wholly to financial and administrative wrangles. By 1950, it was firmly established that the Government of India Act of 1935, subject to the provisions of the Independence Order and such further amendments as may be made from time to time, was to be the effective constitutional and legal framework for the governance of the country.

The ruling *élite*, educated by the British and trained in the art of manipulating the special brand of institutions which the British had evolved to protect and promote imperial interests, discovered that their survival depended on the perpetuation of those institutions. Independence elevated this class from the position of intermediate and indirect domination to that of primary and direct domination. For them there were no other institutions and no other system which could serve the interests of the new country. The judges insisted on donning wigs and robes (a dress in which they were neither married nor buried) and clung to quaint Anglo-Saxon legal procedures, as the executive refused to deviate an inch from the financial and administrative rules prescribed by the British.

For the ruling *élite*, freedom amounted to a process of alignment and adjustment of a territory called Pakistan within the British Empire. The country's air force was called the Royal Air Force, the navy – the Royal Pakistan Navy. No one paused to ask whether royalty had any place in Pakistan. The land forces were not christened as the Royal Pakistan Army because the British had never used such an appellation for their army. All the three Commanders-in-Chief at the time were Englishmen, as were nearly all the key secretaries to the Government, and even some joint secretaries and deputy secretaries. Except for one province, all provinces were under British Governors. The first financial adviser for the Quaid-i-Azam was an Englishman, Sir Archibald Roland, as was the first finance secretary, Sir Victor Turner. The head of the establishment was Creigh-Coen, the Law Secretary Sir Edward Snelson. The Ministries of Defence, Food and Agriculture, and Works were controlled by Englishmen. A portly gentleman from the Bank of England was imported to advise whether Pakistan

should have a Central Bank! No wonder the ruling Pakistani *élite* interpreted independence as a dispensation under which their headquarters were transferred from New Delhi to Karachi, and for this dislocation they could legitimately expect a substantial improvement in their emoluments and prospects of promotion.

The *élite* insisted on keeping English as the official language. This was the language they knew, and more importantly, the language which the people did not know. This one fact alone placed the ruling *élite* beyond the reach of the masses. The curtain of language ensured the safety and the supremacy of the ruling *élite*.

Ordinary men and women were a little puzzled why the British should have forgotten to take their system of government and their local functionaries with them. This was not entirely true because the British had guaranteed payment of pensions and even leave-salary in sterling to their old faithfuls. I remember the first British delegation, under Sir Jeremy Raisman, which came to Pakistan to discuss the future of the sterling balance in December 1948, spent a good deal of its time promising sympathetic consideration of personal cases of some members of the Pakistan delegation. One Pakistani official was promptly promoted because Sir Jeremy looked at him and nodded appreciably during the discussion.

The common people had supported the struggle for Pakistan, and cheerfully sacrificed whatever they possessed, in the hope that the Muslims would be able to order their lives according to their faith and ideology in a country of their own. They were disenchanted and terribly frustrated when they saw Pakistan turning into a continuation of the British system of government.

It was in this atmosphere that I next heard of Mawlānā Mawdūdī as a man who was trying "to exploit religion for political purposes". Senior officials would concede that he was a good writer and a scholar of merit but he was making a nuisance of himself. The *élitist* classes were not opposed to Islam, but they genuinely thought that Islam had served its purpose. Muslims had achieved independence and established a state of their own with the help of Islam. The question now was the development of the country on secular lines. There were enough mosques in the country for Islam. The rest of the country should get on with the job. The *élitist* classes had no understanding of the Qur'ānic principles or of the Islamic laws. The Qur'ān was good for one's private faith but in the affairs of state and public administration there was really no room for *Shari'ah*, which may have been useful for a tribal society some 1,400 years ago. All that could be promised was that if any of the existing laws were found to be repugnant to the Qur'ān or *Sunnah* they might be reviewed and modified in due course. Islam was, of course, the religion of the people of Pakistan, but it must remain a private religion. Public life must be governed by Western institutions and laws. The Government of the country should function within the British institutional framework.

Lord Macaulay had dreamed of creating a class of natives "who would be English in everything except their race and colour". Even he would have been surprised by the products of British educational and administrative policies. Mawlānā Mawdūdī was not only a nuisance, he posed a threat to the whole post-colonial arrangement. He could propagate the doctrine of Islam in some mosque, to that there may be no objection. But the man was advocating wholesale replacement of the British institutions by archaic Islamic institutions, about which the *elitist* classes had little knowledge and no respect. The man was obviously utterly confused. And he was creating difficulties for the new state. He was certainly no friend of the people. Perhaps he was an enemy agent, if not an enemy himself. While people were engaged in constructive work for the unity and solidarity of the country, this man was asking questions which were causing disaffection and despondency. Who was he to remind the rulers of the objectives for which Pakistan had been established? All he wanted was power for himself and was using Islam as a convenient political platform. This is how the ruling *élite* analysed and understood the role of Mawlānā Mawdūdī.

Soon after independence, India and Pakistan found themselves involved in undeclared hostilities. The iniquitous and fraudulent boundary award and Lord Mountbatten's reprehensible role as the first Governor-General of India in procuring Kashmir's accession to India in utter violation of the principles on which the subcontinent had been partitioned, created a grave situation. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was rocked by wide-spread popular agitation. Pakistanis could not remain uninterested in the situation and a large number of tribesmen marched into Kashmir. Mawlānā must have been disturbed by the equivocal and dubious official attitude. He insisted that the struggle of the Kashmiris for self-determination which he whole-heartedly supported could achieve the level of *Jihād* only if it was pursued in the spirit of total sacrifice and honesty. All diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with the enemy must be terminated. Mawlānā's position was denounced by the ruling circles. It was claimed that he was opposed to the struggle of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. In higher official circles serious doubts now began to be expressed about Mawlānā's patriotism.

A more serious situation arose when the anti-Aḥmadiyya agitation in Lahore led to the imposition of Martial Law. Mawlānā Mawdūdī was arrested, tried by a military court and sentenced to death. That was the final judgment of the ruling classes on Mawlānā Mawdūdī. A subsequent writ petition led to the declaration of the particular regulation under which Mawlānā Mawdūdī was tried as void and Mawlānā, after having spent months in a cell meant for condemned prisoners, emerged completely unruffled and, from the official point of view, unreformed and unrepentant.

By 1955 Mawlānā Mawdūdī had developed the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* in Pakistan into a powerful and disciplined organisation supported by a

dedicated cadre of workers. He had written a great deal by then, spelling out his ideas in detail and formulating a coherent and precise position on specific constitutional, political, social and economic questions. The opponents and critics of Mawlānā Mawdūdī and *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* now belonged to three categories:

- (1) The *élitist* classes which considered him a serious threat to their position and a source of agitation and confusion. These classes claimed that Mawlānā was exploiting religion for political ends which made him a power-hungry opportunist.
- (2) The leftist group which regarded Mawlānā's views as reactionary and dubbed him as an agent of capitalists and Western powers, particularly the Americans. It was often suggested that Mawlānā Mawdūdī and *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* received substantial financial assistance from certain foreign powers.
- (3) Certain religious elements which questioned Mawlānā's knowledge and opinions and regarded them as objectionable according to their understanding of the Qur'ān and the *Ḥadīth*.

II

First Encounter with Mawlānā Mawdūdī

I met Mawlānā Mawdūdī for the first time in September 1965. India attacked Pakistan on 6th September and the then President, Ayub Khan, wanted to have a meeting with all the opposition leaders including Mawlānā Mawdūdī, Chaudhury Mohammed Ali, Chaudhury Ghulam Abbas, and Khawja Mohammed Safdar. No one from East Pakistan could come as air travel between the two wings of Pakistan was not possible. When the list of invitees was being discussed, Ayub Khan said that he had always had a great desire to meet Mawlānā Mawdūdī. He had read some of his books and was impressed by his clear and forceful expression. The meeting took place at the President's house in Rawalpindi late in the evening.

Mawlānā Mawdūdī had come from Lahore by car and I found out where he was staying. I was extremely busy but I went to see Mawlānā in order to conduct him to the President's house. I arrived at the house where Mawlānā was staying a little before the *Maghrib* prayers. A number of people were sitting in the room, some in chairs and some on the floor. I occupied a chair near the door and was taken as one of the persons who must have come to meet Mawlānā Mawdūdī. Mawlānā was explaining some point in a soft voice. He was probably answering a question which he had been asked. I was struck by his simple and modest bearing. His profound influence and impressive presence was unmistakable, but there was nothing extraordinary about him. I remember noticing his very delicate skin and rather tired eyes. His face was dominated by a broad forehead. There was

an air of orderliness around him, there was nothing out of place or discordant. He seemed harmless and peaceable, completely different from his official image of a fiery orator advocating violence and revolutionary change. After the prayer, I told Mawlānā that I had come to take him to the President's house for the meeting. We travelled in the same car and I took him to the room where the other guests were sitting. I then went into the President's office to inform him that everybody had arrived. He got up and said to me, with a laugh: "So, you have assembled all my enemies".

Ayub Khan had a very pleasant and fruitful meeting. During the discussion Chaudhury Mohammed Ali said that all decisions would have to be taken by Ayub Khan. He could only say that the people were fully behind the armed forces and were ready to make any sacrifice. Chaudhury Ghulam Abbas said that the Kashmiris owed a debt of gratitude to Ayub Khan, who had taken up their cause with conviction and determination. Mawlānā Mawdūdī gave a brief but lucid analysis of the situation in the country and Ayub Khan then requested him to pray for the success of the defence effort. After the meeting a photograph of all the participants was taken but Mawlānā excused himself most politely from joining the group as a matter of principle.

Ayub Khan was so moved by what Mawlānā had said in the meeting that he asked me the next day to arrange an exclusive meeting with him. This meeting took place a couple of weeks later in Rawalpindi on the lawns of the President's residence. I was present during the discussion. He explained to Mawlānā that he had read some of his books and admired his vast range of knowledge. Mawlānā briefly mentioned what he had tried to do to communicate the true meanings of Islam to the people. He never mentioned the treatment which he had received from successive governments and talked to Ayub Khan on an equal level without any mental reservation or trace of bitterness. It was arranged during this meeting that Mawlānā should broadcast a weekly lecture from Radio Pakistan. It was also agreed that I should keep in touch with Mawlānā and seek his advice on national issues.

Considering the official policy toward Mawlānā Mawdūdī, I felt at the time that this meeting represented a great advance toward mutual understanding. It was during this spell that Ayub Khan told me that none of the Government agencies had been able to show him any evidence to prove that either Mawlānā or the *Jamā'at* had any foreign contacts or were in receipt of any foreign assistance. The spell did not last long. While I was still admiring Ayub Khan's courage in taking the initiative to come to an understanding with Mawlānā Mawdūdī, I was informed that I need not proceed with the arrangements for broadcasting Mawlānā's lectures from Radio Pakistan. I could never find out how this reversal occurred, but I suspect that official agencies as much as certain religious elements reacted most unfavourably to the prospects of any rapprochement between the Government and *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*. There were elements inside as well as

outside the Government which lost no opportunity in creating problems for the Government in its dealings with *Jamā'at*. When *Jamā'at* convened a convention in Lahore, Ayub Khan said in a meeting that some people should go to the convention and put certain questions to *Jamā'at* leadership. By the time these instructions filtered down from the Governor to the Home Secretary they had assumed a most sinister form. The job was entrusted to the Inspector-General of Police who asked the Area Superintendent to do the needful. The Officer-in-Charge of the police station concerned deputed some local toughs who arrived at the convention punch drunk and started shooting, killing one innocent delegate. It was a most revolting and shameful sequel to what was perhaps originally suggested as a political encounter.

I did not get any opportunity to meet Mawlānā Mawdūdī for several years after that. Soon after Mr. Bhutto became the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan, I took over as the Chief Editor of the *Dawn*, Karachi. It was a traumatic period in my life. The country had been dismembered. The Pakistan Army had surrendered in Dacca, and I could not comprehend how Yahya Khan and his men could have continued to follow a ruthless and ruinous course in disregard of all human values. I was appalled by the decision to continue the Martial Law. Mr. Bhutto's decision to appoint himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator was conclusive evidence of betrayal of his political programme. His designs had to be exposed. The editorial columns of *Dawn* pleaded for the restoration of Islamic principles, human values and democratic norms. It was pointed out that if the people learnt no lesson from what had happened in East Pakistan, the backlash would destroy the rest of Pakistan. Those in authority had preferred to surrender to the enemy than to the people. The new Government was in the meantime congratulating itself for having saved the country from utter chaos and people were being encouraged in the belief that the tragedy of East Pakistan had led to the emergence of the rest of Pakistan as a new and stronger nation. I was enraged by the chicanery and shamelessness of the conduct of the ruling party. Another newspaper *Jasārat*, under the able and dedicated editorship of Salahuddin (who languished a long time in prison), wrote inspired editorials and exposed the regime without fear. I was arrested one night and removed to an unspecified place of detention without any lawful order having been served on me. There followed a thirteen month period of detention and interrogation. A writ petition filed by my wife was finally admitted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan and I was set at liberty only to be arrested again under another detention order. The Supreme Court judgment declared Yahya Khan as a usurper and his actions void. Mr. Bhutto had in the meantime introduced an interim constitution and I remained in detention under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. Another writ petition was filed in the Sind and Baluchistan High Court and after prolonged hearings, the petition was

decided in my favour declaring all the grounds of detention to be without any basis whatever. As soon as I was released I started attacking the regime again, and again I was arrested. It was during this interval that I had a meeting with Mawlānā Mawdūdī in Lahore.

I flew from Karachi to Lahore and it was arranged that I should meet Mawlānā at a mosque in Ichhra where he regularly offered his Friday prayers. Months of detention must have affected me because Mawlānā could not recognise me at all. Later when I sat with him in his study, he mentioned again how unhappy he was that I had been subjected to such terrible treatment. He said this with so much feeling that I was compelled to ask why he thought my situation so serious when he had himself spent years in detention, isolation and solitary confinement. He said with great affection: "We prepare for such eventualities from the beginning. You had a different background and I can imagine what you must have gone through."

III

Encounter with Tafhīm al-Qur'ān

I came in contact with *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* by accident. I was arrested on the night of 17th February 1972 and taken to an unknown place where I was locked up in solitary confinement. It was a bare room and the windows were barred. I was pushed into the room and left there slumped in a corner like a heap of rubbish. I had not been allowed to bring any clothes or books with me and the only object of interest in the room, which I saw in the morning, was a small cockroach crawling over the floor and turning itself upside down in some kind of exultation. I spent the day walking up and down and tried to establish a routine of prayers.

The second night I felt terribly lonely and miserable and thought to myself that if I could only see the gaoler, I would ask for a copy of the Qur'ān. There was an element of strategy in this, because I thought however hard-hearted my tormentors, they would not be able to refuse me the Qur'ān. The problem was to find the gaoler. I must have dozed off in exhaustion when I was woken up by the sound of the recitation of the Qur'ān. Some wandering *faqīr* had thoughtfully decided to park himself somewhere in the vicinity of where I was detained. He kept on reciting the Qur'ān through the night. His voice was so rich, so melodious, so warm and so fulfilling that I forgot my misery and my surroundings. The gaoler came to see me the next day and offered me a cigarette. I declined because I had decided to smoke no more. He was surprised. He must have known that I was quite a heavy smoker. He then asked me, in a most casual manner, whether there was anything he could do for me. I asked him to get me a copy of the Qur'ān. His reply was chilling: "I will have to ask them". The day passed but the gaoler did not return. The night came and back came the

faqīr with his recitation of the Qur'ān. He recited with such fervour and depth of feeling that every word seemed to come alive. I could not only hear each word as it was moulded and feel its presence, I could touch it, hold it and kiss it.

The gaoler brought me a copy of the Qur'ān the next day. It was Pickthall's translation and the first thing I did was to see how many pages it contained. I thought I must carefully ration my reading lest I should finish the book too soon. I did not know how long I would stay in detention and I must, therefore, read just a little every day. I started reading each verse slowly and carefully and it was with a sense of great excitement that I discovered after several days of intensive reading that the book was inexhaustible. I remained in solitary confinement in Karachi for twenty-eight days and read Pickthall's translation of the Qur'ān from the beginning to the end several times.

On the 28th day I was removed to a detention camp in Sihala near Rawalpindi. It was a rest-house attached to the Sihala police training college. Since then the place has been formally notified as a prison and is now the most prestigious and internationally known detention camp in the country where political prisoners are taken for special treatment. I was no longer in strict solitary confinement because I had the constant company of a police officer who allowed me to walk in the fields adjacent to the camp. He would talk incessantly; his language was earthy and picturesque and he regaled me with stories of torture and his impressions of different "leaders" under torture. The police training college had a library from which I was able to get the first volume of Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād's *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān*. I was deeply impressed by Āzād's translation. He writes with great passion and arranges his arguments in a persuasive style. Pickthall's translation was accurate but his language was no longer the kind of language which the new generation could read with relish. I was convinced that there was a definite need for the English educated young men and women to have an opportunity to read the Qur'ān in simple English.

After a few months in Sihala the authorities found that I was not responding to the special treatment that they had prescribed and I was removed to the Karachi Central Prison. It was a new experience to go into that prison which I had visited so often as Inspector-General of Prisons. Now I had come as a *détenu*. I spent some ten months in the Karachi prison and as compared to what I had gone through during solitary confinement, and in isolation in Sihala, life in the prison was a relief. My wife who had been fighting my case in the courts was able to obtain permission to provide me with some books. I asked for Arberry's translation of the Qur'ān and enjoyed reading it immensely. Arberry has a much more lively style than Pickthall. One afternoon another inmate of the prison, Naqi Nawab, came to my cell and was surprised to see me reading the Qur'ān in English. He said he was familiar with my writings in Urdu and did not understand why I

preferred to read the Qur'ān in English when *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* was available. He had with him the second volume of *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* which he was good enough to lend me for a few hours. I started reading *Sūrah Yūsuf*. It was an experience I had not known before. I was enthralled. I had never come across anything written in such simple and direct Urdu with complete command over the subject. Soon I was able to get all the six volumes of *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān*.

Mawlānā Mawdūdī started translating the Qur'ān in 1942 and it took him five years to complete the translation and interpretation up to *Sūrah Yūsuf*. Thereafter he was not able to continue with the work for a variety of reasons until he was arrested in October 1948, and this provided him with an opportunity to complete the work. The preface to the first volume of *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* bears the date 11th September 1949, New Central Gaol, Multan. Mawlānā undertook the translation for the average educated reader who is not familiar with the Arabic language. *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* is not a literal translation of the original text. It is an attempt to present the meanings of the Qur'ān in simple Urdu keeping the historical perspective in view. Mawlānā says in the Preface to *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* that "the rhythm of the original, the ecstasy of its expression and the delight of its diction is often lost in literal translation. The Qur'ān speaks to the reader in the language of life, vividly and melodiously, its sparkling cadence invigorates the mind and its impassioned notes stir the soul, as if a great storm were raging in the heart. By comparison the language of the translation is a poor echo of the glorious original, so lifeless and insipid that one is often left completely cold. A flame runs through the words of the Qur'ān which seems to get snuffed in the translation. The spirit of spring in full bloom seems to vanish leaving behind a trail of dry brown leaves."

Mawlānā adds that the Qur'ān is great literature as it is great instruction. Its words go straight to the heart, and it is this quality which, like a crack of lightning, shook the length and breadth of Arabia. In literal translation every word is printed under the original verse thus breaking the message into fragments, and disturbing the rapturous communion between the book and the reader. In *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* these difficulties and defects disappear and the message of the Qur'ān comes through clear and true.

A detailed *Muqaddimah* is provided in the beginning. It explains the theme and the arrangement of the Qur'ān, an arrangement which is different from what we normally expect. We expect a book to follow a certain pattern. It should have a beginning, a middle and an end, and ideas on specific subjects should be arranged and developed in an orderly fashion. The Qur'ān does not follow any such arrangement. We come across beliefs, precepts, orders, criticism, warnings, promises, arguments, evidence, historical illustrations and references to natural phenomena, without any regard for logic. A problem is taken up and discussed repeatedly in different words; a subject is taken up only to be abandoned in the middle. The

audience changes and so does the speaker from time to time, and on each occasion the mode of address takes a different form. One rarely gets an indication where one subject ends and another begins. We find history narrated in a style quite different from the one followed in the text books. Problems of philosophy are discussed in a language which is not the language of philosophy. If we just glance through the Qur'ān we would form the impression that it was some desultory piece of work consisting of notes of varying sizes without any coherent arrangement. What kind of a book is the Qur'ān? Mawlānā answers that it is a book of its own kind. It is based on certain assumptions which Mawlānā sets out in detail, and once these assumptions are grasped the meaning and the purpose of the book become clear.

Man is the subject of the Qur'ān. It invites man to the right path and re-awakens in him the instinctive knowledge of divine instructions. This is the central purpose of the Qur'ān and if this is kept in mind, the whole book acquires coherence and unity. The Qur'ān talks of the origin of man, the structure of the earth and the heavens, manifestations of the universe and history of civilisation. It recalls the beliefs and the conduct of different nations. The object is not to give lessons in social sciences but to convey the knowledge of ultimate reality to man, and to acquaint him with the results which will follow his actions, if those actions come into conflict with the principles underlying the reality of creation.

Mawlānā gives a complete background of each chapter of the Qur'ān. He explains that the Makkan chapters were intended to help the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) to prepare himself for his assignment, which was to invite the people to the right path, and to state those fundamental principles of divine guidance which lead to man's happiness and salvation. The Madinite chapters cover the second phase of the Prophet's mission. It was during this phase that the revolutionary message of Islam created an upheaval in society. Not only the people of Makka and those who belonged to the Quraysh tribe, but the supporters of the old order and the *status quo* in most parts of Arabia, worked up a combined front to defeat the Islamic revolution by force. A bitter and relentless campaign of vilification was unleashed, and all kinds of wild objections, morbid allegations and vulgar accusations were levelled against the messenger of God and his followers. All this had only one purpose – to prevent the people from listening to the Prophet. All means were employed to suppress man's most cherished right – the right to express himself freely.

The revelation served as a warning to those who had slumped into degeneration and decay. They were called upon to look at the ruins of old civilisations around them – mounds of rubble, a constant reminder of the dismal end of communities which had taken to oppressive ways. All around on land and under the heavens were clear signs of the unity of God and the reality of the Hereafter.

Mawlānā explains that the Qur'ān presents an integrated picture of life. It is here that I found a complete answer to the accusation which I had heard so often that Mawlānā Mawdūdī mixes religion with politics, exploiting the *dīn* for worldly purposes. Such an accusation would be valid if Islam made any distinction between politics and religion. If life could be divided into compartments, one compartment dealing with religion, another with business, a third with education, a fourth with family life, a fifth with politics, and so on, then one could legitimately demand that each compartment of life should be kept apart and treated as a unity in itself. Anyone who mixed the contents of one compartment with those of another could then be held guilty of disturbing the arrangement and creating confusion. But such a view of life is totally alien to the Qur'ān. Life is indivisible. It has no compartments. Any attempt to compartmentalise life, and to prescribe different rules for each compartment will only lead to the destruction of the unity of life and human personality.

It is customary for modern educated Muslims nowadays to say that one should not take politics to the mosques. The assumption here is that the mosque is meant for certain rituals, and anything unconnected with those rituals should not be permitted in the mosque. This isolation of the mosque from the life of the community has converted what was, in the life of the Prophet, a centre of social and cultural life into a place where one is only allowed to say his prayers. It is not the mosque alone which has been thus isolated, the prayer itself has lost its integral relationship with the life of the people. What does the prayer mean? It is an act of submission, when man acknowledges his faith in God, and His Prophet, and His revelations, and seeks guidance to organise his life according to the principles revealed in the Qur'ān. The prayer is thus a reaffirmation of the principles which govern man's life. It would be absurd to use the prayer for verbal reaffirmation, when one had no intention of allowing that reaffirmation to govern one's life outside the mosque.

For Mawlānā Mawdūdī the assumption that politics and religion are two different activities, each regulated by different and often contradictory rules, makes no sense at all. He explains in *Tafhim al-Qur'ān* and in his other works that the same set of principles and the same scheme of values govern man's conduct in all spheres of thought and conduct. You do not reaffirm during the prayer your belief in truth, honesty and tolerance, unless you realise that the principles of truth, honesty and tolerance apply in every walk of life, in business as in education, in private dealings as in public conduct, in religion as in politics. If you insist on regulating the political life of the people by the principles of Islam, you are not doing this to gain some doubtful political ends, you are only asserting that all ends have to be moral, whether they are political ends or scientific ends. And all ends must be gained only through the means which conform to the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. The life of the Prophet himself is the finest example

of an individual who followed the same principles which he had derived from the Qur'ān in regulating his conduct in all spheres of life.

Mawlānā explains in the *Muqaddimah* that the process of revelation coincides with the beginning of the Islamic movement. The sequence in which different chapters are revealed has a purpose which is fulfilled when the movement reaches its culmination. The Qur'ān is a book of principles and not of details. Its purpose is to state and advocate, through reason and persuasion, the intellectual and moral basis of the Islamic way of life, but it is the life of the Prophet which provides a practical interpretation and a complete demonstration of the Qur'ānic principles. When Mawlānā suggested that one would recognise the truth and validity of *Hadith* through one's knowledge of the sensibility and temperament of the Prophet (*mizāj shinās-i-rasūl'*), he was attacked for trying to set himself up as some kind of an arbiter of *Hadith*. His critics said that he was indirectly claiming that he alone possessed understanding of the sensibility and the temperament of the Prophet. One sometimes comes to understand a person through his critics. Certainly I have learnt to understand some of the points made by Mawlānā Mawdūdī in his writings through this process. On the question of *Hadith*, I could not see what the critics were getting so worked-up about. Any student of literature knows that a person who acquires sufficient familiarity with the style and tone of an author begins to develop a sense of judgment. If a piece of writing is produced before him, he is able to say on the basis of his judgment whether it could have been written by the author or not. Experts can distinguish on the basis of style alone whether a play is by Marlowe or Shakespeare, or whether a painting is an original Van Gogh or a fake. It is not unusual for unsuspecting customers to buy a piece of artistic work as original when it is no more than a clever copy. In Pakistan several factories produce fake Gandhara pieces, which American tourists buy as originals at fabulous prices. A person who is conversant with Gandhara takes one look at a piece and is able to say this is not genuine. A verse is recited and you say it could not be by Iqbal or Ghalib. The same principle applies to the knowledge of *Hadith*. One has to immerse oneself in the message of the Qur'ān and the life of the Prophet to develop a sense of judgment, judgment born out of identification with the message and its implementation, and one can then feel whether a *Hadith* is sound or not. Mawlānā has never claimed that he has acquired such knowledge or judgment.

IV

A Unique Experiment in Communicating the Message of the Qur'ān

As I read *Tafhim al-Qur'ān* I was moved not only by the excellence of its language, the directness of its expression, the intensity of its grasp of the original, the smooth uninterrupted flow of its diction, but also by the explanatory notes which deal with all significant questions and where all

kinds of doubts and problems are resolved. Mawlānā suggests that as we read the Qur'ān, we should make a note of the questions which arise in our mind and proceed with the study of the Qur'ān. Many of these questions will be answered by the time we finish reading the Qur'ān. Those that remain will be resolved in the second or third reading. The Qur'ān is not meant just for academic study. One begins to understand the Qur'ān as one goes through life. It is a book of guidance to which one returns again and again for enlightenment, for resolving one's inner conflicts, and for instruction to deal with the problems of life.

I must explain why I decided to base my own translation of certain themes of the Qur'ān, in English, on the basis of the rendering in *Tafhim al-Qur'ān* in preference to any other translation. One brief example should suffice.

There are moments when the Qur'ān addresses the Prophet directly, particularly when he is in distress. One such moment occurs in *Sūrah al-An'ām*, verses 25-36. The Prophet had been engaged in his mission for twelve years. His detractors pursued him relentlessly and demanded that he should produce some concrete evidence of the fact that he was a messenger of God and what he claimed to be revelation was of divine origin. The persecution unleashed by the Quraysh had exceeded all bounds. A number of the believers had been forced to migrate to Abyssinia. It was in this situation that this *Sūrah* was revealed. I give below first the translation of the relevant verses as contained in *Ma'ārif al-Qur'ān* (vol. 3, pages 298-312) by Mawlānā Mufti Muḥammad Shafī'.

اور بعضے ان میں کان لگائے رہتے ہیں تیری طرف اور ہم نے ان کے دلوں پر ڈال رکھے ہیں پردے تاکہ اس کو نہ سمجھیں اور رکھ دیا ان کے کانوں میں بوجھ، اور اگر دیکھ لیں تمام نشانیاں تو بھی ایمان نہ لادیں ان پر یہاں تک کہ جب آتے ہیں تیرے پاس تجھ سے جھگڑنے کو تو کہتے ہیں وہ کافر نہیں ہے یہ مگر کہانیاں پہلے لوگوں کی اور یہ لوگ روکتے ہیں اس سے اور بھاگتے ہیں اس سے اور نہیں ہلاک کرتے مگر اپنے آپ کو، اور نہیں سمجھتے۔

اور اگر تو دیکھے جس دقت کہ کھڑے کئے جاویں گے وہ دوزخ پر پس کہیں گے اے کاش ہم پھر بھیج دیئے جاویں اور ہم نہ ٹھٹھلائیں اپنے رب کی آیتوں کو، اور ہو جاویں ہم ایمان والوں میں۔

کوئی نہیں بلکہ ظاہر ہو گیا جو چھپاتے تھے پہلے، اور اگر پھر بھیجے جاویں تو پھر بھی وہی کام کریں جس سے منع کئے گئے تھے اور وہ بے شک جھوٹے ہیں۔

اور کہتے ہیں ہمارے لئے زندگی نہیں مگر یہی دنیا کی اور ہم کو پھر نہیں زندہ ہونا۔
اور کاش کہ تو دیکھے جس وقت وہ کھڑے کے جاویں گے اپنے رب کے سامنے
فرمائے گا کیا یہ سچ نہیں، کہیں گے کیوں نہیں مسم ہے اپنے رب کی، فرمائے گا اب
چکھو عذاب بدلے میں اپنے کفر کے۔

تباہ ہوئے وہ لوگ جنہوں نے جھوٹ جانا ملنا اللہ کا، یہاں تک کہ جب آپہنچے گی
اُن پر قیامت اچانک تو کہیں گے اے افسوس! کیسی کوتاہی ہم نے اس میں کی، اور وہ
اٹھا دیں گے اپنے بوجھ اپنی پیٹھوں پر خبردار ہو جاؤ کہ بُرا بوجھ ہے جس کو وہ اٹھا دیں گے
اور نہیں ہے زندگی دنیا کی مگر کھیل اور جی بہلانا اور آخرت کا گھر بہتر ہے
پر ہیزگاروں کے لئے کیا تم نہیں سمجھتے۔

ہم کو معلوم ہے کہ تجھ کو غم میں ڈالتی ہیں ان کی باتیں سو وہ تجھ کو نہیں جھٹلاتے
لیکن یہ ظالم تو اللہ کی آیتوں کا انکار کرتے ہیں۔

اور جھٹلائے گئے ہیں بہت سے رسول تجھ سے پہلے پس صبر کرتے رہے جھٹلانے
پر اور ایذا پر یہاں تک کہ پہنچی ان کو مدد ہماری، اور کوئی نہیں بدل سکتا اللہ کی باتیں
اور تجھ کو پہنچ چکے ہیں کچھ حالات رسولوں کے۔

اور اگر تجھ پر گراں ہے ان کا منہ پھیرنا تو اگر تجھ سے ہو سکے کہ ڈھونڈ نکالے کوئی
مُرتنگ زمین میں یا کوئی سیڑھی آسمان میں پھر لاوے ان کے پاس ایک معجزہ اور اگر اللہ
چاہتا تو جمع کر دیتا سب کو سیدھی راہ پر سو تو مت ہونا دانوں میں۔

مانتے وہی ہیں جو سنتے ہیں اور مُردوں کو زندہ کرے گا اللہ پھر اس کی طرف
لے جاویں گے۔

Every word of the original has been translated with great care and accuracy. The original and the translated words are printed below each other. The result is that the structure of the sentence has become cumbersome, and the reader has to rearrange the words and to restructure the sentences in his mind to understand the meaning of the original. A wholly new style of writing has thus been developed which corresponds neither to the spoken language nor to any kind of written language. The only merit it has is the

proximity of the literal equivalent to the original word. A great deal of the spirit and warmth of the original, and the rhythmic flow of the language, has been lost in the process. The translator himself is forced to paraphrase his own translation. You thus have the original, the literal rendering, the paraphrased version and the explanatory notes. All this makes the reading heavy-going.

The same verses translated by Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād in *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān* (vol. I, pages 473–476) read as follows:

اور دیکھو، ان میں کچھ لوگ ایسے ہیں جو (بظاہر کلام حق) سننے کے لئے تمہاری طرف کان لگاتے ہیں، اور (واقعہ یہ ہے کہ) ہم نے ان کے دلوں پر پردے ڈال دیئے ہیں کہ ان تک بات کی سمجھ پہنچتی نہیں، اور ان کے کانوں میں بوجھ ہے کہ سُن نہیں سکتے یعنی ان کی گمراہی کے جماؤ اور ہٹ دھرمی کی وجہ سے اُن کے دل و دماغ کا یہ حال ہو گیا ہے اور ہمارا قانون یہی ہے کہ جو کوئی ضد اور تعصب میں مبتلا ہوتا ہے، اُس کا حال ایسا ہی ہو جاتا ہے، اگر یہ سچائی کی، ہر ایک نشانی بھی (جو انسان کے لئے ہو سکتی ہے) دیکھ لیں جب بھی یقین کرنے والے نہیں۔

یہاں تک کہ جب یہ تمہارے پاس آتے ہیں اور تم سے جھگڑتے ہیں تو جن لوگوں نے کفر کی راہ اختیار کی ہے وہ کہنے لگتے ہیں ”یہ تو اس کے سوا کچھ نہیں ہے کہ پچھلوں کی کہانیاں ہیں (جو ہم ہمیشہ سنتے آئے ہیں)

اور (دیکھو) یہ لوگ قرآن (کے سننے) سے دوسروں کو بھی روکتے ہیں، اور خود بھی دُور بھاگتے ہیں۔ اور وہ ایسا کر کے کسی کا کچھ نہیں بگاڑتے، اپنے ہی کو ہلاکت میں ڈالتے ہیں، اور شقاوت کی انتہا یہ ہے کہ اس کا شعور نہیں رکھتے۔

اور (اے انسان!) تو تعجب کرے اگر انہیں اس حالت میں دیکھے۔ جب یہ آتش دوزخ کے کنارے کھڑے ہوں گے اُس وقت کہیں گے ”اے کاش ایسا ہو کہ ہم پھر دنیا کی طرف لوٹا دیئے جائیں، اور اپنے پروردگار کی آیتیں نہ جھٹلائیں، اور ان میں سے ہو جائیں جو ایمان والے ہیں۔ لیکن ان کی یہ حسرت سچے دل کی حسرت نہ ہوگی، بلکہ (اس لئے ہوگی کہ) جو کچھ یہ پہلے چھپایا کرتے تھے (یعنی دل کا روگ) اس کا بدلہ ان پر نمودار ہو گیا (اور

اس سے بچنے کے لئے اظہارِ زدامت کرنے لگے، اگر یہ دنیا کی طرف لوٹا دینے جائیں تو پھر 'زندگی کی غفلتوں میں سرشار ہو کر اُسی بات میں پڑ جائیں جس سے انہیں روکا گیا ہے اور کچھ شک نہیں کہ یہ (اظہارِ زدامت میں) جھوٹے ہوں گے!

اور انہوں نے کہا۔ زندگی اس کے سوا کچھ نہیں ہے کہ یہی دنیا کی زندگی ہے اور ہیں (مرکر) پھر اٹھنا نہیں۔

اور (اے انسان!) تو تعجب کرے، اگر انہیں اُس حالت میں دیکھ، جب یہ (قیامت کے دن) اپنے پروردگار کے سامنے کھڑے کئے جائیں گے، اُس وقت خدا اُن سے پوچھے گا 'تم مرنے کے بعد جی اُٹھنے سے انکار کرتے تھے۔ اب مرنے کے بعد بھی جی اُٹھے ہو، بتلاؤ۔ کیا یہ حقیقت نہیں ہے؟ یہ کہیں گے "ہاں ہمیں اپنے پروردگار کی قسم"۔ اس پر خدا فرمائے گا "تم جو دنیا میں اس زندگی سے انکار کرتے ہو، تو اب اُس کی پاداش میں عذاب کا مزہ چکھ لو!"

یعنی وہ لوگ نقصان و تباہی میں پڑے 'جنہوں نے مرنے کے بعد' خدا کی ملاقات ہونے کو جھٹلایا یہاں تک کہ جب آنے والی گھڑی اچانک اُن پر آجائے گی (یعنی موت کی گھڑی) تو اُس وقت کہیں گے "افسوس اُس پر جو کچھ ہم سے اس بارے میں تقصیر ہوئی!" وہ اُس وقت اپنے گناہوں کا بوجھ پیٹوں پر اٹھائے ہوں گے، سو دیکھو کیا ہی بُرا بوجھ ہوا جو یہ (اپنی پیٹوں پر) لا رہے ہیں۔

اور دنیا کی زندگی تو کچھ نہیں ہے مگر (ایک طرح کا) کھیل اور تماشہ جو متقی ہیں ان کے لئے آخرت ہی کا گھر بہتر ہے۔ (افسوس تم پر!) کیا تم (اتنی بات بھی) نہیں سمجھتے۔

(اے پیغمبر!) ہم جانتے ہیں کہ یہ لوگ (انکار و تعصب کی) جیسی کچھ باتیں کہتے ہیں وہ تمہارے لئے ملالِ خاطر کا موجب ہوتی ہیں۔ یہ دراصل تمہیں نہیں جھٹلاتے بلکہ یہ ظالم جان بوجھ کر اللہ کی آیتوں کو جھٹلا رہے ہیں۔

اور (دیکھو) یہ واقعہ ہے کہ تم سے پہلے بھی خدا کے رسول جھٹلائے گئے۔ سو انہوں

نے لوگوں کے جھٹلانے اور دکھ دینے پر صبر کیا (اور اپنے کام سے لگے رہے یہاں تک کہ بالآخر) ہماری مدد آپہنچی اور (یا درکھو یہ اللہ کا بھڑایا ہوا قانون ہے، اور کوئی نہیں جو اس کی (بھڑائی ہوئی باتوں کو بدل دینے والا ہو، اور رسولوں کی خبروں میں سے بہت سی چیزیں تو تم تک پہنچ ہی چکی ہیں۔

اور اسے پیغمبر! اگر ان لوگوں کی روگردانی تم پر کھٹن گذرتی ہے تو (تم جو کچھ کر سکتے ہو، کر دیکھو، یکبھی باز آنے والے نہیں، اگر تم سے ہو سکے تو زمین کے اندر کوئی سُرنگ ڈھونڈھ نکالو، یا آسمان میں کوئی سیڑھی مل جائے (تو اس پر چڑھ جاؤ، اور اس طرح انہیں ایک نشانی لا دکھاؤ (لیکن پھر بھی وہ انکار ہی کریں گے) اگر خدا چاہتا تو ان سب کو دین حق پر جمع کر دیتا اور سب ایک ہی راہ پر موجاتے، مگر تم دیکھ رہے ہو کہ ایسا نہیں ہوا، پس دیکھو، ان میں سے نہ ہو جاؤ جو (حقیقت کا علم نہیں رکھتے۔

تمہاری دعوت کا وہی جواب دے سکتے ہیں جو تمہاری بیکار سننے ہیں، لیکن جو مرنے ہیں (ان سے جواب کی اُمید کیوں (رکھو؟) انہیں تو اللہ ہی (قبروں سے) اٹھائے گا۔ پھر اس کے حضور لوٹائے جائیں گے۔

The accuracy of the translation is maintained but the language now has greater flow. The reader does not have to restructure the sentences. Some of the phrases are a little involved, others are unnecessarily archaic, as if the use of simple words would affect the sanctity of the original. But the translator is rarely satisfied with his own rendering, and, every now and then, he puts in an explanatory phrase in parentheses. There are forty-one places in this extract alone where explanatory phrases have been put in brackets, and in all two hundred and thirty-four words are used for the purpose. This excessive reliance on explanatory phrases within the text of the translation weakens the confidence of the reader in the rendering and interrupts his communication with the original.

I reproduce now the translation given in *Tafhim al-Qur'an* (vol. I, pages 530-537).

ان میں سے بعض لوگ ایسے ہیں جو کان لگا کر تمہاری بات سننے میں مگر حال یہ ہے کہ ہم نے ان کے دلوں پر پردے ڈال رکھے ہیں جن کی وجہ سے وہ اس کو کچھ نہیں سمجھتے اور ان کے کانوں میں گرائی ڈال دی ہے (کہ سب کچھ سننے پر بھی کچھ نہیں سُننے)۔

وہ خواہ کوئی نشانہ دیکھ لیں، اس پر ایمان لا کر نہ دیں گے۔ حد یہ ہے کہ جب وہ تمہارے پاس آ کر تم سے جھگڑتے ہیں تو ان میں سے جن لوگوں نے انکار کا فیصلہ کر لیا ہے وہ (ساری باتیں سننے کے بعد) یہی کہتے ہیں کہ یہ ایک داستانِ پارینہ کے سوا کچھ نہیں۔ وہ اس امرِ حق کو قبول کرنے سے لوگوں کو روکتے ہیں اور خود بھی اس سے دُور بھاگتے ہیں۔ (وہ سمجھتے ہیں کہ اس حرکت سے وہ تمہارا کچھ بگاڑ رہے ہیں) حالانکہ دراصل وہ خدا اپنی ہی تباہی کا سامان کر رہے ہیں مگر انہیں اس کا شعور نہیں ہے۔ کاش تم اس وقت کی حالت دیکھ سکتے جب وہ دوزخ کے کنارے کھڑے کئے جائیں گے۔ اس وقت وہ کہیں گے کہ کاش کوئی صورت ایسی ہو کہ ہم دنیا میں واپس بھیجے جائیں اور اپنے رب کی نشانیں کو نہ جھٹلائیں اور ایمان لانے والوں میں شامل ہوں۔ درحقیقت یہ بات وہ محض اس وجہ سے کہیں گے کہ جس حقیقت پر انہوں نے پردہ ڈال رکھا تھا وہ اس وقت بے نقاب ہو کر ان کے سامنے آچکی ہوگی۔ ورنہ اگر انہیں سابق زندگی کی طرف واپس بھیجا جائے تو پھر وہی سب کچھ کریں جس سے انہیں منہ کیا گیا ہے۔ وہ تو ہیں ہی جھوٹے (اس لئے اپنی خواہش کے اظہار میں بھی جھوٹ ہی سے کام لیں گے)۔ آج یہ لوگ کہتے ہیں کہ زندگی جو کچھ بھی ہے بس یہی دنیا کی زندگی ہے اور ہم مرنے کے بعد ہرگز دوبارہ نہ اٹھائے جائیں گے۔ کاش وہ منظر تم دیکھ سکو جب یہ اپنے رب کے سامنے کھڑے کئے جائیں گے۔ اس وقت ان کا رب ان سے پوچھے گا ”کیا یہ حقیقت نہیں ہے؟“ یہ کہیں گے ”ہاں اے ہمارے رب، یہ حقیقت ہی ہے۔“ وہ فرمائے گا ”اچھا، تو اب اپنے انکارِ حقیقت کی پاداش میں عذاب کا مزا چکھو۔“

نقصان میں پڑ گئے وہ لوگ جنہوں نے اللہ سے اپنی ملاقات کی اطلاع کو جھوٹ قرار دیا۔ جب وہ گھڑی آجائے گی تو یہی لوگ کہیں گے ”افسوس! ہم سے اس معاملے میں کیسی تقصیر ہوئی!“ اور ان کا حال یہ ہوگا کہ اپنی پیٹھوں پر اپنے گناہوں کا بوجھ لادے ہوئے ہوں گے۔ دیکھو! کیسا بُرا بوجھ ہے جو یہ اٹھا رہے ہیں۔ دنیا کی زندگی تو ایک کھیل

اور ایک تماشہ ہے۔ حقیقت میں آخرت ہی کا مقام اُن لوگوں کے لئے بہتر ہے جزایا کا ری سے بچنا چاہتے ہیں، پھر کیا تم لوگ عقل سے کام نہ لو گے ؟

اے محمد ! ہمیں معلوم ہے کہ جو باتیں یہ لوگ بناتے ہیں ان سے بہتیں رنج ہوتا ہے لیکن یہ لوگ بہتیں نہیں ٹھٹھلاتے بلکہ یہ ظالم دراصل اللہ کی آیات کا انکار کر رہے ہیں۔ تم سے پہلے بھی بہت سے رسول ٹھٹھلائے جا چکے ہیں، مگر اس تکذیب پر اور اُن اذیتوں پر جو انہیں پہنچانی گئیں، انہوں نے صبر کیا، یہاں تک کہ انہیں ہماری مدد پہنچ گئی۔ اللہ کی باتوں کو بدلنے کی طاقت کسی میں نہیں ہے، اور پچھلے رسولوں کے ساتھ جو کچھ پیش آیا اُس کی خبریں بہتیں پہنچ ہی چکی ہیں۔ تاہم اگر ان لوگوں کی بے رخی تم سے برداشت نہیں ہوتی تو اگر تم میں کچھ زور ہے تو زمین میں کوئی مُرنِگ ڈھونڈو یا آسمان میں سیڑھی لگاؤ اور ان کے پاس کوئی نشانی لانے کی کوشش کرو۔ اگر اللہ چاہتا تو ان سب کو ہدایت پر جمع کر سکتا تھا۔ لہذا نادان مت بنو۔ دعوت حق پر لبیک وہی لوگ کہتے ہیں جو سُسنے والے ہیں۔ رہے مُردے، تو انہیں تو اللہ بس قبروں ہی سے اٹھائے گا، اور پھر وہ (اس کی عدالت میں پیش ہونے کے لئے) واپس لائے جائیں گے۔

The language of this translation has undergone a dramatic transformation. It has been relieved of all archaic and pretentious phraseology. There is nothing complicated or pedantic in any of the words or phrases and the translation follows its own course almost without interruption. The parentheses have not all disappeared. There are some fifty words in parentheses at five places, but they do not explain the translated words, they merely provide links in communication and heighten the rhythm of the language. The reader no longer needs any explanatory notes. He does not have to rearrange any words or to restructure any sentence. The meanings of the original are conveyed to him with a directness and simplicity unknown in any of the earlier translations. It was this quality of translation which helped me to translate the original into English in the following words:

“There are some among them who lend you their ears,
but they are dull of hearing and their hearts are muffled,
so nothing penetrates into their mind.
Let them be shown any sign, they will not believe.

They come to you only to dispute.
And the disbelievers among them
dismiss what you tell them as nothing but old tales.
They do not allow themselves to be persuaded by truth
and dissuade the others too.
But do not think that they harm your cause,
they only harm themselves, though they do not know.
Imagine them standing on the brink of Hell
when they will say: if only we could
return to the earth, we will join the believers,
and defy the signs of God no more.
Not that they mean this.
What else can they say confronted with what they denied?
Were they to be sent back, they
will do exactly what they used to do.
They are but liars.
Here they claim; this is the only life we have
and we shall not be raised after we die.
If only you could see them arraigned before their Lord,
'Is this not the truth?' He will ask,
and they will submit, 'Yes, O Lord.'
'Well then', He will ordain, 'suffer
now the consequences of your disbelief.'
Lost are those who deny the return to
God till the hour is upon them.
Then they exclaim; Oh, what a terrible mistake we made!
There they are with their sins on their backs.
Look, what a frightful burden they bear!
Life is but transient pleasure.
The Hereafter is a better abode for the righteous.
Do you not understand this?
We know you are grieved by what they say.
They denounce not you but the message of God.
Before you too the prophets were denounced.
But they suffered patiently till We came to their rescue.
No one can change the words of God.
And you know something of what the prophets had to go through.
Do you find the indifference of the people unbearable?
Then, if you have the strength,
raise a ladder to the sky
or dig a tunnel into the earth and
find them some convincing proof?
Had God willed it so they would
all have submitted to guidance.

Let there be no mistake,
 only those who hear respond to the call.
 As for the dead, they will remain
 in their graves till they are raised by God.
 And to Him they shall return."

(6: 25-36)

V

The Mandate

I shall conclude by recounting a recent experience. I had gone to participate in the First World Educational Conference in Makka in April 1977. The Conference provided me with a rare opportunity to spend several days and nights in the Ka'bah. I always carried the first volume of *Tafhim al-Qur'ān* with me and was able to translate parts of *Sūrah al-Fātiḥah*. Mawlānā says that the word *Fātiḥah* means commencement or introduction. He explains that *Sūrah al-Fātiḥah* is a prayer which man has learnt from God and he begins his study of the Qur'ān with this prayer. Man prays for what he wants with the conviction that the One to whom the prayer is addressed is capable of granting his prayer. Mawlānā then suggests that the real relationship between *Sūrah al-Fātiḥah* and the rest of the Qur'ān is not that of an introduction to the book and the book itself. It is a relationship between prayer and the response to the prayer. *Sūrah al-Fātiḥah* is man's prayer to God and the Qur'ān is God's response to that prayer. Man says to God, guide me, and God places before him the whole of the Qur'ān for this guidance. I had read this several times but I understood its real meaning during a moment of prayer in the Ka'bah.

I was sitting on Mount Ṣafā and I could see the dome above me decorated with stained glass bearing certain verses of the Qur'ān. In front of me up to Mount Marwa were two streams of men and women draped in white: they came in groups, in pairs, and individually, chanting and raising their arms, moving restlessly, reaching out – now quickening their pace a little and now slowing down. It was as if the whole of humanity was on the march.

The first night after performing the 'umrah I sat by the side of the Ka'bah praying. The long black cloth, relieved by inscriptions in Arabic, smoothly descended to the marble floor, its ends held by large brass rings. Behind me was a caravan of people going round the Ka'bah, but as I sat facing the wall of the Ka'bah I could only see the shadows delineated in front of me, bobbing silhouettes, hollow figures in varying configurations, fleeting across the dimly-lit expanse of the wall of the Ka'bah. It was the ceaselessness of the movement of shadows which captivated me. All these shadows were hastening in breathless pursuit of something unknown. They leaned and pressed forward as if there was not a moment to be lost. What were they all seeking, these people, these figures, these shadows? They seemed to moan

and cry, and plead and pray. Were they seeking wealth, fame, success or eminence? Were they asking for power and glory? The few words that I could catch, now and then, seemed to be words of sorrow. The ceaseless motion seemed to turn into an act of ceaseless repentance. They had lost contact with mundane life. This loss of contact might not be permanent but for the moment it seemed to stretch itself into infinity through perpetual motion, and was symbolised not just by the shadows before me but by the memory of unknown figures of men, women and children of all ages, colours and climates receding into antiquity.

There was not a moment when people were not going in a circle round the Ka'bah or walking up and down between the two Mounts, except when the call for prayer rose to the skies and rebounded from the hills. Then a sudden silence descended upon the vast multitude. All movement ceased and the hollow shadows crystallised dramatically into a single act of submission. The prayer over, the restlessness began all over again.

“Worship does not lie in facing toward the East or the West.” Here in the Ka'bah people stand facing the Ka'bah at all angles and from all directions. There is no *Imām* in front of you. You hear him reciting the verses of the Qur'ān as if from nowhere. There is no intermediary between God and man. They all form a circle round the House of God and I can visualise this circle expanding, its orbit widening, ring after ring, row after row, until it encompasses the whole universe – the direction, even the geographical location ceasing to have any relevance. An act of individual submission is thus transformed into an act of universal submission.

In *Sūrah al-Fātiḥah* man prays to God for guidance. This prayer represents man's discovery of perfect expression in a moment of awareness of reality. The divine attributes of mercy and compassion are extolled in the introductory verse. The first verse appeals to God, to Whom all praise is due as the God of the Universe, not of any particular race or nation. He creates and nourishes the worlds and ensures their development to a state of perfection, a state characterised by balance, moderation, tolerance, beauty and charity. The second verse mentions the two attributes which sustain all that is created by God – grace and mercy, both infinite and inexhaustible. We then come to the point of final judgment on man's conduct. Each man gets what he earns, thus establishing the principle of accountability. The fourth verse is a complete charter of human liberty and dignity. Man enters into a covenant with God which excludes all other helpers and masters. He breaks off all bonds of subservience at one stroke and proclaims that to God alone will he bow in obedience and to Him alone will he turn for help. I recall the moment when I first realised the significance of this verse: “We worship You alone and to You alone we turn for help”. It was a moment of freedom when all fear disappeared, and within me I felt a great resurgence of confidence and faith. *Sūrah al-Fātiḥah* is divided into two movements. The first culminates in the third verse, followed by an affirmation of

relationship in the fourth, bringing man into direct communion with God, and in the last three verses man makes his choice in favour of good. He beseeches God for guidance. In the last two verses man places himself in the mirrors of time and sees what would happen if he were to lose faith and prays devoutly that he may be spared the anguish of those who were led astray, and asks for guidance to the path of those who were blessed.

As groups of people return to Mount Şafâ from Marwa, they raise their arms heavenward trying to catch a glimpse of the Ka'bah, acknowledging, as it were, that they had been shown the right path. It was at this precise moment that I realised what Mawlânâ meant by suggesting that man prays to God in *Sûrah al-Fâtiḥah* and God places the whole of the Qur'ân before him for his guidance. Here for the first time I experienced how God's promise of providing guidance to man had been fulfilled. Man had been given a complete mandate, and, having achieved a level of enlightenment and emancipation, it was now his responsibility to execute the terms of the mandate according to his own judgment.

Mawlānā Abul A'ālā Mawdūdī

The Man, the Scholar, the Reformer

Allahbukhsh K. Brohi

I

I FIRST heard the name of Mawlānā Abul A'ālā Mawdūdī before the partition of the subcontinent which, as is well known, took place in August 1947 and it seems to me in retrospect that the circumstances in which his name came to be mentioned have a great deal to do with the way I came, in the days that were to follow, to regard him both as a man and as a scholar. It was my spiritual Father, the late Dr. 'Allāma I. I. Kazi (subsequently the first Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sind) who first introduced his name to me. I can recall very vividly to this day that scene: he had a pamphlet in his hand written in Urdu and to this he drew my attention. The pamphlet was captioned: *Musālmān awr Mawjūdah Siyāsī Kashmakash*, which, when freely translated in English would mean: "the Muslims and the present political conflict". Not only was the name of its author mentioned respectfully by 'Allāma Kazi but he actually read out a great deal of the pamphlet to me, interrupting his reading of it by interpolations of his personal comments which were aimed at offering an interpretation of its significance by way of a sort of running commentary. From this I gathered the impression that Father Kazi had considerable respect for the scholarship of Mawlānā Mawdūdī. Up to then I was of the opinion that the only Muslim thinker he respected was the late 'Allāma Mashriqī who in those days was directing the Khāksār movement. Father Kazi had a good deal of admiration for Mashriqī's approach to the religious and political problems with which the Muslims of the subcontinent were then confronted. Although I had developed considerable respect for the view-point of 'Allāma Kazi about whatever he had to say to me, I had my own reservations about the ultimate success of the Khāksār movement and naturally on that account I did not myself join it, although it was largely under Father Kazi's influence that some of the students who were my college-mates in those

days joined that movement in large numbers. When Father Kazi, therefore, began to mention the contribution that Mawdūdī had made in that pamphlet by clarifying the real political issues that were at stake I naturally turned my attention to his writings and began to cultivate a direct acquaintance with such of his works as were available to me in Karachi. I did this to obtain for myself such guidance as could be furnished by him for the solution of the political problem which at that time was confronting the Muslims of the subcontinent. I distinctly remember till this day the generous compliments that were paid to Mawdūdī by Father Kazi and I know of no Muslim scholar of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent about whom he had spoken to me so enthusiastically either before that occasion or afterwards.

I must mention here in this context that Father Kazi himself was a scholar of considerable magnitude and his exposition of the essentials of Islam was a source of great enlightenment to me. Indeed, for me he symbolised in his person the Muslim ideal as I had come to comprehend it: he was also our *Imām* and we used to say our Friday prayers behind him in the Mosque of the Jinnah Courts – then called Sir Leslie Wilson Hostel – situated at Kutcheri Road, Karachi. His congregational addresses were listened to with a great deal of admiration and respect by the Muslim student community of that time. He remains to this day the most decisive influence that there has been upon my own mental make-up and development.

II

When Pakistan was established Mawdūdī's name became a household word and his writings began to exert immense influence upon the life and thoughts of the people of Pakistan to an extent that is difficult to describe in mere words. Here was a new state that had come into being in which the Muslims of the subcontinent were going to lay the foundation of a radically new socio-political order to enable themselves and their posterity to practise the teachings of Islam both at the individual as well as the collective plane of their existence. And who could conceivably help them to do this better than a Muslim scholar of the rank and type that Mawdūdī was, a scholar well-versed in the elements of religious knowledge? He had been for many years before a diligent crusader for the recognition of the cause for the establishment of a state which was to reflect in our own time the economico-political institutions by means of which Islamic values and ideals were going to be realised. Was the establishment of the state of Pakistan not going to provide for our people, under his influence and guidance the opportunity of organising an Islamic State as a political institution?

I continued to study the writings as well as the utterances of Mawlānā Mawdūdī and followed the activities of the political party called *Jamā'at-i*

Islāmi which had been founded by him as far back as August, 1941, but which had, with the coming into being of the State of Pakistan, acquired considerable prestige and following. As a young practising lawyer I was too busy in those days with my professional work to be able to find the necessary time and energy to cultivate more than what might be called a "nodding acquaintance" with whatever was happening in the country. Things were moving fast and it was difficult to keep pace with the march of events, and although I took an intelligent interest in the political developments that were taking place all over the country I did not *actively participate* in political life nor did I develop even that type of desultory curiosity about men and affairs which invariably leads one to take a vigorous part in the politics of one's country. Nor did I do much, I must admit in all sad sincerity, to function even as a publicist, just to be able to contribute effectively as a writer to the clearer understanding of the issues which were at stake in the new state that had come into being. However, despite these limitations I was not much impressed by the genuineness of the claim that was being put forward by those who were in the forefront of the struggle for responding to, what in those days was fashionably being called the need for having an Islamic State. I found that many of them had no understanding of the letter and spirit of the Qur'ān, much less of the forces which were shaping modern history, and their cry for an Islamic State to me, at any rate, appeared a mere design and a cloak on the part of many politicians to capture the attention of the uninformed multitude and push their way to the top of the political ladder, rather than to advance the cause of enlightenment and a correct understanding of whatever Islam had to say upon the theory and practice of statecraft. This was the time when a lot of public debate was going on as to the *type of constitution* that the country was going to have and both from the press as well as from the public platform a great deal was being said as to what the Qur'ān had to say about it. It was somehow believed that if only an Islamic constitution, as the politicians understood it, was to be given to the country, all our problems somehow would be solved.

I wrote an article in 1952 in which I raised the question, much in the way in which professionally trained lawyers do, that constitutional proposals that were actually being made by the '*ulamā*', were not in keeping with the letter and spirit of Islam and that, at any rate, upon the issues that were being debated viz. whether the state should be unitary or federal, whether it should be of the parliamentary or presidential type, or what should be the limitation on franchise, or what in particular should be the form of government conformably to which the division and distribution of sovereign power within the state could take place, the Holy Qur'ān had nothing specific to say. I believed then, as now, that the Holy Qur'ān merely emphasises certain values and goals which the believers are called upon to realise, but the form of government they ought to establish has nothing to

do with all that, and that at the most these matters had to be incorporated in the preamble to the constitution rather than reflected in the designing of the machinery of government for tackling the problems of modern statecraft.

This article of mine provoked a great deal of controversy, not much of which I must admit was complimentary to me personally and what was even worse, the problem raised by me was never effectively answered; instead, all kinds of judgments were passed against me with regard to my credentials of being a good Muslim and my competence to talk about the Qur'ān, and so on and so forth. The curious thing was that many of these criticisms came from the rank and file of *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* workers but although they had a lot of emotional fervour and, I have no doubt, even a great deal of sincerity about the uncomplimentary things they had to say against me personally, they never came anywhere near to answering the question as to what the Holy Qur'ān had to say about the proposals of a strictly constitutional kind which could be submitted to the then Constituent Assembly for its consideration and eventual adoption and incorporation in the future constitution of Pakistan – beyond of course that we “obey God, obey the Prophet and those who are in command of your affairs” or that all authority must be exercised upon a “consultative basis” (see Qur'ān 4:60 and 42:39). This anyhow did not amount to saying much about the making of constitutional proposals considering that in the mid-twentieth century all that had become the irreducible minimum requirement of any constitution which was to be regarded as republican.

III

Somehow in the world of Islam down through the ages there have been two types of approach to the problem of reform within the Muslim community. One is the type of approach which has been sponsored by the jurists (*fuqahā'*), and this is based upon their unconditional and uncompromising advocacy of the *adoption of Islamic law* as a source of enlightenment and guidance for providing the *ummah* with a framework within which it could evolve in a desirable mould just to be able progressively to reflect the Muslim ideal. The other type is the approach of the reformer which stresses more the value and importance of *reclaiming the individual by so transforming his character by the awakening in him of the Islamic ethical spirit that he reflects in his personal life all the virtues, and reflects the values that Islam as a universal religion of mankind has emphasised*. This latter class of reformer invariably comes from the camp of the *fuqarā'*, the great *mujtahids* and the *shaiyks*, the founders of the schools of *taṣawwuf*. They have believed that the world problem is an individual problem and that the way to solve the problem of collective life is to reclaim the individual in the light of the teachings of the Prophet (peace be on him). The strategy of Islam is first to purify

the believers and make of them a band of righteous and pious people and this, as anyone can see, has little to do with institutional devices which may have to be improvised to induce in the believers a sort of mechanical conformity to the law. Law, too, according to them has a value but then, that by itself, seems to secure merely the conformity of the external conduct of the believer with the law but has no *lasting effect upon him in transforming his character*. In the long run the real transformation of the man alone is productive of any valuable and lasting good – and this comes from the conscious intention of the believer to act freely according to law. Although I am a lawyer myself, I have instinctively believed in the efficaciousness of the approach of the latter type of reformer. I am somewhat suspicious of the efficaciousness of the law-enforcing devices which are aimed to manipulate mechanically the will of citizens to get at any worthwhile results. I am profoundly convinced that although Islam is primarily *law* it is the formation of the *niyah* in the heart of the Muslim (*qalb salim*, to borrow the Qur'ānic expression) who obeys that law *freely, intelligently and consciously* which seems to be the most decisive element in the strategy of Islam to reclaim the individual. *Niyah* (intention) alone counts and it is emphasis upon this *niyah*, rather than upon mechanical conformity to the law viewed as an externally-induced mode of behaviour, which has been responsible for such solid progress as Islam has made down the ages. The Qur'ān, unlike for example the Law of Moses, does not partake of the character of the famous ten commandments. It is the *Furqān* (criterion) and fosters in us a sense of discrimination to be able to reach the higher excellences of life. Capacity for discrimination is born of understanding, of knowledge, of learning and this disposition can never be engendered successfully when life is mechanically manipulated in the service of an externally-induced code of behaviour.

I was in my early 30s in those days and had no previous experience of participating in a religious or as a matter of fact in any sort or form of public controversy. I ignored the criticism and allowed my critics to have their full say. But these very critics when they came in contact with me discovered for themselves that I was somehow not the sort of person they had taken me to be and began to show personal regard and even at times affection for me. Some even began to believe that I had developed devotion for Islam as a result of their criticism and that before Pakistan had come into being, somehow I was not as good a Muslim as I had afterwards, thanks to their enlightening attacks upon my person, turned out to be; and so on and so forth.

IV

I have given this background in order to enable the reader to have a true perspective before him – a perspective in which to evaluate my personal response to the personality of Mawlānā Mawdūdī as a reformer. He was at the head of a political movement, the inspiring genius who had founded

the monthly *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān* in which his views about Islam and what it had to say upon questions relating to the law and constitution of a Muslim state were put forward with a great deal of vigour and clarity. That he was a scholar of enormous range and proportions and was a man of unimpeachable character, was the most obvious thing for anyone to see. But I, somehow, felt that much of his historical relevance to the problem of redeeming the people of Pakistan from their political predicament was being gravely undermined by the well-meaning but at the same time, by and large, too emotional a class of political workers that had thronged the rank and file of *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*, the political party he was leading. Of course there were honourable exceptions to the rank and file of the uninformed following which he had built up and it is invariably to these elements that any party that counts owes much of its prestige and importance.

In April 1953 I was appointed, with neither any prior notification, nor my consent, as a Minister for Law in the Government of Pakistan and it became my lot to become directly involved in the problem of constitution-making. I participated in the party-meetings of the Muslim League and I piloted the Basic Principles Committee's report in the Constituent Assembly and defended the concept of an Islamic State conformably to my own convictions, namely that Islam did not advocate any particular *form* of government and that what mattered in the last resort was not the *form of the government* so much as the *spirit in which the operations of government were conducted to reflect the Islamic ideals of equality, justice, democracy, social welfare, etc.* As it was, long before I arrived upon the political scene, the proposals of the Basic Principles Committee had been published in which parliamentary democracy of the Westminster type was advocated by its authors as being compatible with Islam. The constitution of 1956 was, later on, more or less modelled upon the premises of these very recommendations. And yet this constitution claimed that Pakistan was going to be an Islamic Republic. Everyone who had advocated an Islamic constitution was dissatisfied and the argument against the constitution was that its makers had borrowed 90% of its provisions from the Government of India Act, 1935.

This was about the time when as a result of the first anti-Qādiyāni agitation in the Punjab, Martial Law had to be imposed by the government of the day to counteract the large-scale violence and disorder that had spread everywhere in the Punjab in March 1953. A threat had been posed to the stability of the political society and the solidarity of the nation and it was at my suggestion as the Central Law Minister that a special tribunal was constituted by the Government of the Punjab on 19th June, 1953 to enquire into:

- (1) the circumstances leading to the declaration of Martial Law in Lahore on 6th March, 1953;
- (2) the responsibility for the disturbances; and

- (3) the adequacy or otherwise of the measures taken by the provincial civil authorities to prevent, and subsequently to deal with, the disturbances.

The two gentlemen who were singled out for the purpose of constituting the Tribunal were the then Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir and a Puisne Judge of that Court, the famous Mr. Justice Kayani. Their report is a matter of public record and knowledge and if the findings given by them in their report are not being recapitulated by me here, it is only because they are not strictly relevant for the purposes I have in mind – which is merely to depict Mawlānā Mawdūdī as a man, scholar and reformer. But I should like to mention in this context that the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* published a book embodying therein its criticism of the findings of the Tribunal. They questioned the premises on which the findings of the Tribunal had been grounded. Both of these documents, that is the Martial Law Inquiry Report and its criticism are of considerable importance to the students of Pakistan's constitutional history as they help one to understand the character of the controversy which had been raging in this country for quite some time, and the logic of which has had such a great impact upon the making of various constitutions so that they have been brought to the fore by the people of Pakistan again and again.

It cannot be disputed that today, Pakistan, with regard to what is contained in the Constitution enacted in 1973, professedly, at any rate, is an Islamic State and that every organ of the state that has been set up to frame the constitution has been influenced by the consideration that the policy of Pakistan had somehow to reflect the aspiration of the people of Pakistan, which is to uphold and maintain the Islamic way of life. *And the credit for that achievement must go to Mawlānā Mawdūdī and to him alone.*

Any impartial student of Pakistan's history will have to admit that the one person responsible for mobilising public opinion in favour of establishing a state which was to reflect the Muslim ideal was none other than Mawlānā Mawdūdī. It is useful to recall in this context that the Mawlānā has had to make considerable sacrifices to be able to pursue his point of view upon these and various other public questions. He is undoubtedly a courageous man and his scholarship and learning are not a cloistered virtue which have been practised by him as if in an insulated chamber. His greatest achievement is that he carried on his crusade, both as a scholar and reformer, not in a cosy and comfortable academic forum but in the arena of the noisy streets of Pakistan. He had put forward as far back as 1948 his famous "Four-points demand" which was to be the platform on which he was to take his stand to secure the support of the people at large for establishing an Islamic order in Pakistan. This four-points demand filled the air of those days and both from the columns of the daily press and public platform a relentless

struggle was waged to get the men in power to acknowledge the force of those demands and when on 12th March, 1949, the famous Objectives Resolution was passed by the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan everyone in the country knew that it was to be construed as a personal triumph of Mawlānā Mawdūdī. This was the Resolution in which were set forth the ideals and values which the constitution makers in Pakistan in 1956, 1962, 1972 and 1973 were to keep in view while designing the structure and the apparatus of state machinery for establishing an Islamic order in the country.

Mawlānā Mawdūdī has suffered long terms of imprisonment for his courage to adhere to his convictions. He was imprisoned from 4th October, 1948 to 20th May, 1950 under what are called in Pakistan the laws of preventive detention. Laws of preventive detention provide that the liberty of a citizen can be taken away if some petty official named in the statute is satisfied that it is in the interest of public safety to do so. There need be no trial to prove the accusation against the *détenu*. And it was during Mawlānā Mawdūdī's incarceration in jail that the Constituent Assembly passed the Objectives Resolution which was subsequently to be adopted as a Preamble not only in the Constitution of 1956, but also in all subsequent constitutional instruments like that of 1962 given by the late President Ayub Khan and in the interim constitution of 1972 and the present constitution of 1973 given to the country by the National Parliament under the leadership of the People's Party. Indeed, in all these constitutions, substantially considered, the principles of policy enunciated by the Mawlānā on which, according to him the state of Pakistan was to conduct its affairs, have been accepted, the most notable of these being that the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam are to be fully observed.

After the passing of the Objectives Resolution in 1949, various committees that were set up by the first Constituent Assembly to tackle various aspects of the constitution-making problem, began to engage themselves in what might be called "dilatatory tactics", and so it appeared to the students of public affairs as if the task of constitution-making was being put in cold storage and nothing material was going to be done to enact the constitution conformably to the grammar of the Objectives Resolution. All kinds of criticism were afloat which more or less tended to show that since there were various schools of Islamic thought in Pakistan, it was impossible to establish an Islamic policy. The problem of evolving a consensus amongst the '*ulamā*', representing various schools in regard to the nature of the proposed constitution for Pakistan had, therefore, become a difficult task. It would appear that in order to meet this criticism, there was organised a conference of the representatives of various schools of religious thought viz. *Deobandī*, *Barelvi*, *Ahl-i Hadīth* and *Shi'ah*. At this conference the '*ulamā*' formulated a compendium of 22 principles which, according to

these representatives, were to be regarded as the irreducible minimum requirements of a modern Islamic state, and they invited the representatives of the people sitting in the Constituent Assembly to give effect to their recommendations. The following are the principles that were thus evolved :

- (1) Ultimate sovereignty over all Nature and Law belongs to Allah *Rabb al-'Ālamin*.
- (2) The law of the land shall be based on the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, and no law shall be passed nor any administrative order issued which would be in conflict with the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*.

Explanatory notes:

If there be any laws in force in the country which are in conflict with the Qur'ān or the *Sunnah*, it would be necessary to lay down (in the constitution) that such laws shall be gradually, within a specified period, amended in conformity with the Islamic Law, or repealed.

- (3) The State shall be based not on geographical, linguistic or any other materialistic concepts but on the principles and objectives of the Islamic scheme of life.
- (4) It shall be incumbent upon the State to uphold the right (*ma'rūf*) and suppress the wrong (*munkar*) as postulated in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, to take all necessary measures for the revival and exaltation of the tenets of Islam, and to make provision for Islamic education in accordance with the requirements of the various recognised schools of thought.
- (5) It shall be incumbent upon the State to strengthen the bonds of unity and brotherhood among all the Muslims of the world and to inhibit among the Muslim citizens of the State the growth of all tendencies born of un-Islamic prejudices towards distinctions on the basis of race, language, territory or other materialistic considerations, so as to preserve and strengthen the unity of the *millah islāmīyah*.
- (6) It shall be the responsibility of the government to guarantee the provision of basic human necessities, i.e. food, clothing, housing, medical relief and education to all citizens irrespective of religion or race, who are temporarily or permanently incapable of earning their livelihood due to unemployment, sickness or other reasons.
- (7) The citizens shall be entitled to all the rights conferred on them by the Islamic law, i.e. they shall be assured, within the limits of the law, of full security of life, property and honour, freedom of religion and belief, freedom of worship, freedom of person, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of occupation, equality of opportunity and the right to benefit from public services.
- (8) No citizen shall at any time be deprived of these rights except under the law, and none shall be awarded any punishment on any charge

without being given full opportunity of defence and without the decision of a court of law.

- (9) The recognised Muslim schools of thought shall have, within the limits of the law, complete religious freedom, the right to impart religious instruction to their followers, and shall have the freedom to propagate their views. Matters relating to their personal status shall be administered in accordance with their respective codes of jurisprudence (*Fiqh*). It will be desirable to make provision for the administration of such matters by their respective *qādis*.
- (10) The non-Muslim citizens of the State shall, within the limits of the law, have complete freedom of religion and worship, mode of life, culture and religious education. They shall be entitled to have matters relating to their personal status administered in accordance with their own religious laws, usages and customs.
- (11) All obligations assumed by the State within the limits of the *Shari'ah* towards the non-Muslim citizens shall be fully honoured. They shall be entitled equally with the Muslim citizens to the rights of citizenship as enunciated in paragraph 7.
- (12) The Head of the State must be a male Muslim in whose piety, ability and soundness of judgment the people or their elected representatives have confidence.
- (13) The responsibility for the administration of the State shall primarily vest in the Head of the State, although he may delegate any part of his powers to any individual or body.
- (14) Governance by the Head of the State shall not be autocratic but consultative (*shūrā'i*), i.e., he will discharge his duties in consultation with persons holding responsible positions in the government and with the elected representatives of the people.
- (15) The Head of the State shall have no right to suspend the constitution wholly or partly or to run the administration in any other way but on a consultative basis.
- (16) The body empowered to elect the Head of the State shall also be empowered to remove him by a majority of votes.
- (17) In respect to civic rights, the Head of the State is not above the law.
- (18) All citizens, whether members of the government, officials or private persons, shall be subject to the same laws which shall be applied to all by the same courts of law.
- (19) The judiciary shall be separate from and independent of the executive in the discharge of its duties.
- (20) The propagation and publicity of such views and ideologies as are calculated to undermine the basic principles and fundamentals of the Islamic State shall be prohibited.
- (21) The various zones or regions of the country shall be considered administrative units of a single State. They shall not be racial,

linguistic or tribal units but only administrative areas which may be given such powers under the supremacy of the Centre as may be necessary for administrative convenience. They shall not have the right to secede.

- (22) No interpretation of the constitution which is in conflict with the provisions of the Qur'ān or the *Sunnah* shall be valid.

On 28th March, 1953 on account of his alleged complicity in the anti-Qādiyānī agitation to which reference has already been made, Mawlānā Mawdūdī was once again arrested and detained. This preventive action was justified by the government professedly in order to combat a situation created by large-scale lawlessness and disturbances that had broken out in the Punjab, and to prevent it from spreading to the rest of West Pakistan. A trial was held by a Martial Law Court *in camera* and Mawlānā Mawdūdī was condemned to death by hanging – ostensibly for the part he played in taking a resolute stand on the Qādiyānī question in a pamphlet that he had written. Subsequently, when one of the officers of the Government apparently under instructions from the high-ups approached him to apply for commutation of his death sentence and to appeal for mercy, Mawlānā Mawdūdī came out with a clear-cut “NO” to the suggestion that had been made. Indeed the whole episode of this type of offer and its rejection reminds one of what is said to have occurred in antiquity when Socrates, having been unjustly condemned was approached by the Government of the day through his friend Crito to escape from punishment, had firmly declined the offer. In the meantime, as a result of public pressure, the government itself felt constrained to commute his sentence of death and upon a petition for a *habeas corpus* that was filed on his behalf, the High Court eventually ordered his release on 25th May, 1955.

When the Munir Enquiry Report referred to above had come out as has been mentioned earlier, an analysis of the Munir Report by way of rebuttal was attempted by *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*, and it is widely believed that the thinking behind the criticism was that of Mawlānā Mawdūdī. The following extract from that *Analysis* which is in answer to the plea that had been made by the Munir Enquiry Report for a *radical interpretation of Islam to bring it into conformity with contemporary thought so that Pakistan might be favourably regarded by world opinion* is being cited by the present writer to highlight the *tenacity and cogency with which that contention was repudiated by the Mawlānā and the plea for a re-interpretation of Islam to adapt it to modern conditions was adequately answered*:

If anybody wants to reorient or reconstruct Islam, let him do so. His efforts will be welcomed, provided he proves on the basis of sound arguments which parts of Islam are lifeless, why they are lifeless, and on which grounds they can be changed and also, which are its vital

and living parts and in which form he wants to retain them. But he should grasp two things thoroughly. Firstly, we can obtain decisions from the law-courts in our law suits but we cannot be forced to accept their decision on ideological issues. Secondly, a Muslim might be convinced if the arguments are based upon the Qur'ân and the *Sunnah*. But if Islam is placed before America, Britain, India and the other leaders of the "international fraternity" and they are requested to cut off from it whatever they dislike, to retain whatever they like and to add whatever they consider necessary; and after these improvements, amendments, substitutions, additions and subtractions, something is presented to the Muslims in the name of "Islam", however much it may appeal to certain high officials and the prosperous class, for an ordinary Muslim there would be no other way to greet it than with a flat rejection. . . .

V

Subsequently when the Constitution of 1956 was abrogated and Martial Law was re-imposed by President Ayyûb, Mawdûdî continued his crusade against the arbitrary imposition of Martial Law and with due diligence continued to champion the cause of having Islamic order established in the country. He did so with a great deal of firmness, particularly in view of the rumour which was given considerable currency in those dark days that the Army-sponsored rule that had been imposed by President Ayyûb in October 1958 would establish a *secular state* in Pakistan. In answer to a questionnaire drawn up by the Shahabuddin Constitution Commission which had been appointed by President Ayyûb to elicit opinion and information as to the reasons for the failure of the parliamentary system of government in Pakistan and to receive proposals upon the remedial measures that could be adopted in any future constitution for the restoration of democracy and human rights amongst other things, Mawlânâ Mawdûdî stated the following:

Pakistan has come into being by virtue of the struggle of the common Muslims. Furthermore, next to the grace of God, it is only the determination of the common Muslims that can guarantee its existence and strength. No non-Muslim brought this country into being. It could neither have come into existence without the sacrifices of the Muslims nor can it remain and continue to exist if, God forbid, the Muslims lose hope in it and give up their determination to live and die for it. Barring a few highgrade State servants and a paltry number of people from prosperous families, the general Muslim populace desires to make and see this country flourish as an Islamic State whose laws should be Islamic, whose educational

system should be Islamic and whose culture and civilisation should be Islamic. It is for this object that the Muslims sacrificed their lives, property and honour to establish Pakistan. There can be no greater enmity towards this State than to undermine this interest of the people. After creating frustration and disillusionment among the common Muslims, what support can a handful of such people lend to this State as are embarrassed by the very name of Islam, their own religion?

When the Constitution of 1962 came, it did not have, to begin with, the provision analogous to the one which was to be found in the abrogated Constitution of 1956 viz. that Pakistan shall be an Islamic Republic, but in 1964, the 1962 Constitution was amended to say that Pakistan would be an Islamic Republic. Once again it was due largely to the advocacy of this idea by Mawlānā Mawdūdī that the constitution was so amended.

VI

On the 6th January, 1964, the then two provincial governments of the Federation of Pakistan, namely those of East Pakistan and West Pakistan declared *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* to be an unlawful association under section 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (Act XV of 1908) as Amended by Ordinance XXXI of 1960. The result of this action was that *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* ceased to function as a political party. Simultaneously with this action, prominent leaders of the party along with Mawlānā Mawdūdī were detained under the law relating to preventive detention. I received a message from Mawlānā Mawdūdī from jail where he was detained, saying that he had decided to entrust the institution and prosecution of petitions in the two High Courts for challenging the orders of the two governments entirely to my discretion and that if, for some reason, I either did not wish to undertake this professional engagement or advised against its being launched, he would abide by my decision. This was too much of a trust that was being reposed in a member of the legal profession by the head of an important political party in the country. I undertook to prosecute the two cases, one at Karachi, and the other at Dacca in the two High Courts of the two provinces *ex gratia*, without charging so much as even incidental costs that one has to incur in prosecuting litigation of this type. I undertook this professional duty as a labour of love for the simple reason that with *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* having become an illegal body it was not possible to deal with it in any way, much less to accept professional fees from it for presenting cases on its behalf.

It was during the course of my contact with some prominent *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* workers that I came to discover for myself the high degree of sincerity and earnestness with which the members of the party devoted

themselves to the party work. It was already known to me that the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* believed in strengthening the moral foundation of political action and that it was a party dedicated to the task of waging a struggle for the recognition of political, economic and other rights of the people solely by resort to constitutional means.

This was the one party that somehow did not believe in resorting to violence or in engaging itself in the employment of underhand methods, no matter how bright the prospect of a good result, in the political sense, should be.

Indeed some of the discoveries that I had made during the course of my brief encounter with the workers of the party during the conduct of these cases were heartening. I particularly wish to refer to the diligence with which they applied themselves to the task that was given to them by me and the spirit of heroic self-sacrifice with which they worked. Since the petition which I had drafted ran into over 125 foolscap typed pages, I wanted it to be printed, as several copies were required to be presented not only on the original side in the High Court but also they were required to be supplied at the eventual stage in the Supreme Court where appeals in all probability were going to be lodged for and against the decisions of the two High Courts. This was the time when the spectre of fear was haunting the land and it was an era which in our national history had come to be characterised as the 'Ayyub Era', which term signifies to the student of Pakistan's public history that it was an era of total absence of liberty or freedom. Out of over 1,200 printing houses in Karachi we could not get even one to agree to print the petition! They were, one and all, afraid of the consequences! We were really in a quandary and did not know what to do about the situation that had been thus created. Then I was told that one of the workers of the party somehow had managed to sit through the whole night and a considerable part of the day over a typewriter and had typed out the whole petition and its supporting annexures on stencil paper and the same had been mimeographed. It was also told further that the only son of this worker was ill, suffering from a serious attack of diphtheria and high fever and that in response to the frantic telephone calls he received from his wife demanding his presence, the only reply she could get from him was that not being a doctor he could not do much for the child even if he returned to his house, but somehow he felt sure that God, in whose Holy Name he was working away that night at the typewriter would see to it that his child was spared. This and other stories too numerous to record tended to show the radical transformation of the soul life of the political workers of the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* which had been wrought by the way in which that party was organised by Mawlānā Mawdūdī. During the course of hearings in Court, I even saw people thronging in huge crowds not only the court rooms but also the corridors and even the Court compound of the High Court. I saw some of them actually shedding tears,

having been overcome by a sense of sorrow that their beloved leader was being, without any justification whatever, harassed by the government of the day. Even so it is an admitted fact that during the several political elections in which *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* has taken part there have been no allegations made that any of its workers had voted as a result of corrupt inducement or had been won over or had been coerced into giving away their votes for persons other than those for whom, according to the party line, they had been asked to vote by the party high command.

We lost the case in the West Pakistan High Court but won it in the East Pakistan High Court. Eventually two sets of appeals were taken to the Supreme Court, one by the East Pakistan government and the other by *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*, and the two appeals were disposed of by the Supreme Court in favour of *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* with the eventual result that the orders passed by the two governments banning the party were annulled and the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* was allowed to function as a lawful organisation. The judgment of the Supreme Court which is reported in the Law Reports runs into over 125 closely printed pages and has been written by Full Court – each learned judge of the Court contributing a separate judgment (anyone interested in discovering for himself the nature of the controversy concerning the grounds on which the two appeals were fought out could see the judgment as it was reported in PLD 1964 S.C.).

The point of making a reference to this litigation, however, has a great deal to do with what I discovered when I came up to appear in the constitutional petitions in the nature of *habeas corpus* that had been lodged in the High Court to challenge the legality of the detention of *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* workers. The détenus were summoned to Lahore, from the various jails where they were detained, by the High Court at my request to be present during the hearing and it was then for the first time during the course of the trial that I saw Mawlānā Mawdūdī along with his team of prominent co-workers. What impressed me most about him was his calm demeanour and particularly the quiet dignity with which he sat throughout the proceedings in the court room while the cases were being argued. To my amazement I discovered that none of my clients, who numbered over a dozen *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* leaders, but I alone, was showing evident signs of strain and even of nervousness – all stemming from the concern I obviously had about the possible adverse result of the case. So far as the détenus were concerned, they seemed to have a far-away sphinx-like look, as if to suggest that they were not at all interested in whatever was going on in the Court. Of course in this company the towering figure was that of Mawlānā Mawdūdī who hardly spoke a word and even during the recess hour, when he met me with a genial smile, as far as I remember there was not much verbal communication between us.

VII

Thereafter, of course, whenever I went to Lahore or Mawlānā Mawdūdī came to Karachi there were several meetings between us and my personal devotion to him grew from day to day. The man is made of the stuff heroes are made from and is entirely different from the one you are likely to create in your mind merely from the reports you have heard about him. Even the image that emerges in one's mind when one tries to recreate his personality in terms of whatever impression his writings make upon a sensitive reader is too radically different from the one that is formed in your mind when you get to know him personally. His writings, as I am able to see them, are cast in a scholar's mould; they are calculated to present an argument with as much vigour and vitality as we all associate with the greatest prose writer of the Urdu language that Mawlānā Mawdūdī certainly is. He is a master of precision; he never uses a word too many and, in fact, I know of no other writer on religious and theological subjects in the Urdu language who presents his point of view with that degree of scholarly detachment, compactness and comprehensiveness which is a characteristic of Mawlānā Mawdūdī.

Mawlānā Mawdūdī would have made an excellent practising lawyer had he taken to the profession; I say so because I know of no counsel at the bar of Pakistan who has his method of presenting the case: he never raises his voice while he is addressing his audience and the words flow out in an even and orderly procession from the lips of the man as though he was reading out some invisible writing which is before him. He is never emotional while he is engaged in making a public speech. He never uses too many adjectives to qualify the nouns, nor too many adverbs to modify the verbs. For him green is green. It is never very green. Urdu writers, like the writers of any other oriental language, are by and large prone to indulge in the making of highly exaggerated statements, use extremely ornate expressions and tend to be more poetic than logical while they are engaged in writing prose. But Mawlānā Mawdūdī as a writer is in a class by himself. I have not read all his books but have read a considerable number of them including his *magnum opus*, the *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān*, which is a translation of and commentary on the Holy Book in six volumes, covering over 3,000 pages. I know of no scholar who has his range and breadth of learning and who is so objective when it comes to making a presentation of his ideas and convictions. Mawlānā's book *al-Jihād fī al-Islām* is probably the greatest of his works according to the considered judgment of the present writer and is likely to have a considerable impact upon the course of development of the Muslim society of the future. When one contrasts the cold reasoning which one encounters in his numerous writings with the warmth and cordiality which their author exhibits when one encounters Mawlānā

Mawdūdī in the flesh, one is bound to be impressed by the remarkable man that he turns out to be.

Even a casual look at his major works would tend to exhibit the range of his literary activity and the diversity of the topics upon which he has written. A glance at the titles of his books would tend to show that there is not an aspect of religious thought, belief and practise of the life of a Muslim in respect of which he has not made a lasting and memorable contribution.

VIII

One of the most fascinating aspects of the life of Mawlānā Mawdūdī is to understand the nature of response which the voters in Pakistan have made to his call that they vote for *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*. Whenever general elections have been fought out in the country, by and large, that response has not been in keeping with the rational expectation that in a country such as Pakistan, which has constituted itself into an Islamic Republic, a religious party that does claim to provide for the people of the country a legal, economic, political and social framework in terms of which to realise the Muslim ideal, ought to be able to elicit from the voters that measure of political support to which it could justifiably lay a claim. One may add to this the fact that the people of Pakistan are by and large religious in the sense that an appeal to their religious sentiments never goes unheeded when it comes to other spheres of human activity. Anyone who has examined carefully the problem that has been posed by the paucity of political support on the part of the average voter to a party which is admittedly led by sincere religious workers would be at a loss to explain how and why it is that *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* has not had the chance to get into office so as to be able to provide the proper type of leadership to the country for the management of its political affairs.

This is not the place at which I will undertake a detailed analysis of the factors which in my reckoning operate to explain this enigma. But a few general remarks about the inter-connection of religion and politics which are aimed at explaining certain unusual features of the situation presented by the facts of our public history may not be out of place in a sketch such as the present one, which is designed to depict and delineate the impact which the personality of Mawlānā Mawdūdī makes on the political landscape of Pakistan.

IX

To begin with, I ought to refer to a general theory of human nature to which I subscribe just to be able to explain the anatomy of human action. The motives that move men to act are far too complex to be analysed accurately. Many of us are apt to think that men are moved by rational

considerations in acting in a particular way rather than its reverse, in choosing one thing rather than the other. The development of the science of psycho-analysis has shown that the unconscious forces exert a much greater influence upon the choices we make than do our so-called conscious desires. But it is not so much of this consideration that I have at the back of my mind when I say that the relationship between motives that move men to action and their conscious desires often present conflicting appearances in the way human nature functions. If you wish to control a man's behaviour and to improve his condition, you must have a clear conception of what to do in order to achieve that result and, in particular, you should be clear about the forces you must rely upon in order to shape his character. While rationalising our own conduct we impute quite honestly, but nevertheless mistakenly, certain motivating factors which in fact have not operated at all. At first we are apt to think that our action is a result of our conscious thought and has been brought about by the efficaciousness of knowledge that we had concerning the *pros* and *cons* of the course of conduct we were going to adopt. But upon careful examination it would be found that it is rather the sentiments, preconceptions, passions, prejudices or such other supposed interests which are hardly rational, which have conditioned the response that we have made to the situation in relation to which we have acted. What happens is that our logic is itself upside down; we first embrace the conclusion which is emotionally welcome to us and then ingeniously discover reasons for accepting it.

Ninety-nine per cent of the operations of human life are anchored in the world of the unconscious and yet nearly the whole of humanity is persuaded to think that whatever it is doing, it is as a result of careful thought and planning. In short, many of us are victims of wishful thinking and do not realise that we like to believe that which somehow we wish to accept – not that we accept anything merely because we have rigorously thought about it. Somehow the moral reform of humanity is premised upon the thesis that although man has undeniably been endowed by his Creator with a Divinely-bestowed gift of reason, it is his heart which has been corrupted by his sinfulness, and it is his heart which in the last resort controls the operations of reason, and also it is that heart which hides from itself the most outstanding fact that men are, by and large, self-deceivers. A great deal of literature exists on the question relating to the mystery of self-deception to which I am alluding and the following passage from Male Branche would serve to make the point. Said he:

The passions always seek to justify themselves and persuade us insensibly that we have reasons for following them. The gratification and pleasure to which it gives rise in the mind which should be judging them, corrupt its judgment in their favour; and thus it is, one might say, that it is they which cause it to reason . . . The pas-

sions act on the imagination and the imagination thus being corrupted, works upon reason, always representing things to it, not as they are in themselves but as they are in relation to the present passion, so that it may pronounce the judgment that they desire. (See *Recherche de la Verité* Bk. VI, I, p. 562.)

This is also the theological interpretation of the evil disposition of the believers, in that it highlights the idea that even their good deeds are always promoted by unworthy motives. For instance, when a poet sings songs of praise to highlight the quality of Mercy or Beneficence of the Lord, he is virtually utilising the grand theme of Divine Grace more for winning applause for his poetical performance than for paying a sincere tribute to God. By and large, everybody acts either out of interest or vanity. There may be virtuous actions but these do not imply virtuous motives and so we have arguments such as these – one who is mild, peaceful, indulgent, good and efficacious, is not truly virtuous, and if he is so at all, it is for winning men's love rather than to obey God's commands, etc.

An attempt at honest analysis of the motives that move men into doing various acts and in making diverse choices would show that somehow it is out of an unanalysable impulse that a certain act was done or a choice was made and that the plausible reason for it was found afterwards, whereas the real reasons, of course, if they could be deciphered, would be discovered to be hardly honourable. That is how even Bernard Shaw put the problem with his characteristic candour while depicting the dilemma in which a member of the British Parliament finds himself when parliamentary decisions are to be taken. "It is we, the proprietors of munition factories", says Mr. Undershaft to his son in that famous play by Shaw entitled *Man and Superman*, "who want war; the Parliament only finds out the reasons".

The light of understanding, in short, is like the physical light: it illuminates everything but it, of itself, moves nothing. It shines but it has no strength. If men were controlled by reason they would be persuaded by philosophers rather than by orators. When it is said that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, the argument in support of the adage is not that the wielder of power is corrupt in the sense that he takes money or allows illicit considerations to operate for doing evil, but that by the sheer circumstances that he is in a position of power, his mental processes are corrupted right at their source in the sense that his faculty of reason, far from mirroring the objective character of the environment in which his lot is cast, becomes so perverting that it ministers to the illusion that he, the wielder of the power, is a sort of Super-Man who never commits an error, who never goes wrong, but that, somehow, he hears the hidden voice of truth despite appearance to the contrary, as though he were the chosen instrument of the higher destiny through whom higher purposes somehow have been ordained to prevail.

This being the psychological interpretation of human conduct we can easily understand the phenomenon that men act less by reason and more by uninformed passion. Thus one sees straight away the reason why a mere intellectual approach which a political party makes at elucidating its programme, and in persuading the bulk of voters to accept its manifesto, is doomed to failure, particularly where it is counteracted by another party that exploits their ignorance, appeals to their credulity by making exaggerated promises as though they were seriously made with a view to their eventual implementation. And in countries such as ours, where the bulk of voters is illiterate and have no comprehension of the issues which are at stake, a mere intellectual approach to induce them to give their political support to a given party is an exercise in futility.

X

This having been said there still remains the problem of understanding the question: how is it that even religious-minded persons do not, by and large, vote for *Jamā'at-i Islāmi*? But I think the explanation for this phenomenon is not far to seek. The trouble here in Pakistan is that there are many religious parties. In Pakistan, we have all kinds of political parties that claim to be religious parties in the sense that they professedly take their stand on political issues in the light of what religion says about them. But all the same, it would be noticed that all these religious parties, *inter se*, are at daggers drawn with one another and the simple-hearted religious-minded voter does not really know exactly to which particular party he should give his vote. Each religious party, with honourable exceptions, suggests the other religious parties are comprised of men who are heretics and invariably would be seen subjecting voters to a sort of spiritual intimidation to the effect that should they vote for the rival religious party they will go to Hell and stand accursed in the sight of the Lord. There are some religious parties which have no other foundation for their support except the religious *madrasahs* where the Holy Book is taught by rote and various religious subjects are taught precisely in the manner of a thousand years ago, and where instructions are imparted with a flair of finality and in a spirit of sheer dogmatism. The result is that the student who has his education in the *madrasahs* is rendered more or less a spiritual cripple for the rest of his life, in that he will never be able to recover his intellectual independence, to be able to have access to the fresh vistas of learning much less develop an autonomous capacity for pursuing religious studies at a higher plane of critical thought. Indeed, during the past elections *Jamā'at-i Islāmi* has not been able to understand the psychological relationship that subsists between the character a man possesses and his political choices. I have no doubt that in the long term it is profitable to educate the voter and get him to see the truth of things, but then the pros-

pect of capturing political power by resort to false propaganda by less enlightened parties radically alters the balance. Wherever such parties are in power they are able to take decisions which foreclose the possibility of the acceptance by the electorate of the long-term programme sponsored by enlightened parties. It is thus not possible to reach the individual by rational means and give to him those moral and intellectual resources with which to discriminate between the rival claimants to his political support, enabling him to enlist himself in support of any enlightened programme.

XI

The one sad mistake *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* has made, and I say so with a sense of sorrow, has been its failure to have insisted upon the reform of the constitutional provisions relating to franchise. Here the question that arises is: "Why did it ever support a 'one-man-one-vote' slogan which underlies the present political arrangement for recruiting the representatives of the people in the various legislative assemblies – both in the provinces and in the centre?" It could have insisted, conformably with the spirit of Islam, to limit the right to vote and make it dependent upon some educational qualification being possessed by the voter, by saying that only those who are qualified to read and write any one of the Pakistani languages should be entitled to vote. Some such limitation on the right of franchise would have ensured the implementation of the programme of universal literacy in the country, and what is more, it would have enabled *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* to carry its message to the hearth and home of the distant villager, whom it cannot otherwise possibly reach in a land of great distances such as Pakistan, considering that the network of radio and television broadcasting exclusively lies within the control of the government and cannot be made available to a party other than the one that is actually in power for projecting its views by means of audio-visual publicity.

XII

What, then, in the ultimate analysis, is the role of a political party such as the one founded by Mawlānā Mawdūdī? A political party exists, in the conception of contemporary politics, primarily to capture political power in order to implement its programme, which it may have announced in its election manifesto. This pre-supposes a mutuality of response between the voters and the party asking for political support from them on the basis of political persuasions that their legitimate interests and their most deeply cherished aspirations would be given due weight in the making of government policies. So far as the voters are concerned, before they cast their vote for the party they have to have confidence that their legitimate demands would be met with, consistent of course with the economic and financial

resources that may be available to the party once it is in power. But what happens in a country where the power of comprehension of these complicated issues on the part of the average voter is sadly lacking, where political and economic issues are not clearly understood by them and in particular where the electorate is not sufficiently politically mature to discriminate between a party that is qualified to come to their rescue and a party that is merely exploiting their credulity by making exaggerated promises which, having regard to the nature of the political process and the economic resources available, it is incapable of implementing? In such a situation, the very assumption, on which such a political party as the one founded by Mawlānā Mawdūdī depends, is at a serious disadvantage. It will be some time before our people become politically mature and having been disillusioned by parties that have not been able to implement the exaggerated promises that they had made, they turn to the party that has never been guilty of overstating its case and has uncompromisingly taken its stand upon what it considers strictly to be in the interest of the individual voter and in the larger interests of the nation. In the meantime, of course, things will go on drifting and the practitioners of unprincipled politics with their concomitant improvisations will go on, not acting but only reacting to the situations as and when they emerge just to be able to tide over the difficulties that come the way of those who are at the helm of affairs. In such a case there can be no such thing as a consistent pursuit of clear-cut policies, with the inevitable result that national interests are bound to suffer and much valuable time is bound to be wasted before the conditions of society at large improve to enable democratic institutions to work successfully. Regarded in that perspective, the contribution which *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* has made to the life of the new state of Pakistan can easily be summed up in a few words. As matters stand, at present it can act only as a brake on the party in power and attempt to prevent it from resorting to policies that are fraught with dangerous consequences. The *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* by its ethico-religious outlook is, as a matter of fact, able to condition the political climate of the nation by mobilising opinion by giving to it a sort of moral direction, and any party that is in power is bound to reckon with such opinion and to a considerable extent is bound to be influenced by it. *Indeed, the very existence of such a party in itself becomes its highest activity.* Although it is not visibly to be found operating on the stage of history, it becomes serviceable as a wire-puller behind the scenes and to a remarkable extent becomes a silent but nevertheless effective partner in the handling of political transactions that must go on within the life of the nation. And this by itself, I should imagine, is a significant role, which a party of righteous people can hope to play in a world which is still ruled by forces of immoral publicity and foul propaganda which are aimed at bluffing the unthinking multitude by side-tracking the real issues that are at stake.

XIII

Over and above this achievement which the party founded by Mawlānā Mawdūdī can take credit for, there is the other all-important function it performs. It *transforms* the political character of the individuals who come in contact with it, and this it does by educating them to become patient and steady in the pursuit of their political purposes. Such a party as *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* enables its votaries to realise that a political party need not be in power in order to be effective but that its effectiveness lies in taking uncompromising positions upon issues that are at stake. By and large, the charge against religious-minded persons who are engaged in politics has hitherto been that they, in the image of Father Joseph (a character depicted by Aldous Huxley in his famous historical novel *Grey Eminence*) generally become fanatics, refuse to see the other points of view, by and large come to possess a one-track mind, and do things of questionable character to attain their political objectives.

Politics, as it is said, is the art of the possible; and democratic politics, it is said, is built on the foundation of compromise, of give-and-take, of finding out, by means of a continual dialogue with the parties in opposition, the *via media* in terms of which extreme political positions that are apt to be taken on important issues could be resolved in the light of the rules of the game that is played in the name of party politics. As opposed to this, a party which rigidly adheres to its manifesto and plays the game of "principled politics" and refuses to enter into base and ignoble compromise, plays the serviceable role of being the watch-dog of the virtue of those who happen to be in power. And this, by itself, is a great gain and in the larger perspective of history, the existence of such a party is apt to be productive of lasting and durable good. If it be true that all strength is durable only upon a moral basis, a political party that takes its stand rigidly on a moral basis is likely, in the long run, to prove itself to be more serviceable for the advancement of the national cause than all those parties that have no such commitment but which, because they excel in the art of showmanship, can play the game of politics "successfully" in keeping with the spirit of the twentieth century adage: "God may be God but business is business". It is in that context ever so true to maintain: "Nothing succeeds like failure and nothing fails like success".

XIV

In the foregoing survey I have attempted to give an outline of the historical role that Mawlānā Abul A'lā Mawdūdī has played in our time. I must add that I have attempted to highlight only that aspect of his activity which has a bearing on what might be called his commitment to secure the moral, spiritual and intellectual regeneration of the people of Pakistan in particular,

and the Muslims all over the world in general. We are too near the events in which he has participated to be able to see the significance of his role in its proper perspective. But I have no doubt that the historian of the future, looking back to our times, would see in him a personification of a humble servant of God who had attempted throughout the course of his life to comment upon and to secure the implementation of the programme which the last Prophet of God was commissioned to sponsor and inaugurate. He has utilised his time on earth to the best of his ability by calling the attention of his fellow-men to the truth of the Divine message to man, that is Islam. He has endeavoured to the best of his ability to secure the establishment of a model social order which may reflect the values and promote the ends for which, according to the teachings of Islam, man has been created by his Creator. Man, according to Islam, can realise the best of which he is capable provided he strives to live in harmony with the Divine Law, obedience to which alone is capable of ensuring that he will not only live his life well on earth but will also win the eternal reward which is reserved for the best servants of God in the Hereafter.

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Said Nursi and the *Risala-i Nur*

An Aspect of Islam in Contemporary Turkey

Hamid Algar

Among the believers are men who have remained true to their covenant with Allah; of them, some have completed their vow, and others still wait, with resolve unchanged.
(The Qur'an, 33:23)

IT IS well known that Mustafa Kemal Paşa¹ was the author of the earliest and most destructive attacks upon Islam in the modern world. Through the abolition of the Caliphate, the promotion of an extreme nationalism, the replacement of the *shari'a* by imported European codes, the abolition of the *madrasa* system, the substitution of the Roman for the Arabic script, the proscription of the Sufi *tarikats*, and various sumptuary measures, he tore apart the entire fabric of traditional Islamic life in Turkey. Other Muslim states, it is true, have moved surreptitiously and gradually in the same direction of relegating Islam to the narrow sphere of individual devotion, but the changes brought about in Turkey are rightly regarded as unparalleled in their radical and explicit nature. The precise effects of these changes upon the religious life of the Turkish people, and the vitality of Islam in the face of secularism are, however, topics which have barely been explored. When a resurgence of Islamic expression occurred in the 1950's, certain Western scholars anxiously put pen to paper in an attempt to discover whether the "secularist achievement" was being threatened by "reactionary elements". The accuracy of their researches is vitiated not only by a generally unspoken identification with the cause of secularism, but also by a lack of acquaintance with the most vital Islamic currents in the country. Figures of little importance and influence are selected for lengthy discussion, while the true foci of Islamic loyalty are scarcely mentioned.² Muslim scholars in the Arab world and the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent have, for their part, remained generally unaware of contemporary developments in Turkey, and isolated from the people that bore the stan-

dard of the Caliphate for more than 400 years.³ Given the historic ties of sympathy and interest that have linked the Turkish and Indo-Pakistani sectors of the Islamic *umma*, it seemed, then, appropriate to discuss, in this presentation volume to Mawlānā Mawdūdī, an important element in the history of Turkish Islam in the present century: the life and work of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi.

Said Nursi's eventful life of eighty-seven years embraces the final decades of the Ottoman Caliphate and the first thirty-five years in the life of the Turkish Republic, and reflects the fundamental changes that have taken place in twentieth-century Turkey. Said Nursi himself used, indeed, to divide his life into the period of the "Old Said" (Eski Said) and the "New Said" (Yeni Said), the change coinciding approximately with the institution of the Republic.⁴

He was born in 1873 in the village of Nurs near Bitlis in eastern Anatolia into a Kurdish family of moderate prosperity. His education began at the age of nine when he accompanied his elder brother, Molla Abdullah, to a *madrassa* in the nearby town of Hizan. Throughout his childhood and youth, however, Said Nursi displayed a precocious talent and arrogance that caused him angrily to leave one *madrassa* after another and indeed at one point to abandon all disciplined study. After a dream in which he beheld the Prophet – upon whom be peace and blessings – he resumed his studies under the congenial guidance of a certain Şeyh Mehmed Celali in the city of Doğubayazid. At the same time he imposed upon himself a rigid ascetic discipline, which appears – according to his own penitent account – only to have strengthened his self-esteem. In the midst of winter he would plunge into ice-cold water, and wander for days in the snowy hills of Anatolia, nurtured only by a few scraps of bread. His teacher was, however, able to deflect him from the life of a wandering dervish that would have been the logical outcome of these practices, and he re-entered the company of men, going from city to city in eastern Anatolia, engaging in outspoken debates with the '*ulamā*' of Siirt, Bitlis and Tillo. Such was the vigour with which he conducted these debates and the youthful arrogance with which he flaunted his talent that he was often expelled from a city after the conclusion of the debate.⁵

After one such expulsion, Said Nursi relates, he dreamt of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qādir Gilānī who instructed him to reduce a certain tribal chieftain, Mustafa Paşa, to obedience to the *shari'a*: to cause him to stop his acts of lawlessness and to begin praying. This he achieved by going to Mustafa Paşa's camp and peremptorily conveying this command from the Unseen.⁶

In about 1890, a partial change occurred in the character of Said Nursi. He still engaged in relentless debate with the '*ulamā*', and indeed expanded the range of his polemical fervour to include governmental authority, denouncing various provincial governors for their drunkenness and irreligiosity. But at the same time his concerns came to be directed to more fundamental matters:

traces of the "New Said" were already present. He took up residence in Bitlis and engaged simultaneously in the study of *'ilm al-kalām* and of modern science. It appears that he began to sense the growing need for a fresh exposition and defence of the Qur'ānic message in the face of modern materialism. In the past, *'ilm al-kalām* had provided the means for a logical and rational exposition of the tenets of the faith; and modern science, although not without its threatening aspects, might be used to supplement and adjust *'ilm al-kalām* in accordance with the needs of the age. While thus moving to greater intellectual maturity, Said Nursi also showed an increased interest in the inner life, and frequented various prominent Sufi shaykhs of eastern Anatolia, such as Şeyh Muhammed Küfrevi (Naqshbandi), Seyyid Nur (Qadiri) and Şeyh Fehim (Naqshbandi). Although he never submitted formally to the guidance of any shaykh, and regarded the structure and concern of the *tarikāt* as inappropriate to the circumstances of the age, the influence of Sufism upon him was profound, and can be seen to have permeated the entirety of his writings.⁷

From Bitlis Said Nursi went to Van, staying there for a period of fifteen years. There he continued his efforts for the elaboration of a new *kalām*, and complementarily conceived the project of a religious university where the revived sciences of religion should be taught and cultivated. The institution was to be known as the Medreset üz-Zehra, by analogy with the Azhar in Cairo. The plan, never realised, was pursued by Said Nursi as late as 1951, when he is reputed to have sought the aid of Adnan Menderes.⁸ Among the special characteristics of the projected *madrasa* was its trilingual nature: Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish should all be used in instruction, with special emphasis placed on the first. In addition, modern sciences were to be taught together with traditional subjects, for "the religious sciences are the light of the conscience, and the arts of civilisation are the light of the intellect: truth becomes manifest from the junction of these two".⁹ Finally, the *madrasa* was to aid in the reconciliation and fusion of three antagonistic groups: the adherents of modern learning (*ehl-i mektep*), the students of the traditional sciences (*ehl-i medrese*) and the followers of the Sufi *tarikats* (*ehl-i tekke*).¹⁰

Partly in order to secure government support for the project, and partly in order to do learned battle with the *'ulamā'* of the capital, Said Nursi left Van at the age of thirty-two and for the first time came to Istanbul. The long reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II was nearing its end, and the various forces that were to bring about his overthrow were gathering strength, foremost among them the Society of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti). Said Nursi did not remain indifferent to the political struggle, even though playing no important part in it. While not entirely hostile to Sultan Abdülhamid, he appears to have favoured the Society of Union and Progress and supported the rebellion of July 1908 against the Sultan that resulted in the re-establishment of the Ottoman constitution. Since the movement of July 1908 may be regarded as the first in the chain of events that led ultimately to the

destruction of the Caliphate with all the attendant damage to Islam, and since in retrospect the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid has come to be regarded, in many Turkish Islamic circles, as a period of Islamic ascendancy,¹¹ it is at first sight surprising to see Said Nursi in the ranks of the Sultan's opponents. It should, however, be remembered that numerous members of the Ottoman 'ulamā' supported the establishment of constitutional government and opposed what they considered to be the tyranny of Abdülhamid. As in neighbouring Iran, where a similar struggle for the establishment of a constitutional regime was under way, it was felt that a government whose operations were clearly defined by a code was conducive to the proper implementation of the *shari'a*. A formula current in both countries equated *mashrūṭiyyat* with *mashrū'īyat*; it was expected that the rule of law would be the rule of the *shari'a*.¹²

Such expectations were disappointed, both in Istanbul and Tehran. Said Nursi's confidence in the Society of Union and Progress declined as he saw the liberty proclaimed by the movement of July 1908 to be assuming an anti-religious aspect. Articles hostile to Islam and purveying the current superstitions of Europe began appearing in the Istanbul press, and in order to counteract these, Said Nursi began contributing articles to the paper *Volkan*, organ of the group known as the İttihad-i Muhammedi. This organisation was led by a Bektashi dervish from Cyprus, called Vahdeti, and had as its aim the regeneration of the Ottoman state on the basis of Islam and the promotion of Islamic unity. In April 1909, shortly after the foundation of the İttihad-i Muhammedi, a mutiny broke out among Albanian soldiers garrisoned in Istanbul that was joined by members of other units as well as by some civilians. The slogan of the rebels was simple, "We want the *shari'a*" (*biz şariat isteriz*), and was directed, at least ostensibly, against the westernising tendencies of the Society of Union and Progress. The uprising was swiftly crushed by the arrival of an army from Salonica under the command of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, and the Society of Union and Progress, now seated in power more firmly than ever, deposed Abdülhamid and replaced him with Sultan Mehmed Reşad.¹³

The İttihad-i Muhammedi played a role in the uprising of April 1909 and it was inevitable that Said Nursi should be brought to trial together with other members of the organisation. In reality he had had no part in the insurrection. Thinking he could play no useful role, he had retired from the city to the suburb of Bakırköy, and there written a number of articles for the Istanbul press, on the one hand urging the soldiers to abandon their mutiny and on the other stressing the essential legitimacy of their demand. He was accordingly acquitted by the military court. Later he described the movement of April 1909 as being of originally pure inspiration, designed to modify the constitution in accordance with the *shari'a*, "so that the *shari'a* might be elevated through the constitution and the constitution strengthened through the *shari'a*". Then ignorant people who imagined the *shari'a* to be identical with

monarchical tyranny had joined the movement, and together with various opportunists led it to a disastrous end. The *shari'a* was demanded by different people for different motives.¹⁴

Despite these setbacks, Said continued to work for a constitution in accordance with the *shari'a*, to oppose all yearning for a return to monarchical absolutism, and even to cultivate an optimistic view of the Society of Union and Progress. Shortly after his acquittal he travelled to Salonica and there delivered a speech in defence of constitutionalism and its essential compatibility with Islam. He then returned to his homeland in eastern Anatolia, with few regrets for Istanbul, which he described as full of "well-dressed savages, nurturing hatred for each other in their hearts".¹⁵ Once home, he attempted to arouse sympathies for the constitutional cause among the deeply distrustful and conservative population of the east. The answers he gave to certain questions put to him at this period have been recorded, and illuminate the concept he held of constitutionalism.

Monarchical government, he said, tended to deprive the Muslims of responsibility for their own affairs: everything was left to the Sultan, and a loyalty was accorded him that belonged properly to Allah. The new government, it was true, was not without its defects, but these were out-weighed by its virtues. If the Society of Union and Progress contained atheists in its ranks, at the same time it had as members men who were hovering on the borderline between Islam and disbelief; excessive suspicion would serve only to cause their final abandonment of Islam. In any event, the survival and prosperity of Islam were not dependent on any particular governmental form; the strength of Islam was increasing, the wretchedness of the Muslims would soon be at an end, and the future would be seen to belong to their faith.¹⁶ This optimistic view of matters was expressed also in a *khutba* delivered at the Umayyad mosque in Damascus during a brief trip to Syria shortly afterwards.¹⁷

Never entirely displaced by these political concerns was the project of the Medreset üz-Zehra. On the eve of the First World War, Said Nursi returned to Istanbul and met the Sultan in a successful attempt to secure government aid for the plan. Nineteen thousand liras were allotted for the construction of the *madrasa*, and a site was selected for it on the shores of Lake Van. Before building could begin, war broke out, and the project was to remain unfulfilled.

Said Nursi collected a group of volunteers that engaged in harassing the Russians on their advance in eastern Anatolia. When Van fell to the invaders he withdrew to the area of Vastan, mounting repeated raids on the town. In this same period of military activity, he engaged himself in writing a commentary on *Sūrah al-Fātiha* and the opening part of *Sūrah al-Baqara*, later published under the title of *Ishārāt al-I'jāz*.¹⁸ Before long, he fell prisoner to the Russians and was taken to captivity in Siberia. After two years, he managed to escape and returned to Istanbul via St. Petersburg, Warsaw and Vienna.

It was 1918, the year of the Ottoman collapse. Istanbul, the seat of the

Caliphate, was under Western, primarily British occupation, and the provinces of the Ottoman state had been torn apart and distributed among the victors. Said Nursi's optimism had proven unjustified: the Society of Union and Progress had led the state to disintegration, not regeneration. He was now appointed to the Dar ül-Hikmet il-İslamiye, an advisory body that assisted the Shaykh al-Islām and whose members at this date included also the great Muslim poet Mehmet Akif and the scholar İzmirli İsmail Hakkî. Said Nursi's role in this body was to assist in preserving the independence of the Shaykh al-Islām from the pressures of the occupying powers, and beyond that he attempted no form of activity, sinking, as he put it, into a period of neglect.¹⁹

About two years after his arrival in occupied Istanbul, Said Nursi went one day to Eyüp, the vast cemetery attached to the tomb of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī at the end of the Golden Horn. Like all Ottoman cemeteries, it exudes an incomparable air of peace, tranquillity and the utter assurance of eternity, as if the sweetness of the Hereafter had flowed over into this world. The cemetery next to the tomb of Abū Ayyūb is situated moreover on a hill that affords a wide view of the whole city of Istanbul, and is thus peculiarly suited to meditation and reflection. Gazing over the cemetery and the city beyond, Said Nursi realised that there was death not only in the tombs, but also in the city: there, the old order was dying in the aftermath of war and defeat. His old self, that had been so closely bound up with it, could not do other than die with it. But this death could not be one of extinction, any more than corporeal death is the gate to extinction. Indeed, since the living may be regarded as walking corpses, in view of the inevitability of their death, and since it is the dead who are truly alive with the life of the Hereafter, it can be said that true life follows upon death.²⁰ By analogy, after the death of the "Old Said", came the birth of the "New Said", whose life was fuller and purer than that of his predecessor.

The "Old Said" had been characterised by an acute awareness of his own talents bordering upon arrogance, a predilection for confrontation, and an optimistic concern with political and social affairs. The "New Said" was marked by modesty, retreat from the arena of disputation and a disengagement from political activity. This is not to say that his concern for the Turkish Muslim community ceased; merely that it turned from political to other channels. After his meditation at Eyüp, which was in the nature of an illumination, Said Nursi went into seclusion at the village of Sarıyer on the shore of the Bosphorus. There he devoted himself to the reading of the Qur'ān, the *Futūḥ al-Ghayb* of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qādir Gilānī and the *Maktūbāt* of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī. Under the influence of these readings he felt all darkness dispelled within him, and the light of the Qur'ān pervading his whole being. This experience of the Qur'ān above all as overpowering light came to inspire the whole body of Said Nursi's writing, entitled appropriately the *Risala-i Nur* – "The Treatise of Light".

Before beginning the composition of this work – the fruit and choice part of his whole life – Said Nursi still had to acquit himself of some political concerns: the “Old Said” was not left to rest in peace. The war of independence, led by Mustafa Kemal Paşa, had come to a successful conclusion in ridding Anatolia of foreign occupation, and a National Assembly was convened in Ankara. In 1923 Said Nursi came to Ankara, and upon the invitation of the deputies of Bitlis, Muş and Van delivered an address to the assembly. In it he laid stress upon the necessity of continued adherence to Islam as the condition of national unity. Islam was the only strength of the Muslims, and abandonment of it would be an act of treason. European culture was on the point of collapse and it would be folly to replace Qur’ānic civilisation with the bankrupt norms of Europe. The deputies should affirm their loyalty to Islam by the regular performance of communal prayer.²¹ Some deputies responded favourably, but Mustafa Kemal reproached Said Nursi for bringing to light differences of outlook and aspiration among the deputies. In general, the atmosphere in Ankara was hardly favourable to Said Nursi and his concerns: the war fought in the name of Islam and with the widespread participation of both ‘*ulamā*’ and Sufi shaykhs was followed by the erection of a dictatorship whose violent hostility to religion was barely concealed by the slogan of secularism.²² In the words of Said Nursi himself, “when I came to Ankara in 1338 (1923), the morale of the people of faith was extremely high as a result of the victory of the army of Islam over the Greeks. But I saw that an abominable current of atheism was treacherously attempting to subvert, poison and destroy their morale”.²³ He recognised his inability to stem this current and left the new Turkish capital for his homeland in the east.

His experiences in Ankara had confirmed the illumination at Eyüp. The old order was dead, and with it his old self. The birth of the new self, and its expression in conformity with the conditions of the new order, were to depend upon the intense cultivation of the inner life. Said Nursi therefore retired to a cave near Lake Van, and devoted himself entirely to worship and meditation. In 1925 his seclusion was interrupted when there broke out a full-scale insurrection against the apostatic regime in Ankara, led by the Naqshbandi Şeyh Said. Said Nursi had no connection with the revolt, and indeed is recorded to have attempted to dissuade the rebels from shedding the blood of the soldiers who were, after all, fellow Muslims, irrespective of the nature of the regime. He was, however, exiled from Van to Burdur in western Anatolia on suspicion of fomenting revolt.²⁴ This was the first in a long series of acts of persecution and harassment inflicted upon him by the Turkish government. For thirty-five years he was moved back and forth between various places of enforced residence, kept under strict surveillance, and four times arrested and tried under loosely-defined and ill-supported charges. Yet throughout this period, he pursued with uninterrupted dedication the writing of the *Risala-i Nur* and attained a widespread following he had never enjoyed in the days of his polemical and political activities.

While in Burdur, he composed a brief work entitled *Nurun İlk Kapıları* ("The First Gates of Light"), consisting of thirteen lessons on fundamentals of the Qur'ān. This was secretly lithographed and distributed. From Burdur Said Nursi was moved to Barla and there began writing the *Risala-i Nur* itself, to which *Nurun İlk Kapıları* had been, so to speak, the preface. The task was to occupy him for the rest of his life, and by the time of his death 130 separate sections of the *Risala-i Nur* had been written.

We shall examine later the nature and content of the *Risala-i Nur*, but it is fitting to indicate here the chief purpose of the work as conceived by Said Nursi, and the reason for his embarking on it at this stage in his life. We have already seen that in the pre-war period he wished to elaborate a new *kalām* to defend and expound the truths of the Qur'ān in the face of modern scepticism; and although this project did not flourish, the sense that Islam was in danger remained with him and grew ever more acute. On the eve of the First World War, in one of the vivid and decisive dreams that recurred throughout his life, Said Nursi saw Mount Ararat erupting. He interpreted the dream as follows:

When I awoke, I realised that a great explosion was to occur, and after that explosion, which would be in the nature of a revolution, the walls protecting the Qur'ān would be shattered. The Qur'ān would then defend itself directly, and in face of the attacks mounted upon it, its God-given miraculous nature would encase it like steel armour. I further realised that it would be given to one such as myself to demonstrate some part of that miraculous nature, despite my inadequacy to the task; and that I should take this duty upon myself.²⁵

Elsewhere, Said Nursi spoke in similar terms of his being a chosen instrument to aid in the defence of the Qur'ān – his writings not only derived their power from the Qur'ān but were also devoted to its service. "In former times the foundations of faith were secure; submission to them was firm. As for matters of detail, the statements of the learned were accepted as adequate even without proof. Recently, however, misguidance has stretched out its hand against the foundations and pillars of the faith. Therefore the Wise and Compassionate One of Majestic Essence, Who grants to each disease a suitable cure, has caused a flame from the allegories (*teşbihat*) of the Noble Qur'ān – a bright manifestation of its miraculous nature – to spring forth and aid my writings in the service of the Qur'ān, thus redeeming my impotence and weakness, my poverty and indigence."²⁶

It is possible to combine the evidence of these two statements and suggest the following interpretation. Said Nursi had been conscious for several years of the rise of scepticism and materialism to challenge the traditional primacy of belief, and from this consciousness had arisen his attempt at the evolution of a new *kalām*. This attempt remained unfulfilled, but the dangers threatening the faith increased until the cataclysmic explosions of war and revolution – themselves manifestations of the destructive spirit of the age – destroyed the

traditional order – the “walls protecting the Qur’ān”. It was then no longer a question of intellectual defence of doctrine and practice, but rather of coming to the aid of the Qur’ān itself. Turning away from all political concern, and fortified by an intensification of the inner life, Said Nursi remained, in his own words, “face to face with the Qur’ān”, immersed himself in its luminous wisdom, and sought to refract some of its light through the prism of his own writings.

The real need of the age, he was convinced, was to save people from the inauspicious direction in which they were going; to shed the light of the Qur’ān on their path so that they might see “the impure and pestilential swamp” that lay ahead of them unless they reverted to the Straight Path of Islam. This goal was of a totally different nature from political activity, and more profound in its concerns, for “light can only be perceived or not perceived: there is no possibility of discussion or disagreement concerning it”.²⁷

Despite this devotion to the task of diffusing the Qur’ānic light, and despite a rigorous isolation that forbade even his own relatives to visit him, Said Nursi was brought to trial in 1934 and accused of establishing a secret religious society that had as its goal the subversion of the foundations of the republic. With 120 persons who had been found in possession of his writings, he was brought to the city of Eskişehir for trial. After lengthy proceedings in which no firm evidence was offered by the prosecution, Said Nursi was condemned to six months’ imprisonment, together with fifteen other persons. Said Nursi conducted his own defence, and laid particular stress upon the absurdity of the prosecution claim that he was “exploiting religion for political purposes”, a claim monotonously repeated down to the present by the malicious and the uninformed. The Qur’ān, he said, uncovers the talisman of existence; its scope embraces the entirety of being. How then could religion be made the tool of the narrow and limited sphere of politics? It would be like confining the ocean in a jar.²⁸

After his release from jail, Said Nursi took up residence in Kastamonu where he continued work on the *Risala-i Nur* and despite a certain amount of police surveillance was able to contact an increasing number of followers. These were drawn not only from the immediate area of Kastamonu, but also from other regions of western Anatolia. His writings, copied out by hand or mimeographed, had in a short space of time penetrated wide areas of the country and struck a responsive chord in many people. With these remote followers Said Nursi now entered into correspondence, and it can be said that his letters came to constitute a second monument to his religious activity, after the *Risala-i Nur* itself. The letters appear to have been entirely devoid of political context, and to have concentrated instead on elucidating certain points in the *Risala-i Nur* and encouraging the further copying and distribution of the work. “The most important duty of the devotee of the *Risala-i Nur* is to copy it and to cause others to do so, and in general to help in its distribution.”²⁹

In 1943, Said Nursi was brought to trial again, this time at Denizli. The charges were the same as before, but the prosecution thought it desirable to prepare them more carefully than on the previous occasion. Copies of the *Risala-i Nur* were therefore sent to professors of law at Ankara University for their opinion of its content. Their reply was that the work was of a purely religious nature and furnished no basis for prosecution. A new charge was therefore brought against Said Nursi: that he had proclaimed himself to be the Mahdî. It was true that some of his followers, in their excessive veneration of him, had hinted that he might be the Expected One; but he himself had vigorously refuted the notion. Finally, on 16th June, 1944, Said Nursi and his followers were proclaimed innocent and released.

The release did not mean a cessation of harassment and persecution. On the contrary, since legal means had proved unable to silence Said Nursi, stricter supervision was imposed upon him, and attempts were even made, it is said, to eliminate him by poison or murder. Despite these grossly unfavourable circumstances, work on the *Risala-i Nur* continued in the new place of enforced residence, Emirdağ near Afyon. New sections of the *Risala* were written, and copies multiplied in various parts of western Anatolia, especially the region of İsparta.³⁰

In December, 1947, Said Nursi was brought to trial for the third time, in the town of Afyon. Fifteen of his closest associates were arrested with him, and also those engaged in the distribution of the *Risala-i Nur* in Emirdağ, İsparta, Kastamonu, Konya, İnebolu, Safranbolu and Aydın. The charges were as before: the institution of a secret society aiming at the subversion of the secular bases of the State. Evidence and counter-evidence were much the same as before, but now Said Nursi was condemned to twenty months' imprisonment. The sentence was annulled by a higher court, but immediately a new trial on the same charges began. This ended with Said Nursi's acquittal in September 1949 after almost two years' confinement.³¹

Each trial appears to have had the effect of injecting Said Nursi and his followers with new energy and determination, and he himself referred to jail as *medrese-i Yusufiye*, "the school of Joseph".³² The two-year ordeal that ended in 1949 was thus succeeded by an expansion of activity in various directions. In addition to the further copying and distribution of *Risala-i Nur* in those areas of western Anatolia where it was already circulating, it was decided to begin systematic distribution in eastern Anatolia, particularly in the region of Diyarbakır. Even more significant was the distribution of the work among university students in Ankara and Istanbul. Formerly confined to the traditionally pious of the smaller towns of Anatolia, the *Risala-i Nur* now came to be known to the Islamically-oriented segment of the educated classes in Turkey's two greatest cities. From 1949 to the present, the *Risala-i Nur* has continued to draw an increasing number of adherents among the university population. Parallel to this turning towards the students of Ankara

and Istanbul was the attempt to obtain government favour for the *Risala-i Nur*, or at least an abandonment of hostility to it.³³

This aim might have seemed near at hand when in May 1950 Adnan Menderes came to power as Prime Minister. Much of his electoral appeal was derived from hints that he would relax the rigour of secularism and favour some reassertion of Islamic values, even in the life of the state. In a celebrated speech at İzmir he had, for example, proclaimed that "this country is Muslim and will remain Muslim. All the requirements of Islam will be fulfilled".³⁴ Many hopes were awakened in Islamic circles that the wave of hostility to Islam unleashed by Mustafa Kemal might finally be reversed. Said Nursi himself wrote to Menderes addressing him as "champion of Islam" and urging him to observe Islamic principles while in government.³⁵ No effective response was forthcoming, but at least Said Nursi was temporarily able to move about with relative freedom for the first time since 1925. It soon became apparent to many Muslims, however, that Menderes' appeals to Islamic sentiment were largely opportunistic, and no real changes took place in the attitude of the state to Islam, beyond a few symbolic gestures. The persecution of Said Nursi was also resumed, and early in 1952 he was arrested and brought to trial for the fourth and last time, in Istanbul.

The charges on this occasion related to the publication and distribution by some students at Istanbul University of a section of the *Risala-i Nur* entitled *Gençlik Rehberi*, "A Guide for Youth". The prosecution found objectionable Said Nursi's assertion in this work that the Islamic criteria of dress are more suited to the beauty and dignity of woman than imported western fashions; and his demand that religious instruction be promoted at all levels of education. These two points were held to be subversive. In probably the most effective and outspoken of all his speeches in the court, Said Nursi turned bitterly on the prosecution and asked whether it was necessary for women to expose their bodies and for children to grow up ignorant of religion in order for the state to be preserved. If the answer was positive, then did such a state deserve preservation? The trial was, he declared, an indication of how secularism was being used as a mask for hostility to religion. He was acquitted amidst the triumphant rejoicing of his followers in Istanbul, but had to leave the city to take up residence again in Emirdağ.³⁶

In 1953 he moved to İsparta, and spent almost all the remaining years of his life there. He had a great affection for the place, since it was at nearby Barla that he had begun work on the *Risala-i Nur* and there too that many of his most devoted followers resided. These last years were among the most fruitful, and saw the composition of some of the most important sections of the *Risala-i Nur* as well as distribution of the work on a wider scale than ever before. This became possible by printing the sections of the *Risala* in fixed type for the first time: before, no access to printing presses had been possible, and only handwritten or mimeographed copies were in circulation.³⁷

This is not to say that the final years of Said Nursi's life were without tribu-

lation. He himself was subject to repeated police harassment, and as his following multiplied, so too did arrests and trials. These invariably resulted in acquittal of the accused and the return to the defendants of the copies of the *Risala-i Nur* that had been taken from them. The legal innocuity of the work has, in fact, been so clearly and repeatedly established that these arrests cannot be regarded as other than a manipulation of the law for the purposes of religious persecution.³⁸

In March 1960, Said Nursi left İsparta on a journey to Urfa, a city that had come to be one of the main centres of his following in eastern Anatolia. Upon his arrival, orders were immediately cabled from Ankara that he should leave the city and return to İsparta. He had however fallen seriously ill and his followers refused to move him. Seeing that Said Nursi was in fact a dying man the police chief of Urfa relented and instead ensured that he should die as he had lived for thirty-five years, harassed and surrounded by police.³⁹ On 24th March, Said Nursi left behind both his followers and his persecutors and returned to the presence of his Lord. *Rahimahu 'llāh*.

As for his earthly remains, these were no more left in peace than the living Said Nursi had been. After the military *coup d'état* of 27th May, 1960, that overthrew the Menderes regime, the righteous guardians of the legacy of Mustafa Kemal exhumed the body of Said Nursi and transported it to be reburied in an unknown and unmarked location, concealed even from Said Nursi's own brother.⁴⁰ This was done presumably in the belief that Said Nursi had founded a cult centred on his own person, and that if only the location of his tomb were unknown his following could not fail to disperse after his death.

In reality, however, Said Nursi's following was devoted not so much to him as a person – those who managed to penetrate police surveillance to see him were relatively few – as to the work which he himself regarded as the sole fruit of his life – the *Risala-i Nur*. It is thus comprehensible that the period since his death should have seen a further distribution of his works and an expanding interest in the ideas they contain. In the resurgence of Islamic feeling and expression that has been so marked in the past 15 years, there can be little doubt that the legacy of Said Nursi has played a prominent role.

The printing and distribution of the *Risala-i Nur* reached a new peak in the late 1960s; almost everywhere copies were available to those interested, although never offered for public sale. At the same time, the message of the work became known to a broader public through the Islamic press that sprang up in the second half of the last decade. Extracts from the writings of Said Nursi and articles commemorating his life appeared in numerous journals: mention may be made particularly of the monthly *Hilal*, edited by Salih Özcan (presently under arrest by the Istanbul Martial Law authorities) and the daily *Bugün* (edited, now from exile in Germany, by Mehmet Şevket Eygi, a fiery orator and writer). The followers of Said Nursi themselves have made several ventures in journalism. In 1964 there began to appear in Erzurum the

weekly *Hareket* which carried extracts from the *Risala-i Nur* as well as news of Turkey and the Muslim world. Similar to it in form and content were *Zülfikar*, published in İzmir, and *Bediüzzaman*, published in Konya. All of these were shortlived, and were superseded in 1968 by the weekly *İttihad*, printed in Istanbul and distributed throughout the country. Its editor was Mustafa Polat, formerly editor of *Hareket*. In February 1970, *İttihad* became a daily newspaper, later to be succeeded by the widely-read *Yeni Asya*.

In view of this continued activity after the death of Said Nursi – the distribution of the *Risala-i Nur* and the publication of journals – it may be wondered whether any organisation exists and if so by whom it is led. There are of course persons of prominence publicly associated with the message of the *Risala-i Nur*: one such was the late Mustafa Polat, ‘*alayhi r-rahma*, and another is the Istanbul lawyer, Bekir Berk, who has done much to defend the cause of the *Risala-i Nur* in the courts. Beyond such individuals, there exists only a network of distribution for the *Risala-i Nur* and the organisation necessary to secure it. There is no spiritual or directive successor to Said Nursi: individuals designated as such by those hostile to the *Risala-i Nur* are merely prominent companions of the late Said.⁴¹ In addition to the nationally organised work of distribution, small circles are formed, spontaneously and informally, for the study of the *Risala-i Nur*. They may embrace between ten and seventy people. A meeting of one such circle, attended by the present writer in the Fatih area of Istanbul in March 1970 had sixty participants, and the discussions of the *Risala-i Nur* were led by the Mufti of Bakırköy. These meetings are frequently subject to illegal disruption by the police. There is, however, nothing conspiratorial or political about them: they consist exclusively of reading and discussion of the *Risala-i Nur* and the recitation of *du‘ā*.

Whatever be the ultimate destiny of Said Nursi’s posthumous following, it is upon the *Risala-i Nur* itself that any judgment concerning the value and significance of his strivings must be based. He regarded the entire period of his life before the composition of the *Risala-i Nur*, that of the “Old Said”, as virtually worthless, and stressed that all the attention of his followers should be given to his writings, his person being of no interest. It will, therefore, be appropriate to look more closely at the nature and content of the *Risala-i Nur*.

We have seen already that the *Risala-i Nur* was intended to demonstrate part of the *i‘jāz* of the Qur’ān to an age corrupted and subverted by scepticism and materialism; and that Said Nursi thought himself appointed by Providence to undertake this task. By the time of his death, the *Risala-i Nur* consisted of 130 sections, based directly or indirectly on certain Qur’ānic verses that are taken as points of departure for long and complex discussions of logical and metaphysical questions. The sections are not arranged in any logical sequence and do not constitute a systematic exegesis of the Qur’ān. Rather, certain Qur’ānic themes are taken up in a succession deter-

mined by the pattern of Said Nursi's inner and outer life and expounded upon in a fashion more reminiscent of Sufi discourse than classical *tafsir*. The whole work having the title of "light", its various sections are entitled *lem'a* (flash) or *şu'a* (ray), and each has the effect of refracting the Qur'anic luminosity through the prism of Said's expression.

Among the sections of the *Risala-i Nur* a special place is held by the "Thirty Three Words" (*Otuzüç Söz*), which constitute the core of the whole work. To read them, Said Nursi declared, is a sure means for perceiving the essential truths of the Qur'an;⁴² for, their composition was decreed to him by Shaykh 'Abd al-Qādir Gilāni in a dream.⁴³ The content and style of the "Thirty Three Words" does not, however, differ markedly from the rest of the *Risala-i Nur*.

The *Risala-i Nur*, which Said Nursi described as a moon to the sun of the Qur'an, had as its aim the demonstration of the *i'jāz* of the Qur'an in a manner suited to the needs of the time. Whether it has fulfilled this aim is a difficult and delicate matter to decide. There is little if anything in the *Risala-i Nur* that is identifiably new or unprecedented in either Sufi writings or the literature of *tafsir*. Not that novelty is necessarily desirable; merely that a claim to novelty has been advanced in the case of the *Risala-i Nur*. Most of his interpretations can be found in the great classics of esoteric *tafsir*, such as Ismā'il Ḥakki's *Rūḥ al-Bayān*.

In addition to these sources, Said Nursi placed heavy reliance upon allegory and the interpretation of his own and others' dreams. An example may be drawn from *Yirmi Üçüncü Söz*. He dreamt, he tells us, that he was passing in utter darkness across a bridge suspended between two mountains. To the right of the bridge, he could dimly perceive a vast graveyard plunged in gloom; and to its left, a stormy and dark ocean. He took out a lamp to light his way, but instead saw his path barred by various savage beasts. Then the lamp fell to the ground and broke, and as it did so, the whole scene was transfigured with light. The graveyard was seen to be a pleasant garden, full of men engaged in invocation of the Divine Name and pious conversation; and the dark ocean to the left of the bridge was changed into a placid green meadow. The savage beasts on the bridge were also transformed into tame and innocuous animals.

Said Nursi's interpretation of the dream was as follows. The mountains represented respectively the beginning of human life and the Hereafter – *mabda'* and *ma'ād*. The right of the bridge was the past, and the left, the future. The bridge was life itself; the lamp that had been broken was egoism and the savage beasts that had been glimpsed in its false light were the vicissitudes of life. Once the lamp of egoism was broken, the whole scene was transfigured and seen as a vast and seamless manifestation of God's mercy. This dream Said Nursi took to be illustrative of several Qur'anic verses, especially, "God is the Protector of those who have faith: from the depths of darkness He will lead them forth into light" (Qur'an, 2:257) and the Light Verse (Qur'an, 24:35).⁴⁴

Such interpretations, based upon dream and allegory, are not without their beauty and power to convince, but it is to be doubted that they fulfil the express purpose of reaffirming the *i'jāz* of the Qur'ān in a manner suitable to the needs of the present dark age. They presuppose a certain cast of mind that is already imbued with the readiness to believe, and can do little to convince the sceptical seduced by the superstitions of modernity. That objects have a symbolic dimension and that true knowledge may be vouchsafed in a dream are propositions largely alien to the modern mentality.

More immediately directed to the victims of modern ideology are those parts of the *Risala-i Nur* which affirm the prediction by the Qur'ān of various technological inventions. The aeroplane, the railway, the radio, electricity – the coming of all has been intimated in revelation.⁴⁵ This concession to the technological predilections of the age is a strange and unexpected feature of the *Risala-i Nur*. It is to be found also in the commentaries on the Qur'ān of the Egyptian, Ṭanṭāwī Jawharī, and Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī of the Aḥmadīya. In each of these cases, however, the "scientific" prejudice forms part of a consistently aberrant interpretation of revelation. In the *Risala-i Nur* it is strangely juxtaposed with traditional modes of interpretation. The incongruity is doubtless to be explained by Said Nursi's wish to achieve a synthesis of the old and new learning, a wish that had inspired also his attempts at formulating a new *kalām*.

The combination of allegorical and pseudo-scientific interpretation makes it possible, it is claimed, for the believer to exchange faith by imitation (*taklidi iman*) for faith by certainty (*tahkiki iman*).⁴⁶ In the conditions of the present age it is only the latter that can have any hope of survival, for imitation and submission are abhorrent to modern man. It is legitimate to question, however, whether a reading of the *Risala-i Nur* can result in *tahkiki iman*. *Tahkik* in its traditional usage denotes a process of spiritual realisation, accomplished not so much by study and reflection as by an intensity of devotional practice that results in a purifying of the heart and the opening of inner vision.⁴⁷ Clearly this cannot be vouchsafed by the mere reading of any work, however inspired and profound.

Beyond these general considerations, it is difficult to decide whether the *Risala-i Nur* has in fact been able to restore or preserve the faith of those who would otherwise have lost it. Readers of the *Risala-i Nur* are to be found among university students, government officials and lawyers – classes that might be supposed especially prone to the seductions of *kufr* in the modern age – but probably the bulk of Said Nursi's followers have always been the traditionally pious and observant Muslims of the smaller towns of Anatolia. The role of the *Risala-i Nur* has been primarily to provide them with a focus for their loyalty to Islam and to strengthen their faith in the face of the constant hostility displayed by the secular republic.

If this be the true extent of Said Nursi's achievement – to have produced a work which combined traditional interpretations of the Qur'ān with certain

modernist features, and to have sustained the faith of the traditionally religious people of Anatolia – why, it may be asked, was he subject to constant harassment and persecution throughout his life; and why is the possession and study of the *Risala-i Nur* even now an invitation to arrest and prosecution? The charges made at each trial of Said Nursi and his followers relate to the alleged foundation of a secret society for the subversion of the secular foundations of the state. It has proved impossible to substantiate these charges, firstly, because the network organised for the distribution of the *Risala-i Nur* does not satisfy the legal definition of society under the appropriate section of the Turkish Penal Code; and secondly, because the *Risala-i Nur* does not have any overtly political content. The accusation nonetheless persists, and is repeated not only in the courts but also in the polemical literature directed against Said Nursi by secularist writers.

The explanation is to be sought in the nature of Turkish secularism. While secularism implies non-interference by the state in matters of religion no less than it does the freeing of the political realm from religious concern, in Turkey secularism has been interpreted in a consistently anti-religious sense.⁴⁸ Not only was the law of Islam abolished as the law of the state, but the state took upon itself the regulation of matters of a purely religious nature. Hence the substitution of the Turkish for the Arabic *ezan* (repealed in 1950), the dissolution of the *tarikats*, and the institution of the Diyanet İşleri Reisliği (The Religious Affairs Directorate), a government affiliated body to supervise the religious life of the country. The aim, it might be said, has been to remove Islam not only from the life of the state, but also – more gradually – from the life of society, ultimately imprisoning religion in the mosque in the hope that it might there die of neglect and attrition. In this sense, then, Said Nursi was indeed an offender against secularism, although he had offended against no laws: through his work he reaffirmed Qur'ānic values and their primacy in the life of man, individually and collectively. He also attacked certain aspects of modernisation that although not legislated for are essential to secularism: the cultivation of an extreme nationalist ideology and the concomitant severing of all bonds of sentiment with other Muslim peoples;⁴⁹ the propulsion of women into the chaos of modern social life;⁵⁰ and the suppression or neglect of religious education.⁵¹

It needs to be admitted, of course, that Said Nursi and his followers, together with all Islamically-oriented circles in Turkey, do indeed profoundly reject the whole secularist structure imposed by Mustafa Kemal, and that this strong sentiment, although not expressed in the *Risala-i Nur* or journals printed by Said Nursi's followers, is nonetheless felt and bitterly resented by the adherents of the new order. Whatever be the legalities of the matter, there can be no doubt that there is a fundamental antagonism between the loyalty to Islam proclaimed in the *Risala-i Nur* and the ideology of the Turkish Republic.

Opponents of the *Risala-i Nur* are not, however, content with recognising

this principal antagonism and instead level additional charges against Said Nursi which have received much credence among the uninformed. It is claimed, for example, that he was a Kurdish nationalist whose true aim – the creation of a Kurdish state in Anatolia – was concealed by his professions of religious concern.⁵² In fact, *Nurculuk* (adherence to the *Risala-i Nur*) is frequently linked in the press with Kurdish nationalism and Communism as one of the chief subversive currents in the country. Said Nursi was indeed a Kurd, and before the foundation of the republic and the denial of the very existence of a Kurdish population in Anatolia he called himself Said Kurdi. There was, however, no nationalist significance in his use of this *nisba*. It is also true that Kurdish was to be one of the languages of instruction at the projected Medreset üz-Zehra, together with Turkish and Arabic, but it was to be subordinate to both of these.⁵³ These considerations apart, it is established that Said Nursi opposed Kurdish nationalism as contrary to Islamic brotherhood: he proclaimed that the welfare of the Kurds depended on that of the Turks, and in 1925 sought to dissuade the Kurdish followers of Shaykh Said from fighting against the Turkish army.⁵⁴

Another notion propagated by the enemies of Said Nursi is that he founded a new Sufi order, a new *tarikât*, in defiance of the measure of 1925 that decreed the dissolution of the orders.⁵⁵ The press, when reporting the arrest of the readers of the *Risala-i Nur*, commonly speaks of the performance of *âyin*, of Sufi ceremonies, although in fact nothing of a devotional nature occurs beyond the recitation of *du'â*. Said Nursi himself, by a curious coincidence of outlook with the secularists, regarded the structure of the *tarikats* as inappropriate to the needs of the present age. He was deeply imbued with Sufi spirituality, had enjoyed the company of Sufi shaykhs, and frequently quoted from Sufi writings, above all the *Maktûbât* of Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindî. But under the conditions of the present dark age, there were, he declared, more pressing concerns than the cultivation of *taṣawwuf*. The whole basis of faith was threatened and practice of the *shari'a* – prerequisite for all authentic Sufism – suspended. "A man cannot live without bread, but he can live without fruit. Sufism is like fruit, the truths of the Qur'ân are like bread".⁵⁶ A new focus of concern was then needed, different from that of the *tarikats*.⁵⁷

Finally, mention may be made of the most grotesque charge levelled against the *Risala-i Nur* by its secularist enemies: that it preaches a separate ideology, not only independent of Islam but indeed opposed to it.⁵⁸ This show of concern for Islam is strange indeed coming from the pens of those who imagine "true, enlightened Islam" to consist in rigorous abstention from prayer and fasting and unqualified submission to the pronouncements of Mustafa Kemal. It is not, however, without its effect: those deprived of religious education and ignorant also of the *Risala-i Nur* may in good faith regard the charge as justified. It may be remarked in passing that it is a frequent technique of Turkish secularists to label loyalty to essential aspects of Islam as deviations from it. Thus they speak of *şeriatçilik* (a desire for the

implementation of the *shari'a*) and *ümmetçilik* (adherence to the concept of a single Muslim *umma*) as aberrant deviations from the faith, as if true Islam knew no *shari'a* and no *umma*.

Aside from the fundamental antagonism between the *Risala-i Nur* and the principles and workings of Turkish secularism, the other accusations brought against the work and its author may all be dismissed as baseless. More deserving of attention are certain misgivings felt in Islamic circles, not so much with respect to Said Nursi and his work, as to certain aspects of his legacy. One feature that strikes any visitor to a circle of his devotees is their channelling of all their enthusiasm and emotional loyalty into the study of the *Risala-i Nur*. They appear to read no other religious literature and to neglect the direct study even of the Qur'ân itself. They enjoin upon others to imitate them, hinting that one's faith can be secure from danger only after assimilating the *Risala-i Nur*. This somewhat narrow attitude, for which Said Nursi cannot be held directly responsible and which has doubtless been fostered by decades of persecution, has threatening implications. Said Nursi spoke of his work as being a moon reflecting the light of the Qur'anic sun; it sometimes seems as if, for his followers, the moon has become brighter than the sun. A certain exclusiveness among the adherents of the *Risala-i Nur* has also led to regrettable tensions and divisions in Turkish Islamic circles that can be ill afforded.

It should also be made clear that Said Nursi did not in any sense establish an Islamic movement – one calling for the establishment of an Islamic state – analogous to the Muslim Brethren of the Arab lands or the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī* in Pakistan.⁵⁹ Although his devotion to the Qur'ân could not fail to have political implications, in the manner discussed above, he genuinely foreswore all specifically political concerns. He never discussed in any detail the political and economic principles of Islam, nor suggested ways for their practical implementation; nor did he ever call for the abrogation of the secularist constitution. Rather he deemed the first problem of the Turkish Muslim community to be the salvation of the very bases of faith itself, and in addressing himself to the solution of that problem he was for thirty-five years a living challenge to the atheism that was so thinly veiled by the slogans of secularism.

Whatever be the shortcomings of the present adherents of the *Risala-i Nur*, and whatever be the degree of success accorded to that work in the strengthening and revivification of faith in the Qur'ân, it is indisputable that credit and honour belong to Said Nursi and his past and present followers for the maintenance of loyalty to Islam under harsh and difficult conditions. They will be seen, in any future reassertion of Islamic hegemony in Turkey, to have played an indispensable role in providing a focus for religious sentiment and aspiration. *Wallāhu a'lam bi ḥaqā'iq al-umūr.*

POSTSCRIPT

The foregoing article was written in December 1970. Since that date, the place occupied in the religious, social and political life of Turkey by the followers of the *Risala-i Nur* has expanded considerably, and numerous topics of importance have inevitably been left untreated in my article, especially the role played by some Nurcus in the foundation of the National Salvation Party, and the increasingly explicit support given by others to the Justice Party. The author's knowledge and perception of the movement have also changed in the course of the past seven years. Although the article remains factually accurate and the author still holds to most of its conclusions, it is therefore partially obsolete in two respects. Readers are asked to bear this in mind, and to wait for a more definitive treatment of the subject in a book now being prepared.

Hamid Algar, September 1977.

Notes and Sources

- 1 In conformity with the usage of conservative Turkish Muslims, we refrain from using his grandiose and self-awarded title of "Atatürk" ("father of the Turks").
- 2 Examples of such writing are Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey", *International Affairs*, XXVIII (1952), pp. 38-48; L. V. Thomas, "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam", *Middle East Journal* VI (1952), pp. 22-40; Howard A. Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", *Middle East Journal*, VIII (1954), pp. 267-282; the same, "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims", in R. N. Frye, ed., *Islam and the West* (The Hague, 1957), pp. 108-148; and Annemarie Schimmel, "Islam in Turkey", in A. J. Arberry, ed., *Religion in the Middle East* (Cambridge, 1969), II, pp. 68-95.
- 3 Exceptions known to us are furnished by the series of articles by Abu al-Hasan Ali Nadwi entitled "Usbū'ān fi Turkiya al-Islāmiyya" that appeared in volumes X and XI (1386/1966) of *al-Ba'th al-Islāmi* (Lucknow); the brief article on Said Nursi by Sharāfat 'Alī in *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān*, Lahore, January 1963; and a recent anonymous article on the same subject in *al-Mujtama'* (Kuwait), no. 108 (11 July, 1972), pp. 16-17.
- 4 The following account of the life of Said Nursi is based largely on the anonymous work entitled *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi: Hayatı, Mesleki, Tercüme-i Halı* (Istanbul, 1960), which contains numerous extracts from his writings and letters; and on the summary of this work in Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Son Devrin Din Mazlumlari* (Istanbul, 1969), pp. 75-163.
- 5 *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*, pp. 21-38.
- 6 *Ibid.*, pp. 39-42.
- 7 *Ibid.*, pp. 43-47.
- 8 Çetin Özek, *Türkiyede Gerici Akımlar ve Nurculuğun İcüzü* (Istanbul, 1960), p. 286.
- 9 Said Nursi, *Münazarat* (Istanbul, 1958), pp. 71-76.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 75.
- 11 For a detailed if flamboyant exposition of this view, see Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Ulu Hakan Abdülhamid Han* (Istanbul, 1970).
- 12 For the case of Iran, see the present writer's *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906*:

The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969), pp. 253–254.

- 13 There is an extensive literature on the movement of April, 1909 (or 31 March, according to the Greek calendar then in use). Here we will mention only Yunus Nadi's *Ihtilal ve İnkılab-ı Osmanî* (Istanbul, 1328/1913).
- 14 *Münazarat*, p. 34; and Kısakürek, *Son Devrin Din Mazlumları*, pp. 100–102.
- 15 *Ibid.*, p. 103.
- 16 *Münazarat*, *passim*.
- 17 *al-Khuṭbat al-Shāmiya* (Damascus, n.d.). The *khuṭba* has also been published in Turkish translation: *Hutbe-i Şamiye* (Istanbul, 1958).
- 18 This *tafsir*, first written in Arabic and then translated into Turkish by Said Nursi's brother, Abdülmecid, was written, according to its author, after dreaming of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. See Said Nursi, *Barla Hayatı* (Istanbul, 1960), pp. 65–66.
- 19 *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*, pp. 112–117.
- 20 Qur'ân, 29:64.
- 21 *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*, pp. 133–136. The text of his remarks is recorded in *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Ceridesi*, XXIV, p. 457.
- 22 The part played by men of religion in the War of Independence is indicated by Sabahattin Selek in *Millî Mücadele* (Istanbul, 1963), I, pp. 62–68; and discussed in great detail by Kadir Mısıroğlu in his *Kurtuluş Savaşında Sarıklı Mücahitler* (Istanbul, 1969), *passim*.
- 23 *Son Devrin Din Mazlumları*, p. 119.
- 24 *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*, pp. 142–145.
- 25 *Son Devrin Din Mazlumları*, p. 89.
- 26 *Barla Hayatı*, p. 68.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 73.
- 28 *Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*, pp. 203–210.
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 286.
- 30 *Ibid.*, pp. 381–401.
- 31 *Ibid.*, pp. 525–546.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 542.
- 33 *Son Devrin Din Mazlumları*, p. 145.
- 34 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 146.
- 35 *Ibid.*, pp. 148–151.
- 36 *Ibid.*, pp. 148–151.
- 37 Certain parts of the *Risala-i Nur* are still circulating in mimeographed form, notably those written in the Arabic script, to which the followers of Said Nursi refer as the "Qur'anic alphabet".
- 38 By April 1971, no fewer than 721 trials had been held of the adherents of the *Risala-i Nur*, all of them resulting in the acquittal of the defendants. For a complete list, see Bekir Berk, *Nurculuk* (Istanbul, 1971), pp. 833–851.
- 39 *Son Devrin Din Mazlumları*, p. 155.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 161. See also the anonymous article entitled "Dünyaca menfur bir cinayet" in *Bugün*, 17 December, 1969, p. 6.
- 41 See, for example, Özek, *op. cit.*, p. 256; Tarık Z. Tunaya, *İslamcılık Cereyanı* (Istanbul, 1962), p. 238; and Yılmaz Çetiner, *Nurcular Arasında Bir Ay* (Istanbul, 1964), p. 50.
- 42 Said Nursi, *Hakikat Nurları* (Istanbul, 1960), p. 132.
- 43 *Son Devrin Din Mazlumları*, p. 136.
- 44 *Yirmi Üçüncü Söz* (Istanbul, 1960), pp. 6–10.
- 45 Said Nursi, *Ayetül-Kübra* (Istanbul, 1959), p. 83.
- 46 Conversation with Bekir Berk, Istanbul, March 1970.

- 47 See, for example, the definitions quoted by Sayyid Ja'far Sajjādi in *Farhangi Muṣṣalāḥāt-i 'Urafā'* (Tehran, 1339 solar/1960), p. 105.
- 48 This point is developed in great detail by the late Professor Ali Fuad Başgil in his important book *Din ve Laiklik*, 2nd ed., (Istanbul, 1962).
- 49 Said Nursi compared the relationship of the Turks with the Arabs to that existing between the *ḥaramayn* (*Münazarat*, p. 75).
- 50 See *Hanımlar Rehberi* (Istanbul, 1959), especially pp. 48–56 where the social utility of the veil is discussed.
- 51 *Gençlik Rehberi*, pp. 46–49.
- 52 See Çetiner, *op. cit.*, p. 29; and the grotesque assertion of the *dönme* journalist, Ahmet Emin Yalman, that Said Nursi was a Kurdish nationalist acting under Communist inspiration. *Turkey in My Time* (Oklahoma, 1956), p. 250.
- 53 *Münazarat*, p. 72.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- 55 See Tunaya, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
- 56 *Hakikat Nurları*, p. 47. Much of this work is devoted to a discussion of Sufism. On the same topic see also *Münazarat*, pp. 59–64.
- 57 It may, however, be remarked that in the void left by the abolition of the *madrasas* certain of the *tarikats* – especially the Naqshbandis – undertook the task of providing a basic religious education without particular Sufi emphasis. The role of the *tarikats* in the republican period is another unwritten chapter in the “secret history” of contemporary Turkish Islam.
- 58 See, for example, Çetiner, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
- 59 It will also be evident that the religiosity of Said Nursi – depending heavily on dreams and esoterism – was of a quite different nature from that of other contemporary Islamic leaders.

CHAPTER TWENTY

From Rashīd Riḍā to Lloyd George

A. L. Tibawi

SHAYKH Rashīd Riḍā occupies a special place in modern Arabic and Islamic thought. He participated in, and sometimes led, movements for Arab and Muslim revival or political independence, and displayed a rare combination of integrity, dedication and clarity of thought.

He was an indefatigable writer on the religious, political, social and literary problems of his time, and his views carried weight with friend and foe alike. In the political field he dealt with the Turks and the British in the interests of Islam in general and the Arab nation in particular. As a prominent member of the Decentralisation Party, and as a Muslim thinker, the British authorities in Egypt sought his views on a number of occasions on the eve and during the course of the First World War.

Like his master Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Abduh, he regarded the Ottoman Empire as a symbol of Islamic sovereignty and the Caliphate. Neither he nor his master ever questioned the title of the Ottoman sultans to the Caliphate, nor did they support at the time the call for an Arab caliphate. When the Sharif of Makka put forward proposals for Arab political independence within certain territorial limits, the Oriental Secretary of the British High Commissioner in Cairo found these bearing an “exact resemblance” to the views already expressed by Riḍā.

Again when the British government was sounding Arab opinion in Cairo in 1915–16, through Sir Mark Sykes, Riḍā’s testimony shines through the prevarications and cowardice of lesser men. Should the Ottoman Empire fall, he said, another independent Islamic state must rise comprising the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Syria – Palestine under the Sharif of Makka. He refused Sykes’s suggestion of any foreign surveillance as diminution of sovereignty. Instead of admiring such an upright man Sykes wrote him off as a “fanatic” who understood only the argument of “force”.

This was exactly what happened. The Arabs were *forced* to submit to foreign control. Sykes was, with a Frenchman, responsible for the notorious Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 by which the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were partitioned as spheres of influence, British or French. The end of the war witnessed these countries largely under British and partly under

French occupation. And contrary to President Wilson's liberal principles and the proclaimed principles of consent of the governed and self-determination, Iraq was administered by Britain on colonial lines and Syria was partitioned between Britain and France, and a large slice thereof was promised to the Zionists as a national home.

Concurrently with outraged Arab national feeling, there was much Islamic sympathy with Turkey for the humiliation inflicted on it by Britain and her allies. It was in this atmosphere of crisis in the Arab and Muslim worlds that Riḍā wrote a memorandum, not to the British authorities in Cairo as he had done before on a number of occasions, but to the Prime Minister of Great Britain Lloyd George. I was fortunate to discover it in the archives of the Foreign Office at the Public Record Office in London. It is dated 25th June, 1919 and is written in a clear Arabic hand by Riḍā himself and comprises seven foolscap pages. It was brought to London by General Gilbert Clayton, the Chief Political Officer to the British Commander-in-Chief, who regarded the writer of sufficient importance to take note of his views.

The memorandum was first sent to the School of Oriental Studies for translation. It took that efficient institution six weeks to produce a translation, at the rate of one page per week. It reached the Foreign Office without any covering letter, probably by hand. Hence it is difficult to establish who was responsible for this expeditious performance. The translation is neither literal nor literary and more often than not it gives rough paraphrase with little respect to the text or the sequence of the points made by the writer. There are even omissions and additions. For example, the translation of the passage about "freedom and justice" refers to "the Christians" only, whereas the original Arabic has "the Christians *and* Jews". For these reasons I had to do my own translation.

Despite Clayton's high opinion of Riḍā, the memorandum received little more than cursory consideration before being forwarded to Lord Milner who was with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary at the Peace Conference in Paris. There is no evidence that it ever reached Lloyd George or that it received more consideration than other representations from Arab representatives in Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Egypt. But brief though they are, the remarks made in minutes at the India Office and the War Office are illuminating.

"The publication of the terms of the Peace Treaty (with Turkey)," goes the India Office minute, "had a disturbing effect on the Muslim World". Then the writer quotes from Riḍā's memorandum that "right and justice" were meant for the Christians only and not for the Muslims. The War Office minute states that Riḍā "represented moderate Muslim opinion" but that he over-estimated the capacity of Muslims to organise independent states and under-estimated the economic difficulties involved. The Foreign Office minute by Hubert Young merely quoted Clayton's opinion of Riḍā's standing.

The Memorandum is now of merely historical interest.

"A Memorandum (*mudhakkirah*) on the Political Aspirations (*raghā'ib*) of the Muslims and Arabs submitted to the great British Prime Minister Mr. Lloyd George."

It opens with a note on the writer and his religious, political and literary activities, and his efforts through "the most moderate (*a'qal*) of the Arab political parties" to cultivate British friendship with the Arabs before the war, believing that in doing so he was seeking to benefit the Arabs and the British alike. Then he refers to previous representations, oral and written, to the British authorities in Egypt concerning the Muslim and Arab questions in 1914 and after.

In particular he mentions a memorandum submitted "towards the end of 1914" detailing the dangers of the annexation of Iraq and Syria by Britain and France respectively, the question of the protectorate over Egypt, the evil consequences of giving Syria to France, and the high regard for Britain among the Muslims and Arabs for safeguarding "religious freedom" in her dominions. He then asked Britain, in the name of the Arabs and Muslims, to use its influence towards realising the complete independence of the Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Iraq. In a supplementary memorandum submitted "in February 1915" he detailed the political, economic and moral advantages to Britain resulting from her thus helping the Arabs to attain their independence.

It is clear that Riḍā's argument is that of the politician, not of the divine. He is all the time at pains to stress British interests and to prove these will be better served by helping the Arabs and Muslims to achieve their aims rather than disregarding their wishes. He deplores the fact that Britain did not follow the line of policy he indicated, and that instead based its Arab policy on some arrangements with the Amīr of Najd and the Sharif of Makka coupled with a powerful propaganda campaign. Circulars were distributed by various means in all the Arab lands, provinces of the Ottoman Empire, "raising the hopes of the Arab nation for independence, the revival of past Arab glory and their civilisation in Baghdad and Damascus". This did raise the Arab hopes and the British reaped some military advantages.

The end of the war found Britain with her allies in occupation of all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. It soon transpired that the independence which British propaganda proclaimed was in practice British control in Iraq and French control in Syria, with Prince Faisal in the interior subject to foreign control in the Syrian littoral. The authors of this plan, Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot, visited the Arab lands assuming the style of "friends of the Arabs". "But for military rule and the strait circumstances of the people as a result of the war these two 'friends of the Arabs' would have witnessed unimaginable consequences (of their presumptions)."

At the beginning of the war Riḍā expressed an opinion to the British

authorities, later confirmed by personal contacts with pilgrims at Makka, that the Muslim world was more sympathetic toward Germany on account of its alliance with the Ottoman Empire, the symbol of the Caliphate and Islamic sovereignty. On the other hand the Arabs believed that a British victory would lead to their independence.

After the armistice it became apparent, however, that Britain and her allies were contemplating the partition of the Ottoman Empire among themselves and even giving parts thereof to small Christian nations like the Armenians. This created unrest in the Muslim world which became convinced of the truth of war-time German propaganda that Britain intended to demolish the strongest Islamic sovereign state and to divide its territory among Christians. Hence it was likely that the disturbances and revolt in Egypt, India and Afghanistan might spread to other parts with adverse consequences to British commerce and moral influence. It was still possible for the wisdom of the British government to avert these dangers. This memorandum contains suggestions for this purpose.

At the beginning of the war the Arabs had hopes of attaining their aspirations through Great Britain. Towards its end some Muslims had similar hopes in President Wilson's liberal ideas, which were declared publicly and endorsed by Britain and her allies. "But it became apparent to them after the armistice, that the justice and freedom in these declarations were not meant for the Muslims but for the Christians only, and also for the Jews according to some."

"The British Government now faces difficulties at home, in the Empire and with other governments. She may spare herself the enmity of 300 million Muslims because of the intention to partition the territory of the Ottoman Empire with France, Italy, Greece and the Armenians. She should instead attain economic and moral supremacy in all the Arab and Turkish lands by abandoning this policy of partition, and adopting another based on justice, namely the independence of the Islamic nations, the Arabs, Turks and Persians, in their own countries similar to the Christian nations. This would be in accordance with Wilson's principles and British and allied declarations now misrepresented by imperialist designs on Islamic territory under the guise of trusteeship and foreign assistance."

Returning to the theme of Anglo-Arab and Anglo-Islamic amity, the writer argues that the survival of Islamic sovereignty and the independence of the Arab countries constitute no danger to Britain's position. As for the Arabs they are riddled with sectarian divisions, different forms of government and social philosophies. Most of their land is desolate (*kharāb*). To develop it and establish unity among its parts will not be possible in less than two generations. In the meantime British interests cannot be adversely affected. These interests would even be enhanced if Arab development was achieved with British assistance and friendship.

Asked in France what would happen if the Arabs were denied indepen-

dence, Prince Faisal is reported to have replied: "Then we shall be rebels." According to Riḍā this was expected to be the inevitable outcome of the denial of national aspirations. It would result in diminished British prestige and the need to keep large military forces in every country. He then asks: "Is it better for Britain, civilisation and humanity to see the Arabs in Syria and Iraq independent . . . striving to establish a modern civilisation in the Arabian Peninsula . . . or to see them as fanatic rebels, spreading fanaticism among the Islamic nations in the East . . . ?" In his opinion the British were able to establish themselves in the East, and to gain great influence in the world, through wisdom, not military power. He does not believe that they would abandon this wise policy in order to follow one based on military might as they did recently in Egypt and India.

The final section of the memorandum is entitled: "What will satisfy the Muslims from Great Britain?" It dismisses the efficacy of the British declaration that the Islamic holy places in Hijaz, Jerusalem and Iraq would be under Islamic control. Such a declaration is even painful to Muslims since it implies that the holy places were under foreign sovereignty and consequently worship there depends upon the pleasure of the foreigner. The Muslims were not concerned that their holy places would be demolished or access to them denied; their real concern was for Islamic sovereignty without which Islam itself would not be safe. The preservation of this sovereignty is a desire mixed with the blood of every Muslim who regards the survival of his religion as dependent upon the existence of an independent strong state, subject to no foreign influence.

But the Muslims would not be satisfied if Britain helped merely to maintain an independent Turkish state in the purely Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire as a symbol of the Caliphate. For it is impossible to separate the Caliphate from the holy places, all of which are in the Arab provinces which were also desirous of establishing their own independence.

There are two possible solutions: either the restoration of the pre-war territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire (which is impossible because the Turks themselves had accepted Wilson's terms and the Arabs would not agree to return to Turkish rule even though their leaders regard it as less dangerous than the protectorate or trusteeship of a European Power), or the proclamation of the independence of all the Arab provinces similar to that of the Turkish provinces (leaving the question of the Caliphate for the Muslims to settle later on among themselves).

If Britain, the memorandum concludes, can prevail at the Peace Conference so that the unconditional independence of the Islamic countries is agreed, if she will evacuate Iraq and Palestine, leaving their inhabitants to manage their own affairs – a circumstance that will prompt other powers (like France in Syria) to do likewise – if British wisdom can devise a policy to satisfy the Egyptians, then the entire Muslim world will be unanimous in desiring friendship with her. This will also promote British economic and moral

influence, and the spread of the English language. Furthermore, it will prompt the Muslims and Arabs to prefer British assistance to any other for the development of their countries and the exploitation of their natural resources. And lastly, it will win for Britain the goodwill of the Indian Muslims “with whom she could maintain the balance”.

مذكرة

في رغائب المسلمين والعرب السياسية

مرفوعة الى مقام وزير الدولة البريطانيّة الأكبر المستر لوي جورج

راجع هذه المذكرة عالم مسلم شريف النسب سوريّ الشفاء هاجر الى مصر منذ اثنتين وعشرين سنة
يدعو فيها الى الاصلاح الاسلامي وله مجلة اصداحية اجتماعية فلسفية تسمى "المنار" وقد اسس مع
كثيرين عدة جمعيات واحزاب سياسية وعليه وساح في البلاد التركية والعربية والهندية وراكب
في الهند مؤتمره و العلماء الاسلاميين سنة ١٩١٢ واختبر سبل الشرق والغرب بالمطالعة
ولقاء اهل الارياض الذين يطمون بمصر حجاجا وادبا فحين اشتغل بالسعي لترقية الامّة العربية
وله علاقه حسنة بامراء الجزيرة العربية وزعماء العراق وسورية

وقد سمى باسم اعقل الاحزاب العربية قبل الحرب وبعدها لخطّة مودة بريطانيا العظمى للعرب
ومباعدتهم على الاصلاح المطلوب لا اعتقاد هذه الحرب ان هذه المدة خير لقوم العرب ولبريطانيا
جميعا. وقد صاح رجال الانكليز في مصر قولا وكلمات بارائهم المنبئة على اخباره الصحيحة واخباره الدقيق
في المستقبل العربي والاسلامية. وكتب اليهم كتباً ومذكرات لانزال الازام تظهر صحة رأيها
وان ما دعا اليه هو الموافق لصلحة البريطانيين والعرب دون ما خالفه

وانني ارفع هذه المذكرة الان الى رجل الامّة البريطانية العظيم ووزيرها الفعال في رغائب
المسلمين والعرب عسى ان يفتش بما أقره عليه نواب الهدى والافلاص. وهو صاحب الارادة
التي لا يشوبها سبيل عن تنفيذ ما يعتقد ان فيه المصلحة الرائجة لامة

تمهيده في مذكرة في سنتي ١٩١٤ و ١٩١٥

كنت كتبت مذكرة قد منها لرجال الحكومة البريطانية في مصر اثر ما دار بيني وبينهم من اذكريات في المستقبل
العربية والاسلامية في اواخر سنة ١٩١٤ او عنها ١٥ قضية جعلتها مقدمات للنتيجة التي رتبها عليها
بينت فيها غوائل الاستيلاء على العراق وسورية في نظر العالم الاسلامي وسكان حامية مصر ومسلمي
اتهام الكفرة بالعمز على ازالة الحكم الاسلامي من الارض قبل ظهور الدعوة (البربرغندة) الاتحادية
المانية الى ذلك. وسألني ابيح الدبني. ومقدار حسن ظني المسلمين والعرب خاتمة باركليز في
الجزيرة العربية وغيرها. ورأي العرب في صداقة الكفرة وعداوتها. وعواقب استمرار السلطة القبية
في سورية والعراق. وسعي المانية للاستفاد من العالم الاسلامي باستاتة ايماء وتقية من الانكليز
وما يتوقعه المفكرون من افضاء انتصار للحملات الى التنازع واستناظر السياسات وحسد الكفرة على قدر
خبايا وعظم رجاء الاستيلاء على مستعمرات المانية وامداد امير اطورنيا من راسل البريطاني
الى الاسكندرية ومن حدود برقة غربا الى حدود البصير شرقا. وكون اعضاء سورية نفوسا ما يزيد على
بلية ويكون حطام المستقبل على ما حولا. وشدة نفور مسلمي سورية وكثرة خوفهم من الانكليز

واما نتيجة هذه المقدمات في المذكرة فهو مطالب الكفرة باسم حرب والاسلام بان تسعين تراديا
لاستقلال جزيرة العرب وسورية والعراق بالاستقلال التام. وانما يهدد واحدة تبني ضدنا للفرق والاسلام
على صغر ثابت وتلف غماس مسلمي مصر والهند وغيرهم من اعراضا عن سائر الدورات العثمانية

Shāh Walī-Allāh's Concept of the *Sharī'ah*

Mi'rāj Muḥammad

AḤMAD b. 'Abdu-r-Raḥīm, better known as Shāh Walī-Allāh al-Dihlawī (1114–1176 A.H./1703–1762), flourished during the decline of the Mughal Empire of India, an era when the Muslim community of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was facing a grave crisis – economic, political and spiritual. This crisis provided Shāh Walī-Allāh with an intellectual irritant and prompted him to discuss the problems with which his society was faced. Endowed with rare profoundness and perception, Walī-Allāh delved into the depths of the Islamic tradition, came forward with many new and bold ideas and thereby regenerated the intellectual life of his community and enriched its cumulative store of ideas. By dint of his creative thinking he exerted a great and lasting influence on the Muslim society of the subcontinent, which can still be perceived among the academic circles of the country. Today, almost all of the 'ulamā' of India and Pakistan, despite their different religious affiliations, claim to belong to his intellectual lineage. The respect and influence commanded by Shāh Walī-Allāh prompt the followers of various schools of thought to invoke his authority for supporting their respective stand-points and attitudes. Even the Muslim Modernists, who despite their professed repudiation of every authority except that of reason,¹ do not fail to seek his support for their modernist views.²

We intend to examine in the following pages Shāh Walī-Allāh's notion of *sharī'ah* in general, and his concept of the Islamic *Sharī'ah* in particular – his ideas regarding its genesis and character, especially its attitude towards the customary law of pre-Islamic Arabia and its position in relation to human reason.

The Notion of *Sharī'ah*

The essential purpose of religion, according to Shāh Walī-Allāh, is to follow the will of God, both in personal and social life, by adhering to the principles of piety (*uṣūl al-birr*), by keeping a balance between angelic and bestial faculties, and by improving social institutions (for which he uses the innovative term *irtifāqāt*).³ A *sharī'ah*, in his view, aims at giving an institutional shape to these indeterminate and vague notions by defining their essentials, conditions, etc.⁴; for people cannot be asked to follow them in this world

or called to account here or hereafter unless these principles are given some kind of form.⁵ Accordingly, when these principles acquire a certain form, that form becomes their *locum tenens* in the same way as a word stands for its meaning or an image for its subject.⁶ And it is this form or *shari'ah* according to which people can be asked to act and called to account.

A *shari'ah*, therefore, aims at embodying certain fundamental principles of morality, and of social and criminal justice. These fundamental principles seem to be the motivating spirit, the essence and the core of the *shari'ahs* of the prophets in all ages and climes.⁷ In trying to give these principles a form, the lawgiver takes cognizance of many existential factors such as the mental predilections and customs of the people who at a given time are required to follow it. In fact, Shāh Wali-Allāh shows much greater awareness of these factors and emphasises them much more than Muslim jurists are wont to do. He outlines at considerable length these factors, which are fairly important even though subsidiary to what seem to be the fundamental principles which constitute the core of *shari'ah* and which it seeks to embody.

He divides these factors into two categories: (1) essential factors, and (2) accidental factors.

Some of the essential factors are the following:

- (a) the knowledge and sciences of the contemporary people;
- (b) their beliefs, convictions and pre-suppositions;
- (c) their customs and usages;
- (d) their temperaments, their trend of mind and their habits; and
- (e) the legacies of the former prophets.

As for the accidental factors, they are:

- (a) the queries of the companions of the prophet who propounds his *shari'ah*;
- (b) the wishes, prayers and habits of the [law-giving] prophet;
- (c) the heedlessness of the contemporary people in obeying a command, or their persistence in a sin; and
- (d) their extreme attachment to or constant practice of a good deed so much so that they consider it a sin to discontinue or contravene it.⁸

With regard to the essential factors, Shāh Wali-Allāh compares a people to an individual who cannot perceive a thing as it is because of his physical or intellectual deficiencies. In view of his deficiencies the knowledge of that thing is modified or reduced to the level of his understanding. Wali-Allāh illustrates their point by the example of a congenitally blind person who has no idea of colour or shape in his mind. He can perceive things only through hearing of sounds or touching, etc. When he has a dream of an incident or some knowledge is inspired to him in a dream, that knowledge or incident must occur in his mind through ideas or shapes that are already in his mind. Illustrating the same point by another example, he says: "When an Arab

who knows only the Arabic language acquires a science, it takes shape in his mind only in the Arabic language.”⁹ He further exemplifies the point by citing the instance of the inhabitants of a country where certain huge, ugly animals such as elephants, etc., are found. People in these countries conceive the torture of the jinn and the terror of the devils by imagining these ugly, huge animals, whereas others do not think in that manner.¹⁰

From these examples Shāh Walī-Allāh infers that, as the other human sciences are influenced by the existing state of a people, in the same way their lore and learning, their convictions and conventions, and their tendencies and temperament have great effect in the formation of their *sharī'ah*.¹¹ He cites an instance from the Hebrew *Sharī'ah* to show how the above-mentioned five essential factors influence a *sharī'ah* commandment. After regaining his health the Prophet Ya'qūb (Jacob) prohibited for himself meat and milk of the camel according to his vow to God. His children also followed him in this practice. With the passage of time, all Israel believed it a sin to contravene the practice of their Patriarch. Now, it was because of this pre-supposition, conviction and practice that the Torah enjoyed a ban on these things. But since Banū Ismā'il did not hold this belief, camel's meat and milk were made lawful for them.¹² Thus the existing situation and the customs of the society in which a prophet introduces his *sharī'ah* play a significant role in shaping that *sharī'ah*.¹³

In this connection Walī-Allāh compares *sharī'ah* to rain water which is limpid when it falls from the sky; but dust and air change its original form as it falls on the ground. For the same reason, the water of low-lying land is not as clear as that of higher land.¹⁴ By this analogy he intends to show that in the same way the forms that *sharī'ah* assumes in different times and climes differ from one another owing to the reasons mentioned above, even though they seek to embody the same fundamental principles.¹⁵ In other words, all the prophets agree in respect of the basic tenets and fundamental principles of piety and justice which form the core of religion (*aṣl al-dīn*). They differ, however, in respect of the external forms of these principles (i.e., in respect of *sharī'ah*).¹⁶

Moreover, since a *sharī'ah* aims at the reform of human society, it works like a physician who recommends different medicines and different precautions for different diseases of different persons.¹⁷ By this example he demonstrates why the *sharī'ah* of an age or a people appears to be different from the *sharī'ahs* of other ages and other peoples when one looks at their external features; but when looked at inwardly, they are always the same in respect of their essentials.

The external form of a *sharī'ah*, in the opinion of Shāh Walī-Allāh, reflects in this respect the norms and mores of a people as it is essentially a reproduction of the total result of the cumulative process of their cultural life and social activities. According to his philosophy, the sciences, beliefs, dogmas and practices which have deep roots in a society rise to, and remain for a long

time in *Ḥaẓīrat al-Quds* (the Realm of Sanctity or Supernal Plenum), a realm wherein the problems and destinies of humanity are considered and determined.¹⁸ Then, by the benevolent, assimilatory action of God they become *nāmūs* (*nomos*, divine law) and form the source of inspiration for the prophets who guide their peoples accordingly. Shāh Wali-Allāh compares this process to that of rainfall. By the heat of the sun water evaporates and becomes water-laden cloud after rising into the atmosphere. There the cold air turns it to rain. Now, it is the self-same water which comes down again to the earth and flows into streams to irrigate the fields and produce vegetation.¹⁹ Hence *sharī'ah* is not altogether extrinsic to a people; for it does not disregard their customs, practices, potentialities and predilections; on the contrary, it takes full cognizance of them.²⁰

Moreover, since the prophets, according to Wali-Allāh, strive to effect changes in the existing system of law and customs²¹ in order to reform human society rather than to subject their peoples to inconvenience and discomfort by overburdening them with new and unfamiliar laws, generally they neither formulate new principles of piety and sin (*uṣūl al-birr wa al-iḥm*), nor introduce new and unknown laws,²² nor deviate from the accepted and familiar *irtifāqāt* (social institutions).²³ They rather look into the existing customs and practices and retain what is found to be in agreement with the will of God, the laws of revealed religion (*al-qawānīn al-millīyah*) and universal ends (*al-ārā' al-kullīyah*)²⁴ and reject what is found to be contrary to them. They further rectify and amend the practices that need amendment and sometimes add to them what is beneficial.²⁵ In the theory of Shāh Wali-Allāh, therefore, the customs and usages of the contemporary society form the warp or woof of its *sharī'ah*.²⁶

While describing the method adopted by the prophets in reforming the customary law of their peoples, he says:

The prophets examine the prevalent manners of their people in eating, in dressing, and in building, their ways of adornment, their customs of marriage and marital relations, their practices of buying and selling, their punitive measures, their procedure of settling litigations, etc. If the existing system is found in agreement with *al-ra'y al-kullī*, they feel no need of changing it or replacing it by a different system; rather they vindicate it and urge their people to adhere to it. But if it is not found in accordance with *al-ra'y al-kullī* and the need of some alteration is felt because of certain harmful customs and usages, it is not considered desirable to replace it by a different one which is absolutely unknown to them. In this case the prophets have recourse to the existing precedents which are better and refer to the leading examples of the reputable, righteous forbears of their people. The basic purpose is that these reforms should be introduced in such a way that their faculty of reasoning is satisfied and does not repel them.²⁷

The Genesis of the Islamic Shari'ah

As we have seen, it has repeatedly been stressed by Shāh Walī-Allāh that a *shari'ah* does not take shape in a vacuum; rather it develops in the context of the customs and usages of the contemporary society.²⁸ He maintains the same with regard to the Islamic *Shari'ah*.

The significance of the customary law of pre-Islamic Arabia *vis-à-vis* the Islamic *Shari'ah* has either been denied or not much emphasised by the classical *fuqahā*. Shāh Walī-Allāh, however, very emphatically stresses this characteristic of the Islamic *Shari'ah*. He holds that the form and the substance of the Islamic *Shari'ah* have vital links with the customs and usages of pre-Islamic Arabia,²⁹ and especially those of the Quraysh,³⁰ so much so that they constitute the raw material (*māddah*) of the Islamic *Shari'ah*, and without their knowledge one cannot understand the Islamic law and perceive its spirit and implications.³¹

In order to show the origins of the Islamic *Shari'ah* in the tradition of pre-Islamic Arabia, Walī-Allāh classifies the *Shari'ah* into two parts, or rather refers to its two aspects. One of these he calls *irtifāqāt* (social institutions), which includes, *inter alia*, the political set up, civil law, penal law and customs.³² The other he calls *'ibādāt*, which consists of rituals and acts of devotion.³³

He observes that in both of these aspects the Islamic *Shari'ah* is substantially based on the pre-Islamic tradition of Arab society.³⁴ In reforming the *'ibādāt*, the Prophet Muḥammad (upon whom be peace) had recourse to the tradition of their ancestors, Ibrāhīm and Ismā'il;³⁵ and in amending the *irtifāqāt* and customs, he was always guided by what Walī-Allāh terms as *al-ra'y al-kullī*, and by considerations of general good (*al-maṣlahah al-kulliyah*).³⁶ The Prophet (upon whom be peace) did not generally introduce altogether new laws and institutions. The method that he generally followed was to alter the existing rules and institutions with a view to reforming his people.³⁷

According to Shāh Walī-Allāh, the fact is not that the pre-Islamic Arabs had no rules and regulations for organising their society and no rules of personal status and family, of inheritance, of trade and commerce, of criminal justice, etc., and that the Prophet (upon whom be peace) introduced these rules for the first time. On the contrary, Shāh Walī-Allāh observes:

They had strict rules and conventions (*sunan muta'akkidah*) concerning eating, drinking, dressing, wedding ceremonies, festivals, obsequies, marriage, divorce, *'iddah* (waiting period), mourning, trafficking and [other mundane] transactions. They censured one another on the contravention of these rules. They always regarded marriage with mother, daughter, sister and other *maḥārim* as unlawful. They had punitive measures (*mazājir*), e.g., *qisās* (retaliation), *diyāh* (blood-money), *qasāmah* (compurgation) for offensive crimes, and [various]

punishments (*'uqūbāt*) for adultery and theft. Certain well-developed *irtifāqāt* (social institutions) had also penetrated their society. But [reforms were needed because] they had also adopted some depraved practices such as cruelty to prisoners of war, robbery, adultery, certain vitiated types of marriage, usury, etc.³⁸

Shāh Walī-Allāh maintains that the Prophet (upon whom be peace) was not inclined to negate the entire customary law of Arabia. He rather attempted to accommodate it into the Islamic *Shari'ah* with certain modifications which were required to make some of the customs compatible with the tenets of Islam, the fundamental principles of morality and general good.³⁹ While expounding the reform-process adopted by the Prophet (upon whom be peace) he asserts:

Those who have a deep knowledge know that in matters of marriage, divorce, [mundane] transactions, adornment, dress, *qaḍā'* (dispensation of justice), penalties and [the rules of] the distribution of war booty, [etc.], the [Islamic] *Shar'* did not introduce [new laws] that would be unfamiliar to them [i.e., the contemporary Arabs] or which they would hesitate to accept. No doubt, some baneful practices were reformed or abolished. [For example when] usury became exorbitant, it was prohibited; and since people had conflicts about the purchase of unripe fruits on the tree [because of natural calamities], it was made unlawful. [But a number of contemporary rules were left intact such as] *diyyah* (blood-money) was ten camels in the time of 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib; but he increased it to a hundred camels when he saw that the people did not stop slaying. The Prophet (upon whom be peace) retained the increased amount of *diyyah*. [Similarly] the *qasāmah* (compurgation) was first enacted by Abū Ṭālib [and then retained by the Prophet]. The chief of the tribe received one-fourth of the war booty, the Prophet (upon whom be peace) fixed it at one-fifth [for the head of the community]. *Kharāj* and *'ushr* were levied on them by Kobad and his son Noshirwan [the Emperors of Persia]; the *Shar'* maintained almost the same [laws of revenue]. The Jews [of Arabia] stoned the adulterer, cut off the hand of the thief and took life for life; accordingly, the Qur'ān promulgated the same [penalties]. If one traces [the origins of the Islamic *Shari'ah*] one can find so many examples of this type.⁴⁰

Shāh Walī-Allāh does not limit this process of the enactment of the Islamic *Shari'ah* to civil and criminal law but includes the *'ibādāt* as well.

Moreover, if you are intelligent and have a comprehensive knowledge of all aspects of the [Islamic] injunctions, you can perceive that even in [matters of] *'ibādāt* the prophets only prescribed [literally, "brought"] those things which were found among their peoples or things similar to them. Indeed, they did nullify the distortions of the *Jāhiliyyah* in

them, prescribed their timings and *arkān* (the essentials) which were vague, and elucidated what was obscure.⁴¹

The pre-Islamic Arabs had, according to Shāh Walī-Allāh, almost all the religious practices and rituals which we now find in the Islamic *Shari'ah*, e.g., *ṣalāh* (prayer), *ṣawm* (fasting), *hajj* (pilgrimage), *zakāh* (poor-due), *i'tikāf* (worship in seclusion), *wuḍū'* (ablution), *'aḳīqah*, etc., though in corrupted forms.⁴² In order to prove his thesis, he traces the history of the religion of the pre-Islamic Arabs after Ismā'il and regards the rituals in vogue among them as the relics of the *millah* (religious tradition) of their ancestors, Ibrāhīm and Ismā'il. He holds that the Arabs strictly practised the true religion of their patriarch Ismā'il, until 'Amr b. Luḥayy, who flourished three hundred years before the Prophet Muḥammad (upon whom be peace), distorted the true religion and introduced certain polytheistic practices. In spite of 'Amr's misleading endeavours, the Arabs preserved some original beliefs and religious rituals, though in distorted forms.⁴³

Shāh Walī-Allāh asserts that since the Prophet Muḥammad (upon whom be peace) was sent to revive the pristine religion of Ibrāhīm and Ismā'il, he did not make big changes in the main institutions of *al-millah al-ḥanifiyah* of Ibrāhīm.⁴⁴ He examined the ways of the Arabs before Islam and retained those beliefs which were found in accordance with the way (*minhāj*) of Ismā'il and strongly revoked the distortions and corruptions which had entered into it or anything which was akin to *shirk* (polytheism) or *kuf'r* (unbelief). He also revived those true beliefs and valid rituals which had been buried into oblivion and only traces of them were found at that time.⁴⁵

In short, in enacting the civil and criminal laws and religious practices of Islamic *Shari'ah*, and even in formulating such details as fixing the timings of the prayers,⁴⁶ rates and *niṣāb* of *zakāh*, *niṣāb* of theft, the *shar'i* measurements and quantities, in prohibiting certain foods, in permitting certain types of marriage and forbidding others, etc.,⁴⁷ the prevalent customs, usages, and socio-economic condition of the contemporary Arabs, or in the extreme case, those of the contemporary Persians and Byzantines, were taken into consideration, while those of more distant countries were disregarded.⁴⁸

The Character of the Islamic Shari'ah

In view of the above-mentioned opinions of Shāh Walī-Allāh about *shari'ah* in general, and the Islamic *Shari'ah* in particular – that the *shari'ah* of any given people is related to that people's predilections, social institutions, etc.,⁴⁹ that the Islamic *Shari'ah*, having arisen among the Arabs, is related to their customs, traditions and social institutions,⁵⁰ and that the laws of *shari'ah* change according to changing circumstances and the needs of peoples and places,⁵¹ – it may appear that according to Walī-Allāh, the Islamic *Shari'ah* was basically meant for the Arabian society of the sixth century, or at the most also had in view some of the neighbouring countries, and its

validity was time-bound. This conclusion appears plausible at first sight, particularly in view of his statement that a new era begins with every century or every millenium in which God introduces a reformed *shari'ah* according to the needs and requirements of the age.⁵² Some modern scholars have deduced from these statements of Shāh Walī-Allāh that he tended to regard some of the laws, especially the punitive laws, of the Islamic *Shari'ah* as specific to the Arabs of the time of the Prophet (upon whom be peace) and did not favour strictly enforcing them in the case of future generations.⁵³ Some of them have claimed that Shāh Walī-Allāh favoured an Indianised form of the *shari'ah* rather than its Arabian form,⁵⁴ and suggested that the universal elements in it be sifted from the local ones for its adaptation to the needs and circumstances of other societies.⁵⁵

A thorough scrutiny of Shāh Walī-Allāh's writings show, however, that he is firmly opposed to such ideas and strongly holds that the pristine Islamic *Shari'ah* in its Arabian form has been made obligatory on the peoples of all countries and all ages.⁵⁶ He stresses its innate perfection to such an extent that he neither allows it to be abrogated, nor considers it appropriate to add anything to or improve upon it.⁵⁷

This opinion of Shāh Walī-Allāh may appear to be in conflict with his above-mentioned ideas about *shari'ah* according to which he recognises different *shari'ahs* for different times and climes.⁵⁸ But this apparent contradiction may be solved were we to note that here he refers exclusively to the *shari'ahs* of the prophets before the Prophet Muḥammad (upon whom be peace).⁵⁹ He avers that the earlier prophets had been appointed specifically for the guidance of their own peoples who were comparatively smaller in number. Their *shari'ahs*, therefore, did not have sufficient comprehensiveness to provide guiding rules for peoples other than their own.⁶⁰ Their *shari'ahs* became obsolete after the lapse of a few generations and were abrogated by subsequent prophets who altered the preceding *shari'ahs* corresponding to the traditions and circumstances of the peoples of their time.⁶¹

On the other hand, the Prophet Muḥammad (upon whom be peace) was sent, according to Walī-Allāh, to all the peoples of the world and his mission was to subject all the nations and peoples to his *shari'ah*. His *shari'ah*, therefore, differed in some respects from those of the former prophets. It was more comprehensive than, and superior to, the previous ones in several ways.⁶² His process of promulgating and enforcing the *shari'ah*, Walī-Allāh observes, differed from that of the former prophets; for a prophet who wants to bring various peoples under the fold of a *millah* (religion) is bound to select initially a certain people; and after he has reformed them, he uses them as his instrument for reforming other peoples. It is, therefore, indispensable for him to treat with an amount of deference the customs, *'ulūm* (sciences) and *irtifāqāt* (social institutions) of his own people in making them a substantive base of his *shari'ah*. Subsequently, he has to take into consideration only those laws and customs of other peoples that can be accepted as the natural religion

(*al-madhhab al-ṭabī'i*) of the civilised world (*al-aqālim al-sāliḥah*). Apart from these all humanity is to be urged to follow the *shari'ah* of the prophet's own people.⁶³

Walī-Allāh justifies this prophetic method by arguing that in such a case it is neither feasible nor commendable to leave the task of formulating *shari'ah* to each of the people or to the leaders of each generation, as doing so would destroy the very purpose of the enactment of a *shari'ah*. He also considers it to be impracticable for the prophet who has to guide and reform various peoples and nations to formulate a different *shari'ah* for each people, since it is impossible to examine and comprehend the customary laws and usages of all the peoples of different countries and communities that would be essential for this purpose. In view of these difficulties, Shāh Walī-Allāh regards it as best and easiest that such a *shari'ah* should be closely connected with the customs of the society in which it is introduced. As for later generations and other peoples who are expected to come under the domain of the *shari'ah*, there should neither be complete rigidity nor absolute laxity for them in the law.⁶⁴

The people in whose society this universal *shari'ah* is introduced, he adds, find it easy to adopt because of their strong belief in their prophet and because the *shari'ah* is related to the customs and usages in vogue in their society. As for those peoples who come under the domain of this *shari'ah* later, they find it easy to adopt because of their tendency to follow their leaders and rulers who succeed the prophet.⁶⁵

Now, in the time of the Prophet Muḥammad (upon whom be peace), Shāh Walī-Allāh remarks, all the civilised world was under the sway of two great empires, the Roman and the Persian; and the customs, usages and social institutions of these two empires had penetrated the life of all the peoples of the civilised world of that time. The reform of these two empires meant, therefore, the reform of all the contemporary world. It was because of these reasons that the Providence willed to reform the Arabs through the Prophet Muḥammad and his Companions, and to reform the two above-mentioned empires at the hand of the Arabs; for it would lead to the reform of the rest of the world through those empires.⁶⁶

The Prophet Muḥammad (upon whom be peace), according to this theory, was assigned two missions, one for Banū Ismā'il, i.e., the Arabs, and the other for the rest of the world. It was necessary in the interest of the former to base the Islamic *Shari'ah* on the customs and social institutions (*irtifāqāt*) of Banū Ismā'il. As for the universal aspect of his mission, it was accomplished by accommodating what he terms as the fourth *irtifāq* into the *Shari'ah*.⁶⁷ Accordingly, the Islamic *Shari'ah* which is related to the customary law of pre-Islamic Arabia and was inherited subsequently by generations of various peoples has been made obligatory in its original Arabian form on all peoples and for all times to come. By the holy decree of God, Walī-Allāh avers, the *Shari'ah* has become a genus which demands the existence and preservation

of its species (i.e., laws and injunctions). Hence, any attempt to alter or disregard the laws of the Islamic *Shari'ah* is tantamount to the sin of altering or annihilating God's creation, which deserves His wrath.⁶⁸ Wali-Allāh stresses a strict and literal adherence to the *Shari'ah* and denounces the attempt to alter its external form by seeking guidance merely from the spirit of its laws, even if this be done for the purpose of applying it to the changed circumstances of various societies.⁶⁹

He firmly believes that the Islamic *Shari'ah* has already been completely purified from the wrong and baneful customs of the society in which its enactment took place; and now there is no need for further scrutiny of it, except that it may be examined and purified, from time to time, by the *mujaddids* (renovators), from the aberrant accretions imposed upon it by the distorters of later times.⁷⁰ Thus, even the process of reform-activity which has been allowed, according to him, may not change the external form of the *Shari'ah*. On the contrary, it should be directed towards bringing it closer to its original Arabian form. He stands for maintaining the *Shari'ah* strictly in its Arabian form so much so that he exhorts his people to abandon the customs of 'Ajam (Persians) and Hindus and advises them to love Arabs, keep to the customs and habits of the early Arabs, and adopt their modes of dress and conduct. He considers all this to be a means of adhering to, and extolling, the Islamic *Shari'ah*.⁷¹ He also takes pride in his Arab origin and in the Arabic language,⁷² and always admires the early Arabs for their simplicity and purity of taste. He urges reference to their customs and usages whenever there arises any difference of opinion in regard to defining a *shar'i* term or a *mazīnnah* or a *manāṭ* (effective cause).⁷³

Another aspect of Shāh Wali-Allāh's notion of the *Shari'ah* that calls for examination is its position in relation to human reason. While declaring his creed in the *Tafhimāt*, Shāh Wali-Allāh asserts that human reason has no authority in defining things as good or bad, right or wrong, or in declaring certain acts to merit reward and others punishment in the Hereafter. The goodness or badness of acts is established solely by the decree of God and is an imposition from Him. The other alternative appears to him tantamount to setting up another *hākim* (lawgiver) alongside God.⁷⁴

He seems, however, to have modified this view, to some extent, in the *Hujjat-Allāh* where he is inclined to assign reason a greater role. There he divides actions into two categories: *maṣāliḥ wa mafāsīd* (virtues and vices), and *sharā'i' wa maqādir* (laws and quantitatively fixed rules).⁷⁵ By the former he means acts with moral or ethical implications for which there are no well-defined, fixed, codified regulations. They constitute the realm of the cultivation of self, domestic economy, manners of living and political economy.⁷⁶ They can be conceived, according to him, by human reason without the help of revelation.⁷⁷

The second category, according to Shāh Wali-Allāh, stems from the first one. The laws and regulations governing actions in this category are aimed

at providing an external, cognizable form for a part of the above-mentioned abstract moral values and virtues so that people may be required to observe them and be called to account in case of default. Hence, the *arkān* (essentials), *shurūṭ* (conditions), *ādāb* (embellishments) and other details of these laws are defined and codified, by which they can be clearly understood. This category comprises those actions governed by *shar'ī* laws which serve the purpose of safeguarding and preserving the religion and its institutions.⁷⁸ These *sharā'ī* and *maqādir*, according to Shāh Walī-Allāh, are not to be necessarily penetrated by intelligence.⁷⁹

In Walī-Allāh's opinion, the *sharā'ī* (laws) are based on considerations of *maṣāliḥ* (general good).⁸⁰ He strongly repudiates the view that *shar'ī* laws are merely peremptory and their purpose is only to test people.⁸¹ This does not mean, he further adds, that the goodness and badness of acts (in the sense of an act being deserving of reward or punishment in the Hereafter) are based on reason in every respect. Nor does it mean that the function of the *Shari'ah* (i.e., *Shāri'*, Lawgiver) is just to describe the inherent properties and qualities of the acts without playing any role in making them lawful or unlawful like a physician who only discovers and describes the properties and qualities of medicines and symptoms of diseases. Shāh Walī-Allāh maintains that apart from the *maṣāliḥ* that are considered in the *sharā'ī*, the enactment of the *Shāri'* (Lawgiver) is itself an important source of authority in declaring acts and things lawful or unlawful.⁸²

Thus he attempts to reconcile '*aql* (reason) and *naql* (report, revelation) and tries to strike a middle course between the two extremes. According to his modified view, both [the inherent qualities of] acts and the enactment of the *Shāri'* (Lawgiver) are responsible for, and effective in, making acts rewardable or punishable.⁸³ But since, practically speaking, the *Shāri'* (Lawgiver) has not enjoined what is bad or forbidden what is good according to reason, and since every act of God is based on *ḥikmah* (wisdom) and *maṣlaḥah* (general good),⁸⁴ the *Shari'ah* with all its details, such as the fixed tariffs, timings, etc., is in complete harmony with human reason and nature⁸⁵ in the sense that our faculty of reasoning can perceive the soundness of the *shar'ī* laws in most cases, if not in all,⁸⁶ though it cannot formulate them independently.⁸⁷

The utility and wisdom of all *shar'ī* laws cannot necessarily be perceived by human reason. Hence, when a *shar'ī* commandment is proved to be authentic it is obligatory to follow it irrespective of whether any utility or reason is perceived in it or not.⁸⁸ Conversely, the doctrines regarding which the *Shari'ah* has provided no guidance, negatively or positively, but which are formulated on the basis of human reason he emphatically refuses to consider as an integral part of the *Shari'ah* or to regard them as religiously obligatory, even if they are sound.⁸⁹ He holds the same view about doctrines which are not inferred from the *nuṣūṣ* (texts) by means of *qiyās jalī* (self-evident analogy).⁹⁰

It should be clear from the preceding discussion that Shāh Walī-Allāh

traces the relationship of the Islamic *Shari'ah* to the customs and usages of pre-Islamic Arabian society, not for the purpose of accommodating into it the local customs of various societies or accretions of later generations. He does so in order to stress its Arabian character and to maintain that character by purging it of the later accretions such as local customs, etc. Similarly, he emphasises the rational character of the *Shari'ah*, not with a view to purifying it from laws which seem to be irrational or against *qiyās*, or in order to elaborate *shar'i* laws on the basis of pure reason; but rather to prove that all the details of the *Shari'ah* are in complete harmony with reason, and to demonstrate the incapacity of human reason to scrutinise them or to make further laws without the help of revelation.

In short, his main purpose seems to be to stress and maintain the original and pristine form of the *Shari'ah*, and to vindicate its innate perfection, its inner consistency, its perfect wisdom, and its conformity to the universal divine scheme – qualities which, in his opinion, render it sacrosanct and immutable.

The Modernists of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent tend to paint Shāh Wali-Allāh as a rationalist and endeavour to present him as the founder of the principle which they would like to make an integral part of the legal outlook of the present-day Muslims.⁹¹ Hence they claim to be inspired by his thought. But, as we have seen, the considerations that underlie the reform-activity of Shāh Wali-Allāh were significantly different from the considerations and objectives cherished by the Modernists.

As a matter of fact, the source of inspiration of the Modernists is the West. In the words of Schacht, "the ideas and arguments of the Modernists come from the West. . . ."⁹² Or as Gibb remarks, "Modernism is primarily a function of Western liberalism . . . [and] . . . is largely a product of European influences. . . ."⁹³ To cite another scholar of Islamic law, the Modernists attempt "to fashion the terms of the [Islamic] law to meet the needs of society objectively determined. This new attitude of modern Islamic jurisprudence, which is, of course, the antithesis of the classical view that the only legitimate standards for society are set by the law [*Shari'ah*], was inherent in the process of [modernist] reform from the very outset. . . ."⁹⁴

The Modernists are, as such, guided by "practical and social conditions"⁹⁵ and have a non-Islamic civilisation as the source of their inspiration, which is quite different from the case of Shāh Wali-Allāh. He did not favour, as we have seen, setting up reason or expediency as the paramount basis of formulating or reforming law. He rather stood for reviving the *Shari'ah* in its pristine, original Arabian form, and was strongly opposed to subjecting it to revision under any rational inspiration.

Notes and Sources

- 1 See M. Mazharuddin Siddiqi, "General Characteristics of Muslim Modernism" in *Islamic Studies*, Islamabad, IX:1 (March, 1970), p. 33.
- 2 For instance, see Fazlur Rahman, *Islamic Methodology in History*, Karachi, 1965, p. 11; Nasim Ahmad Jawed, "Principles of Movement in Modern Islam . . ." in *Islamic Studies*, Islamabad, IX:4 (December, 1970), p. 297. See also Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964*, London, 1967, pp. 40 f., 104, and *passim*.
- 3 Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Hujjat-Allāh al-Bālighah*, with Urdu tr. 'Abdu-l-Haqq Haqqāni, Karachi, n.d. [1953?] (hereafter cited as *Hujjat*), I, 182 f., 193, 222; *id.*, *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'*, Bareilly, [1286 A.H./1869] (hereafter referred to as *Izālat*), I, 258.
- 4 *Hujjat*, I, 183, 192, 194; *Izālat*, I, 259.
- 5 *Hujjat*, I, 183, 185, 194.
- 6 *Ibid.*, I, 183, 194; *Izālat*, I, 259.
- 7 *Hujjat*, I, 182 f., 194 f.
- 8 *Ibid.*, I, 188-192.
- 9 The fact that revelation, which is, in his opinion, an essence, takes its shape in a certain language is also attributed by him to this cause. He says: "Likewise the revelation occurs only in the words, phrases and styles of expression that are stored in the mind of the person who receives it. That is why God inspired the Arab in Arabic and Syrian in Syriac." (See Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Fuyūd al-Ḥaramayn*, with Urdu tr. 'Abidu-r-Rahmān Kāndhlavi, Karachi, n.d. (hereafter referred to as *Fuyūd*), p. 56.)
- 10 *Hujjat*, I, 188 f.
- 11 *Ibid.*, I, 189 f.
- 12 *Ibid.*, I, 186, 189, 203; cf. the Qur'ān, 3:93.
- 13 *Hujjat*, I, 190 f.
- 14 Shāh Walī-Allāh, *al-Tafhimāt al-Ilāhiyah*, ed., M. A. Razā, Dabhel, 1936 (hereafter cited as *Tafhimāt*), II, 23.
- 15 *Hujjat*, I, 182 f., 188; *Izālat*, I, 259; Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Qurrat al-'aynayn fī tafdīl al-Shaykhayn*, Delhi, 1310 A.H. (hereafter referred to as *Qurrat*), pp. 256 f., 327 f.
- 16 *Hujjat*, I, 181 ff., 188.
- 17 *Qurrat*, p. 256; *Izālat*, I, 259; *Hujjat*, I, 187. Here Shāh Walī-Allāh compares the rôle of *shari'ah* to that of a physician, and at one place he actually mentions the prophet as "the divine physician" (see Shāh Walī-Allāh, *al-Budūr al-Bāzighah*, Dabhel, 1936 [hereafter referred to as *al-Budūr*], p. 166), and God as "the Real Physician" (see *id.*, *al-Fawz al-Kabīr*, Lahore, 1300 A.H. [cited hereafter as *al-Fawz*], p. 10); but at another place he denies their comparison in other respects (see above, p. 352).
- 18 For a detailed exposition of this metaphysical principle, see *Hujjat*, I, 29 ff.; *Qurrat*, pp. 256 f., 327 f.
- 19 *Tafhimāt*, I, 67 f.
- 20 See *Qurrat*, pp. 256, 327 f.; *Izālat*, I, 258, 284, 287; *Hujjat*, I, 188 f.; *Fuyūd*, p. 56.
- 21 *Wujūh al-irtifāqāt*, 'ādāt, and *sharā'i'*.
- 22 *Shā'a'ir, sunan wa wujūh al-irtifāqāt, mā lā ya'rifūna aṣṣan, mā yubāyin al-ma'lūf*.
- 23 *Hujjat*, I, 187, 267; *Fawz*, pp. 9 f., 18; cf. *Budūr*, p. 177 (*ma'lūf, mashhūrāt, musalla-māt*).
- 24 What he seems to mean by *al-ārā' al-kulliyah* is the consideration of those universally accepted fundamental purposes which underlie the rules taught by the prophets. (See Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Ta'wil al-Aḥādīth*, Hyderabad (Pakistan), 1966, p. 82. See also *Hujjat*, I, 100 f.).

- 25 *Ibid.*, I, 221 ff., 265 f., 272; *Fuyūd*, p. 56; *Budūr*, 221 f.; *Fawz*, pp. 9 f., 15.
- 26 Cf. *Hujjat*, I, 99.
- 27 *Ibid.*, I, 222 f.
- 28 See above p. 343.
- 29 *Hujjat*, I, 217, 220, 245, 267, 271; *Fawz*, p. 15.
- 30 *Hujjat*, II, 425 f.
- 31 *Ibid.*, I, 271. Cf. *ibid.* I, 267; *Fawz*, p. 15; *Budūr* p. 198; Shāh Wali-Allāh, *Sharḥ Tarājīm Abwāb Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Hyderabad (Dn.), 1356 A.H. (hereafter referred to as *Sharḥ*), p. 97.
- 32 According to him, the customs are the essential part of the *irtifāqāt*: "The customs are to the *irtifāqāt* what the heart is to the body". (*Hujjat*, I, 99, 221.)
- 33 *Ibid.*, I, 221 f.
- 34 *Ibid.*, I, 267; cf. *Fawz*, p. 15.
- 35 *Hujjat*, I, 272, 279 ff.; *Tafhimāt*, II, 139; cf. *Fawz*, p. 15.
- 36 *Hujjat*, I, 223. Cf. *ibid.*, I, 221.
- 37 *Ibid.*, I, 223 f., 267, 272; *Fawz*, p. 9, 15; *Sharḥ*, p. 97.
- 38 *Hujjat*, I, 279 f. Cf. *ibid.*, II, 412 f.; *Izālat*, II, 134.
- 39 *Fawz*, pp. 9, 15. Cf. *Hujjat*, I, 266 f., 271 f., 280; *Sharḥ*, p. 97; *Budūr*, p. 221 f.
- 40 *Hujjat*, I, 223 f. Cf. *ibid.*, I, 279 f.; *Budūr*, pp. 221 f.
- 41 *Hujjat*, I, 224. It is evident from the context that here he particularly refers to the Prophet Muhammad (upon whom be peace) and his *Shari'ah*. It is further corroborated by his explicit statements in *ibid.*, I, 277–79, where he draws similarities between the religious practices of the pre-Islamic Arabs and those prescribed in the Islamic *Shari'ah*.
- 42 *Fawz*, pp. 4, 15; *Hujjat*, I, 277 ff.; *ibid.*, II, 412 f.
- 43 *Ibid.*, I, 272, 279; *Fawz*, p. 5.
- 44 *Hujjat*, I, 271 f.; *Fawz*, p. 15; *Tafhimāt*, II, 139.
- 45 *Hujjat*, I, 272; cf. *Sharḥ*, p. 97; *Fawz*, p. 15; *Budūr*, pp. 221 f.
- 46 *Tafhimāt*, II, 113.
- 47 *Hujjat*, I, 189, 217; *ibid.*, II, 425 f., 509 f. Cf. *Izālat*, II, 134; *Budūr*, pp. 214 ff.
- 48 *Hujjat*, I, 217, 235; cf. *ibid.*, I, 190.
- 49 See above p. 343.
- 50 See above p. 346.
- 51 See above p. 345. Cf. *Qurrat*, pp. 256, 327.
- 52 *Hujjat*, I, 165, 191 f.; *Tafhimāt*, I, 198; cf. *ibid.*, I, 228 f.; *Qurrat*, pp. 256, 327 f.
- 53 Shibli Nu'mānī (d. 1914), the so-called "conservative", was the first man who, under his "modernist" impulse, proffered this conclusion in 1904 in his *al-Kalām* (Kanpur, 1904, part II, pp. 113, 115); then we see Dr. Muḥammad Iqbāl (d. 1938) closely following Shibli's lines of thinking in his Six Lectures delivered in 1928–29, which were later published under the title, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1965, pp. 171 f.). Then came Mawlānā 'Ubaydullāh Sindhī (d. 1944), who was the next to follow Shibli (and he admitted the fact); but he pushed this conclusion to the extreme. (See Muḥammad Sarwar, ed., *Mawlānā 'Ubaydullāh Sindhī, ḥālāt-i zindagī, ta'limāt awr siyāsī afkār*, Lahore, 1969, pp. 268–302, esp. pp. 275–81.)
- 54 For instance, see Freeland Abbott, "The Decline of the Mughal Empire and Shah Waliyullah" in *The Muslim World*, Hartford, 52:116–123 (1962), pp. 117 f. Here he has adopted the views of 'Ubaydullāh Sindhī in this respect.
- 55 See Fazlur Rahman, "The Thinker of Crisis – Shah Waliy-Ullah" in *Pakistan Quarterly*, Karachi, vol. 6, No. 2 (1956), p. 48. It is strange to see that some modernists, imitating their predecessors, still continue to stick to this wrongly-conceived conclusion and attribute these views to Shāh Wali-Allāh. (For instance, see Nasim Ahmad Jawed, *op. cit.*, pp. 298 f., 302 f., where, instead of attributing this

conclusion to its first propounder, Shibli Nu'mānī, he attributes it to Dr. Muḥammad Iqbāl).

56 *Tafhimāt*, I, 147, 209; *ibid.*, II, 72 f.

57 *Ibid.*, I, 24; *ibid.*, II, 114.

58 See above, p. 345.

59 See *Hujjat*, I, 271.

60 *Ibid.*, I, 270 f.

61 *Loc. cit.*

62 *Ibid.*, I, 176 f., 254 f., 266 f., 270 f.

63 *Ibid.*, I, 254 f., 266 f.

64 *Ibid.*, I, 254 f. Here Shāh Walī-Allāh apparently alludes to the fact that the Prophet (upon whom be peace) has left a number of problems and cases of subsidiary status (*furū'*) to be decided by the future generations with the help of *ijtihād*, *qiyās*, etc., in the light of his teachings and in view of existing circumstances.

65 *Ibid.*, I, 255.

66 *Ibid.*, I, 255 ff.

67 *Ibid.*, I, 266 f. By the fourth *irtifāq* he means the universal *khilāfah* and the customs and institutions which are universally accepted as constituents of *al-amr al-ṭabī'i wa al-madhab al-ṭabī'i* (the natural religion). For its detailed definition, see *ibid.*, I, 96 ff., 230.

68 *Ibid.*, I, 230. Cf. *ibid.*, I, 258, 262, 288; *ibid.*, II, 424.

69 *Ibid.*, I, 218, 258, 288; *id.*, *Anfās al-'Arifin*, Delhi, 1917 (hereafter cited as *Anfās*), pp. 80 f.

70 *Tafhimāt*, I, 40; *ibid.*, II, 113 f. It is this revivalist process to which he refers when he asserts that after every century a new era sets in which demands a renewal of the *Shari'ah* (see above p. 351). As for the millenary reform in the *Shari'ah*, it is accomplished, according to him, by the succeeding prophets. (See *Tafhimāt*, I, 198, 228; *Hujjat*, I, 165, 191 f.; *Qurrat*, pp. 256, 327 f.).

71 *Hujjat*, I, 245; *ibid.*, II, 521; *Tafhimāt*, II, 245 f.

72 *Loc. cit.*

73 *Hujjat*, I, 200, 217, 220, 237 f., 241; cf. *ibid.*, II, 509 f., 521.

74 *Tafhimāt*, I, 146.

75 *Hujjat*, I, 284; cf. *ibid.*, I, 199, 293.

76 *Ibid.*, I, 284.

77 *Ibid.*, I, 285, 293.

78 *Ibid.*, I, 285 ff.

79 *Ibid.*, I, 286 f., 293.

80 We have above translated this word, *maṣāliḥ* (sing. *maṣlahah*) as virtues (see above, p. 351). But here it is used in a slightly different meaning. We have tried to express this changed nuance of meaning in this translation.

81 *Hujjat*, I, 21.

82 *Ibid.*, I, 24.

83 *Ibid.*, I, 25, 243.

84 *Tafhimāt*, I, 146.

85 *Ibid.*, I, 68; *ibid.*, II, 113 f., 220; *Budūr*, p. 191; *Hujjat*, I, 190, 211 ff., 281; *ibid.*, II, 305, 315. Shāh Walī-Allāh has devoted almost the whole of his book, the *Hujjat* to show the effective causes, *maṣāliḥ*, utilities, wisdom, and underlying reasons for various *shar'i* commandments and to prove them rational.

86 *Hujjat*, I, 196 ff., 211 ff., 258. Shāh Walī-Allāh, however, does not accept the domain of reason in the area of dogmas and tenets ('*aqā'id*'). (See *Budūr*, pp. 197, 204).

87 *Hujjat*, I, 284 ff.; *ibid.*, II, 330; *Tafhimāt*, I, 241; *Anfās*, pp. 80 f.; *id.*, *Maktūbāt ma' manāqib Abi 'Abd-Allāh . . . al-Bukhārī . . .*, Delhi, n.d. (hereafter cited as *Maktūbāt*), p. 24; *id.*, *Aṭyab al-Nagham . . .*, Muradabad, [1304 A.H.], p. 15. He cites the example

of a *shar'ī* law that the minimum amount of the assets liable to *zakāh* is 200 dirhams or 5 *wasqs*. The human mind can perceive its suitability but could not initially fix it, if it had not been revealed. (See *Hujjat*, I, 286 f.).

- 88 *Ibid.*, I, 25. In other words, they are binding even if they seem to be irrational or against *qiyās* (cf. *ibid.*, I, 16).
- 89 *Maktūbāt*, p. 28. In this connection, he gives the example of the doctrine of fixing the minimum limit of the quantity of water that does not admit the bearing of impurity at 10 × 10 cubits, which is held by the Hanafī school (*ibid.*); and at other places he cites the doctrine of fixing the minimum limit of cotton liable to *zakāh* at 5 *aḥmāl* (loads) (see *ibid.*, I, 287), which is held by the famous Hanafī jurist, al-Shaybānī, and the doctrine of prohibition of tobacco (see *Anfās*, pp. 80 f.).
- 90 *Anfās*, p. 81.
- 91 See for instance, F. Rahman, *op. cit.*, pp. 44 f., 48; *idem*, *Islamic Methodology in History*, pp. 10 f.; N. A. Jawed, *op. cit.*, pp. 297 ff.
- 92 J. Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law*, Oxford, 1964, p. 106.
- 93 H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago, 1947, pp. 63, 69.
- 94 N. J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, Edinburgh, 1964, p. 201. Even Dr. Fazlur Rahman admits this fact in these words: "I reserve the name Modernism for the trends which seek to integrate Westernism with Islam, irrespective of whether their initiation lies in Islam or in Westernism . . ." (See his article, "Muslim Modernism in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent" in the *Bulletin of School of Oriental & African Studies*, London, XXI (1958), p. 91.)
- 95 Coulson, *loc. cit.*

Mawlānā Sayyid Abul A'ālā Mawdūdī

An Introduction to His Vision of Islam and Islamic Revival

*Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari**

THE TWO ends of the twentieth century present two different pictures of the Muslim world. At the beginning of this century, the Muslims were in a state of disarray. Most of the Muslim countries were under the control of the colonial powers. The Ottoman empire was disintegrating into oblivion. The balance of world power seemed to have finally settled in favour of the West, condemning the Muslims to a state of political servitude, economic dependence and intellectual and cultural stagnation. Before the First World War, the Muslims were regarded as a world power. After the World War, they seemed to be in the process of being relegated to obscurity and insignificance. Some of the adversaries of Islam thought that its chapter in history had been closed; that the twilight would soon dissolve into darkness. The years and decades that followed have belied the prophets of doom. The inner vitality of Islam proved too strong to be annihilated by the forces of political, intellectual and economic subjugation. Resistance blossomed into resurgence and the tide began to turn. Now in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Muslim world, despite much in it that is heart-rending, presents a somewhat encouraging picture. The chains of political slavery in many parts of the Muslim world have been shattered. The balance of economic power is witnessing new shifts in favour of the Muslims. There is a perceptible disenchantment with man-made ideologies

* This is a joint paper by K. Ahmad and Z. I. Ansari. Of the three parts into which the paper is divided, Part II is mainly the work of Ansari and Part III of Ahmad. Part II draws considerably on a paper presented by Ansari at the First International Islamic Conference organised by the Islamic Council of Europe in April, 1976. Part III draws mainly on a lecture given by Ahmad at the Fifteenth Annual Convention of the Muslim Students Association of America and Canada held in May, 1977 at Bloomington, Indiana, U.S.A.

which had lately begun to cast a spell over Muslims as solvents to man's problems. There is an increasing desire to draw upon the intrinsic resources of Islam to build a new order. What lies, to a large measure, at the root of these political, economic, cultural and intellectual manifestations of resurgence is a rediscovery of the relevance of Islam to the problems and challenges of the time. Undoubtedly, the problems facing the Muslims are formidable and the threats that confront them are legion. It is encouraging, nevertheless, that they are exhibiting a new confidence and vitality in their striving to regain their lost position and to contribute their share in rebuilding the world. This confidence and vitality are reflected in the movements of Islamic revival which have emerged in different parts of the world during the last fifty years. One of the chief architects of this movement is the quiet and unassuming thinker, reformer and leader, Mawlānā Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdūdī.

This paper attempts to present a systematic introduction to Mawlānā Mawdūdī's thought, and the movement which has arisen on its basis. This has been prefaced by an extremely brief sketch of his life, mainly to serve as the background against which his ideas may be better appreciated.

I

Life¹

Abul A'la was born on Rajab 3, 1321 A.H./September 25, 1903 C.E. in Aurangabad, a well-known town in the former princely state of Hyderabad (Deccan), presently Andhra Pradesh, India. He was born in a respectable family and his ancestry, on the paternal side, is traced back to the Holy Prophet (peace be on him). The family had a long-standing tradition of spiritual leadership, for a number of Mawdūdī's ancestors were outstanding leaders of Sufi Orders. One of the luminaries among them, the one from whom he derives his family name, was Khwājah Quṭb al-Dīn Mawdūd (d. 527 A.H.), a renowned leader of the Chishtī Sufi Order. Mawdūdī's ancestors had moved to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent from Chisht towards the end of the ninth century of the Islamic calendar/15th century of the Christian calendar. The first one to arrive was Mawdūdī's namesake, Abul A'la Mawdūdī (d. 935 A.H.).

Mawdūdī's father, Aḥmad Ḥasan, born in 1855 C.E., a lawyer by profession, was a highly religious and devout person. Abul A'la was the youngest of his three sons. After acquiring early education at home, he joined a high school called Madrasah Fawqāniyah, which attempted to combine the modern Western with the traditional Islamic education. Abul A'la completed his secondary education successfully and was at the stage of undergraduate studies at Dār al-'Ulūm, Hyderabad when his formal education was disrupted by the illness and then the death of his father. This did not deter Mawdūdī from continuing his studies, however, though these had

to be outside of the regular educational institutions. By the early 1920s, Abul A'la knew enough Arabic, Persian and English, beside his mother-tongue, Urdu, to study the subjects of his interest independently. Thus, most of what he learned was self-acquired, though for short spells of time, he was able to receive systematic instruction or guidance from some competent scholars. Thus, Mawdūdī's intellectual growth was largely a result of his own effort and the stimulation he received from his teachers. His moral uprightness, his profound regard for propriety and righteousness, however, largely reflect the religious piety of his parents and their concern for his proper moral upbringing.²

After the interruption of his formal education, Mawdūdī turned to journalism in order to make his living. In 1918, he was already contributing to a leading Urdu newspaper, and in 1920, at the age of seventeen, he was appointed editor of *Tāj*, which was being published from Jabalpur, a city in the province now called Madhya Pradesh, India. Late in 1920, Mawdūdī came to Delhi and first assumed the editorship of the newspaper *Muslim* (1921–23), and later of *al-Jam'iyat* (1925–28), both of which were organs of the *Jam'iyat-i 'Ulamā-i Hind*, an organisation of Muslim religious scholars. Under his editorship, *al-Jam'iyat* became the leading newspaper of the Muslims of India.

Around the year 1920, Mawdūdī also began to take some interest in politics. He participated in the Khilafat movement, and was also involved with a secret society, but soon became disenchanted with the very idea of such societies. Mawdūdī also became associated with the *Tahrik-i Hijrat*, which was a movement in opposition to the British rule over India and urged the Muslims of that country to migrate *en masse* to Afghanistan. However, he fell foul of the leadership of the movement because of his insistence that the aims and strategy of the movement should be realistic and well-planned. Mawdūdī withdrew more and more into academic and journalistic concerns.

During 1920–28, Mawlānā Mawdūdī also translated four different books, one from Arabic and the rest from English. He also made his mark on the academic life of the subcontinent by writing his first major book, *al-Jihād fi al-Islām*. This is a masterly treatise on the Islamic law of war and peace. It was first serialised in *Al-Jam'iyat* in 1927 and was formally published in 1930. It was highly acclaimed both by the famous poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) and Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī Jawhar (d. 1931), the famous leader of the Khilafat and Independence movements. Though written during his twenties, it remains one of his major and most highly regarded works.

After his resignation from *Al-Jam'iyat* in 1928, Mawdūdī moved to Hyderabad and devoted himself to research and writing. It was in this connection that he took up the editorship of the monthly *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān* in 1933, which since then has remained the main vehicle for the

dissemination of Mawdūdī's ideas. He proved to be a highly prolific writer, turning out several scores of pages every month. Initially he concentrated on an exposition of the ideas, values and basic principles of Islam. He paid special attention to the questions arising out of the conflict between the Islamic and the contemporary Western world views. He also attempted to discuss some of the major problems of the modern age and sought to present Islamic solutions to those problems. He also developed a new methodology to study those problems in the context of the experience of the West and the Muslim world, judging them on the theoretical criterion of their intrinsic soundness and viability and conformity with the teachings of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. His writings disclosed erudition and scholarship, a deep perception of the significance of the teachings of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* and a critical awareness of the mainstream of Western thought and history. All this brought a freshness to his approach and lent a wider appeal to his message.

In the mid-thirties, Mawdūdī started writing on the major political and cultural issues confronting Muslim India at that time and tried to examine them from the Islamic perspective rather than merely from the viewpoint of short-term political and economic interests. He relentlessly criticised the new-fangled ideologies which had begun to cast a spell over the minds and hearts of his brethren-in-faith and attempted to show the hollowness of those ideologies. In this connection, the idea of nationalism received concentrated attention from Mawdūdī when he forcefully explained its dangerous potentialities as well as its incompatibility with the teachings of Islam. Mawdūdī also emphasised that nationalism in the context of India meant the utter destruction of the collective identity of Muslims. In the meantime, an invitation from the philosopher-poet Muḥammad Iqbal persuaded him to leave Hyderabad and settle down at a place which lay in the Eastern part of Panjab, in the district of Pathankot. Mawdūdī established what was essentially an academic and research centre called *Dār al-Islām* where, in collaboration with Iqbal, he had planned to train competent scholars in Islamics to produce works of outstanding quality on Islam, and above all, to carry out the reconstruction of Islamic Law.

Around the year 1940 Mawdūdī developed ideas regarding the founding of a more comprehensive and ambitious movement and this led him to launch a new organisation under the name of the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*. Mawdūdī, who founded the *Jamā'at*, was also elected its chief and remained so till 1972 when he withdrew from that responsibility for reasons of health.

In 1947, when two independent states were carved out of the sub-continent – Pakistan and India – the *Jamā'at* was divided into the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*, India and the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*, Pakistan. Since August 1947, when Mawdūdī migrated to Pakistan, he has concentrated his efforts on establishing a truly Islamic state and society in that country. Consistent with this objective, he has written profusely to explain the different aspects of the

Islamic way of life, especially the socio-political aspects. This concern for the implementation of the Islamic way of life has also led Mawdūdī to criticise and oppose the policies pursued by the successive governments of Pakistan, and to blame those in power for failing to transform Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. The rulers reacted with severe reprisal measures. Mawdūdī was often arrested and had to serve long spells in prison.³ During these years of struggle and persecution, Mawdūdī impressed all, including his critics and opponents, by the firmness and tenacity of his will, and other outstanding qualities. In 1953, when he was sentenced to death by the martial law authorities on the charge of writing a seditious pamphlet on the Qādiyānī problem, he resolutely turned down the opportunity to file a petition for mercy. He cheerfully expressed his preference for death to seeking clemency from those who wanted, altogether unjustly, to hang him. With unshakable faith that life and death lie solely in the hands of God, he told his son as well as his colleagues: "If the time of my death has come, no one can keep me from it; and if it has not come, they cannot send me to the gallows even if they hang themselves upside down in trying to do so." His family also declined to make any appeal for mercy. His firmness astonished the Government which was forced, under strong public pressure both from within and without, to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment.⁴

Mawlānā Mawdūdī is completing nearly sixty years of public life. During these many years, he has been continually active and vocal. He has written over one hundred and twenty books and pamphlets and has made over a thousand speeches and press statements of which at least seven hundred are available on record.⁵

Mawdūdī's pen is at once prolific, forceful and versatile. The range of subjects he has covered is unusually wide. Disciplines such as *Tafsir*, *Ḥadīth*, law, philosophy and history, all have received the due share of his attention. He has discussed a wide variety of problems – political, economic, cultural, social, theological and so on – and has attempted to state how the teachings of Islam are related to those problems. Mawdūdī has not delved into the technical world of the specialist, but has expounded the essentials of the Islamic approach in most of the fields of learning and inquiry. His main contribution, however, has been in the fields of the Qur'ānic exegesis (*Tafsir*), ethics, social studies and the problems facing the international movement of Islamic revival. Presently, he is writing a biography of the Prophet (peace be on him). The first two volumes covering the Makkan period are about to appear. Two more volumes are expected to cover the Madinan period.

His greatest work, however, is his monumental *tafsir* of the Qur'ān in Urdu, *Tafhim al-Qur'ān*, a work he has taken thirty years to complete.⁶ Its chief characteristic lies in presenting the meaning and message of the Qur'ān in a language and style that penetrates the hearts and minds of the

men and women of today and shows the relevance of the Qur'ān to their everyday problems, both on the individual and societal planes. He has translated the Qur'ān in direct and forceful modern Urdu idiom. His translation is much more readable and eloquent than ordinary literal translations of the Qur'ān. He has presented the Qur'ān as a book of guidance for human life and as a guidebook for the movement to implement and enforce that guidance in human life. He has attempted to explain the verses of the Qur'ān in the context of its total message. This *tafsir* has made a far-reaching impact on contemporary Islamic thinking in the sub-continent, and through its translations, even abroad.

Jamā'at-i Islāmī, the Islamic movement which Mawdūdī founded, has grown into a strong and highly organised religio-political organisation which has attracted people from all classes, but has a specially strong influence over the intelligentsia and the youth of the subcontinent.

The influence of Mawlānā Mawdūdī is not confined, however, to those associated with the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*. That influence transcends the boundaries of parties and organisations, and even goes far beyond the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Mawdūdī has by now become very much like a father figure for Muslims all over the world. As a scholar and writer, he is the most widely read Muslim writer of our time. His books have been translated into most of the major languages of the world – Arabic, English, Turkish, Persian, Hindi, French, German, Swahili, Tamil, Bengali, etc. – and are now increasingly becoming available in many more of the Asian, African and European languages. The several journeys which Mawdūdī undertook during the years 1956–74 enabled Muslims in many parts of the world to become acquainted with him personally and appreciate many of his qualities. At the same time, these journeys were educative for Mawdūdī as well for they provided the opportunity to gain a great deal of first-hand knowledge of the facts of life and to get acquainted with a large number of persons in different parts of the world. During these numerous tours, he has lectured in Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Makka, Madina, Jeddah, Kuwait, Rabat, Istanbul, London, New York, Toronto and a host of other international centres. During these years, he also participated in some ten international conferences. He also made a study tour of Saudi Arabia, Jordan (including Jerusalem), Syria and Egypt in 1959–60 in order to study the geographical aspects of the places mentioned in the Qur'ān.⁷ He was also invited to serve on the Advisory Committee which prepared the scheme for the establishment of the Islamic University of Madina and has been on its Academic Council ever since the inception of that University in 1962.

He has also been a member of the Foundation Committee of the *Rābi'ah al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, Makka, and of the Academy of Research on Islamic Law, Madina. In short, he is a tower of inspiration for Muslims the world over. Even though during the last few years, his physical move-

ment has been restricted, for reasons of health, he continues to influence the climate of thought of Muslims, as the Himalayas or the Alps influence the climate in Asia or Europe without themselves moving about.

II

Vision of Islam

The starting point of Mawlānā Mawdūdī's religious thought is his concept of God. Indeed it is his concept in so far as in recent times he has stressed it perhaps more than others, or else he claims no credit for its originality. In fact, he considers it to be the true, original concept of God as it was expounded by all the prophets and messengers of God. The first part of the basic Islamic confession of faith – "There is no god but Allah" – the statement which might seem to affirm merely the Oneness of the Creator, in Mawlānā Mawdūdī's view, has implications far beyond what the words of the statement might suggest at first sight. The statement not merely proclaims the unity of God as the Creator or even as the sole object of worship. It also proclaims the uniqueness of God as the Master, Sovereign, Lord and Law-Giver. Essentially God alone has the right to give command, to demand of man exclusive service and obedience, to claim man's total loyalty. Being the Creator of mankind, God alone has the right to tell man what is the true purpose of his creation, and the way to achieve it. The Islamic statement of faith mentioned above is, therefore, essentially a moral statement; a summons that man respond to Him with his whole being in exclusive service and obedience and devotion and worship.⁸ Mawlānā Mawdūdī stresses that this total submission to God alone is Islam (a word which, according to its root meaning, denotes submission or surrender). The entire universe is *Muslim*, i.e. in the state of submission to God since it is subject to the natural laws ordained by God. In the case of the inanimate world, and even in the case of that part of man's being which is beyond his control (e.g. the system operating in his physical organism, etc.), this submission (*Islām*) is involuntary and constitutes what might be termed as submission to the providential will of God. Man is unique in so far as he has been endowed by God, among other things, with free will and with moral discernment. He can choose to serve God or disobey Him. The service to God envisaged by Islam is, therefore, a voluntary one, denoting man's willing submission to the directives and commands of God.⁹

This concept of God, with its emphasis on His being the sole Sovereign and Law-Giver, provides the basic principle of authority. All principles, laws, customs and usages which are contrary to the directives of God are to be spurned. All theories or doctrines which claim that in disregard of Divine guidance, man himself has the right – be it as an individual or a group of persons, or a nation or even all humanity combined – to decide what is good or bad for mankind, are indeed to be regarded as denying the

Sovereignty of God and as setting up gods other than the One True God. Submission to God means bringing the entire life of man into harmony with the revealed Will of God.¹⁰

As for man, he is God's creature, and hence is bound to the service and obedience of God. Not only that, God has chosen man, in the words of the Qur'ān, for the unique distinction of His vicegerency on earth. Each human being is endowed with the trust of vicegerency from God and is accountable to Him in that regard. In his capacity as God's vicegerent, man is also committed to his Principal – God – to administer the affairs of the world in strict accordance according to the latter's directives, and to exercise all his powers – which after all have been conferred upon him by God – within the limits prescribed by Him.¹¹

The question remains: In what manner should man submit to God? How should he come to know the commands and directives of God which he is required to follow? The answer to this question lies in the doctrine of prophethood, a doctrine which is an essential supplement to the doctrine of the Sovereignty of God. Mawlānā Mawdūdī dwells at length upon prophethood and considers it God's response to man's perennial need for guidance.¹² Because of the perennality of this need, prophethood began with the beginning of human life on earth. The first man was also the first Prophet.¹³ And since it was the need of all mankind, prophets are not the special prerogative of any particular race or region. According to the Qur'ān, prophets were raised in all parts of the world. They were recipients of certain basic truths which were communicated to them by the extraordinary means of revelation. They were required to communicate and practise them, and summon people to the absolute service of God. All these prophets as well as their followers were Muslims (submitters to the Will of God). The Divine guidance which they taught was revealed in its final and perfected form to Muḥammad (peace be on him) who not only communicated it to others, but practised it himself and successfully built up a society and state on its basis. This Divine guidance is embodied in its pristine form in the Qur'ān and in the *Sunnah* of Muḥammad (peace be on him). Operationally speaking, therefore, since the advent of the Holy Prophet (peace be on him), submission to God means commitment and striving to follow the norms embodied in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*.¹⁴

In addition to providing Divine guidance to mankind, the prophets were also required to purify the lives of men, and to strive to establish the sovereignty of God. All prophets aimed at doing so and attained varying degrees of success. The nature of their mission brought them into conflict with the powers that were. For rulers tend to arrogate to themselves sovereignty which, in the view of the prophets, belongs to none save God. The real dispute between the prophets and their peoples, or the rulers of their time (Pharaoh, Nimrod, etc.) was not as to whether God exists or not. The existence of God as the Creator has been a commonly accepted fact. The

point in dispute was: Who is their real Ruler and Master? Whom ought they to regard as their Law-Giver? Whose commands ought they to follow?¹⁵ Likewise, the 'ibādah to which prophets invited people did not consist merely of performing acts of prayer and worship. It embraced acceptance of the Lord as the supreme object of loyalty, and commitment to obey and follow His command and to do His will.¹⁶

Mawlānā Mawdūdī emphasises that there are two basically different, in fact mutually opposed, attitudes to life: one, of accepting God as the Sovereign and Law-Giver and as such responding to Him as His slave and servant; the other, of defiance and rebellion against God, and arrogation to oneself or to others than the One True God of the authority to command.¹⁷

The prophets challenged this latter attitude and invited mankind to the path of submission to One God. This erroneous attitude, the essence of which is to deny the overriding authority of the prophetic guidance in human life, is termed by Mawlānā Mawdūdī as *Jāhiliyah*, (a term which is only a pale reflection of the original when translated as "Ignorance"). It is so termed since true knowledge regarding the right principles which ought to regulate human life can be derived from no other source than the revealed guidance communicated to human beings by the prophets. Now, *Jāhiliyah* has different shapes and forms, and is thus possessed of considerable internal diversity. It remains *Jāhiliyah*, nevertheless, in each of these shapes and forms and Mawlānā Mawdūdī posits it as a category which is fundamentally antithetical to Islam.¹⁸

Islam can never become a living reality unless the dominance of *Jāhiliyah* is ended. The prophets and their true followers, therefore, engaged in a striving which also aims at putting an end to the hegemony of *Jāhiliyah*. This lends a revolutionary character to their struggle.¹⁹

Another major point of Mawlānā Mawdūdī's emphasis is that the guidance embodied in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* embraces the entire life of man. Hardly anything has been opposed by Mawlānā Mawdūdī as vehemently as the attitude of considering Islam an entirely personal relationship between man and God, or merely a set of metaphysical doctrines, or just a body of rituals. Again and again, he points out that Islam is a way of life, and that it is a complete comprehensive way of life. Neither trade nor industry, neither governmental affairs nor international relations, neither civil nor penal laws, in short, no aspect of human life can claim an autonomous status and thus fall beyond the jurisdiction of Islam. A Muslim is not only required to submit to God in places of worship, but in all places and at all times – in his home and on the street, on the battlefield and around the conference table, in schools and colleges and universities, in centres of business and finance; and so on and so forth.²⁰ For service to God is not confined to a few defined acts. Man's whole life should be an act of devotion and service to God, for every act of man whereby he seeks

the good pleasure of God and wherein he remains heedful of the directives of God is an act of devotion and service to God.²¹ Since Divine guidance embodies the infinite knowledge, wisdom and benevolence of God, the principles which go to make the Islamic way of life are sound and healthy, as well as incomparably superior to all man-made systems. Man's intellect and reason have great achievements in certain fields, e.g. in the field of natural sciences and technology. But human reason, unaided by Divine guidance, is altogether inadequate to lay down the principles which can do full justice to all the different aspects of man's nature and conduce to his true happiness. At any given period of history, the sum total of knowledge and wisdom available to man is too meagre to prescribe the true way of life for man. This task has been rendered even more difficult by the fact that animal desires and passions and different biases and narrow interests affect man's reason and distort his vision. It is owing to such factors that human reason constantly keeps swerving between different extremes. Such extremes become clearly evident if we were to consider the positions men have taken on questions such as those concerning the relative rights of the individual and of society, the appropriate position and role of men and women, the relationship between labour and capital.²² Mawlānā Mawdūdī points out that the Hegelian dialectics – the emergence of a thesis, then its anti-thesis, followed by a synthesis which combines the former extremes is partly correct, though to say so is merely to make a statement of fact and has no normative value. The emergence of an extremist anti-thesis in reaction to a perhaps equally one-sided, extremist thesis only illustrates the fickleness of human reason when it embarks independently on the venture of laying down the set of norms and values which could lead to truly good human life.²³ It is for this reason that the Islamic way of life as laid down in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* is superior and much more conducive to man's happiness and self-fulfilment in this world – let alone to his salvation in the Hereafter – than any man-made systems of life, whether of the past, or of the present.²⁴

Far from having any apologetic feeling for Islam because of the global dominance of the civilisation actuated by norms and values quite foreign to Islam, Mawlānā Mawdūdī considers the Islamic way of life just as necessary today for the salvation of contemporary man as it was for man in former times. He appreciates the scientific and technological achievements and the vigour shown in general by the Western civilisation during the past few centuries. At the same time, he thinks that the Western civilisation does not possess the right sense of direction, and is inherently rotten because of the falsity of its foundational principles. The fundamental fault of that civilisation – the fault which lies at the basis of all its other evils – is that it is based on man's independence of, and indifference to, Divine guidance. Modern man has gradually come to a point where he neither considers it necessary to follow God's guidance, nor feels that he is answer-

able to God for his conduct. And if any at all are conscious of the need to follow God's guidance, then the purview of that guidance is confined to a very narrow sphere of man's life, allowing human caprices, biases and concern with narrow interests to play havoc with human life. Deprived of Divine guidance, the modern man conceives of himself as merely an animal who is equipped with the capacity of reasoning. Instead of clearly defined moral standards man has come to have an overridingly utilitarian view of morals. This, in effect, promotes, rather than serves as a brake on an unbridled pursuit of personal or group self-interest. The human family has been split into a multiplicity of nations with strong feelings of mutual alienation and hostility tearing at the ideal of the universal brotherhood of man. Rather than that love and co-operation are promoted, self and group aggrandisement are held up as natural phenomena and rational objectives of human effort, leading to irreconcilable strife and conflict, in economic, social and political spheres of life. Rather than that family ties are strengthened, and the human home made the nursery for the cultivation of some of the most precious moral virtues, the craze for sensual pleasure has given rise to modes of social behaviour which are destroying the very bases of family life and are robbing man of purity of feelings and character. All the "isms" which have arisen in the present age, despite their mutual disagreements, have arisen from the same basic philosophy – that man rather than God has the right to prescribe the goal of human life and the norms for human conduct. Being contrary to basic truths, these are morally unsound and historically disastrous.²⁵

Mawlānā Mawdūdī emphasises that the putrescence of the modern civilisation is becoming increasingly clear to the intelligent and sensitive people of the world. The present civilisation, he feels, is moving along the road to collapse and disintegration. And if none comes forward with a constructive vision and offers alternative principles for developing a new order, the entire world might slide into the abyss of a frightful dark age. This makes it all the more necessary that the Islamic way of life in all its fullness – its metaphysical doctrines, its principles of personal behaviour and social conduct, as well as the principles of organising a sound and healthy economy and state should be spelled out and put into practice.²⁶

What this calls for is not merely a concerted activity aimed at the cultivation of a set of moral virtues. Mawlānā Mawdūdī's vision essentially is that of carrying out a total reconstruction of human life and establishing a new social order and state, and thereby ushering in a new era in human history.

A major question that one faces in connection with the task of carrying out an Islamic reconstruction of human life in the present age is: what should be our attitude towards the modern Western civilisation and its achievements? In this connection, Mawlānā Mawdūdī mentions that the contact of Muslim society with modern Western civilisation has generally given

birth to two reactions, each of which he considers inadequate. The first reaction was a defeatist one, that of according an indiscriminate welcome to all that was labelled as “modern” – the Western outlook on life, Western legal codes, Western style of life, Western customs of social behaviour, Western political doctrines and institutions, Western economic ideologies, and so on. In several respects contact with the West, and in fact even this defeatist reaction has done the Muslims some good. This contact has shattered the closed, static outlook of the Muslims, has widened their horizons, and has, to some extent, enabled them to come to grips with the problems of the present age. But these benefits are far outweighed by the harm caused by the defeatist outlook. For, by encouraging indiscriminate westernisation, this attitude threatens to erode the Islamic identity and to rob Islam of its effectiveness as a force guiding the life of man.

The other extremist reaction was the one termed by Mawlānā Mawdūdī as “static”. It appeared as a result of the operation of the defensive impulse in Muslim society. This reaction made people feel that unless the entire heritage which had come down to them from their ancestors was jealously preserved, Islam would be obliterated. Such people made little attempt to distinguish between the healthy and the unhealthy components of this heritage. They hardly bothered to explore what had led to the decline and downfall of the Muslims, and what were the factors which had enabled the Western nations to surpass and overwhelm them. These Muslims were seized by the obsession of the antiquarian and the tendency of the blindly conservative to oppose every change, to cling to every item coming down from the past. Mawlānā Mawdūdī is emphatic that the normative and immutable part of the Muslim heritage consists of the principles of the Qur’ān and the *Sunnah*, and nothing else. The Qur’ān and the *Sunnah* are the touchstone for our judgment – for judging what the Muslims did in the past as well as what they are doing at present. Muslim history indeed has a great deal to fill a Muslim’s heart with pride. But the acts of human beings – even of human beings motivated by the best of intentions – are not necessarily normative for all Muslims. In fact, Mawlānā Mawdūdī is quite critical of much that has taken place in the past and often points out the failings of different sections of Muslim society – rulers, scholars, spiritual leaders, and so on. And even when the people of the past had made sound decisions, those decisions cannot be considered indiscriminately binding on Muslims for all times to come.

It should be clear from this that his outlook is distinct from the outlook of the so-called modernists as well as of the so-called conservatives. He urges that the Muslim heritage (which is naturally a complex composite of truly Islamic and non-Islamic, of healthy and un-healthy elements) should be subjected to critical examination and careful analysis. Thereafter only those elements which are demonstrably derived from the Qur’ān and the *Sunnah* should be considered of permanent value. Likewise, the Western

civilisation should be subjected to a critical scrutiny and analysis. The Western philosophy of life, the Western standard of evaluation, and the corruptions and errors which have plagued the Western social life should definitely be discarded. But this should not prevent Muslims from abstracting the healthy achievements of the modern West – its sciences, its technology, its techniques of efficient organisation and administration. There is no harm in appropriating these elements, as long as they are value-free and can be assimilated in the Islamic scheme of life. They are in fact a part of the common heritage of all mankind to which all nations, including Muslims, have contributed. Such a step is also necessary in so far as the true objective of the Muslims cannot be merely to foster belief in certain doctrines and promote certain moral virtues. It should rather be to make the entire scheme of life envisaged by Islam a living reality in the changed circumstances of the present age.²⁷

The above brings out a major and overridingly important facet of Mawdūdī's vision of Islamic religious life. This evidently relates largely to man's outward behaviour, especially on the societal plane. Were one to borrow the jargon of the philosophers of religion, one would perhaps say that the above depicts, in the main, how man ought to respond to God in His transcendence. Since the principles and values of Islam relating to the socio-economic and political spheres of life had become relegated to oblivion, it is understandable that Mawdūdī felt called upon to emphasise those principles and values and to spell them out with a great deal of detail. Perhaps for this reason the rich inwardness of religious life, man's innate yearning to strive for proximity with the Divine, the restless striving of man's soul to reach out to the One Who is at once elusive to the senses and yet is nearer than his neck-vein, does not seem to have been emphasised to the same degree. Or, once again to borrow the jargon of the philosophers of religion, the way man ought to respond to the immanence of God does not come out with equally compelling force. This becomes understandable when we recall that this facet of religious life had already received considerable emphasis in Muslim society, not least in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent where Mawdūdī was born, grew up and lived. Moreover, even the outstandingly religious Muslims had begun to forget, and thus had to be reminded, that God is not only to be loved and feared and worshipped; but being man's Sovereign Lord and Law-Giver his devotion to the Creator should also impel him to follow His directives and obey His commands in all spheres of life and to strive for the supremacy of His word. In a way, this calls for a stronger, and at least a different kind of allegiance and commitment to God, and is inconceivable without a rich and profound kind of spirituality.

Be that as it may, this aspect does come up in Mawdūdī's writings, to which we refer here briefly in order to have a more balanced concept of his vision of Islamic life. We are taking up here Mawdūdī's views regarding

imān (faith) to illustrate his approach to the inner, experiential, and a more conspicuously personalist, aspect of religious life. In several of his writings, Mawdūdī emphasises the centrality of faith in man's religious life.²⁸ Faith, "full in expanse and firmly rooted in depth", is, in Mawdūdī's view, an indispensable base for a truly Islamic life.²⁹

Faith ties man in a strong relationship of fidelity to one's Creator, and without that pulsating relationship all outwardly religious acts are futile and barren. Islam in Mawdūdī's view is concerned both with the apparent and observable conduct of man, the outward fulfilling of a duty, as well as with the spirit of that conduct,³⁰ which is rooted in faith. Faith impels man to turn to God with a throbbing heart, to focus his attention upon Him as his chief object of love and devotion, as well as that of obedience, service and worship, and to hold Him dearer than everything and everyone else. Faith gives man a deep sense of self-fulfilment, and a profound feeling of inner happiness in moving closer to the Divine and in carrying out His behests. According to Mawdūdī, the inevitable demand of *Tawhīd* is that "the sole purpose of all human endeavour . . . in this worldly life should be to seek the good pleasure of God".³¹ Thus, once a person has faith, the basis of Islamic life is laid. The spiritual life of a person can, however, be rich or poor, it can rise to very sublime heights or remain on a low, ordinary plane, depending largely on the degree of genuineness and intensity of faith of the person concerned.

Genuine faith, as distinguished from its verbal confession, leads man to shape his conduct according to God's command. Faith is the propelling power to do God's Will, the motivating force which changes what are apparently physical movements into rich acts of communion with the Divine. Thus Islam – one's actual submission to God's commands – is a manifestation of faith (*imān*); the former being the superstructure which rises on the foundation of the latter. "The mutual relationship between faith and Islam", says Mawdūdī, "is that between the seed and its tree."³² If man has faith, he can rise to ever-higher stages of spiritual growth. One of these stages in his spiritual growth is piety (*taqwā*). Mawdūdī does not consider piety to consist merely of observing the familiar outward forms of the so-called pietistic behaviour – wearing a special kind of dress, adopting an ascetic attitude towards life, etc. In his view, piety rather "refers to that state of the soul which is born out of the fear of God and a sense of responsibility . . . which manifests itself in all aspects of one's life."³³

The highest stage of man's spiritual growth is characterised by Mawdūdī as *ihsān* (state of spiritual excellence), a term which occurs in a well-known tradition of the Holy Prophet (peace be on him).³⁴ *Ihsān*, Mawdūdī emphasises, represents man's most profound attachment to God and His Messenger and the religion that He has prescribed for man. It denotes that deep love, that sincere allegiance and that spirit of self-sacrifice which make one lose oneself entirely in one's devotion to God. "The essence of *ihsān*",

as distinguished from *taqwā*, whose propelling force is a fear of God, "is the love of God which impels man to win God's favour."³⁵ "*Ihsān* means that man's will becomes one with God's. Whatever pleases God, pleases His servant as well; whatever displeases God, also displeases His servant." This, however, is not just a passive state of the heart. Like *imān* and *islām*, *ihsān* also has an activist signification in Mawdūdī's thinking. It leads one to strive for the promotion of good and the obliteration of evil with a strong sense of allegiance to and love for God, making one fearless of everything else. "Those evils whose existence God does not desire on His earth, His servant not only avoids, but also strives to extirpate from the world with all his power and resources."³⁶ He also does his utmost, even at the risk of his life, to foster the virtues with which God desires to beautify His world. "When a man reaches this stage", says Mawdūdī, "he enjoys the closest possible proximity with God and this is, therefore, the highest stage of his spiritual growth."³⁷

III

Vision of Islamic Revival

The earlier section gives an idea of the key concepts in Mawdūdī's understanding of Islam. These concepts are equally vital for comprehending his vision of Islamic revival.

a. View of History

In this connection, it is also essential to keep in mind Mawdūdī's view regarding history in general, and Muslim history since the advent of the Holy Prophet (peace be on him) in particular. History is seen by Mawdūdī to consist essentially of a perpetual struggle between Islam and *Jāhiliyah*. As we have noted earlier, Mawdūdī employs the term *Jāhiliyah* as the antithesis of Islam. He applies this term to all world views and systems of thought, belief and action which deny God's sovereignty and the authority of Divine guidance. There can be, and indeed there have been many combinations and permutations of *Jāhiliyah*. There is, first of all, the pure *Jāhiliyah*, consisting of a total denial of the realm of the super-sensory or super-natural. Then there is a wide variety of partial or mixed *Jāhiliyahs*. These consist of a recognition of the existence of the Creator, but that is mixed with other false beliefs, thereby adulterating certain elements of Divine guidance with other false elements. These partial or mixed *Jāhiliyahs* are at times inclined to an exaggerated spirituality which generates attitudes of world-renunciation. On other occasions, *Jāhiliyah* assumes an exaggerated mystical form which carries man's inherent devotion to the Divine to monistic and pantheistic directions, to blur the distinction between the Creator and the created; and so on and so forth.³⁸

Islam is opposed to *Jāhiliyah* in all its shapes and forms and it seeks to

bring about a total revolution in human life aimed at fashioning it according to Divine guidance. This revolution begins by providing man with a set of beliefs, an outlook on life, a concept of reality, a new scale of values, a fresh moral commitment, and a transformation of his motivation and personality. This inaugurates a catalytic process resulting in a whole series of changes in the lives of individuals, leading those individuals to develop a community of faith. The community grows as an ideological movement, engaged in bringing about social change in the desired direction. This effort aims at the reconstruction of human life as a whole and leads to the building of a new society and state, to the establishment of a new order, an order which in its ideal form is characterised by Mawdūdī as *Khilāfah ‘alā Minhāj al-Nubūwah* (Caliphate on the Prophetic pattern), and serves as the ideal pattern of socio-political order which Muslims ought to try to actualise in their lives.³⁹

On the basis of these premises, Mawdūdī builds a conceptual framework to analyse the genuine movement towards Islamic revival on the one hand, and the efforts that are made to bring about compromise with *Jāhiliyah* in the name of Islam, on the other. Within the overall framework of the struggle between Islam and *Jāhiliyah* there are two poles around which different efforts cluster. On the one end is *Tajdid* – an effort to re-establish Islam in its pristine purity and to reconstruct the fabric of life and society in a given space-time context in accordance with Islamic values and principles. The other pole is represented by *Tajaddud*, which assumes, among others, any or all of the following three forms:

- (i) There develops an excessive concern for material interests, for territorial conquests, etc., in disregard of the true moral spirit of Islam. This destroys the balance that Islam seeks to establish between the spiritual and material aspects of life;
- (ii) Compromise is made with the spirit and form of the dominant *Jāhiliyah* of the age, which leads to the emergence of a new mixture of Islam and *Jāhiliyah*;
- (iii) The values, principles and modes of conduct are taken over from non-Islamic societies but an Islamic façade is maintained, usually by employing Islamic terminology to characterise these borrowings.⁴⁰

b. Objectives and Strategy of Islamic Revival⁴¹

Although both these approaches are characterised by dynamism, the objectives of Islamic revolution are achieved only through *Tajdid* and not *Tajaddud*. *Tajdid* represents a continuation of the mission of the prophets to implement Islam. It flows from a firm conviction, from an uncompromising resolve to do the Will of God. Its spirit is one of creativity. It is inspired by high ambition, though the effort itself might, indeed should, be made with great caution and realism, and is accompanied with full moral and

material preparation. In this kind of striving an effort is made to avoid extremes and to see that the Islamic principles are realised in form as well as in spirit. This involves three preliminary steps:

- (i) An analysis of the situation as it prevails in relation to conflict between Islam and *Jāhiliyah* in a given space-time context. A clear and straightforward appraisal of the situation is necessary in order to know the forms *Jāhiliyah* has assumed, the sources from which it is being nourished and the sensitive points on which tensions and conflicts exist between Islam and *Jāhiliyah*. The sources of weakness in contemporary Muslim life should also be examined and a sound diagnosis should be made so that one is clear about the major ailments from which Muslim society suffers at a given period of history.
- (ii) The chief objective of this intellectual effort should be to hammer out a strategy, based on the above analysis, in order that Islamic principles once again become operative in the lives of the Muslims.
- (iii) For the preparation of a realistic strategy it is also essential to examine the resources that are available at a given period of time. It is only in the light of self-evaluation and a careful assessment of the mental, moral and material resources available that a blueprint for revival can be worked out. The effort must harness the most effective means available for the achievement of the above-mentioned objective.

What should be the major elements of this strategy? Since Islam stands for total change and the ultimate objective is the establishment of the ideal Islamic order (*Khilāfah 'alā Minhāj al-Nubūwah*) this programme would have at least the following elements:

- (a) The ideals and principles of Islam should be restated in a language understandable to the people of the age. This necessitates that the *Jāhiliyah* concepts in vogue at a given period of time should be carefully studied, analysed and subjected to criticism. Islamic principles should be presented in such a manner that their relevance, and their superiority over the principles propounded by false, man-made ideologies, becomes self-evident. This would require vigorous intellectual effort so that both the theoretical and practical implications of the Islamic world view are clearly spelled out and the Islamic way of life in all its ramifications is crystallised.
- (b) The moral fibre of the life of the people should be rebuilt so as to develop a true Islamic character in them and involve them in a striving aimed at bringing about reform and reconstruction. Social habits, customs, education, socio-economic institutions, and political power – all ought to be subordinated to this effort. Social life ought

to be freed from perverse innovations (*bid'ah*) which run counter to the spirit of Islam, and should be so restructured as to conform to the *Sunnah*.

- (c) The entire exercise involves *ijtihād fī al-dīn*. This means that the ideals, values and principles of Islam will have to be reapplied to the changed context. A clear understanding of Islamic ideals and the Islamic scheme of priorities, and a careful differentiation between the essential and the incidental elements found in the actual life of Muslims are crucial to this exercise.

Ijtihād represents the principle of movement within the system of Islam and it involves creative thinking and action with a view to bringing the stream of life under the guidance of Islam. *Ijtihād* at the intellectual level is to be accompanied by *jihād* (struggle) at the practical level. Both ought to be combined so that the Muslims have, on the one hand, clarity of vision regarding their objectives and the mechanics to achieve them, and on the other hand, the resolve and the energy needed to actualise those objectives.

This brings us to consider the position of the person who articulates the implications of the Islamic way of life, who resorts outstandingly to both creative intellectual and practical effort in order to transform Islam into living reality. The impact of his personality is important and serves as a major catalyst in a given space-time context. Despite the impact of the personality of the initiator of Islamic revival, the movement that is launched need not be, in fact should not be, personality-centred. For, in Islam there exists sanction for the religious authority of none except a prophet. What is needed is a social movement and much would depend, as far as the results are concerned, upon the quality of the leadership that pilots it and the way it is organised.

In the past movements have often hovered round the charismatic personalities of the *mujaddids*. But in modern times properly organised bodies can play the same role. In fact in order to achieve total change it is necessary that an organised movement should be launched which should culminate in the establishment of a state committed to this mission.

c. Application of the Model to the Contemporary Situation⁴²

Mawdūdī's own analysis of the contemporary situation is that the Muslim society has gradually drifted away from the ideal order established by the Prophet (peace be upon him), which had continued and developed along the same line during the period of *al-Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn*. The first important change in the body-politic of Islam was a change from *Khilāfah* to a more or less worldly monarchy with very important consequential changes affecting the role of religion in the socio-political life. Gradually the very idea of unity of life began to be weakened, and consciously or unconsciously a degree of separation between religion and politics was brought about.

There also developed a bifurcation of leadership into political and religious leadership, with separate domains and areas of influence for each.

The second major change occurred in the system of education. This had catastrophic consequences as it began to perpetuate the schisms and tensions that were shearing Muslim society and gradually sapped the springs of creativity which had ensured the vitality of the Islamic civilisation in all the major realms of human effort.

As a consequence of the above changes, the moral life of the people began to deteriorate; their faithful allegiance and sincere devotion to Islam weakened, and a gap between theory and practice began to appear and widen, leading to the strengthening of the moral disease of *nifāq* (hypocrisy). Widespread efforts were made throughout Muslim history to rectify this situation. But the rot continued till Muslims succumbed to the colonial powers of the West. During this period an alien system was imposed upon them in all fields of life, including the field of education. Because of this new system of education the separation of religion and politics in practical life gradually became an acceptable proposition for Muslim society. When the Muslims threw off the yoke of foreign dominance and began living as independent peoples, the leadership of the Muslim countries generally passed into the hands of those whose mental attitudes and lifestyles had been shaped by the colonial system of education and their experience of political subjection. These leaders have hardly any real understanding of Islam. They are living, by far and large, under the spell of non-Islamic ideas and values. This is in addition to the several weaknesses inherited by Muslims from earlier periods of their history. At the present, some of the major failings of Muslim society seem to be the lack of adequate knowledge of Islam, *nifāq*, the weakening of Islamic moral values, the tensions between the leadership and the masses, and the disruption of the socio-political order of Islam. The general mass of people love Islam but do not understand its meaning and message properly. The leadership, in its wider sense, is in the hands of those who are not prepared to submit themselves fully to the Islamic scheme of life; nor do they have any clear vision of the Islamic order. This has led the Muslim society to be rent by a strife between two systems: the Islamic system, and the system of modern *Jāhiliyyah*, which derives its inspiration from contemporary Western civilisation. This civilisation, as we all know, is based on the principle of effecting separation between religion and man's practical life, and tends to erect the socio-economic structure of man's life, in fact tends to handle his mundane affairs as such without any reference to God or to His will or law. How can the situation be redressed? Mawdūdī's answer would be: through faith and continuous struggle.

Mawdūdī has devoted a great deal to developing a comprehensive programme that would change Pakistan into an ideal Islamic society and state. The organisation of which he has been the chief, the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*

has been the main instrument through which he has tried to implement this programme.

Before we discuss that programme, it seems necessary to spell out a major assumption on which Mawdūdī's movement is based. The assumption is that the intellectuals play a crucial role in every human society, but especially in modern society. He has emphasised that Islam will become an operative reality in our times when men possessed of faith and integrity and a clear vision of the Islamic Order, people who are in the vanguard of man's intellectual life and have the competence to run the affairs of the world assume the reins of leadership. The term leadership is generally used in a broad sense, and might be said to refer to those who are the pace-setters of a society; those who count and are imitated by others. Broadly speaking, they belong to the educated class, out of whom those who happen to control the organs of the state play an even more effective role in human life. Mawlānā Mawdūdī likens the role of the leadership to that of the driver of a railway train. The driver, he says, is in a position to carry the train wherever he wishes to (unless of course the passengers have that driver replaced by another one). This emphasis on the importance of the ruling class in modern society is also the result of the consciousness that nowadays the state plays a far greater *élite*, and affects the lives of ordinary men and women much more than it used to do in the past. Having at its disposal the control of education, of the mass media, of economic life, the efforts to bring about any changes in human life are foredoomed to failure unless the state were to co-operate in those efforts.

Bearing this assumption in mind we now move on to elaborating the programme propounded by Mawdūdī which clusters around four points.

(1) The first major point of this programme is an intellectual one, viz. a clear exposition of the teachings of Islam which is shorn of all false ideas and purged of all unhealthy accretions. This exposition should also be geared to showing how the teachings of Islam can be applied in the present-day world, and what steps should be taken so as to develop a sound and healthy order of life. This would necessitate a stock-taking both of the Muslim heritage and of modern civilisation, followed by a discriminate appropriation of healthy elements from them. So far as the teachings of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* are concerned, they are eternally binding and should thus be followed by the Muslims in all periods of history.

Mawdūdī is also conscious of the need for the renewal of Islamic thought. In this connection, he makes the significant observation that Muslim society has lost a great deal of its original dynamism and *elan* because it has lost sight of the original order of priorities: viz. the Qur'ān, the *Sunnah* and *Ijtihād*. The Muslims, he feels, have reversed this order. They now turn, in the first place, to the opinions of the scholars of the past, to the results of their *ijtihād*. It is only after looking into the opinions of the jurists that we turn to the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. This has stultified the Muslim

mind. The original dynamism can be recaptured only if the Muslims decide to replace the present by the original order of priorities. This means that we ought to look first to the Qur'ān, then to the *Sunnah*, and after that to the deductive elaborations of the jurists and to the ideas propounded by other Muslim thinkers.

(2) The second item of the programme is to reach out to the persons who are disposed to righteousness, and are inclined to work for the establishment and enthronement of righteousness in human life. Such persons should be identified and brought together into an organised body. Not only that, an effort should also be made to help such people develop a clear outlook, to purify their lives, and cultivate the qualities of good moral character. It is only after a group of people, which combines true Islamic vision and Islamic character side by side with intellectual competence and with the skill needed to run the affairs of this world, emerges on the stage of human history, pools its strength and resources, and strives in a systematic manner that God will permit the Islamic Order to be established. Hence, Mawdūdī tries to emphasise the necessity of maintaining an inner core of highly dedicated and conspicuously upright men as the foundation of Islamic revival. Quality is not to be sacrificed at the altar of quantity. The reason for it is, to borrow from Charles J. Adams, in Mawdūdī's opinion, "the best way to transform a society is by the creation of a small, informed, dedicated and disciplined group" the creation of "a righteous group, a saving element . . . which would leaven the whole lump of society".⁴³ This group, however, is not to remain stationary. It should rather expand by persuading others to share its viewpoint and co-operate in the struggle to establish the supremacy of justice and righteousness.

(3) The third point of the programme consists of striving to bring about societal change, to effect reform in the light of Islamic teachings. The idea is that the people who are dedicated to the cause of Islam, or at least have an Islamic orientation and a concern for the well-being of human society should take the initiative and expend their time, effort and resources to bring about maximum healthy change and improvement. This programme of societal reform is quite a comprehensive one. It seeks to make the mosque the hub of all Islamic activity. Moreover, there is heavy emphasis on education: the basic teachings of Islam should be communicated to the common people, arrangements should be made for adult education, reading rooms should be opened to create enlightenment, and educational institutions should be established at different levels. In the area of social life, the programme emphasises resort to public pressure to prevent people from being subjected to injustice; creating a sense of hygiene and cleanliness and fostering co-operation among people so as to ensure healthy conditions of living; drawing up lists of orphans and widows, of the crippled and the incapacitated people, and of poor students and arranging for their financial assistance; and catering for the health requirements

of people, especially the poor. Clearly, inspired by Islamic ideals, the objective is to foster the religious, moral, social and material welfare of the people and to move towards creating the social conditions which are conducive to the total transformation of human life.

(4) The fourth point of the programme envisages change of leadership in the broader sense of the term. It includes intellectual leadership, social and cultural leadership, and ultimately also political leadership. The last mentioned marks the culmination of the process. The state is conceived as an indispensable means for establishing the order envisaged by Islam. A truly Islamic state is considered inconceivable unless its affairs are directed by people of clear Islamic vision and commitment, and upright character and competence.

How can this change of leadership be brought about? So far as non-political leadership is concerned, perhaps a great deal can be done by developing leadership qualities in people who are possessed of right orientation. Mawdūdī always kept this in mind as one of his aims. As for the change of political leadership, in a democratic order this can possibly be brought about through general elections. Mawdūdī has been hopeful that if the Islamic movement keeps on striving patiently, it will ultimately succeed in installing righteous men in power. He is also convinced that the democratic structure is congenial to the Islamic state. He also thinks that the democratic order will provide the framework in which an Islamic movement can flourish, gather strength and bring about the total transformation that it aims at. For all these reasons, Mawdūdī cast his weight in favour of the establishment and maintenance of a truly democratic order in Pakistan.

d. Revolution or Reform?⁴⁴

Mawdūdī has frequently used the term "revolution" to denote the radical change that he seeks to bring about. The use of this term has not created in him any fondness for the process or the method by which some of the revolutionary movements of modern times have tried to effect their cherished changes.

In a critical study of the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution and the Kamalist Revolution in Turkey, Mawdūdī shows that the Western revolutionary approaches have swung between extremes. What is common, however, to the contemporary revolutionary movements is the assumption that if the socio-economic or political framework, the material and social setting of human life is changed, a radical change for the better can be brought about. These revolutionaries have neglected the problem of changing man himself: his outlook, the goal of his life, his motivation, his personality. Islamic revolution seeks a much more radical, a much more profound change. This change includes, and primarily so, the man, the individual, who is to serve as a solid base for the new order.

Revolutions have also resorted to making use of hatred and wide-scale

violence and have not confined the use of force to the unavoidable and morally justifiable minimum. Mawdūdī disapproves of the so-called revolutionary techniques and emphasises that Islamic revival can be brought about through a different set of “revolutionary” tactics. While the ultimate aim is to effect total change, the advance to that goal should be gradual and well-calculated. Instead of bluntly reacting against the entire prevalent system – against every single item of it – and striving to destroy it immediately and totally, he pleads for a restrained approach. He wants the prevailing system to be carefully examined with a view to finding out what is malignant and hence deserves to be changed, and what is healthy and as such deserves to be preserved. He suggests that those who seek to bring about change should proceed the way a surgeon approaches his patient, using his surgical instruments only to the extent that their use is necessary to get rid of the undesirable part of the organism. Moreover, while he considers the Islamic approach to be revolutionary, in the sense that the new order it wants to establish would be basically different from the present order, and the change it envisages is total and complete, Islam seeks to bring about this transformation gradually, through a set of careful and calculated moves. This is in addition to his opposition to the dictum, quite acceptable to both the revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries of our time: “ends justify means”. He emphasises, on the contrary, that both the ends and the means ought to be clean and commendable, for only thus can a healthy order take shape.

Under the influence of Mawdūdī’s ideas a considerable amount of activity is visible in different parts of the world. In the subcontinent in particular, a movement is at work to give a practical shape to his vision of Islamic revival. It would perhaps be a bit too early, and especially for those who are in one way or another involved in the movement launched under his inspiration, to make evaluative judgments. What is significant is that a process of change has already begun to operate. Only the future will show whether that process is strong enough to transform the Muslim society to any significant degree in the near future or if it will only yield some new seeds for efforts in the future. Much will depend, in any case, on the extent of dedication, integrity and wisdom of the men and women associated with that movement. Mawdūdī’s contribution lies in initiating a process of change markedly inspired by Islamic ideals in an age which appeared to be insensitive, let alone unresponsive to God.

Notes and Sources

- 1 For biographical information about Mawdūdī, see 'Alī Sufyān Āfāqī, *Abul A'la Mawdūdī*, (Lahore, 1955); Abu'l Āfāq, *Sayyid-Abul A'la Mawdūdī: Sāwanth, Afkār, Tahrik*, (Lahore, 1971), Mu'in al-Dīn 'Aqīl, *Tahrik-i Pākistān awr Mawlānā Mawdūdī*, (Karachi, 1971), pp. 11–19; Tharwat Ṣawlat, *Mawlānā Mawdūdī ki Taqārīr*, vol. I, (Lahore, 1976), pp. 9–115; Maryam Jameelah, *Who is Maudoodi?* (Lahore, 1973); Muḥammad Yūsuf, *Mawlānā Mawdūdī Apnī awr Dūsrōn ki Nazar mēn*, (Lahore, 1955); Misbahul Islam Faruqī, *Introducing Mawdūdī*, (Karachi, 1968); Na'im Ṣiddiqī, *Mawlānā Mawdūdī: Ēk Ta'ārūf*, (Lahore, 1963). For other relevant works, see the Bibliography in the beginning of this book.
- 2 For an incident illustrating this concern, see Abū Sufyān Āfāqī, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
- 3 Between 1948 and 1967, he spent a total of four years and eight months in prison: first, from 4 October, 1948 till 28 May, 1950; second, from 28 March, 1953 till 25 May, 1955; third, from 6 January, 1964 till 10 October, 1964; and fourth, from 29 January, 1967 till 16 March, 1967.
- 4 Āfāqī, *op. cit.*, pp. 131–149. See also Abu'l Āfāq, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–43.
- 5 Tharwat Ṣawlat is editing them in a series of books *Mawlānā Mawdūdī ki Taqārīr* (Speeches of Mawlānā Mawdūdī). The first two volumes appeared in 1976 and the whole series is expected to be completed in ten or eleven volumes.
- 6 *Tafhim al-Qur'ān* is in six volumes (comprising 4,170 large pages). Mawdūdī began writing it in 1942 and completed it in 1972.
- 7 A diary of the journey was written by his secretary who accompanied him on that journey. See Muḥammad 'Āṣim al-Ḥaddād, *Safar Nāma-i Arḍ al-Qur'ān* (Journey Across the Land of the Qur'ān), (Karachi, 1962).
- 8 See Mawdūdī, *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, (Lahore, 1967), pp. 14 ff. and 41 ff.; *Political Theory of Islam*, IV edition, (Lahore, 1974), p. 3 ff.; and *Qur'ān ki Chār Bunyādī Iṣṭilāḥeyn*; *Ilāh, Rabb, 'Ibādāt, Dīn*, IX edition, (Lahore, 1973), *passim*; see also *id.*, *Tafhim al-Qur'ān*, XII edition, (Lahore, 1976), vol. I, p. 113 ff., nn. 130 and 132; p. 412, n. 174; p. 438, n. 4, etc.
- 9 See *Towards Understanding Islam*, tr. and ed. Khurshid Ahmad, XIV edition, (Lahore, 1974), p. 2 ff.; *Tafhim al-Qur'ān*, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 16–19; p. 400, n. 150.
- 10 See *Qur'ān ki Chār Bunyādī Iṣṭilāḥeyn*, *op. cit.*, *passim*; *Islāmī 'Ibādāt par Tahqīqī Nazar*, XI edition, (Lahore, 1976), p. 9 ff.; *Tafhim al-Qur'ān*, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 113 ff., nn. 130 and 132; p. 160, n. 226; p. 444, n. 16; and *Tafhimāt*, X edition, vol. I, (Lahore, 1974); p. 46 ff.
- 11 *Islāmī Tahdhib awr us-kē Uṣūl wa Mabādī*, VI edition, (Lahore, 1975), p. 25 ff.; *Tafhim al-Qur'ān*, vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 62, n. 38.
- 12 *Towards Understanding Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 31 ff.; and *Islam and Ignorance*, (Lahore 1976), *passim*, *Tafhim al-Qur'ān*, vol. II, X edition, (Lahore, 1976), p. 527 ff., n. 9; p. 530 ff., n. 14.
- 13 *Towards Understanding Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 41. See also *Islāmī Tahdhib*, *op. cit.*, p. 190 ff., and *Tafhim al-Qur'ān*, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 16–19.
- 14 See *Towards Understanding Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 79 ff., *Islāmī Tahdhib*, *op. cit.*, p. 208 ff.; see also *Tafhimāt*, *op. cit.*, p. 256 ff.
- 15 *Political Theory of Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 3 ff.
- 16 See *Qur'ān ki Chār Bunyādī Iṣṭilāḥeyn*, *op. cit.*, *passim*, esp. p. 115 ff.; *Islāmī 'Ibādāt par Tahqīqī Nazar*, *op. cit.*, p. 7 ff., and *Tafhimāt*, *op. cit.*, p. 4 ff.
- 17 See *Islam and Ignorance*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.
- 18 For Mawdūdī's views on this question, see his *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, tr. Al-Ash'arī, III edition, (Lahore, 1976), chapter I, and *Islam and Ignorance*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.
- 19 See *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–26, and

- Political Theory of Islam*, op. cit., p. 3 ff, and *The Process of Islamic Revolution*, op. cit., p. 47 ff.
- 20 *Tahrik-i Azâdi-'i Hind awr Musalmân*, vol. I, V edition, (Lahore, 1976), p. 109 ff.; see also n. 11 above.
- 21 *Islâmi 'Ibâdat par Tahqîqî Nâzar*, op. cit., p. 9 ff.; *Tafhimât*, op. cit., p. 67 ff.; *Islâmi Nizâm-i Zindagi awr us-kê Bunyâdi Taşawwurat*, VII edition, (Lahore, 1976), p. 461 ff.
- 22 *The Religion of Truth*, IV edition, (Lahore, 1976), *passim*; *The Road to Peace and Salvation*, IV edition, (Lahore, 1976), *passim*, esp. p. 19 ff.; and *Islam and Ignorance*, op. cit., *passim*, and *Pardah*, XVII edition, (Lahore, 1976), see chapters 1-9.
- 23 *Id.*, *Tafhimât*, vol. II, V edition, (Lahore, 1970), p. 263 ff. See also *Tafhim al-Qur'an*, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 452-456, n. 35.
- 24 See *The Religion of the Truth*, op. cit., *passim*; *Islam and Ignorance*, *passim*; and *Islâm awr Jadid Ma'âshî Nazariyât*, IX edition, (Lahore, 1976), *passim*; *Pardah*, *passim*; and often elsewhere in Mawdûdî's writings.
- 25 See *id.*, *Tanqihât*, XII edition, (Lahore, 1976), pp. 63 ff., and 76 ff., and *Tahrik-i Azâdi-'i Hind awr Musalmân*, III edition, vol. II, (Lahore, 1976), p. 201 ff.; and *Musalmânôn kâ Mâdî, Hâl awr Mustaqbil*, IX edition, (Lahore, 1977), pp. 4 and 18 ff.
- 26 *Tahrik-i Azâdi-'i Hind*, op. cit., vol. II, p. 201 ff.
- 27 See *Musalmânôn kâ Mâdî . . .*, op. cit., p. 18 ff. See also *Tanqihât*, op. cit., pp. 96 ff. and 177 ff.
- 28 See, for instance, *Islâmi Tahdhib*, op. cit., p. 115 ff.
- 29 *The Moral Foundations of the Islamic Movement*, (Lahore, 1976), p. 33.
- 30 See *Towards Understanding Islam*, op. cit., p. 145 ff.
- 31 *The Moral Foundations of the Islamic Movement*, op. cit., p. 16. (The actual words of the text, which is a translation from the Urdu original, have been slightly altered here as well as below.)
- 32 *Ibid*, p. 37.
- 33 *Ibid*, p. 40.
- 34 See Muslim, al-Şaḥiḥ, "Kitâb al-Imân".
- 35 *The Moral Foundations of the Islamic Movement*, op. cit., p. 45. (The actual words of the text have been slightly altered.)
- 36 *Id.*, *Islâm kâ Nizâm-i Ḥayât*, XVII edition, (Lahore, 1976), p. 47.
- 37 *Loc. cit.*
- 38 *Islam and Ignorance*, op. cit., *passim*, and *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, op. cit., pp. 5-34.
- 39 *Ibid.*, pp. 25 ff., and 35 ff.
- 40 *Ibid.*, p. 35 ff.
- 41 This section is mainly based on the following works of Mawdûdî: *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, op. cit.; *Musalmânôn kâ Mâdî . . .*, op. cit.; *Islam Today*, (Karachi, 1968); *Tahrik-i Azâdi-'i Hind awr Musalmân*, 2 vols., op. cit.; *Mawlânâ Mawdûdî kî Taqârîr*, vol. I, op. cit.; *Tahrik-i Islâmi kâ 'Aindah Lâ'ihâ-'i 'Amal*, VI edition, (Lahore, 1976); *Da'wat-i Islâmi awr us-kê Tarîq-i Kâr*, II edition, (Lahore, 1977); Mawdûdî, et. al., *Da'wat-i Islâmi awr us-kê Muṭâlabât*, VI edition, (Lahore, 1964).
- 42 See n. 41 above. See also *Nazariya-'i Ta'lim awr Islâm*, II edition, (Lahore, 1975).
- 43 C. J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlânâ Mawdûdî", in D. E. Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion*, (Princeton, 1966), p. 375.
- 44 This section is mainly based on *Tanqihât*, op. cit., p. 177 ff.; *The Moral Foundations of the Islamic Movement*, op. cit.; *Islâmi Riyâsat*, V edition, (Lahore, 1974), pp. 685-724.

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Early twentieth century has witnessed a number of well-organised movements for the revival of Islam in different parts of the Muslim world. In the Indo-Pak subcontinent, Mawlānā Mawdūdī, the founder of the *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*, has made an indelible mark on history by organising the *Jamā'ah* and successfully leading it through different turbulent periods and delineating cogent guidelines for the revival of Islam and application of its teachings to the problems of the modern world. Few men have captured the imagination and inspired the educated Muslims during the last few decades to the extent Mawlānā Mawdūdī has done. His admirers, friends and associates have made an effort, through this volume, to pay their heartfelt tribute to Mawlānā's long record of service to the cause of Islam, especially to Islamic scholarship.

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